Greene v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2023

S23A0200. GREENE v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Eric Jackson Greene was convicted of malice murder

and theft by taking in connection with the strangling death of Sheila

Bryant in January 2019.1 On appeal, Greene contends that the

evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that

the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) by denying

1 Bryant’s body was discovered on January 25, 2019. In March 2019,
Greene was indicted by a Douglas County grand jury on charges of malice
murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by strangling her,
and theft by taking. In February 2020, a jury found Greene guilty of all counts.
The trial court sentenced Greene to serve life in prison without the possibility
of parole on the malice murder count, plus an additional ten years on the theft
by taking count. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. On
March 3, 2020, Greene filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended
through new counsel on January 4, 2021. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied Greene’s motion for new trial on July 29, 2022. Greene
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on August 11, 2022, and the case
was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2022 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
Greene’s motion to suppress his statement taken on February 18,

2019; (2) by admitting improper extrinsic evidence; (3) by admitting

overly graphic autopsy photographs; (4) by allowing the State to

present harmful and non-probative evidence from Greene’s cell

phone showing that he conducted internet searches pertaining to

rape; and (5) by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and

corroboration of a defendant’s statement. For the reasons that

follow, these claims fail, and we affirm Greene’s convictions.

The evidence presented at Greene’s trial showed that, on the

night of January 23, 2019, Greene—who did not have a permanent

residence—stayed at the home of Kenny Bradford. 2 Christina

Norton was also staying at Bradford’s house in January 2019, and

she testified that, on January 24, she needed a ride to meet with her

probation officer, so she texted her friend, Blake Lee, to ask for a

ride. Lee did not have a car of his own, but he was living with

Bryant—the victim in this case—who did own a car. Lee testified

2 Bradford testified that a lot of people were “coming and going” and
“doing drugs” at his house during this time period.

2
that he asked Bryant if they could give Norton a ride to her

probation meeting in Bryant’s car, and Bryant agreed. Lee and

Bryant arrived at Bradford’s house around 3:30 p.m. on January 24.

According to Norton, Greene had been hanging out at Bradford’s

house all day, trying to get a ride to a car lot because he wanted to

steal a truck. And, when Lee and Bryant arrived and Greene

realized that Bryant owned a car, he asked for Bryant’s help to

“accomplish this car lot plan” because Greene “needed somebody to

be there to test drive [the truck].” Lee testified that he and Bryant

did not know Greene, so Lee told Greene they could not help him

with his plan. Lee later realized that Greene had talked Bryant into

taking him to the car lot because, when they left Bradford’s house,

Greene rode with them.

Lee testified that, after leaving Bradford’s house, he asked

Bryant to drop him off at a mobile home park where Zada Price—a

woman he knew—lived. According to Lee, after getting dropped off,

he could not get in touch with Price, so he went to the home of her

neighbor, Greg Jones. Jones testified that Lee ended up staying at

3
his house for “five or six, seven hours,” until after 9:30 p.m., trying

to reach Price and waiting for Bryant to pick him up. After several

hours, Lee assumed that Bryant was not going to “show back up,” so

he walked back to Bradford’s house. Greene and Bryant did not

return to Bradford’s house that night, and Lee testified that he never

saw Bryant again.

At approximately 7:45 the next morning, Bill Messer was

driving home from work along West Union Hill Road when he saw

“somebody l[y]ing on the side of the road.” Messer pulled over and

approached the person, noting upon closer examination that it was

a woman, lying “face down,” whose “underwear was still for the most

part up, but her pants were pulled down.” Messer, who was a

firefighter, “took a radial pulse from both [her] wrists,” and after

finding no pulse, he called 911.

Law enforcement officers with the Douglas County Sheriff’s

Office arrived shortly afterwards and also observed a “female l[y]ing

face down on the side of the road,” with her arms “stretched above

her head,” her pants and underwear “pulled down below her

4
buttocks,” and her “feet elevated in some bushes.” Lieutenant Greg

Ashcraft, one of the responding officers, testified that the woman

also had frost on her jacket, “which told [him] she had been out there

a period of time and the moisture had frozen on her.” Lieutenant

Ashcraft also noticed tire impressions going through the grass close

to the body. When officers turned the woman’s body over in

preparation for removing her from the scene, Lieutenant Ashcraft

observed that “a lot of her abdomen area [was] exposed” and that

she had “bruising” up towards her “ear area” and “what appeared to

be an injury around the neck area,” including “sign[s] of a ligature

having been used.” Lieutenant Ashcraft testified that, on this basis,

he believed this woman had died from “ligature strangulation.”

Investigator Jay Hayes with the Criminal Investigation

Division of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office also responded to the

scene and used a mobile fingerprint identification device to identify

the deceased as Bryant. At trial, the medical examiner testified that

Bryant’s cause of death was ligature strangulation by a belt or

similar object, as demonstrated by “the broad abrasion over a

5
significant portion of the neck” and a “very straight line across the

whole front of the neck.” According to the medical examiner, the

strangulation was “forceful,” causing “deep tissue damage.” The

medical examiner also noted bruising on Bryant’s extremities, as

well as “contusions and superficial abrasions and skin tears on her

hands,” indicating that she was “in a struggle” and “trying to fight

somebody off.” The medical examiner also documented “injuries to

[] Bryant’s vagina” consistent with “sexual penetration.”

Investigator Hayes testified at trial that Lee was initially a

person of interest because he lived with Bryant and was the last

person Bryant’s daughters had seen with her on January 24. On

January 29, 2019, Investigator Hayes interviewed Lee at the

Sheriff’s Office. During the interview, Lee told Investigator Hayes

that Bryant and Greene dropped Lee off at a mobile home park on

the afternoon of January 24 and that was the last time he saw

Bryant. Lee stated that he hung out at Jones’s house because he

could not get in touch with Price—the woman he was hoping to see—

6
and after several hours, Lee walked back to Bradford’s house.3

Based on Lee’s cell phone records and witness interviews,

Investigator Hayes “eliminate[d]” Lee as a suspect, determining

that Lee “wasn’t anywhere near” the “area of the crime scene” during

the hours in question. Investigator Hayes also learned that Bryant

owned a four-door, silver or gray 2010 Mazda 6 sedan that was

missing.

During the early morning hours of January 30 or 31, Lee called

Investigator Hayes and informed him that Greene had just stopped

by Bradford’s house and was driving Bryant’s car. Norton testified

that she also saw Greene in Bryant’s car that night, and then, on

February 1, she received a text message from Greene at 4:15 a.m.,

stating that it was “hard to believe [Bryant] got killed.” Norton also

received a second message from Greene stating that Bryant had told

Greene on January 24 that “she was supposed to go meet someone

about some pills.”

3During this interview, Lee consented to having a buccal swab of his
DNA taken by Investigator Hayes.

7
About a week later, on February 7, Officer Timothy Ito with

the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office responded to “a report of a

vehicle parked in front of a residence” in Paulding County “where

the male was sleeping in the front seat.” When Officer Ito arrived,

he observed a man asleep in the front seat of a “gray four door

Mazda” sedan. Officer Ito directed the man—later identified as

Greene—to exit the vehicle. As Officer Ito was in the process of

obtaining Greene’s personal information, he received a report that

“the vehicle had returned as stolen” and “was connected to a

homicide.” At that point, “Greene grabbed his phone and took off

running,” but he tripped and fell down. Officer Ito took Greene into

custody and coordinated with Douglas County law enforcement to

tow Bryant’s vehicle and have Green transported to Douglas

County.

Later that same day, Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene.4

After waiving his Miranda rights, 5 Greene told Investigator Hayes

4 This interview was video-recorded and played for the jury at trial.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

8
that he had borrowed the car he was sleeping in “from a guy named

Blake”—later determined to be Blake Lee—about two weeks before.

Greene told Investigator Hayes that he met Lee on January 24 when

Lee “showed up” at Bradford’s house with “an older lady”—later

determined to be Bryant—and they gave Greene a ride to a few car

lots in Villa Rica and Douglasville for Greene to look for a truck.

Greene said that, when they arrived at the last car lot in

Douglasville, he “got out of [the car] and they took off on [him].”

Greene said his phone was not working, so he had to walk back to

Bradford’s house. Greene stated that he saw Lee again about “two

or three days” later at Bradford’s house, and Greene borrowed the

car from Lee.

Investigator Hayes confronted Greene with Lee’s account of

events and advised Greene that Bryant had been murdered. Greene

said he did not realize Bryant was dead, denied any involvement in

her death, and consented to have a buccal swab of his DNA taken.

Greene also gave several differing accounts about how he obtained

Bryant’s car. In the last account, Greene said that, three days after

9
he visited the car lots with Lee and Bryant, Lee offered to rent him

Bryant’s car, and Greene agreed to do so.

When Investigator Hayes informed Greene that he would “pull

video” surveillance from the various car lots Greene had mentioned,

Greene’s account changed slightly. Greene said he went to one car

lot alone with Bryant because they had dropped Lee off at a store.

According to Greene, when they arrived at this car lot, Bryant

appeared to be under the influence. Greene said he did not want her

driving “when [she] was like that,” so he helped her out of the car

and put her in the passenger seat. Greene said he then drove

Bryant’s car to pick up Lee, and they stopped by a few other car lots.

At the last one, Lee and Bryant left Greene, forcing him to walk back

to Bradford’s house.

At the end of the interview, Investigator Hayes looked through

Greene’s cell phone and observed that the call log started at 6:35

p.m. on January 25, the day Bryant’s body was discovered. Greene

told Investigator Hayes that he did a factory reset on January 25

because the “memory got too full” and the phone was “not working.”

10
Investigator Hayes also observed “slight indications of healing from

scratch marks or like thin lacerations on [Greene’s] hands.” When

Investigator Hayes asked Greene about the scratches and whether

his DNA would be under Bryant’s fingernails, Greene insisted that

he did not touch Bryant and that he would “never do anything to

harm a woman.”

Following this interview and after obtaining a search warrant

for the contents of Greene’s cell phone, an investigator conducted a

search of the phone and discovered that, on January 23 and 24, 2019,

Greene conducted internet searches, specifically appearing on his

phone as “‘Rape’ Search – [a link to the specific website].” Any

material or photographs Greene might have obtained as a result of

these searches were not referenced or admitted at trial—only the

fact that Greene conducted the searches. Additionally, Investigator

Hayes obtained surveillance video from the car lots Greene

mentioned and from the surrounding businesses, but the footage did

not show that Greene visited or was in the vicinity of any of those

businesses on January 24, except for Comfort Cars in Villa Rica.

11
The surveillance video recording from Comfort Cars and the

testimony from one of its salesman, James Clayton, demonstrated

that Bryant and Greene arrived at the car lot in Bryant’s car around

5:00 p.m. on January 24. Bryant was driving the car at the time,

Greene was in the front passenger seat, and no one else was in the

car. Clayton testified that these two individuals “stuck out in [his]

mind” because the “female in the vehicle was high on something”

and “couldn’t even hold herself up.” Clayton observed that “she was

slumped over” in the car and “kind of drunk like.” Greene told

Clayton that he was looking for a truck and asked about a Chevrolet

Avalanche that Clayton had on the lot. Greene told Clayton that “he

didn’t have a license, so she [indicating Bryant] was going to drive,”

and Clayton responded that she was “not in any shape to drive.”

Clayton testified that he walked over to the office to get the key to

the Avalanche, and as he did so, he could hear Greene telling Bryant

to “straighten the f**k up” and “sit up straight.” Clayton said he

heard Greene yelling and swearing at her, calling her a “stupid

f**king b**ch.” According to Clayton, Greene then pulled Bryant

12
out of the driver’s seat of the car and walked her around to the front

passenger seat. Clayton said “she was a dish rag,” that “she was

gone.” Greene got into the driver’s seat of Bryant’s car and drove

out of the Comfort Cars lot at 5:25 p.m.

Officers collecting evidence from Bryant’s car located a receipt

from an auto parts store with Greene’s name and contact

information on it. The manager of the auto parts store testified that,

on January 25, at 7:27 p.m., he assisted Greene in exchanging a

headlight bulb that Greene had purchased earlier in the evening for

one that would fit a 2010 Mazda 6.

A forensic DNA analyst with the GBI testified that she tested

swabs from Bryant’s hands and vaginal area and identified Greene’s

DNA on Bryant’s fingernail clippings and inside her vaginal area.

Greene was arrested soon afterwards.

On February 15, Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene a

second time6 and reviewed Greene’s Miranda rights, which Greene

agreed to waive. After Investigator Hayes confronted Greene with

6 This interview was video-recorded and played for the jury at trial.

13
discrepancies in his statements from the February 7 interview—

including where Greene allegedly went on January 24 and 25, who

accompanied him, and when he took possession of Bryant’s vehicle—

Greene eventually told Investigator Hayes that, about 45 minutes

after being left at the last car lot on January 24, Lee and Bryant

returned, and the following occurred:

[Lee] comes to me. He was in the driver’s seat, she was in
the passenger’s seat. And I thought she was asleep. And
he sat there and said, “Hey, I done f**ked up. I done
f**ked up.” And I was like, “How’d you f**k up?” And he
said [inaudible], “I don’t know what to do, I don’t know
what to do.” And I said, “So what are you talking about?
What did you do?” And he said, “I killed somebody.” And
I said, “How’d you kill somebody?” And he said, “She’s
dead.” And I said, “Who’s dead?” I didn’t know he was
talking about the woman who was sitting right next to
him.

Greene said he asked Lee to drop him off because he “didn’t want

any part of it,” and Greene hitched a ride back to Bradford’s house

to get his belongings and then to a friend’s house in Paulding

County. Greene told Investigator Hayes that the next day, January

25—around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m.—Greene was walking down the road

in Villa Rica when he “ran into [Lee] again.” According to Greene,

14
Lee was driving Bryant’s Mazda, and Lee stopped the car and told

Greene that he would sell him the car and “give him the title and

everything.” Greene said he agreed to buy the car and took

possession of it at that time. Greene told Investigator Hayes that he

replaced the headlight that evening because he noticed “it was

blown.”

