COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY

318 Ga. 29
FINAL COPY

S22G1146. COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY et al.

LAGRUA, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to decide two issues: first,

whether official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the

purported negligent use of a covered motor vehicle are “claims

against counties” as that phrase is used in OCGA § 36-11-1;1 and

second, if OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to claims of this nature, whether

presentment of such a claim to the county commission satisfies a

claimant’s duty under this statute. The Court of Appeals concluded

that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to such claims, but held that, to

comply with the statute, a claimant must present her claim to the

county sheriff, not the county commission. See Collington v. Clayton,

—————————————————————
1 OCGA § 36-11-1 provides that “[a]ll claims against counties must be

presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same
are barred, provided that minors or other persons laboring under disabilities
shall be allowed 12 months after the removal of the disability to present their
claims.”
364 Ga. App. XXV (Case No. A22A0379) (June 2, 2022)

(unpublished). While we agree with the Court of Appeals that OCGA

§ 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff

for the purported negligent use of a covered motor vehicle, we

overrule a line of Court of Appeals case law holding that, to comply

with the requirements of OCGA § 36-11-1, a claimant is required to

present her claim to the county sheriff, as opposed to the county

governing authority. Instead, we hold that, because a claim against

a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a

covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-

11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority

satisfies the statute’s presentment requirement. We therefore affirm

in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History

The relevant facts, as drawn from the allegations in the

complaint and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

are as follows:

2
On August 30, 2018, Mary Collington was operating her vehicle

on State Route 85 in Clayton County when she was involved in a

motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton

County Sheriff’s Department, who was operating a 2015 Dodge

Charger owned by Clayton County. It is undisputed that Deputy

Curney was acting in the scope of his official duties as a deputy

sheriff at the time of the collision.

Based on the description of Deputy Curney’s vehicle in the

accident report — i.e., “2015 Dodge Charger Police” — Collington

was initially under the impression that Deputy Curney was a

Clayton County police officer. Accordingly, on February 12, 2019,

Collington’s attorney sent notice of her claims via certified mail to

the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County

Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County.

Thereafter, on October 21, 2019, Collington filed a lawsuit against

Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries in an

automobile accident caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney,

3
who was driving a county-owned vehicle and acting in the course

and scope of his employment with Clayton County at the time of the

accident. Clayton County moved to dismiss the complaint on the

basis that the County did not employ Deputy Curney and was not

liable for his actions. On December 1, 2020, Collington voluntarily

dismissed the action.

On December 21, 2020, Collington filed a renewed complaint

pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61 (a)2 against Deputy Curney, Clayton

County, and Victor Hill, in his capacity as the Sheriff of Clayton

County (the “Sheriff”)3 (collectively the “Defendants”) in the State

—————————————————————
2 This statute provides:

When any case has been commenced in either a state or
federal court within the applicable statute of limitations and the
plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be
recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court either
within the original applicable period of limitations or within six
months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later,
subject to the requirement of payment of costs in the original
action as required by subsection (d) of Code Section 9-11-41;
provided, however, if the dismissal or discontinuance occurs after
the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, this privilege
of renewal shall be exercised only once.
OCGA § 9-2-61 (a). Collington asserts that the renewal lawsuit was filed within
the original two-year statute of limitation as extended by this Court’s COVID-
19 Judicial Emergency Orders.
3 Victor Hill was removed from office during the pendency of this

4
Court of Clayton County. On February 12, 2021, the Defendants

filed a consolidated motion to dismiss Collington’s complaint,

arguing that: (1) Deputy Curney was an improper party pursuant to

OCGA § 36-92-3 because this statute forecloses claims against a

deputy in his individual capacity for torts allegedly committed while

he was operating a covered motor vehicle in the performance of his

official duties;4 (2) Clayton County was not a proper party under

—————————————————————
litigation. Sheriff Levon Allen now serves as the Sheriff of Clayton County.
4 The pertinent portions of OCGA § 36-92-3 provide as follows:

(a) Any local government officer or employee who commits a
tort involving the use of a covered motor vehicle while in the
performance of his or her official duties is not subject to lawsuit or
liability therefor. Nothing in this chapter, however, shall be
construed to give the local government officer or employee
immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the local
government officer’s or employee’s conduct was not within the
performance of his or her official duties.
(b) A person bringing an action against a local government
entity under the provisions of this chapter shall name as a party
defendant the local government entity for which the officer or
employee was acting and shall not name the local government
officer or employee individually. In the event that the local
government officer or employee is individually named for an act
for which the local government entity is liable under this chapter,
the local government entity for which the local government officer
or employee was acting shall be substituted as the party
defendant.
OCGA § 36-92-3 (a) and (b).
5
OCGA § 36-92-3 (b) because the County did not employ Deputy

Curney and could not be liable for his actions; and (3) Collington’s

claims against the Sheriff were barred by sovereign immunity

because, while Collington timely presented notice of her claims to

Clayton County and its Board of Commissioners, Collington failed

to submit timely notice of her claims to the Sheriff pursuant to

OCGA § 36-11-1.

In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Collington

conceded that, because OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq. was amended after

the subject collision occurred,5 her claims against Deputy Curney in

his individual capacity were improper and should be dismissed. See

OCGA § 36-92-3 (a). Collington further asserted that the

amendments to OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq., as well as then-Presiding

Justice Nahmias’s concurrence in Mendez v. Moats, 310 Ga. 114, 124

(3) (a) (852 SE2d 816) (2020) (Nahmias, P. J., concurring), suggested

that Clayton County may be a proper party to be sued. Finally,

—————————————————————
5 The amendments to OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq. went into effect in July

2019.
6
Collington asserted that, with respect to her claims against the

Sheriff, if the trial court were to conclude that the Sheriff was the

proper defendant, then presenting notice of her claims to Clayton

County should be deemed sufficient under OCGA § 36-11-1. While

Collington admitted that she did not present notice directly to the

Sheriff, she argued that the Mendez concurrence called into question

whether the presentment notice even applied to claims involving

sheriff’s deputies, and if so, whether notice to the relevant county

commission for claims against the sheriff satisfied that notice

requirement. See id. Collington also argued that the Mendez

concurrence seemed to conclude that there was no justification for

holding that OCGA § 36-11-1 required “a plaintiff to present his

official-capacity claims against a sheriff to the sheriff instead of the

county governing authority,” id. at 123 (3) (a), and that presentment

of the notice to the “county governing authority” should be sufficient

to comply with the statute. Id. at 125 (3) (a). Collington thus asserted

that, even assuming the notice requirement applied in a case like

7
this one, she provided notice to Clayton County, which was sufficient

under the analysis in the Mendez concurrence. See id.

On June 9, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that: (1) Collington’s

claims against Deputy Curney should be dismissed under OCGA §

36-92-3 (a); (2) Collington’s claims against Clayton County should

be dismissed because the conduct giving rise to Collington’s injury

was committed by a deputy sheriff, not a county officer or employee;

and (3) Collington’s claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed

because Collington “failed to present a timely . . . notice to the

Sheriff’s office pursuant to OCGA § 36-11-1.” Collington filed a

timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.6

On June 2, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued a decision7

affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s claims against

the Sheriff, vacating the dismissal of Collington’s claims against the

County, and remanding the case with direction. See Collington, 364

—————————————————————
6 Collington did not appeal the trial court’s dismissal of Deputy Curney.
7 The Court of Appeals’s opinion is unpublished.

8
Ga. App. XXV, supra. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the

claims against the Sheriff, the Court of Appeals determined that

Collington did not present notice of her claims to the Sheriff as

required by OCGA § 36-11-1, and thus, she could not proceed with

those claims. In vacating the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s

claims against Clayton County, the Court of Appeals noted that, in

responding to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the trial court,

Collington contended that Clayton County might be the proper party

to be sued if the 2019 amendments to OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq. were

applicable in the present case. The Court of Appeals determined

that, because the trial court did not address or issue a definitive

ruling on that question, the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s

claims against Clayton County should be vacated. The Court of

Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to rule on whether

Clayton County was a proper defendant in this case.8

—————————————————————
8 We do not decide who the proper defendant is to be sued in this case.