The trial evidence showed that Greene ultimately gave five

accounts of what occurred on January 24 and 25. In Greene’s final

account, Greene told Captain John Sweat—who had taken over the

interview for Investigator Hayes—that, 45 minutes after Lee and

Bryant left Greene at the last car lot, they returned with “two

unidentified males in the back seat of the car,” and Greene sat in

between the men in the back seat. Greene indicated that these men

were “[u]nknown gang members,” but could not otherwise provide

any identifying information about them or how to get in touch with

them. Greene said that Bryant was alive at this point, and she and

Lee were “bickering.” According to Greene, a few minutes later, they

pulled off the road near some power lines on West Union Hill Road

15
in Douglas County, and Lee choked Bryant with his arm and

wrapped “a purple scarf around her neck,” which he used to strangle

her. 7 Greene then demonstrated the act for Captain Sweat,

explaining that Lee pulled the scarf through the headrest and

“cinche[d] down on it.” Greene stated that he tried to stop Lee, but

he “had these two guys sitting beside [him], and each one put a gun

to [his] head at that moment.” Greene said that, after Bryant was

“obviously dead,” Lee drove over to the “dump site”—an area off the

side of the road, not far from the area where she was killed. Greene

said that Lee and one of the men pulled Bryant out of the car and

“dragged her over to the wood line off the roadway,” leaving her face

down on the side of the road. Greene said the man seated beside

him in the backseat put a gun in his mouth and “told [him] not to

move.” Greene stated that Lee and “this other guy” went through

Bryant’s pockets and stole something from her. Greene repeated the

The medical examiner testified that, “based on the broad abrasion over
7

a significant portion of the neck” and a “very straight line across the whole
front of the neck,” it “d[id]n’t seem likely” that Bryant was strangled with a
scarf.

16
same account to Investigator Hayes when Hayes rejoined the

interview. Investigator Hayes asked Greene if he would be able to

lead officers to the site where Bryant was killed, and Greene

indicated he could do so.

On February 18, Investigator Hayes and another officer picked

Greene up at the Douglas County Jail. 8 Investigator Hayes testified

that he briefly reviewed Greene’s Miranda rights again, after which

Greene led the officers to “a dirt, turn-off road with power lines

running across it” along West Union Hill Road, where Greene

asserted that Bryant had been killed. Investigator Hayes testified

that this location was “[a]bout six-tenths of a mile” from there they

found Bryant’s body.

At trial, Jerry Trotter, a family friend of Greene’s, testified

that, between 9:45 and 10:15 p.m. on January 24, Greene stopped

by Trotter’s house, which is located “maybe a mile” from where

“[Bryant’s] body was found.” According to Trotter, Greene was alone

at the time and was driving “a late model dark colored four-door

8 This car trip was audio-recorded and played for the jury at trial.

17
sedan” that Trotter had never seen before. Trotter asked Greene

whose car he was driving, and Greene said it was “his girlfriend’s,

Sheila’s.” When the State asked Trotter about Greene’s demeanor

that night, he testified that Greene seemed “nervous” and “worried.”

Additionally, Trotter testified that he was very familiar with the

area where Bryant was purportedly killed—i.e., the power lines on

West Union Hill Road—because he and Greene fished a pond in that

area and Greene would also occasionally hang out and sleep in his

car there. Amber Echols, an acquaintance of Greene’s, also testified

at trial that she and Greene had previously hung out by the power

lines on West Union Hill Road to “smoke[]” because the area was “off

the road” where “nobody could see [them].” Echols said that, in late

January 2019, Greene started driving a “darker color” car with four

doors.

Jennifer Brownlow, a family friend of Greene’s, also testified

at trial. According to Brownlow, Greene attended a birthday party

at her house on January 27, 2019, arriving in a “blue colored car”

with “four door[s].” Brownlow observed that Greene was “a little off

18
that day, kind of fidgety, looking around,” and stayed at the party

for “maybe ten minutes at the most.”

1. On appeal, Greene contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for malice murder under OCGA

§ 16-5-1 (a).9 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,

61 LE2d 560) (1979). Greene also contends that his conviction was

based solely on circumstantial evidence and that the State failed to

exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Lee was the person who

killed Bryant by strangling her. See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant

a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not

only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude

every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the

accused.”). Pretermitting whether Greene’s convictions were based

solely on circumstantial evidence, we disagree that the evidence was

insufficient to support Greene’s conviction for malice murder as a

matter of constitutional due process or under OCGA § 24-14-6.

9 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), “[a] person commits the offense of
murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being.”

19
When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B) (emphasis in original).

“We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in

the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to

be derived from the facts, and we do not reweigh the evidence.”

Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 229 (2) (869 SE2d 461) (2022).

Additionally,

“[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the
proved facts shall not only be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.” Not every hypothesis is reasonable, and the
evidence does not have to exclude every conceivable
inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that
are reasonable. Whether alternative hypotheses are
reasonable, however, is usually a question for the jury,
and this Court will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it
is insufficient as a matter of law.

20
Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 19-20 (2) (875 SE2d 631) (2022) (quoting

OCGA § 24-14-6). And, although “the State is required to prove its

case with competent evidence, there is no requirement that it prove

its case with any particular sort of evidence.” Id. at 21 (2) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, the evidence demonstrated the following: (1) Greene

was the last person seen with Bryant on January 24, 2019—the day

before her body was discovered; (2) the sales manager for Comfort

Cars observed Greene yelling and swearing at Bryant in the Comfort

Cars parking lot that evening, and around 5:25 p.m., Greene moved

Bryant to the passenger seat and drove her car away from the

dealership; (3) later that night, between 9:45 and 10:15 p.m., Greene

showed up at Trotter’s house alone, driving a vehicle closely

resembling Bryant’s car that he said had been given to him by

someone named “Sheila”; (4) the next morning, Bryant was found

dead on the side of the road—in an area close to where Trotter

lived—with her pants and underwear pulled down, and Greene’s

21
DNA was found inside Bryant’s vaginal area; (5) Greene purchased

a headlight bulb for Bryant’s car the evening after her body was

discovered; (6) over the next few days, several witnesses, including

Lee, saw Greene driving Bryant’s car; (7) a week or so later, Greene

was discovered by law enforcement sleeping in and living out of

Bryant’s car; (8) during Greene’s subsequent interviews with law

enforcement, Greene gave a number of conflicting accounts

regarding his whereabouts and activities on January 24 and 25, and

those interviews were played for the jury; (9) Greene’s DNA was

found underneath Bryant’s fingernails, and Investigator Hayes

observed scratch marks on Greene’s hands during his first interview

on February 7; and (10) the medical examiner testified that Bryant

had “superficial abrasions and skin tears on her hands”—consistent

with having been “in a struggle” and “trying to fight somebody off.”

Additionally, Greene placed himself at the location of Bryant’s

murder and the location where her body was found—stating that he

was present for Bryant’s murder and the disposal of her body, but

did not kill her or touch her. Greene also led Investigator Hayes to

22
the murder site—the power lines along West Union Hill Road—and

trial testimony from Trotter and Echols demonstrated that Greene

was familiar with this area, having gone there often to fish, hang

out, sleep in his car, and smoke. And, although Greene told

Investigator Hayes that he saw Lee strangle and kill Bryant, law

enforcement had already eliminated Lee as a suspect based on

witness statements and cell phone data that confirmed Lee was

nowhere near the crime scene on January 24 and 25.

The jury was “entitled to disbelieve” Greene’s version of the

events preceding Bryant’s death because “his story conflicted with

most of the other evidence.” McKinney v. State, 300 Ga. 562, 567 (2)

(797 SE2d 484) (2017). “The jury could instead believe the testimony

and other evidence” indicating that Greene was the person who

strangled Bryant to death on the night of January 24. Id.

Accordingly, after properly viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient under the Jackson standard for a jury to find Greene

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See Jackson,

23
443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B). See also Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 207 (1)

(830 SE2d 160) (2019). Additionally, based on this evidence, the jury

was authorized to find that Greene killed Bryant and that the

alternative hypothesis that someone other than Greene committed

the crimes was unreasonable. See Garay, 314 Ga. at 21 (2).

Therefore, Greene’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a

matter of both constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law

fails.

2. Greene next contends that the trial court erred in not

suppressing his February 18, 2019 statement to Investigator Hayes

because Investigator Hayes failed to give Greene his complete

Miranda warnings at the outset of that interview. “The trial court

determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the

preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of

the circumstances. Although we defer to the trial court’s findings of

disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the

law to the facts.” Gaddy v. State, 311 Ga. 44, 46 (2) (855 SE2d 613)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

24
At the Jackson-Denno 10 hearing, Investigator Hayes testified

that Greene was taken into custody on February 7, 2019, and before

Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene that day, he read Greene his

Miranda rights. Greene indicated that he understood those rights,

signed a waiver of rights form, and agreed to speak with Investigator

Hayes. Investigator Hayes testified that he interviewed Greene a

second time on February 15, 2019. At the outset of the February 15

interview, Investigator Hayes read Greene his Miranda rights, and

Greene indicated that he understood those rights and affirmatively

waived those rights. According to Investigator Hayes, during the

February 15 interview, Greene “changed course”—going from

having “no knowledge” of Bryant’s death, to having been present

when Bryant was killed and “when the body was disposed of.” So

Investigator Hayes asked Greene whether “he would take [them] out

and show [them] the location that [Bryant] was killed,” and Greene

confirmed that he could.

Investigator Hayes testified that, three days later, on February

10 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

25
18, he and another officer removed Greene from the Douglas County

Jail for Greene to lead them to the site where Bryant was killed.

Investigator Hayes noted that he had already Mirandized Greene

“at least twice,” but he briefly recited Greene’s Miranda rights again

before driving to the location in question. Investigator Hayes

recorded the interview on a digital voice recorder inside the vehicle.

The audio recording of the February 18 interview was then played

for the trial court, and in the recording, the following exchange

occurred:

INVESTIGATOR HAYES: Do you understand that you’re
still under your rights? You still have the right to remain
silent. You still have the right to have an attorney with
you if I ask you any questions or before you can answer
any questions if you like. If you can’t afford to hire an
attorney, one can be appointed to represent you if you
wish. You understand all those rights?
GREENE: Yes.
INVESTIGATOR HAYES: OK, having all those rights in
mind, you still want to continue with our field trip?
GREENE: Yes.

After hearing Investigator Hayes’s testimony and the audio

recording of the interview, the trial court denied Greene’s motion to

suppress, finding that: (1) Investigator Hayes had previously

26
advised Greene of his Miranda rights during his February 7 and

February 15 interviews; (2) during both of the prior interviews,

Greene “waived his rights freely and voluntarily, without hope of

benefit, [or] fear of injury” and spoke to Investigator Hayes about

“the homicide that is at issue in this case”; (3) on February 18,

Investigator Hayes gained Greene’s “voluntary cooperation” to go to

a location “where the victim was originally killed,” and “rather than

give the full Miranda warning,” Investigator Hayes “advised”

Greene that “the Miranda rights still applied and substantially gave

the Miranda warning”; and (4) Greene “freely and voluntarily

agreed to converse with [Investigator Hayes] and go to the location

and answer the officer’s questions.” The trial court ruled that,

“under the circumstances of this case,” Greene’s February 18

statement was “admissible and that [Greene] waived his rights and

made the statement voluntarily.” The trial court reached the same

conclusion in denying Greene’s motion for new trial.

On appeal, Greene does not dispute that Investigator Hayes

properly advised him of his Miranda rights before questioning him

27
on February 7 and February 15 and that he signed a Miranda

waiver prior to each of those interviews. Greene argues, as he did

below, that, on February 18, he did not sign a waiver of rights form

and that Investigator Hayes went over the Miranda warnings “real

quick” while they were driving to the site where Bryant was

allegedly killed. Greene contends that Investigator Hayes left out

the following rights from the Miranda warning: (1) Greene had a

right to stop the interrogation at any time, and (2) anything Greene

said during the interview could be used against him. Greene asserts

that his February 7, February 15, and February 18 interviews were

independent—as opposed to one continuous interview—and

accordingly, Investigator Hayes “committed an error of

constitutional magnitude” when he “outright failed” to advise

Greene that anything he said on February 18 could be used against

him in a court of law.

The trial court did not err in concluding that Greene knowingly

and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights on February 18. See

Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 119 (5) (856 SE2d 302) (2021)

28
(concluding that the record supported the trial court’s finding that

the appellant “made a knowing, intelligent voluntary waiver of his

rights” during his custodial interview and that “the officers were not

required to re-read the Miranda warnings to [the appellant] before

commencing their questioning” eight days later). “Neither federal

nor Georgia law mandates that an accused be continually reminded

of his rights once he has intelligently waived them.” Ellis v. State,

299 Ga. 645, 648 (2) (791 SE2d 16) (2016) (citation and punctuation

omitted). “Thus, when conducting a follow-up interview or a

continuation of a previous interview, a reminder of Miranda rights

may be permitted in place of a complete restatement.” Gaddy, 311

Ga. at 47 (2) (citations omitted).

Here, Greene does not dispute that he was fully advised of and

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to his

interviews with Investigator Hayes on February 7 and 15, and the

record reflects that Investigator Hayes reminded Greene of those

rights on February 18. Greene has not shown that, under these

circumstances, “the Miranda warnings he received” on February 15

29
“became stale” in the three days “between receiving them and [any]

incriminating statements he made to the police on” February 18 or

that other circumstances arose after Greene was informed of those

rights on February 15 which would have rendered his February 18

statements involuntary. Pender, 311 Ga. at 119 (5). Therefore,

“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not

err in its determination that” Greene’s February 18 statement was

“freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given or in its admission” of the

statement at trial. Id.

3. Greene also contends that the trial court erroneously

admitted other-acts evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)

(“Rule 404 (b)”). We conclude that the trial court did not clearly

abuse its discretion in admitting this other-acts evidence at trial,

but even if certain of this evidence should not have been admitted,

any such error was harmless.