We granted certiorari to decide two limited issues — whether OCGA § 36-11-
1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent
use of a covered motor vehicle, and if so, whether the proper presentment of
9
Collington then filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in this

Court.9 We granted certiorari to address whether OCGA § 36-11-

1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the

negligent use of a covered motor vehicle, and if so, whether the

proper presentment of such claims to the county commission

satisfies the claimant’s duty under the statute.

2. Analysis

(a) The answer to the first question is yes — OCGA § 36-11-1

applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the

negligent use of a covered motor vehicle because such a claim is a

claim against the county itself. As explained below, this question is

one of statutory construction, and critical to the question of

construction here is the historical context of OCGA § 36-11-1,

including the legal context against which the statutory language

was enacted. See Camp v. Williams, 314 Ga. 699, 703 (2) (b) (879

—————————————————————
such claims to the county commission satisfies the claimant’s duty under the
statute.
9 Clayton County also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on June 22,

2022, which we denied.
10
SE2d 88) (2022). In other words, discerning the meaning of OCGA §

36-11-1 requires us to determine whether, when this statute was

enacted, “claims against counties” would have been understood to

include official-capacity claims against the appropriate county

officials.

“When construing a statute, we must presume that the General

Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Bell v.

Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30, 32 (2) (867 SE2d 101) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “Accordingly, we afford the statutory text its

plain and ordinary meaning, viewing the statutory text in the

context in which it appears, and reading the statutory text in its

most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the

English language would.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

“[A]s we have said many times before when interpreting legal text,

we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context.” Camp, 314

Ga. at 703 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). So, “even if

words are apparently plain in meaning, they must not be read in

11
isolation and instead, must be read in the context of the [statute] as

a whole.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “The primary

determinant of a text’s meaning is its context, which includes the

structure and history of the text and the broader context in which

that text was enacted, including statutory and decisional law that

forms the legal background of the written text.” City of Guyton v.

Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3) (828 SE2d 366) (2019).

The text of OCGA § 36-11-1 is brief: in pertinent part, it

provides that “[a]ll claims against counties must be presented within

12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are

barred[.]” Id. First enacted in 1860, “[t]he statutory presentment

requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 has been a part of our law for more

than 150 years.” Croy v. Whitfield County, 301 Ga. 380, 381 (2) (801

SE2d 892) (2017). See Code 1863, § 479 (providing that “[a]ll claims

against counties must be presented within twelve months after they

accrue or become payable, or the same are barred . . .”). And the

presentment statute was last amended, without material change, in

12
1933. See Code 1933, § 23-1602 (providing that “[a]ll claims against

counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or

become payable, or the same are barred . . .”).

To begin, we look to decisions issued by this Court in and

around the time the presentment statute was enacted in 1860 to

ascertain how the statute was then understood. See Elliott v. State,

305 Ga. 179, 182 (II) (A) (824 SE2d 265) (2019) (examining the

“original public meaning” of a constitutional or statutory provision

is “an interpretive principle” that we apply to discern how the

provision was understood at the time it was adopted).10 At that time,

claims against counties could only be brought in accordance with

strict statutory guidelines — guidelines which instituted a “uniform

practice” of naming “the person or persons charged with the duty of

attending to the affairs of the county [as] the defendant or

defendants to the suits.” Conyers v. Commrs. of Roads and Revenues

—————————————————————
10 In looking to these cases, we acknowledge that many of them were
decided in different contexts. But, because they were cases decided around the
time that the presentment statute was enacted, they are useful evidence of the
meaning of the language of that statute.
13
of Bartow County, 116 Ga. 101, 103 (42 SE 419) (1902). Initially,

“[t]he proper way to sue the county” was “to proceed against the

inferior court of the county.” Id. at 102 (citing Irwin’s Code 1867, §

526). However, “[t]he inferior courts were abolished by the

constitution of 1868,” and in 1872, the General Assembly “passed an

act” providing that “the proper way to sue a county would be to sue

either the ordinary or the board of county commissioners, as the case

might be, in their official capacity.” Id. at 103.

Several other cases issued by the Court during that timeframe

similarly suggested that bringing claims against the appropriate

government officials in their official capacities was a recognized way

to proceed against a governmental entity — be it the State or one of

its counties. See, e.g., Western & Atlantic R. v. Carlton, 28 Ga. 180,

182-183 (2)-(3) (1859) (noting that, where the State embarked on an

enterprise to run a railroad and a plaintiff suffered damages to

property being carried by the railroad, the plaintiff could “present

[its claims] for settlement to the superintendent of the railroad” as

14
an agent of the State and “bring suit against the superintendent of

the railroad” to recover for its damages); Southern Mining Co. v.

Lowe, 105 Ga. 352, 354-356 (31 SE 191) (1898) (noting that, in a

lawsuit filed against the prison commissioners of Georgia where the

plaintiff sought to enjoin the commissioners from entering into a

contract for the hiring of penitentiary convicts, the commissioners

had been “sued as officials, having no personal interest in the

subject-matter of the suit,” and thus, “[t]he injunction sought, if

granted, would be against representatives of the State in their

official capacity, and therefore neither more nor less than a judicial

proceeding against the State itself”); Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga.

691, 694-695 (1) (1 SE2d 713) (1939) (holding that a lawsuit filed

against the commissioner of agriculture in his official capacity

seeking an accounting and injunction was a suit against the State

itself).

In Roberts, the Court observed that “[i]t is difficult to describe

in advance every action or suit against an officer or agent of the

15
State that should be classified as an action against the State.”

Roberts, 187 Ga. at 695 (2). Thus, in an effort to provide some

guidance, the Roberts Court explained that

[t]he general rule that is applicable in all cases is that any
case, regardless of who are named parties thereto, that
could result in a judgment or decree that would in any
manner affect or control the property or action of the
State, in a manner not prescribed by statute, is a suit
against the State[.]

Id. The Court expounded upon this rule, noting that, in Roberts, a

judgment was being sought against the commissioner of agriculture,

“not as an individual,” but as “an officer of the State.” Id. The Court

further noted that the commissioner of agriculture “owns no funds

or property out of which a judgment in this case could be satisfied[;]

[i]nstead, every asset of every nature held and possessed by him in

his official capacity is property of the State of Georgia.” Id. Thus, “a

judgment for the plaintiff . . . in the instant case, for any amount, if

satisfied at all, would be satisfied from the assets of the State, and

to the extent the State’s assets were used in this manner[,] the State

itself would be bound by the judgment.” Id.

16
Subsequent cases issued by this Court relied on the Roberts

rule to similarly conclude that, “[w]here a suit is brought against an

officer or agency of the State” and “the State, while not a party to

the record, is the real party against which relief is sought, so that a

judgment for the plaintiff . . . will operate to control the action of the

state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the

state.” Musgrove v. Ga. R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 155 (49 SE2d

26) (1948). See also, e.g., Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 330 (264

SE2d 878) (1980) (holding that “in instances where an officer or

agent of the [S]tate is sued in his official capacity” and “a judgment

can be rendered controlling the action or property of the State in a

manner not prescribed by statute,” any such suit “is a suit against

the State”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Gilbert v.

Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (noting that

“suits against public employees in their official capacities are in

reality suits against the state”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

17
As these precedents show, by the time the presentment statute

was enacted in 1860, it would have been understood that claims

against a government could include official capacity claims against

at least some of the government’s officials; this was inherent within

the meaning of the statute when it was adopted. That meaning is to

be applied in light of the ensuing precedent, which further developed

how and when suing a county official made the claims in that

lawsuit qualify as claims against the county itself. This development

was based — in part — on changes to the broader statutory context

in which the presentment statute operates. And all of that

contextual development leaves us today with a presentment statute

that, in requiring claims against counties to be presented within 12

months, is properly understood to apply to official capacity claims

against county officials, as well. See OCGA § 36-11-1.