The other-acts evidence admitted at trial involved Greene’s

prior assaults by strangulation of his ex-girlfriends, Amber Clark

and Nadine Pirkle. Clark, who dated Greene in 2017, testified that,

30
when Greene got angry with her, he would strangle her—explaining

that it happened “so many” times she “couldn’t count” and “[i]t would

feel like [she] was about to die.” Clark testified that, on one occasion,

Greene got angry with her while he was driving her car, and he

pulled the car over on the side of the road, at which point Clark

exited the car and started running. Greene caught up with Clark

and strangled her to the point of unconsciousness, and while she was

unconscious, Greene stole Clark’s vehicle and left her on the side of

the road. When Clark woke up, she started walking, and a police

officer stopped and gave her a ride to a friend’s house. The police

officer testified at trial that Clark indicated there had been a

“physical altercation” with someone, but she “denied a report.”

Clark testified that she did not want to press charges because

Greene still had her car, and she was afraid of him. Pirkle also

testified that she dated Greene in 2000, and when he got angry with

her, he would strangle her—generally “grabb[ing] [her] from

behind.” Pirkle testified that Greene frequently “choked [her] till

[she] passed out,” and on one occasion, when Pirkle refused to give

31
Greene money from her tax refund, he “strangled [her] in front of

[her] mother.” Pirkle called the police, and the responding officer

testified that she arrested Greene and charged him with simple

battery.11

“We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence

pursuant to Rule 404 (b) for a clear abuse of discretion.” Hood v.

State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020). “Rule 404 (b) is a

rule of inclusion, but it does prohibit the introduction of other acts

evidence when it is offered for the sole purpose of showing a

defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Booth

v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 683 (3) (804 SE2d 104) (2017). To that end,

“[i]t is well established that other acts evidence is not admissible ‘to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith,’” but “such evidence is admissible for other purposes,

including ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

11 A certified copy of the indictment was admitted at trial, as well as
Greene’s guilty plea to simple battery.

32
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Hood, 309

Ga. at 499 (2) (quoting OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)).

A party offering evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) must
demonstrate three things: (1) that the evidence is
relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s
character; (2) that the evidence’s probative value is not
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3)
that sufficient proof exists for a jury to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the other act.

Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Greene does not argue that the State failed to satisfy its

burden under the third part of the test to show that he committed

the other acts against Clark and Pirkle. Therefore, we need only

examine the first and second parts of the test to determine whether

the other-acts evidence was relevant to an issue other than Greene’s

character and whether the probative value of the evidence was

“substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice.” Hood, 309 Ga. at

499 (2).

To determine whether evidence is “relevant to an issue in the

case other than the defendant’s character,” Kirby v. State, 304 Ga.

33
472, 479 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018), we apply OCGA § 24-4-401,

which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Greene argues

that relevance can only be established in this context where the

other act was committed with the same state of mind as the charged

crimes. Greene further argues that, because the intent required for

the other acts at issue was not the same as the offenses for which he

was charged—namely, malice murder by strangling Bryant and

theft by taking for stealing Bryant’s car12—the other-acts evidence

was not relevant for any purpose except to impermissibly show

Greene’s propensity to commit criminal acts. We disagree and

conclude that the other-acts evidence was relevant to the issue of

Greene’s intent. Because Greene entered a plea of not guilty in this

case and “did not take affirmative steps to remove intent as an

12 We note that Greene was also charged with felony murder predicated
on aggravated assault for causing the death of Bryant, irrespective of malice,
by strangling her.

34
issue,” Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 794 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 201)

(2022), he made intent “a material issue,” and “the State may prove

intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence absent affirmative steps

by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.” Hood, 309 Ga. at

499-500 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Naples v.

State, 308 Ga. 43, 51 (2) (838 SE2d 780) (2020) (“We have stated that

a defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material

issue, and the State may prove intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b)

evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent

as an issue.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

As noted above, Greene was charged in this case with felony

murder predicated on aggravated assault for causing Bryant’s death

by strangling her and theft by taking for unlawfully taking Bryant’s

motor vehicle with the intent to deprive her of it. And “we may

consider whether the other acts were relevant to the issue of intent

on any of these offenses.” Booth, 301 Ga. at 683 (3). The charged

offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by

strangulation involved “similar intent,” id., to Greene’s prior acts of

35
strangulation against Clark and Pirkle—acts which could also have

constituted aggravated assaults by strangulation. 13 The charged

offense of theft by taking for stealing Bryant’s car likewise involved

“similar intent” to Greene’s theft of Clark’s vehicle after she passed

out from strangulation, which could also have constituted a theft by

taking. “The relevance of other[-]acts evidence offered to show

intent is established when the prior act was committed with the

same state of mind as the charged crime.” Hood, 309 Ga. at 500 (2)

(“Here, the states of mind required for the charged offenses of

aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and armed robbery were

the same as the states of mind required for the uncharged DeKalb

County incident, which could constitute robbery, aggravated

assault, and aggravated battery. Therefore, the trial court did not

err by ruling that the other acts evidence was relevant to a matter

other than Hood’s character – her intent.”). Phrased another way,

13 Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (3), “[a] person commits the offense
of aggravated assault when he or she assaults: . . . [w]ith any object, device, or
instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or
actually does result in strangulation . . . .”

36
“evidence that an accused committed an intentional act generally is

relevant to show . . . that the same defendant committed a similar

act with the same sort of intent.” Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 72 (2)

(786 SE2d 633) (2016). See also Booth, 301 Ga. at 682-683 (3)

(explaining that, while the appellant “focuse[d] specifically on the

intent required for malice murder,” malice murder was “not the only

crime for which he was prosecuted in this case and thus for which

the State was required to prove intent”). Accordingly, because “the

intent required for the charged offense and other acts is the same,

and intent is at issue, the first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test [has

been] satisfied.” Id.

Having concluded that the other-acts evidence was relevant to

prove intent and met the first part of the Rule 404 (b) test, “the next

step is to weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect,”

Kirby, 304 Ga. at 481 (4) (a), which “requires evaluation of the other-

acts evidence under Rule 403.” Naples, 308 Ga. at 52 (2).

Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or

37
misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. In other words, other acts evidence should be
excluded if it constitutes matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
prejudicial effect. Factors to be considered in
determining the probative value of other act evidence
offered to prove intent include its overall similarity to the
charged crime, its temporal remoteness, and the
prosecutorial need for it.

Hood, 309 Ga. at 500-501 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).

As discussed above, the State was required to prove that

Greene intended to assault Bryant by strangling her and to take

Bryant’s car with the intention of depriving her of this property.

And the other-acts evidence related to Clark “was highly probative”

on those points “given the overall similarity between the offenses,

their temporal proximity, and the prosecution’s need for them.”

Hounkpatin, 313 Ga. at 795 (2) (a). The evidence shows that

Greene’s acts of strangling Clark were “the same type of act alleged

to have caused” Bryant’s “death.” Hounkpatin, 313 Ga. at 795 (2)

(a). And, while Clark did not ultimately die as a result of the

assaults by strangulation and Greene generally used his hands or

38
arm as an instrument—as opposed to a ligature of some kind—when

strangling her, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (3), these differences do not

alter the striking similarities in Greene’s mental state and intent in

engaging in these acts of strangulation. Additionally, with respect

to the theft by taking charge in this case, the other-acts evidence

established that, on at least one occasion after Greene strangled

Clark and she passed out, he stole her car and left her on the side of

the road. Bryant’s car was also stolen after she was strangled and

left on the side of the road, and her car was later found in Greene’s

possession.

The similarities between the acts of strangling Clark and

taking her property—i.e., her car—with the intent to deprive her of

said property and the theft of Bryant’s car following her death by

strangulation were substantial. And, “[w]hen other act evidence is

introduced to prove intent, [] a lesser degree of similarity between

the charged crime and the extrinsic evidence is required” than when

it is used to prove identity. Kirby, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i) (quotation

and punctuation omitted). As for temporal proximity, the crimes

39
charged in this case occurred two years after Greene’s violent

strangulation of Clark and consequent theft of her car. Given this

timeframe and the significant similarities between the Clark

incidents and the crimes at issue, the incidents involving Clark were

highly probative. See Hood, 309 Ga. at 501 (2). And, even if the

other-acts evidence involving Clark was not “critical to the State’s

prosecution,” the other-acts evidence proved that Greene acted with

intent in assaulting Bryant by strangling her and unlawfully taking

her car with the intent to deprive her of this property. Hounkpatin,

313 Ga. at 796 (2) (a). See also Olds, 299 Ga. at 75 (concluding that

the “probative value of evidence derives in large part from the extent

to which the evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more or

less probable,” and “the greater the tendency to make the existence

of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value”)

(citations omitted).

We recognize that the other-acts evidence related to Clark was

also certainly prejudicial to Greene, particularly since he was not

charged with any crimes arising from his assaults on Clark or the

40
theft of her car, which can increase the prejudicial impact of this

evidence. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 105 (786 SE2d 648) (noting

that the danger of admitting extrinsic offense evidence is greater

where “the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a prior

conviction” because “the jury may feel that the defendant should be

punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense

charged”). However, “Rule 403’s exclusionary force is meant to be

applied sparingly—primarily when the other-acts evidence has

scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the

sake of its prejudicial effect.” Hounkpatin, 313 Ga. at 796 (2) (a)

(citations and punctuation omitted). “Given the substantial

probative value” of this other-acts evidence in proving Greene’s

intent, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that unfair prejudice” to Greene did not “substantially outweigh it.”

Id. at 797 (2) (a).

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the other-acts

evidence involving Clark “was not a matter of scant or cumulative

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

41
effect,” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i) (quotation and punctuation

omitted), and we cannot say that the probative value of this other-

acts evidence “was so outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted it.” Hood,

309 Ga. at 501 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Turning to the trial court’s admission of Greene’s violent acts

towards Pirkle, we conclude that, because these acts occurred 19

years before the charged crimes, they were too remote in time to

have much, if any, evidentiary value, but any error in admitting this

evidence was harmless.

The test for determining whether a nonconstitutional
evidentiary error was harmless is whether it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
In conducting this harmless-error review, we review the
record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done[.]

Tiraboschi v. State, 312 Ga. 198, 200 (2) (862 SE2d 276) (2021)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

As discussed above in Division 1, the evidence of Greene’s guilt,

“aside from the other[-]acts evidence” related to Pirkle, was “strong.”

42
Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. 176, 184 (3) (839 SE2d 599) (2020).

Greene’s DNA was found underneath Bryant’s fingernails and

inside her vaginal area—demonstrating that Greene had physical

and sexual contact with Bryant, despite his statements to the

contrary. And Greene had healing scratch marks on his hands

during his first interview with law enforcement. Bryant also had

abrasions on her hands at the time of her death, indicating a

struggle with someone. Greene was in sole possession of Bryant’s

car as of the night she was killed, which was confirmed by several

witnesses who saw him in the car on the night of the murder and in

the days afterward, and Greene purchased a headlight bulb for a car

of the same make and model as Bryant’s on the day Bryant’s body

was discovered. Additionally, Greene gave hours of conflicting

statements to law enforcement about his activities and whereabouts

on January 24 and 25, which were videotaped and played for the

jury. In his final account, Greene admitted to being present for

Bryant’s murder and the disposal of her body, but insisted that

Lee—who had an alibi—was the person who killed her. Greene then

43
took law enforcement officers to the location of Bryant’s murder—a

location he knew well.

Moreover, before the State presented the other-acts evidence

and again during the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury

that it could consider the other-acts evidence only for certain limited

purposes, including Greene’s alleged intent to commit the crimes for

which he was charged, but the jury was not permitted to consider

the other-acts evidence for any other purpose—to include inferring

that Greene was of the character to commit these other acts. The

trial court also emphasized that Greene was on trial only for the

offenses charged in this case and not for any other act.

“[A]lthough the trial court’s limiting instructions did not

meaningfully explain” the only “permissible purpose” for which this

evidence was relevant, the instructions “did, at least, tell the jury

what it could not do,” which was to “infer from such evidence that

the accused is of a character that would commit such crimes. We

have held that this sort of admonition can lower the risk that the

jury will convict for the wrong reasons.” Nundra v. State, --- Ga. --

44
--, 885 SE2d 790, 797 (2) (March 21, 2023).

To be clear: because these instructions [were overly broad
as to] the permissible purposes for which the evidence
could be considered, they do not have the same mitigating
effect that we have found in other cases where the trial
judge specifically [and appropriately] instructed the jury
on which Rule 404 (b) purposes could be considered.

Id. “Even so, the trial court’s admonition that the jury may not infer

from such evidence that the accused is of a character that would

commit such crimes reduces the likelihood that the evidence” of

Greene’s prior acts “influenced the verdict.” Id.

Given the substantial evidence of guilt in this case, including

the other-acts evidence involving Clark, we conclude that “it is

highly probable” that any error in admitting the other-acts evidence

involving Pirkle was harmless and did not contribute to the jury’s

guilty verdicts against Greene, Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 81 (2)

(c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019), and we need not decide whether it was

error for the trial court to admit the other-acts evidence for purposes

other than proving Greene’s intent. See Tiraboschi, 312 Ga. at 200

(2) (“We need not decide whether this evidence was erroneously

45
admitted, because any such error was harmless.”). Therefore, this

contention fails.

4. Greene next contends that the trial court erred by admitting

autopsy photographs into evidence that were overly graphic and

unduly prejudicial. We see no merit to this contention.

“[W]e generally evaluate the admissibility of autopsy

photographs under OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403.”

Mitchell v. State, 307 Ga. 855, 863 (3) (b) (838 SE2d 847) (2020).

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-402, “[a]ll relevant evidence
shall be admissible[.]” To evaluate relevancy, this Court
relies on OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”
However, relevant evidence may be excluded
under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. The
major function of Rule 403 is to exclud(e) matter of scant
or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for
the sake of its prejudicial effect. Moreover, the exclusion
of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary
remedy that should be used only sparingly.

46
Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 527 (4) (852 SE2d 509) (2020) (citations

and punctuation omitted).

Before the medical examiner testified at trial, the State

advised the trial court of its intention to introduce autopsy

photographs—some of which were graphic in nature—and Greene

objected. The trial court then excused the jury and reviewed the

photographs the State sought to admit, which reflected traumatic

injuries to the exterior and interior of the victim’s neck and scalp—

including contusions and other extensive bruising—and injuries to

the exterior surfaces of the victim’s hands and vagina, including skin

abrasions and vaginal tearing. The trial court questioned the

medical examiner outside the presence of the jury about whether the

photographs were “necessary” to his presentation of the evidence

regarding the injuries to the victim.

The medical examiner testified that the photographs were

necessary because the deep tissue damage and interior injuries to

the victim’s neck and scalp could not be reflected without peeling

back the tissue in the neck and scalp area to demonstrate the extent

47
of her injuries, which included hemorrhaging caused by ligature

strangulation and blunt force trauma. And the tearing and

abrasions in the victim’s vaginal area—consistent with “sexual

penetration”—could not be shown without moving the skin to

adequately reflect the external components of that area. The

medical examiner also testified that “photographs are always

helpful to explain what people aren’t used to seeing.” The trial court

then admitted the photographs, concluding that they were necessary

to depict injuries that would be visible only by altering the body.

“Given the medical examiner’s testimony, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the autopsy

photograph[s] [were] relevant under Rule 401’s broad definition.”

Mitchell, 307 Ga. at 864 (3) (b). The trial court also determined that

the photographs were necessary for the medical examiner to explain

Bryant’s injuries, and we cannot say, based upon this finding, that

“the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the

autopsy photograph[s] at issue here.” Id. at 865 (3) (b). “Further,

the photographs were relevant to show the nature and location of

48
the victim[’s] wounds, which corroborated the State’s evidence of the

circumstances of the killing[].” Lanier, 310 Ga. at 527-528 (4).

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

the challenged photographs at trial. See id. at 528 (4).

5. Greene also argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in allowing the State to introduce harmful and non-probative

evidence to the jury from Greene’s cell phone showing that he

conducted two internet searches for rape because he was not charged

with rape in this case. During trial, the State sought to introduce a

photograph of Greene’s cell phone browser history showing that he

conducted two internet searches related to rape14 on January 23 and

24, 2019—the day before and day of Bryant’s murder. The State

argued that the fact Greene conducted these internet searches

“help[ed] explain[] what’s going on here in this particular crime.”

Greene objected to the introduction of the photograph of this search

history from his cell phone. The trial court excused the jury and

14 The precise time of the searches was not included in the cell phone
data.

49
reviewed the evidence in question. The trial court determined that

the photograph of Greene’s cell phone showing Greene conducted

two internet searches, identified on his phone as “‘Rape’ Search,”

was admissible as intrinsic evidence, and the photograph was

admitted into evidence through the law enforcement officer who

conducted the forensics download of Greene’s cell phone.

Assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting this photograph of Greene’s cell phone into evidence, we

conclude that any such abuse of discretion was harmless error and

“requires reversal only if it harms” Greene’s “substantial rights.”

Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 238 (2) (c) (880 SE2d 501) (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

[W]e determine whether such harm occurred by asking
whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. As part of that determination,
we review all the evidence de novo, after setting aside the
evidence admitted in error, and we weigh the remaining
evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done[.]

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).

50
As detailed in Divisions 1 and 3, the evidence of Greene’s guilt

in this case, apart from the photograph showing the two internet

searches, was strong. “In light of this very strong evidence, it is

highly probable” that the photographic evidence of the internet

search history from Greene’s cell phone, while not helpful to Greene,

“did not contribute to the verdicts.” Roberts, 315 Ga. at 239 (2) (c).

As such, in light of the other strong evidence presented against

Greene at trial, any error in the trial court’s admission of this

evidence was harmless.

6. Greene contends that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on mere presence and corroboration of a

defendant’s statement as he requested.15 However, the record

15 Greene requested the pattern charge on “mere presence,” tracking the
following language from Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 19 (1) (635 SE2d
325) (2006):
A jury is not authorized to find a person who was merely present
at the scene of a commission of a crime at the time of its
perpetration guilty of consent in and concurrence in the
commission of the crime, unless the evidence shows, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that such person committed the actual crime,
helped in the actual perpetration of the crime, or participated in
the criminal endeavor.
Greene also requested the following charge on corroboration: “A
defendant’s statement unsupported by any other evidence is not sufficient to

51
reflects that, at the conclusion of the charge to the jury, Greene’s

trial counsel did not object to the omission of these charges, and

thus, our “review of the trial court’s instructions is for plain error

only.” Palencia v. State, 313 Ga. 625, 628 (872 SE2d 681) (2022).

To establish plain error in regard to jury instructions, Greene

must satisfy the following four prongs:

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of
deviation from a legal rule—that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Palencia, 313 Ga. at 628 (citing State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a)

(718 SE2d 232) (2011)). “Satisfying all four prongs of this standard

is difficult, as it should be.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a).

justify a conviction.”

52
During the charge conference, the trial court explained that it

would not give a charge on mere presence unless Greene could point

to case law showing that the charge was legally required in this case.

Additionally, the trial court advised that it would not give the

corroboration charge because Greene had not given a confession, and

Greene would “need to find” a case stating that the trial court was

required to give such a charge under those circumstances. The

following day, Greene informed the trial court that he could not find

any case law mandating that the trial court give a charge on mere

presence, but he stated that “our request is still obviously in effect.”

Greene did not mention his prior request to charge on corroboration

of a defendant’s statement or provide any case law demonstrating

that such a charge was appropriate where a defendant has not given

a confession. The trial court did not instruct the jury on mere

presence or corroboration, and as noted above, Greene did not object

at the conclusion of the jury charge.

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly or obviously err

in refusing to charge the jury on corroboration because Greene did

53
not confess to committing the crimes charged. See OCGA § 24-8-823

(providing that “[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other

evidence, shall not justify a conviction”). See also English v. State,

300 Ga. 471, 474 (2) (796 SE2d 258) (2017) (determining that “in a

confession, the entire criminal act is confessed”). We further

conclude that a failure to give a mere presence instruction is not

error where, as here, the trial court instructed the jury that the

State was required to prove each element of the crimes charged. See

Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (14) (646 SE2d 55) (2007)

(“[M]ere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the

State prove each element of the crime charged, and, as the trial

court’s instructions clearly informed the jury of this requirement,

there was no error.” (citation omitted)). However, even if the trial

court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury on

mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such

error likely affected the outcome of the trial,” and thus, “he has

failed to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (4)

(883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

54
As detailed above, the evidence presented by the State in this

case was substantial, and Greene “has not met his burden of

affirmatively showing that the [trial court’s] failure to give” a mere

presence instruction “probably affected the outcome of his trial.”

Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 320-321 (2) (800 SE2d 333) (2017).

Accordingly, even if there was clear and obvious error, “there is no

likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different

had the instruction in question been given, and, for this reason [],

there is no plain error.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 34 (2) (b).

7. Finally, because we assumed error in the trial court’s

admission of the Rule 404 (b) evidence related to Pirkle and the

photograph of Greene’s cell phone showing his internet search

history, we must consider whether the cumulative prejudicial

impact of these admissions requires a new trial. See State v. Lane,

308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). “To establish cumulative

error,” an appellant “must show that (1) at least two errors were

committed in the course of the trial; and (2) considered together

along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the

55
jury’s deliberation that they denied” the appellant a “fundamentally

fair trial.” Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 808 (2) (d) (860 SE2d 731)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Having considered the combined effect of the trial court’s errors

in this case, we conclude that they do not entitle Greene to a new

trial. In light of the harmlessness of the evidentiary errors in

question and in light of the other substantial evidence heard by the

jury in this case, which included: (1) Greene’s repeated denials that

he ever touched Bryant, when his DNA was found both underneath

her fingernails and in her vaginal area; (2) his possession of her car

on the night of her murder; and (3) his multiple, conflicting

statements to law enforcement—first insisting he did not know

about Bryant’s death, then stating that he was present for Bryant’s

murder—statements the jury was entitled to disbelieve; “it is highly

probable that the error[s] did not contribute to the verdict.” Lane,

308 Ga. at 21 (4). Additionally, Greene has not shown that “the

multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied”

him a “fundamentally fair trial.” Flood, 311 Ga. at 808 (2) (d).

56
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,
who concurs in judgment only in Division 4, and Peterson, P. J., and
Warren and Pinson, JJ., who dissent.

57
PETERSON, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

I generally agree with the majority’s legal conclusions.

Unfortunately, I find myself unable to agree with its more fact-

bound conclusions. I therefore respectfully dissent.

A proper Rule 403 analysis would have excluded the Clark Rule

404 (b) evidence. The majority overstates the prosecutorial need for

that evidence (and thus its probative value); although intent was

technically put at issue by Greene’s not guilty plea, it was not an

important issue in the case. Greene’s defense was that he didn’t do

the crime at all, not that he did the act alleged but without culpable

intent. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-76 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016)

(clarifying previous case law to explain that while intent was always

technically at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty, that does

not mean that intent is an important issue in every such case). And

the majority substantially overstates the mitigating impact of a

“limiting” instruction that affirmatively told the jurors that they

could consider the evidence for a range of impermissible purposes,

58
including motive, identity, and absence of harm or mistake

(purposes that the majority does not contend were permissible).

And the majority is correct that the Rule 404 (b) evidence was

“certainly prejudicial.” It told the jury that Greene regularly

strangled women, the crime with which he was charged here. The

jurors were expressly instructed that they could consider that

evidence of identity – i.e., that strangling was such a signature crime

of his that the fact this victim was strangled was evidence he did

it. 16 The Rule 404 (b) evidence also told the jury that he had not

previously been held criminally responsible for some of those prior

attacks, including because one of the victims was afraid of him. The

majority merely acknowledges that there is a greater danger in

admitting such evidence without explaining what the danger is; the

16 Evidence admitted for identity under Rule 404 (b) “must be a
‘signature’ crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is
uniquely his. . . . Evidence cannot be used to prove identity simply because the
defendant has at other times committed the same commonplace variety of
criminal act.” Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 725 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted); see also Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 443,
447-448 (1) (870 SE2d 397) (2022) (same). That is absent here, of course; the
Rule 404 (b) evidence showed that Greene strangled Clark and Pirkle with his
hands, and the victim here was strangled with an instrument.

59
danger is that there was a high risk that the jury would convict

Greene not for the charged offense but for the extrinsic acts. See

Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 485 (4) (a) (i) (819 SE2d 468) (2018)

(“[T]he risk that a jury may convict a defendant not for the offense

charged but for his extrinsic conduct is greater where the extrinsic

conduct was not already the subject of a conviction.”).

The majority presumes that admission of the Pirkle Rule 404

(b) evidence and Greene’s search for rape pornography were error;

in my view, they were in fact error. 17 A cumulative harm

assessment, then, must consider the harm of the Clark evidence, the

Pirkle evidence, and the search for rape pornography. And that

assessment must also recognize that because those errors were

preserved by trial counsel, the State bears the burden of showing

that those errors, in combination, were highly probable not to have

17 Underlying much of the State’s case was at least a subtext of sexual
assault. But Greene was not charged with any sexual offense. Although the
State’s medical examiner who conducted an autopsy of the victim testified that
the victim had injuries to her vagina, when asked whether he could “say
whether that penetration’s consensual or nonconsensual,” the medical
examiner responded, “I cannot.”

60
contributed to the verdict. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 81 (2)

(c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019).

The State has not made that showing. Although the majority

characterizes the evidence against Greene as “very strong,” almost

all of it was circumstantial. The strongest evidence, I think, was the

evidence of the scrapes on Greene’s hands and the presence of his

DNA under the victim’s fingernails. In my view, the evidence

against him was plainly sufficient for federal due process purposes.

But constitutional sufficiency is a much lower bar than a showing of

harmlessness.

Standing alone, the Rule 404 (b) evidence was certainly

prejudicial, but the cumulative impact of the evidence was

heightened because it portrayed Greene not just as a strangler, but

as serial strangler who had been committing violent crimes for

almost 20 years. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at 486 (4) (a) (ii) (the resulting

prejudice from the Rule 404 (b) evidence substantially outweighed

its scant probative value because the evidence suggested the

defendant was a serial criminal who kept committing dangerous

61
crimes). And the search for rape pornography additionally painted

him (quite possibly accurately, albeit irrelevant to any charge here)

as someone who enjoyed harming women sexually.

All of this was powerful. And we have no idea how the State

used it, because closing arguments were not transcribed.18 But it is

not reasonable to assume that this powerful evidence would not have

been used to significant advantage for those impermissible purposes

that the jury was instructed the State could use it. “Where

evidentiary error is deemed harmless, it is often true that the

evidence was only ‘marginal’ to the prosecution’s case.” Thompson v.

State, 302 Ga. 533, 542 (III) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017) (quoting

Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 277, 280 (800 SE2d 545) (2017)); compare

Jackson, 306 Ga. at 80 (holding Rule 404 (b) evidence harmless even

in absence of transcript because the “prosecutor did not need to rely

18In briefing on appeal, both the District Attorney’s Office that tried the
case and the Attorney General focus their arguments regarding the other-acts
evidence as being admissible for the purpose of establishing identity, arguing
that identity was the central issue in the case because Greene denied killing
the victim, there were no eyewitnesses to the incident, no one could place
Greene at the scene of the crime, and the murder weapon was never found.

62
on the [Rule 404 (b) evidence] in his closing argument, because there

was solid direct evidence” and “compelling circumstantial

evidence”). The State has not shown that this powerful, inadmissible

evidence was highly probable not to have contributed to the verdict.

Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice Warren and Justice

Pinson join in this dissent.

63

316 Ga. 584
FINAL COPY

S23A0200. GREENE v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Eric Jackson Greene was convicted of malice murder

and theft by taking in connection with the strangling death of Sheila

Bryant in January 2019.1 On appeal, Greene contends that the

evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that

the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) by denying

Greene’s motion to suppress his statement taken on February 18,

2019; (2) by admitting improper extrinsic evidence; (3) by admitting

1 Bryant’s body was discovered on January 25, 2019. In March 2019,
Greene was indicted by a Douglas County grand jury on charges of malice
murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by strangling her,
and theft by taking. In February 2020, a jury found Greene guilty of all counts.
The trial court sentenced Greene to serve life in prison without the possibility
of parole on the malice murder count, plus an additional ten years on the theft
by taking count. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. On
March 3, 2020, Greene filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended
through new counsel on January 4, 2021. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied Greene’s motion for new trial on July 29, 2022. Greene
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on August 11, 2022, and the case
was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2022 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
overly graphic autopsy photographs; (4) by allowing the State to

present harmful and non-probative evidence from Greene’s cell

phone showing that he conducted Internet searches pertaining to

rape; and (5) by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and

corroboration of a defendant’s statement. For the reasons that

follow, these claims fail, and we affirm Greene’s convictions.

The evidence presented at Greene’s trial showed that, on the

night of January 23, 2019, Greene — who did not have a permanent

residence — stayed at the home of Kenny Bradford.2 Christina

Norton was also staying at Bradford’s house in January 2019, and

she testified that, on January 24, she needed a ride to meet with her

probation officer, so she texted her friend, Blake Lee, to ask for a

ride. Lee did not have a car of his own, but he was living with Bryant

— the victim in this case — who did own a car. Lee testified that he

asked Bryant if they could give Norton a ride to her probation

meeting in Bryant’s car, and Bryant agreed. Lee and Bryant arrived

2 Bradford testified that a lot of people were “coming and going” and

“doing drugs” at his house during this time period.

2
at Bradford’s house around 3:30 p.m. on January 24. According to

Norton, Greene had been hanging out at Bradford’s house all day,

trying to get a ride to a car lot because he wanted to steal a truck.

And, when Lee and Bryant arrived and Greene realized that Bryant

owned a car, he asked for Bryant’s help to “accomplish this car lot

plan” because Greene “needed somebody to be there to test drive [the

truck].” Lee testified that he and Bryant did not know Greene, so

Lee told Greene they could not help him with his plan. Lee later

realized that Greene had talked Bryant into taking him to the car

lot because, when they left Bradford’s house, Greene rode with them.

Lee testified that, after leaving Bradford’s house, he asked

Bryant to drop him off at a mobile home park where Zada Price — a

woman he knew — lived. According to Lee, after getting dropped

off, he could not get in touch with Price, so he went to the home of

her neighbor, Greg Jones. Jones testified that Lee ended up staying

at his house for “five or six, seven hours,” until after 9:30 p.m., trying

to reach Price and waiting for Bryant to pick him up. After several

hours, Lee assumed that Bryant was not going to “show back up,” so

3
he walked back to Bradford’s house. Greene and Bryant did not

return to Bradford’s house that night, and Lee testified that he never

saw Bryant again.

At approximately 7:45 the next morning, Bill Messer was

driving home from work along West Union Hill Road when he saw

“somebody l[y]ing on the side of the road.” Messer pulled over and

approached the person, noting upon closer examination that it was

a woman, lying “face down,” whose “underwear was still for the most

part up, but her pants were pulled down.” Messer, who was a

firefighter, “took a radial pulse from both [her] wrists,” and after

finding no pulse, he called 911.

Law enforcement officers with the Douglas County Sheriff’s

Office arrived shortly afterward and also observed a “female l[y]ing

face down on the side of the road,” with her arms “stretched above

her head,” her pants and underwear “pulled down below her

buttocks,” and her “feet elevated in some bushes.” Lieutenant Greg

Ashcraft, one of the responding officers, testified that the woman

also had frost on her jacket, “which told [him] she had been out there

4
a period of time and the moisture had frozen on her.” Lieutenant

Ashcraft also noticed tire impressions going through the grass close

to the body. When officers turned the woman’s body over in

preparation for removing her from the scene, Lieutenant Ashcraft

observed that “a lot of her abdomen area [was] exposed” and that

she had “bruising” up toward her “ear area” and “what appeared to

be an injury around the neck area,” including “sign[s] of a ligature

having been used.” Lieutenant Ashcraft testified that, on this basis,

he believed this woman had died from “ligature strangulation.”

Investigator Jay Hayes with the Criminal Investigation

Division of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office also responded to the

scene and used a mobile fingerprint identification device to identify

the deceased as Bryant. At trial, the medical examiner testified that

Bryant’s cause of death was ligature strangulation by a belt or

similar object, as demonstrated by the “broad abrasion over a

significant portion of the neck” and a “very straight line across the

whole front of the neck.” According to the medical examiner, the

strangulation was “forceful,” causing “deep tissue damage.” The

5
medical examiner also noted bruising on Bryant’s extremities, as

well as “contusions and superficial abrasions and skin tears” on her

hands, indicating that she was “in a struggle” and “trying to fight

somebody off.” The medical examiner also documented “injuries to

[ ] Bryant’s vagina” consistent with “sexual penetration.”

Investigator Hayes testified at trial that Lee was initially a

person of interest because he lived with Bryant and was the last

person Bryant’s daughters had seen with her on January 24. On

January 29, 2019, Investigator Hayes interviewed Lee at the

Sheriff’s Office. During the interview, Lee told Investigator Hayes

that Bryant and Greene dropped Lee off at a mobile home park on

the afternoon of January 24 and that was the last time he saw

Bryant. Lee stated that he hung out at Jones’s house because he

could not get in touch with Price — the woman he was hoping to see

— and after several hours, Lee walked back to Bradford’s house.3

Based on Lee’s cell phone records and witness interviews,

3 During this interview, Lee consented to having a buccal swab of his

DNA taken by Investigator Hayes.

6
Investigator Hayes “eliminate[d]” Lee as a suspect, determining

that Lee “wasn’t anywhere near” the “area of the crime scene” during

the hours in question. Investigator Hayes also learned that Bryant

owned a four-door, silver or gray 2010 Mazda 6 sedan that was

missing.

During the early morning hours of January 30 or 31, Lee called

Investigator Hayes and informed him that Greene had just stopped

by Bradford’s house and was driving Bryant’s car. Norton testified

that she also saw Greene in Bryant’s car that night, and then, on

February 1, she received a text message from Greene at 4:15 a.m.,

stating that it was “hard to believe [Bryant] got killed.” Norton also

received a second message from Greene stating that Bryant had told

Greene on January 24 that “she was supposed to go meet someone

about some pills.”

About a week later, on February 7, Officer Timothy Ito with

the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office responded to “a report of a

vehicle parked in front of a residence” in Paulding County “where

the male was sleeping in the front seat.” When Officer Ito arrived,

7
he observed a man asleep in the front seat of a “gray four door

Mazda” sedan. Officer Ito directed the man — later identified as

Greene — to exit the vehicle. As Officer Ito was in the process of

obtaining Greene’s personal information, he received a report that

“the vehicle had returned as stolen” and “was connected to a

homicide.” At that point, “Greene grabbed his phone and took off

running,” but he tripped and fell down. Officer Ito took Greene into

custody and coordinated with Douglas County law enforcement to

tow Bryant’s vehicle and have Green transported to Douglas

County.

Later that same day, Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene.4

After waiving his Miranda rights,5 Greene told Investigator Hayes

that he had borrowed the car he was sleeping in “from a guy named

Blake” — later determined to be Blake Lee — about two weeks

before. Greene told Investigator Hayes that he met Lee on January

24 when Lee “showed up” at Bradford’s house with “an older lady”

4 This interview was video-recorded and played for the jury at trial.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

8
— later determined to be Bryant — and they gave Greene a ride to

a few car lots in Villa Rica and Douglasville for Greene to look for a

truck. Greene said that, when they arrived at the last car lot in

Douglasville, he “got out of [the car] and they took off on [him].”

Greene said his phone was not working, so he had to walk back to

Bradford’s house. Greene stated that he saw Lee again about “two

or three days” later at Bradford’s house, and Greene borrowed the

car from Lee.

Investigator Hayes confronted Greene with Lee’s account of

events and advised Greene that Bryant had been murdered. Greene

said he did not realize Bryant was dead, denied any involvement in

her death, and consented to have a buccal swab of his DNA taken.

Greene also gave several differing accounts about how he obtained

Bryant’s car. In the last account, Greene said that, three days after

he visited the car lots with Lee and Bryant, Lee offered to rent him

Bryant’s car, and Greene agreed to do so.

When Investigator Hayes informed Greene that he would “pull

video” surveillance from the various car lots Greene had mentioned,

9
Greene’s account changed slightly. Greene said he went to one car

lot alone with Bryant because they had dropped Lee off at a store.

According to Greene, when they arrived at this car lot, Bryant

appeared to be under the influence. Greene said he did not want her

driving “when [she] was like that,” so he helped her out of the car

and put her in the passenger seat. Greene said he then drove

Bryant’s car to pick up Lee, and they stopped by a few other car lots.

At the last one, Lee and Bryant left Greene, forcing him to walk back

to Bradford’s house.

At the end of the interview, Investigator Hayes looked through

Greene’s cell phone and observed that the call log started at 6:35

p.m. on January 25, the day Bryant’s body was discovered. Greene

told Investigator Hayes that he did a factory reset on January 25

because the “memory got too full” and the phone was “not working.”

Investigator Hayes also observed “slight indications of healing from

scratch marks or like thin lacerations on [Greene’s] hands.” When

Investigator Hayes asked Greene about the scratches and whether

his DNA would be under Bryant’s fingernails, Greene insisted that

10
he did not touch Bryant and that he would “never do anything to

harm a woman.”

Following this interview and after obtaining a search warrant

for the contents of Greene’s cell phone, an investigator conducted a

search of the phone and discovered that, on January 23 and 24, 2019,

Greene conducted Internet searches, specifically appearing on his

phone as “‘Rape’ Search — [a link to the specific website].” Any

material or photographs Greene might have obtained as a result of

these searches were not referenced or admitted at trial — only the

fact that Greene conducted the searches. Additionally, Investigator

Hayes obtained surveillance video from the car lots Greene

mentioned and from the surrounding businesses, but the footage did

not show that Greene visited or was in the vicinity of any of those

businesses on January 24, except for Comfort Cars in Villa Rica.

The surveillance video recording from Comfort Cars and the

testimony from one of its salesmen, James Clayton, demonstrated

that Bryant and Greene arrived at the car lot in Bryant’s car around

5:00 p.m. on January 24. Bryant was driving the car at the time,

11
Greene was in the front passenger seat, and no one else was in the

car. Clayton testified that these two individuals “stuck out in [his]

mind” because the “female in the vehicle was high on something”

and “couldn’t even hold herself up.” Clayton observed that “she was

slumped over” in the car and “kind of drunk like.” Greene told

Clayton that he was looking for a truck and asked about a Chevrolet

Avalanche that Clayton had on the lot. Greene told Clayton that “he

didn’t have a license, [so] she [indicating Bryant] was going to drive,”

and Clayton responded that she was “not in any shape to drive.”

Clayton testified that he walked over to the office to get the key to

the Avalanche, and as he did so, he could hear Greene telling Bryant

to “straighten the f**k up” and “sit up straight.” Clayton said he

heard Greene yelling and swearing at her, calling her a “stupid

f**king b**ch.” According to Clayton, Greene then pulled Bryant

out of the driver’s seat of the car and walked her around to the front

passenger seat. Clayton said “she was a dish rag,” that “she was

gone.” Greene got into the driver’s seat of Bryant’s car and drove

out of the Comfort Cars lot at 5:25 p.m.

12
Officers collecting evidence from Bryant’s car located a receipt

from an auto parts store with Greene’s name and contact

information on it. The manager of the auto parts store testified that,

on January 25, at 7:27 p.m., he assisted Greene in exchanging a

headlight bulb that Greene had purchased earlier in the evening for

one that would fit a 2010 Mazda 6.

A forensic DNA analyst with the GBI testified that she tested

swabs from Bryant’s hands and vaginal area and identified Greene’s

DNA on Bryant’s fingernail clippings and inside her vaginal area.

Greene was arrested soon afterward.

On February 15, Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene a

second time6 and reviewed Greene’s Miranda rights, which Greene

agreed to waive. After Investigator Hayes confronted Greene with

discrepancies in his statements from the February 7 interview —

including where Greene allegedly went on January 24 and 25, who

accompanied him, and when he took possession of Bryant’s vehicle

— Greene eventually told Investigator Hayes that, about 45

6 This interview was video-recorded and played for the jury at trial.

13
minutes after being left at the last car lot on January 24, Lee and

Bryant returned, and the following occurred:

[Lee] comes to me. He was in the driver’s seat, she
was in the passenger’s seat. And I thought she was asleep.
And he sat there and said, “Hey, I done f**ked up. I done
f**ked up.” And I was like, “How’d you f**k up?” And he
said [inaudible], “I don’t know what to do, I don’t know
what to do.” And I said, “So what are you talking about?
What did you do?” And he said, “I killed somebody.” And
I said, “How’d you kill somebody?” And he said, “She’s
dead.” And I said, “Who’s dead?” I didn’t know he was
talking about the woman who was sitting right next to
him.

Greene said he asked Lee to drop him off because he “didn’t want

any part of it,” and Greene hitched a ride back to Bradford’s house

to get his belongings and then to a friend’s house in Paulding

County. Greene told Investigator Hayes that the next day, January

25 — around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. — Greene was walking down the road

in Villa Rica when he “ran into [Lee] again.” According to Greene,

Lee was driving Bryant’s Mazda, and Lee stopped the car and told

Greene that he would sell him the car and “give him the title and

everything.” Greene said he agreed to buy the car and took

possession of it at that time. Greene told Investigator Hayes that he

14
replaced the headlight that evening because he noticed “it was

blown.”

The trial evidence showed that Greene ultimately gave five

accounts of what occurred on January 24 and 25. In Greene’s final

account, Greene told Captain John Sweat — who had taken over the

interview for Investigator Hayes — that, 45 minutes after Lee and

Bryant left Greene at the last car lot, they returned with “two

unidentified males in the back seat of the car,” and Greene sat in

between the men in the back seat. Greene indicated that these men

were “[u]nknown gang members,” but could not otherwise provide

any identifying information about them or how to get in touch with

them. Greene said that Bryant was alive at this point, and she and

Lee were “bickering.” According to Greene, a few minutes later, they

pulled off the road near some power lines on West Union Hill Road

in Douglas County, and Lee choked Bryant with his arm and

wrapped “a purple scarf around her neck,” which he used to strangle

her.7 Greene then demonstrated the act for Captain Sweat,

7 The medical examiner testified that, based on the “broad abrasion over

15
explaining that Lee pulled the scarf through the headrest and

“cinche[d] down on it.” Greene stated that he tried to stop Lee, but

he “had these two guys sitting beside [him] and each one put a gun

to [his] head at that moment.” Greene said that, after Bryant was

“obviously dead,” Lee drove over to the “dump site” — an area off the

side of the road, not far from the area where she was killed. Greene

said that Lee and one of the men pulled Bryant out of the car and

“dragged her over to the wood line off the roadway,” leaving her face

down on the side of the road. Greene said the man seated beside

him in the back seat put a gun in his mouth and “told [him] not to

move.” Greene stated that Lee and “this other guy” went through

Bryant’s pockets and stole something from her. Greene repeated the

same account to Investigator Hayes when Hayes rejoined the

interview. Investigator Hayes asked Greene if he would be able to

lead officers to the site where Bryant was killed, and Greene

indicated he could do so.

a significant portion of the neck” and a “very straight line across the whole
front of the neck,” it “d[id]n’t seem that likely” that Bryant was strangled with
a scarf.

16
On February 18, Investigator Hayes and another officer picked

Greene up at the Douglas County Jail.8 Investigator Hayes testified

that he briefly reviewed Greene’s Miranda rights again, after which

Greene led the officers to “a dirt, turn-off road with power lines

running across it” along West Union Hill Road, where Greene

asserted that Bryant had been killed. Investigator Hayes testified

that this location was “[a]bout six-tenths of a mile” from where they

found Bryant’s body.

At trial, Jerry Trotter, a family friend of Greene’s, testified

that, between 9:45 and 10:15 p.m. on January 24, Greene stopped

by Trotter’s house, which is located “maybe a mile” from where

“[Bryant’s] body was found.” According to Trotter, Greene was alone

at the time and was driving “a late model dark colored four-door

sedan” that Trotter had never seen before. Trotter asked Greene

whose car he was driving, and Greene said it was “[his] girlfriend’s,

Sheila’s.” When the State asked Trotter about Greene’s demeanor

that night, he testified that Greene seemed “nervous” and “worried.”

8 This car trip was audio-recorded and played for the jury at trial.

17
Additionally, Trotter testified that he was very familiar with the

area where Bryant was purportedly killed — i.e., the power lines on

West Union Hill Road — because he and Greene fished a pond in

that area and Greene would also occasionally hang out and sleep in

his car there. Amber Echols, an acquaintance of Greene’s, also

testified at trial that she and Greene had previously hung out by the

power lines on West Union Hill Road to “smoke[ ]” because the area

was “off the road” where “nobody could see [them].” Echols said that,

in late January 2019, Greene started driving a “darker color” car

with four doors.

Jennifer Brownlow, a family friend of Greene’s, also testified

at trial. According to Brownlow, Greene attended a birthday party

at her house on January 27, 2019, arriving in a “blue colored car”

with “four door[s].” Brownlow observed that Greene was “a little off

that day, kind of fidgety, looking around,” and stayed at the party

for “maybe ten minutes at the most.”

1. On appeal, Greene contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for malice murder under OCGA

18
§ 16-5-1 (a).9 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,

61 LE2d 560) (1979). Greene also contends that his conviction was

based solely on circumstantial evidence and that the State failed to

exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Lee was the person who

killed Bryant by strangling her. See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant

a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not

only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude

every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the

accused.”). Pretermitting whether Greene’s convictions were based

solely on circumstantial evidence, we disagree that the evidence was

insufficient to support Greene’s conviction for malice murder as a

matter of constitutional due process or under OCGA § 24-14-6.

When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

9 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), “[a] person commits the offense of
murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being.”

19
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B) (emphasis in original).

“We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in

the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to

be derived from the facts, and we do not reweigh the evidence.”

Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 229 (2) (869 SE2d 461) (2022) (citations

and punctuation omitted). Additionally,

“[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the
proved facts shall not only be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.” Not every hypothesis is reasonable, and the
evidence does not have to exclude every conceivable
inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that
are reasonable. Whether alternative hypotheses are
reasonable, however, is usually a question for the jury,
and this Court will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it
is insufficient as a matter of law.

Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 19-20 (2) (875 SE2d 631) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6). And, although

“the State is required to prove its case with competent evidence,

there is no requirement that it prove its case with any particular

sort of evidence.” Id. at 21 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

20
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, the evidence demonstrated the following: (1) Greene

was the last person seen with Bryant on January 24, 2019 — the

day before her body was discovered; (2) the sales manager for

Comfort Cars observed Greene yelling and swearing at Bryant in

the Comfort Cars parking lot that evening, and around 5:25 p.m.,

Greene moved Bryant to the passenger seat and drove her car away

from the dealership; (3) later that night, between 9:45 and 10:15

p.m., Greene showed up at Trotter’s house alone, driving a vehicle

closely resembling Bryant’s car that he said had been given to him

by someone named “Sheila”; (4) the next morning, Bryant was found

dead on the side of the road — in an area close to where Trotter lived

— with her pants and underwear pulled down, and Greene’s DNA

was found inside Bryant’s vaginal area; (5) Greene purchased a

headlight bulb for Bryant’s car the evening after her body was

discovered; (6) over the next few days, several witnesses, including

Lee, saw Greene driving Bryant’s car; (7) a week or so later, Greene

was discovered by law enforcement sleeping in and living out of

21
Bryant’s car; (8) during Greene’s subsequent interviews with law

enforcement, Greene gave a number of conflicting accounts

regarding his whereabouts and activities on January 24 and 25, and

those interviews were played for the jury; (9) Greene’s DNA was

found underneath Bryant’s fingernails, and Investigator Hayes

observed scratch marks on Greene’s hands during his first interview

on February 7; and (10) the medical examiner testified that Bryant

had “superficial abrasions and skin tears on her hands” — consistent

with having been “in a struggle” and “trying to fight somebody off.”

Additionally, Greene placed himself at the location of Bryant’s

murder and the location where her body was found — stating that

he was present for Bryant’s murder and the disposal of her body, but

did not kill her or touch her. Greene also led Investigator Hayes to

the murder site — the power lines along West Union Hill Road —

and trial testimony from Trotter and Echols demonstrated that

Greene was familiar with this area, having gone there often to fish,

hang out, sleep in his car, and smoke. And, although Greene told

Investigator Hayes that he saw Lee strangle and kill Bryant, law

22
enforcement had already eliminated Lee as a suspect based on

witness statements and cell phone data that confirmed Lee was

nowhere near the crime scene on January 24 and 25.

The jury was “entitled to disbelieve” Greene’s version of the

events preceding Bryant’s death because “his story conflicted with

most of the other evidence.” McKinney v. State, 300 Ga. 562, 567 (2)

(797 SE2d 484) (2017). “The jury could instead believe the testimony

and other evidence” indicating that Greene was the person who

strangled Bryant to death on the night of January 24. Id.

Accordingly, after properly viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient under the Jackson standard for a jury to find Greene

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B). See also Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 207 (1)

(830 SE2d 160) (2019). Additionally, based on this evidence, the jury

was authorized to find that Greene killed Bryant and that the

alternative hypothesis that someone other than Greene committed

the crimes was unreasonable. See Garay, 314 Ga. at 21 (2).

23
Therefore, Greene’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a

matter of both constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law

fails.

2. Greene next contends that the trial court erred in not

suppressing his February 18, 2019 statement to Investigator Hayes

because Investigator Hayes failed to give Greene his complete

Miranda warnings at the outset of that interview. “The trial court

determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the

preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of

the circumstances. Although we defer to the trial court’s findings of

disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the

law to the facts.” Gaddy v. State, 311 Ga. 44, 46 (2) (855 SE2d 613)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

At the Jackson-Denno10 hearing, Investigator Hayes testified

that Greene was taken into custody on February 7, 2019, and before

Investigator Hayes interviewed Greene that day, he read Greene his

Miranda rights. Greene indicated that he understood those rights,

10 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

24
signed a waiver of rights form, and agreed to speak with Investigator

Hayes. Investigator Hayes testified that he interviewed Greene a

second time on February 15, 2019. At the outset of the February 15

interview, Investigator Hayes read Greene his Miranda rights, and

Greene indicated that he understood those rights and affirmatively

waived those rights. According to Investigator Hayes, during the

February 15 interview, Greene “changed course” — going from

having “no knowledge” of Bryant’s death, to having been present

when Bryant was killed and “when the body was disposed of.” So

Investigator Hayes asked Greene whether “he would take [them] out

and show [them] the location that [Bryant] was killed,” and Greene

confirmed that he could.

Investigator Hayes testified that, three days later, on February

18, he and another officer removed Greene from the Douglas County

Jail for Greene to lead them to the site where Bryant was killed.

Investigator Hayes noted that he had already Mirandized Greene

“at least twice,” but he briefly recited Greene’s Miranda rights again

before driving to the location in question. Investigator Hayes

25
recorded the interview on a digital voice recorder inside the vehicle.

The audio recording of the February 18 interview was then played

for the trial court, and in the recording, the following exchange

occurred:

INVESTIGATOR HAYES: Do you understand that you’re
still under your rights? You still have the right to remain
silent. You still have the right to have an attorney with
you if I ask you any questions or before you can answer
any questions if you like. If you can’t afford to hire an
attorney, one can be appointed to represent you if you
wish. You understand all those rights?
GREENE: Yes.
INVESTIGATOR HAYES: OK, having all those rights in
mind, you still want to continue with our field trip?
GREENE: Yes.

After hearing Investigator Hayes’s testimony and the audio

recording of the interview, the trial court denied Greene’s motion to

suppress, finding that: (1) Investigator Hayes had previously

advised Greene of his Miranda rights during his February 7 and

February 15 interviews; (2) during both of the prior interviews,

Greene “waived his rights freely and voluntarily, without hope of

benefit, [or] fear of injury” and spoke to Investigator Hayes about

“the homicide that is at issue in this case”; (3) on February 18,

26
Investigator Hayes gained Greene’s “voluntary cooperation” to go to

a location “where the victim was originally killed,” and “rather than

give the full Miranda warning,” Investigator Hayes “advised”

Greene that “the Miranda rights still applied and substantially gave

[the] Miranda warning”; and (4) Greene “freely and voluntarily

agreed to converse with [Investigator Hayes] and go to the location

and answer the officer’s questions.” The trial court ruled that,

“under the circumstances of this case,” Greene’s February 18

statement was “admissible and that [Greene] waived his rights and

made the statement voluntarily.” The trial court reached the same

conclusion in denying Greene’s motion for new trial.

On appeal, Greene does not dispute that Investigator Hayes

properly advised him of his Miranda rights before questioning him

on February 7 and February 15 and that he signed a Miranda

waiver prior to each of those interviews. Greene argues, as he did

below, that, on February 18, he did not sign a waiver of rights form

and that Investigator Hayes went over the Miranda warnings “real

quick” while they were driving to the site where Bryant was

27
allegedly killed. Greene contends that Investigator Hayes left out

the following rights from the Miranda warning: (1) Greene had a

right to stop the interrogation at any time, and (2) anything Greene

said during the interview could be used against him. Greene asserts

that his February 7, February 15, and February 18 interviews were

independent — as opposed to one continuous interview — and

accordingly, Investigator Hayes “committed an error of

constitutional magnitude” when he “outright failed” to advise

Greene that anything he said on February 18 could be used against

him in a court of law.

The trial court did not err in concluding that Greene knowingly

and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights on February 18. See

Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 119 (5) (856 SE2d 302) (2021)

(concluding that the record supported the trial court’s finding that

the appellant “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of

his rights” during his custodial interview and that “the officers were

not required to re-read the Miranda warnings to [the appellant]

before commencing their questioning” eight days later). “Neither

28
federal nor Georgia law mandates that an accused be continually

reminded of his rights once he has intelligently waived them.” Ellis

v. State, 299 Ga. 645, 648 (2) (791 SE2d 16) (2016) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “Thus, when conducting a follow-up

interview or a continuation of a previous interview, a reminder of

Miranda rights may be permitted in place of a complete

restatement.” Gaddy, 311 Ga. at 47 (2).

Here, Greene does not dispute that he was fully advised of and

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to his

interviews with Investigator Hayes on February 7 and 15, and the

record reflects that Investigator Hayes reminded Greene of those

rights on February 18. Greene has not shown that, under these

circumstances, “the Miranda warnings he received” on February 15

“became stale” in the three days “between receiving them and [any]

incriminating statements he made to the police on” February 18 or

that other circumstances arose after Greene was informed of those

rights on February 15 which would have rendered his February 18

statements involuntary. Pender, 311 Ga. at 119 (5). Therefore,

29
“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not

err in its determination that” Greene’s February 18 statement was

“freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given or in its admission” of the

statement at trial. Id.

3. Greene also contends that the trial court erroneously

admitted other-acts evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)

(“Rule 404 (b)”). We conclude that the trial court did not clearly

abuse its discretion in admitting this other-acts evidence at trial,

but even if certain of this evidence should not have been admitted,

any such error was harmless.

The other-acts evidence admitted at trial involved Greene’s

prior assaults by strangulation of his ex-girlfriends, Amber Clark

and Nadine Pirkle. Clark, who dated Greene in 2017, testified that,

when Greene got angry with her, he would strangle her —

explaining that it happened “so many” times she “couldn’t count”

and “[i]t would feel like [she] was about to die.” Clark testified that,

on one occasion, Greene got angry with her while he was driving her

car, and he pulled the car over on the side of the road, at which point

30
Clark exited the car and started running. Greene caught up with

Clark and strangled her to the point of unconsciousness, and while

she was unconscious, Greene stole Clark’s vehicle and left her on the

side of the road. When Clark woke up, she started walking, and a

police officer stopped and gave her a ride to a friend’s house. The

police officer testified at trial that Clark indicated there had been a

“physical altercation” with someone, but she “denied a report.”

Clark testified that she did not want to press charges because

Greene still had her car, and she was afraid of him. Pirkle also

testified that she dated Greene in 2000, and when he got angry with

her, he would strangle her — generally “grabb[ing] [her] from

behind.” Pirkle testified that Greene frequently “choked [her] till

[she] passed out,” and on one occasion, when Pirkle refused to give

Greene money from her tax refund, he “strangled [her] in front of

[her] mother.” Pirkle called the police, and the responding officer

testified that she arrested Greene and charged him with simple

battery.11

11 A certified copy of the indictment was admitted at trial, as well as

31
“We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence

pursuant to Rule 404 (b) for a clear abuse of discretion.” Hood v.

State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020). “Rule 404 (b) is a

rule of inclusion, but it does prohibit the introduction of other acts

evidence when it is offered for the sole purpose of showing a

defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Booth

v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682 (3) (804 SE2d 104) (2017). To that end,

“[i]t is well established that other acts evidence is not admissible ‘to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith,’” but “such evidence is admissible for other purposes,

including ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Hood, 309

Ga. at 499 (2) (quoting OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)).

A party offering evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) must
demonstrate three things: (1) that the evidence is
relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s
character; (2) that the evidence’s probative value is not
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3)
that sufficient proof exists for a jury to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the other act.

Greene’s guilty plea to simple battery.

32
Id.

Here, Greene does not argue that the State failed to satisfy its

burden under the third part of the test to show that he committed

the other acts against Clark and Pirkle. Therefore, we need only

examine the first and second parts of the test to determine whether

the other-acts evidence was relevant to an issue other than Greene’s

character and whether the probative value of the evidence was

“substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice.” Hood, 309 Ga. at

499 (2).

To determine whether evidence is “relevant to an issue in the

case other than the defendant’s character,” Kirby v. State, 304 Ga.

472, 479 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018), we apply OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule

401”), which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Greene argues

that relevance can only be established in this context where the

33
other act was committed with the same state of mind as the charged

crimes. Greene further argues that, because the intent required for

the other acts at issue was not the same as the offenses for which he

was charged — namely, malice murder by strangling Bryant and

theft by taking for stealing Bryant’s car12 — the other-acts evidence

was not relevant for any purpose except to impermissibly show

Greene’s propensity to commit criminal acts. We disagree and

conclude that the other-acts evidence was relevant to the issue of

Greene’s intent. Because Greene entered a plea of not guilty in this

case and did not take “affirmative steps to remove intent as an

issue,” Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 794 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 201)

(2022), he made intent “a material issue,” and “the State may prove

intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence absent affirmative steps

by the defendant to remove intent as an issue,” Hood, 309 Ga. at

499-500 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Naples v.

State, 308 Ga. 43, 51 (2) (838 SE2d 780) (2020) (“We have stated that

12 We note that Greene was also charged with felony murder predicated

on aggravated assault for causing the death of Bryant, irrespective of malice,
by strangling her.

34
a defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material

issue, and the State may prove intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b)

evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent

as an issue.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

As noted above, Greene was charged in this case with felony

murder predicated on aggravated assault for causing Bryant’s death

by strangling her and theft by taking for unlawfully taking Bryant’s

motor vehicle with the intent to deprive her of it. And “we may

consider whether the other acts were relevant to the issue of intent

on any of these offenses.” Booth, 301 Ga. at 683 (3). The charged

offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by

strangulation involved “similar intent,” id., to Greene’s prior acts of

strangulation against Clark and Pirkle — acts which could also have

constituted aggravated assaults by strangulation.13 The charged

offense of theft by taking for stealing Bryant’s car likewise involved

13 Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (3), “[a] person commits the offense
of aggravated assault when he or she assaults: . . . [w]ith any object, device, or
instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or
actually does result in strangulation . . . .”

35
“similar intent” to Greene’s theft of Clark’s vehicle after she passed

out from strangulation, which could also have constituted a theft by

taking. “The relevance of other acts evidence offered to show intent

is established when the prior act was committed with the same state

of mind as the charged crime.” Hood, 309 Ga. at 500 (2) (“Here, the

states of mind required for the charged offenses of aggravated

assault, aggravated battery, and armed robbery were the same as

the states of mind required for the uncharged DeKalb County

incident, which could constitute robbery, aggravated assault, and

aggravated battery. Therefore, the trial court did not err by ruling

that the other acts evidence was relevant to a matter other than

Hood’s character — her intent.”). Phrased another way, “evidence

that an accused committed an intentional act generally is relevant

to show . . . that the same defendant committed a similar act with

the same sort of intent.” Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 72 (2) (786 SE2d

633) (2016). See also Booth, 301 Ga. at 682-683 (3) (explaining that,

while the appellant “focuse[d] specifically on the intent required for

malice murder,” malice murder was “not the only crime for which he

36
was prosecuted in this case and thus for which the State was

required to prove intent”). Accordingly, because “the intent required

for the charged offense and other acts is the same, and intent is at

issue, the first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test [has been] satisfied.”

Id.

Having concluded that the other-acts evidence was relevant to

prove intent and met the first part of the Rule 404 (b) test, “the next

step is to weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect,”

Kirby, 304 Ga. at 481 (4) (a), which “requires the evaluation of the

other acts evidence under Rule 403,” Naples, 308 Ga. at 52 (2).

Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. In other words, other acts evidence should be
excluded if it constitutes matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
prejudicial effect. Factors to be considered in
determining the probative value of other act evidence
offered to prove intent include its overall similarity to the
charged crime, its temporal remoteness, and the
prosecutorial need for it.

Hood, 309 Ga. at 500-501 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).

37
As discussed above, the State was required to prove that

Greene intended to assault Bryant by strangling her and to take

Bryant’s car with the intention of depriving her of this property.

And the other-acts evidence related to Clark “was highly probative”

on those points “given the overall similarities between the offenses,

their temporal proximity, and the prosecution’s need for them.”

Hounkpatin, 313 Ga. at 795 (2) (a). The evidence shows that

Greene’s acts of strangling Clark were “the same type of act alleged

to have caused [Bryant’s] death.” Id. And, while Clark did not

ultimately die as a result of the assaults by strangulation and

Greene generally used his hands or arm as an instrument — as

opposed to a ligature of some kind — when strangling her, see OCGA

§ 16-5-21 (a) (3), these differences do not alter the striking

similarities in Greene’s mental state and intent in engaging in these

acts of strangulation. Additionally, with respect to the theft by

taking charge in this case, the other-acts evidence established that,

on at least one occasion after Greene strangled Clark and she passed

out, he stole her car and left her on the side of the road. Bryant’s

38
car was also stolen after she was strangled and left on the side of the

road, and her car was later found in Greene’s possession.

The similarities between the acts of strangling Clark and

taking her property — i.e., her car — with the intent to deprive her

of said property and the theft of Bryant’s car following her death by

strangulation were substantial. And, “[w]hen other act evidence is

introduced to prove intent, [ ] a lesser degree of similarity between

the charged crime and the extrinsic evidence is required” than when

it is used to prove identity. Kirby, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i) (citation

and punctuation omitted). As for temporal proximity, the crimes

charged in this case occurred two years after Greene’s violent

strangulation of Clark and consequent theft of her car. Given this

timeframe and the significant similarities between the Clark

incidents and the crimes at issue, the incidents involving Clark were

highly probative. See Hood, 309 Ga. at 501 (2). And, even if the

other-acts evidence involving Clark was not “critical to the State’s

prosecution,” the other-acts evidence proved that Greene acted with

intent in assaulting Bryant by strangling her and unlawfully taking

39
her car with the intent to deprive her of this property. Hounkpatin,

313 Ga. at 796 (2) (a). See also Olds, 299 Ga. at 75 (concluding that

the “probative value of evidence derives in large part from the extent

to which the evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more or

less probable,” and “the greater the tendency to make the existence

of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value”).

We recognize that the other-acts evidence related to Clark was

also certainly prejudicial to Greene, particularly since he was not

charged with any crimes arising from his assaults on Clark or the

theft of her car, which can increase the prejudicial impact of this

evidence. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 105 (786 SE2d 648) (2016)

(noting that the danger of admitting extrinsic offense evidence is

greater where “the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a prior

conviction” because “the jury may feel that the defendant should be

punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense

charged”). However, “Rule 403’s exclusionary force is meant to be

applied sparingly — primarily when the other-acts evidence has

scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the

40
sake of its prejudicial effect.” Hounkpatin, 313 Ga. at 796 (2) (a)

(citations and punctuation omitted). “Given the substantial

probative value” of this other-acts evidence in proving Greene’s

intent, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that unfair prejudice” to Greene did not “substantially outweigh it.”

Id. at 797 (2) (a).

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the other-acts

evidence involving Clark “was not a matter of scant or cumulative

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

effect,” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i) (citation and punctuation

omitted), and we cannot say that the probative value of this other-

acts evidence “was so outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted it,” Hood,

309 Ga. at 501 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Turning to the trial court’s admission of Greene’s violent acts

toward Pirkle, we conclude that, because these acts occurred 19

years before the charged crimes, they were too remote in time to

have much, if any, evidentiary value, but any error in admitting this

41
evidence was harmless.

The test for determining whether a nonconstitutional
evidentiary error was harmless is whether it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
In conducting this harmless-error review, we review the
record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done[.]

Tiraboschi v. State, 312 Ga. 198, 200 (2) (862 SE2d 276) (2021)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

As discussed above in Division 1, the evidence of Greene’s guilt,

“aside from the other acts evidence” related to Pirkle, was “strong.”

Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. 176, 184 (3) (839 SE2d 599) (2020).

Greene’s DNA was found underneath Bryant’s fingernails and

inside her vaginal area — demonstrating that Greene had physical

and sexual contact with Bryant, despite his statements to the

contrary. And Greene had healing scratch marks on his hands

during his first interview with law enforcement. Bryant also had

abrasions on her hands at the time of her death, indicating a

struggle with someone. Greene was in sole possession of Bryant’s

car as of the night she was killed, which was confirmed by several

42
witnesses who saw him in the car on the night of the murder and in

the days afterward, and Greene purchased a headlight bulb for a car

of the same make and model as Bryant’s on the day Bryant’s body

was discovered. Additionally, Greene gave hours of conflicting

statements to law enforcement about his activities and whereabouts

on January 24 and 25, which were videotaped and played for the

jury. In his final account, Greene admitted to being present for

Bryant’s murder and the disposal of her body, but insisted that Lee

— who had an alibi — was the person who killed her. Greene then

took law enforcement officers to the location of Bryant’s murder —

a location he knew well.

Moreover, before the State presented the other-acts evidence

and again during the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury

that it could consider the other-acts evidence only for certain limited

purposes, including Greene’s alleged intent to commit the crimes for

which he was charged, but the jury was not permitted to consider

the other-acts evidence for any other purpose — to include inferring

that Greene was of the character to commit these other acts. The

43
trial court also emphasized that Greene was on trial only for the

offenses charged in this case and not for any other act.

“[A]lthough the trial court’s limiting instructions did not

meaningfully explain” the only “permissible purpose” for which this

evidence was relevant, the instructions “did, at least, tell the jury

what it could not do,” which was to “infer from such evidence that

the accused is of a character that would commit such crimes. . . .

[W]e have held that this sort of admonition can lower the risk that

the jury will convict for the wrong reasons.” Nundra v. State, 316

Ga. 1, 8 (2) (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

To be clear: because these instructions [were overly broad
as to] the permissible purposes for which the evidence
could be considered, they do not have the same mitigating
effect that we have found in other cases where the trial
judge specifically [and appropriately] instructed the jury
on which Rule 404 (b) purposes could be considered.

Id. “Even so, the trial court’s admonition that the jury may not infer

from such evidence that the accused is of a character that would

commit such crimes reduces the likelihood that the evidence” of

44
Greene’s prior acts “influenced the verdict.” Id. at 8-9 (2)

(punctuation omitted).

Given the substantial evidence of guilt in this case, including

the other-acts evidence involving Clark, we conclude that “it is

highly probable” that any error in admitting the other-acts evidence

involving Pirkle was harmless and did not contribute to the jury’s

guilty verdicts against Greene, Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 81 (2)

(c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019), and we need not decide whether it was

error for the trial court to admit the other-acts evidence for purposes

other than proving Greene’s intent. See Tiraboschi, 312 Ga. at 200

(2) (“We need not decide whether this evidence was erroneously

admitted, because any such error was harmless.”). Therefore, this

contention fails.

4. Greene next contends that the trial court erred by admitting

autopsy photographs into evidence that were overly graphic and

unduly prejudicial. We see no merit to this contention.

“[W]e generally evaluate the admissibility of autopsy

photographs under OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403.”

45
Mitchell v. State, 307 Ga. 855, 863 (3) (b) (838 SE2d 847) (2020).

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-402, “[a]ll relevant evidence
shall be admissible[.]” To evaluate relevancy, this Court
relies on OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”
However, relevant evidence may be excluded
under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. The
major function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or
cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the
sake of its prejudicial effect. Moreover, the exclusion of
relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary
remedy that should be used only sparingly.

Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 527 (4) (852 SE2d 509) (2020) (citations

and punctuation omitted).

Before the medical examiner testified at trial, the State

advised the trial court of its intention to introduce autopsy

photographs — some of which were graphic in nature — and Greene

objected. The trial court then excused the jury and reviewed the

photographs the State sought to admit, which reflected traumatic

46
injuries to the exterior and interior of the victim’s neck and scalp —

including contusions and other extensive bruising — and injuries to

the exterior surfaces of the victim’s hands and vagina, including skin

abrasions and vaginal tearing. The trial court questioned the

medical examiner outside the presence of the jury about whether the

photographs were “necessary” to his presentation of the evidence

regarding the injuries to the victim.

The medical examiner testified that the photographs were

necessary because the deep tissue damage and interior injuries to

the victim’s neck and scalp could not be reflected without peeling

back the tissue in the neck and scalp area to demonstrate the extent

of her injuries, which included hemorrhaging caused by ligature

strangulation and blunt force trauma. And the tearing and

abrasions in the victim’s vaginal area — consistent with “sexual

penetration” — could not be shown without moving the skin to

adequately reflect the external components of that area. The

medical examiner also testified that “photographs are always

helpful to explain what people aren’t used to seeing.” The trial court

47
then admitted the photographs, concluding that they were necessary

to depict injuries that would be visible only by altering the body.

“Given the medical examiner’s testimony, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the autopsy

photograph[s] [were] relevant under Rule 401’s broad definition.”

Mitchell, 307 Ga. at 864 (3) (b). The trial court also determined that

the photographs were necessary for the medical examiner to explain

Bryant’s injuries, and we cannot say, based upon this finding, that

“the trial court abused its [discretion] in admitting into evidence the

autopsy photograph[s] at issue here.” Id. at 865 (3) (b). “Further,

the photographs were relevant to show the nature and location of

the victim[’s] wounds, which corroborated the State’s evidence of the

circumstances of the killing[ ].” Lanier, 310 Ga. at 527-528 (4).

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

the challenged photographs at trial. See id. at 528 (4).

5. Greene also argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in allowing the State to introduce harmful and non-probative

evidence to the jury from Greene’s cell phone showing that he

48
conducted two Internet searches for rape because he was not

charged with rape in this case. During trial, the State sought to

introduce a photograph of Greene’s cell phone browser history

showing that he conducted two Internet searches related to rape14

on January 23 and 24, 2019 — the day before and day of Bryant’s

murder. The State argued that the fact Greene conducted these

Internet searches “help[ed] explain[ ] what’s going on here in this

particular crime.” Greene objected to the introduction of the

photograph of this search history from his cell phone. The trial court

excused the jury and reviewed the evidence in question. The trial

court determined that the photograph of Greene’s cell phone

showing Greene conducted two Internet searches, identified on his

phone as “‘Rape’ Search,” was admissible as intrinsic evidence, and

the photograph was admitted into evidence through the law

enforcement officer who conducted the forensics download of

Greene’s cell phone.

14 The precise time of the searches was not included in the cell phone

data.

49
Assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting this photograph of Greene’s cell phone into evidence, we

conclude that any such abuse of discretion was harmless error and

“requires reversal only if it harms” Greene’s “substantial rights.”

Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 238 (2) (c) (880 SE2d 501) (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

[W]e determine whether such harm occurred by asking
whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. As part of that determination,
we review all the evidence de novo, after setting aside the
evidence admitted in error, and we weigh the remaining
evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done[.]

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).

As detailed in Divisions 1 and 3, the evidence of Greene’s guilt

in this case, apart from the photograph showing the two Internet

searches, was strong. “In light of this very strong evidence, it is

highly probable” that the photographic evidence of the Internet

search history from Greene’s cell phone, while not helpful to Greene,

“did not contribute to the verdicts.” Roberts, 315 Ga. at 239 (2) (c).

As such, in light of the other strong evidence presented against

50
Greene at trial, any error in the trial court’s admission of this

evidence was harmless.

6. Greene contends that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on mere presence and corroboration of a

defendant’s statement as he requested.15 However, the record

reflects that, at the conclusion of the charge to the jury, Greene’s

trial counsel did not object to the omission of these charges, and

thus, our “review of the trial court’s instructions is for plain error

only.” Palencia v. State, 313 Ga. 625, 627 (872 SE2d 681) (2022).

To establish plain error in regard to jury instructions, Greene

must satisfy the following four prongs:

15 Greene requested the pattern charge on “mere presence,” tracking the

following language from Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 19 (1) (635 SE2d
325) (2006):
A jury is not authorized to find a person who was merely
present at the scene of a commission of a crime at the time of its
perpetration guilty of consent in and concurrence in the
commission of the crime, unless the evidence shows, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that such person committed the actual crime,
helped in the actual perpetration of the crime, or participated in
the criminal endeavor.
Greene also requested the following charge on corroboration: “A
defendant’s statement unsupported by any other evidence is not sufficient to
justify a conviction.”

51
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort
of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Palencia, 313 Ga. at 627 (citing State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a)

(718 SE2d 232) (2011)). “Satisfying all four prongs of this standard

is difficult, as it should be.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

During the charge conference, the trial court explained that it

would not give a charge on mere presence unless Greene could point

to case law showing that the charge was legally required in this case.

Additionally, the trial court advised that it would not give the

corroboration charge because Greene had not given a confession, and

Greene would “need to find” a case stating that the trial court was

52
required to give such a charge under those circumstances. The

following day, Greene informed the trial court that he could not find

any case law mandating that the trial court give a charge on mere

presence, but he stated that “our request is still obviously in effect.”

Greene did not mention his prior request to charge on corroboration

of a defendant’s statement or provide any case law demonstrating

that such a charge was appropriate where a defendant has not given

a confession. The trial court did not instruct the jury on mere

presence or corroboration, and as noted above, Greene did not object

at the conclusion of the jury charge.

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly or obviously err

in refusing to charge the jury on corroboration because Greene did

not confess to committing the crimes charged. See OCGA § 24-8-823

(providing that “[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other

evidence, shall not justify a conviction”). See also English v. State,

300 Ga. 471, 474 (2) (796 SE2d 258) (2017) (determining that “in a

confession, the entire criminal act is confessed” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). We further conclude that a failure to give a

53
mere presence instruction is not error where, as here, the trial court

instructed the jury that the State was required to prove each

element of the crimes charged. See Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183,

188 (14) (646 SE2d 55) (2007) (“[M]ere presence is only a corollary

to the requirement that the State prove each element of the crime

charged, and, as the trial court’s instructions clearly informed the

jury of this requirement, there was no error.”). However, even if the

trial court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury

on mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such

error likely affected the outcome of his trial,” and thus, “he has failed

to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (4) (883

SE2d 317) (2023).

As detailed above, the evidence presented by the State in this

case was substantial, and Greene “has not met his burden of

affirmatively showing that the [trial court’s] failure to give” a mere

presence instruction “probably affected the outcome of his trial.”

Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 320-321 (2) (800 SE2d 333) (2017).

Accordingly, even if there was clear and obvious error, “there is no

54
likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different

had the instruction in question been given, and, for this reason . . . ,

there is no plain error.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 34 (2) (b).

7. Finally, because we assumed error in the trial court’s

admission of the Rule 404 (b) evidence related to Pirkle and the

photograph of Greene’s cell phone showing his Internet search

history, we must consider whether the cumulative prejudicial

impact of these admissions requires a new trial. See State v. Lane,

308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). “To establish cumulative

error,” an appellant “must show that (1) at least two errors were

committed in the course of the trial; and (2) considered together

along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the

jury’s deliberation that they denied” the appellant a “fundamentally

fair trial.” Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 808 (2) (d) (860 SE2d 731)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Having considered the combined effect of the trial court’s errors

in this case, we conclude that they do not entitle Greene to a new

trial. In light of the harmlessness of the evidentiary errors in

55
question and in light of the other substantial evidence heard by the

jury in this case, which included: (1) Greene’s repeated denials that

he ever touched Bryant, when his DNA was found both underneath

her fingernails and in her vaginal area; (2) his possession of her car

on the night of her murder; and (3) his multiple, conflicting

statements to law enforcement — first insisting he did not know

about Bryant’s death, then stating that he was present for Bryant’s

murder — statements the jury was entitled to disbelieve; “it is

highly probable that the error[s] did not contribute to the verdict.”

Lane, 308 Ga. at 21 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Additionally, Greene has not shown that “the multiple errors so

infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied” him a

“fundamentally fair trial.” Flood, 311 Ga. at 808 (2) (d) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,
who concurs in judgment only in Division 4, and Peterson, P. J., and
Warren and Pinson, JJ., who dissent.

56
PETERSON, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

I generally agree with the majority’s legal conclusions.

Unfortunately, I find myself unable to agree with its more fact-

bound conclusions. I therefore respectfully dissent.

A proper Rule 403 analysis would have excluded the Clark Rule

404 (b) evidence. The majority overstates the prosecutorial need for

that evidence (and thus its probative value); although intent was

technically put at issue by Greene’s not guilty plea, it was not an

important issue in the case. Greene’s defense was that he didn’t do

the crime at all, not that he did the act alleged but without culpable

intent. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-76 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016)

(clarifying previous case law to explain that while intent was always

technically at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty, that does

not mean that intent is an important issue in every such case). And

the majority substantially overstates the mitigating impact of a

“limiting” instruction that affirmatively told the jurors that they

could consider the evidence for a range of impermissible purposes,

57
including motive, identity, and absence of harm or mistake

(purposes that the majority does not contend were permissible).

And the majority is correct that the Rule 404 (b) evidence was

“certainly prejudicial.” It told the jury that Greene regularly

strangled women, the crime with which he was charged here. The

jurors were expressly instructed that they could consider that

evidence of identity — i.e., that strangling was such a signature

crime of his that the fact this victim was strangled was evidence he

did it.16 The Rule 404 (b) evidence also told the jury that he had not

previously been held criminally responsible for some of those prior

attacks, including because one of the victims was afraid of him. The

majority merely acknowledges that there is a greater danger in

admitting such evidence without explaining what the danger is; the

16 Evidence admitted for identity under Rule 404 (b) “must be a
‘signature’ crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is
uniquely his. . . . Evidence cannot be used to prove identity simply because the
defendant has at other times committed the same commonplace variety of
criminal act.” Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 725 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted); see also Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 443,
447-48 (1) (870 SE2d 397) (2022) (same). That is absent here, of course; the
Rule 404 (b) evidence showed that Greene strangled Clark and Pirkle with his
hands, and the victim here was strangled with an instrument.

58
danger is that there was a high risk that the jury would convict

Greene not for the charged offense but for the extrinsic acts. See

Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 485 (4) (a) (i) (819 SE2d 468) (2018)

(“[T]he risk that a jury may convict a defendant not for the offense

charged but for his extrinsic conduct is greater where the extrinsic

conduct was not already the subject of a conviction.”).

The majority presumes that admission of the Pirkle Rule 404

(b) evidence and Greene’s search for rape pornography were error;

in my view, they were in fact error.17 A cumulative harm

assessment, then, must consider the harm of the Clark evidence, the

Pirkle evidence, and the search for rape pornography. And that

assessment must also recognize that because those errors were

preserved by trial counsel, the State bears the burden of showing

that those errors, in combination, were highly probable not to have

17 Underlying much of the State’s case was at least a subtext of sexual

assault. But Greene was not charged with any sexual offense. Although the
State’s medical examiner who conducted an autopsy of the victim testified that
the victim had injuries to her vagina, when asked whether he could “say
whether that penetration’s consensual or nonconsensual,” the medical
examiner responded, “I cannot.”

59
contributed to the verdict. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 81 (2)

(c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019).

The State has not made that showing. Although the majority

characterizes the evidence against Greene as “very strong,” almost

all of it was circumstantial. The strongest evidence, I think, was the

evidence of the scrapes on Greene’s hands and the presence of his

DNA under the victim’s fingernails. In my view, the evidence

against him was plainly sufficient for federal due process purposes.

But constitutional sufficiency is a much lower bar than a showing of

harmlessness.

Standing alone, the Rule 404 (b) evidence was certainly

prejudicial, but the cumulative impact of the evidence was

heightened because it portrayed Greene not just as a strangler, but

as a serial strangler who had been committing violent crimes for

almost 20 years. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at 486 (4) (a) (ii) (the resulting

prejudice from the Rule 404 (b) evidence substantially outweighed

its scant probative value because the evidence suggested the

defendant was a serial criminal who kept committing dangerous

60
crimes). And the search for rape pornography additionally painted

him (quite possibly accurately, albeit irrelevant to any charge here)

as someone who enjoyed harming women sexually.

All of this was powerful. And we have no idea how the State

used it, because closing arguments were not transcribed.18 But it is

not reasonable to assume that this powerful evidence would not have

been used to significant advantage for those impermissible purposes

that the jury was instructed the State could use it. “Where

evidentiary error is deemed harmless, it is often true that the

evidence was only ‘marginal’ to the prosecution’s case.” Thompson v.

State, 302 Ga. 533, 542 (III) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017) (quoting

Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 277, 280 (800 SE2d 545) (2017)); compare

Jackson, 306 Ga. at 80 (2) (c) (holding Rule 404 (b) evidence

harmless even in absence of transcript because the “prosecutor did

18 In briefing on appeal, both the District Attorney’s Office that tried the

case and the Attorney General focus their arguments regarding the other-acts
evidence as being admissible for the purpose of establishing identity, arguing
that identity was the central issue in the case because Greene denied killing
the victim, there were no eyewitnesses to the incident, no one could place
Greene at the scene of the crime, and the murder weapon was never found.

61
not need to rely on the [Rule 404 (b) evidence] in his closing

argument, because there was solid direct evidence” and “compelling

circumstantial evidence”). The State has not shown that this

powerful, inadmissible evidence was highly probable not to have

contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice Warren and Justice

Pinson join in this dissent.

Decided June 21, 2023.

Murder. Douglas Superior Court. Before Judge McClain.

James K. Luttrell, for appellant.

Dalia Racine, District Attorney, Aimee F. Sobhani, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attorney General, for

appellee.

62