The general rule articulated in Roberts also applies to official-

capacity claims filed against a county sheriff for losses arising from

the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. See OCGA § 36-92-1 et

18
seq. Sheriffs are county officials, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec.

I, Par. III, and generally, nothing about a sheriff’s relationship with

a county makes him or her different in kind for purposes of applying

the general rule. Additionally, local government entities —

including counties — are subject to liability for losses caused by the

“negligence of a local government entity officer or employee using a

covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties or

employment.” OCGA § 36-92-1 (1). And “[a] sheriff, deputy sheriff,

or other agent, servant, or employee of a sheriff’s office” is defined

as a “[l]ocal government officer or employee” for purposes of this

statute. OCGA § 36-92-1 (4) (B). Moreover, local governmental

entities — including counties — are the ones who provide for the

payment of claims, settlements, judgments, and the associated costs

arising out of losses caused by covered motor vehicles. See OCGA §

36-92-4 (a). And, here, the record reflects that Clayton County

owned the vehicle Deputy Curney was driving when the motor

vehicle accident at issue occurred. See OCGA § 36-92-1 (2) (A)

19
(providing that “[c]overed motor vehicle means: . . . [a]ny motor

vehicle owned by the local government entity”). Therefore, any

“judgment or decree” issued in this case would “affect or control the

property or action of” Clayton County and thus is a suit against the

County. Roberts, 187 Ga. at 695 (2).

Accordingly, we conclude that official-capacity claims against

a county sheriff for a deputy’s allegedly negligent use of a county-

owned vehicle are claims against the county itself, and thus, the

presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to such claims,

including Collington’s official-capacity claims against the Sheriff in

this case. See Mendez, 310 Ga. at 122 (2) (b).

(b) Turning to the second question before us, we also answer

this question in the affirmative — a claimant’s duty under OCGA §

36-11-1 is satisfied by presenting notice to the appropriate county

governing authority of her official-capacity claims against a county

sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. OCGA § 36-

11-1 “does not specify to whom presentment must be made,” and

20
“our appellate courts have consistently construed OCGA § 36-11-1

and its predecessors to require presentment of claims to the county

governing authority.” Mendez, 310 Ga. at 122 (3) (a) (citing Croy, 301

Ga. at 381 (2)). Before the Court of Appeals’s decision in Davis v.

Morrison, 344 Ga. App. 527, 532 (2) (810 SE2d 649) (2018), “no

Georgia court had ever held that the presentment of claims to the

county governing authority itself was inadequate to satisfy OCGA §

36-11-1, or that presentment to an entity other than the county

governing authority was required.” Mendez, 310 Ga. at 123 (3) (a).

“There is no justification for holding, contrary to more than a

century of precedent, that presentment of claims against counties

covered by OCGA § 36-11-1 to the county governing authority is

insufficient to comply with the statute,” Mendez, 310 Ga. at 125 (3)

(a), and we overrule any cases from the Court of Appeals holding

otherwise. See, e.g., Moats v. Mendez, 349 Ga. App. 811, 814 (2) (824

SE2d 808) (2019); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2). Because a claim

against a sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a

21
covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-

11-1, “presentment to the county governing authority of a claim to

which OCGA § 36-11-1 applies satisfies the statute’s presentment

requirement.”11 Mendez, 310 Ga. at 122 (3).

3. Conclusion

Accordingly, Collington’s timely presentment of notice of her

claims to the Clayton County Commissioners satisfied her burden

under OCGA § 36-11-1. We thus reverse in part the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand the case for the Court of Appeals to

direct the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the
Justices concur.

—————————————————————
11 We do not decide here whether presenting a claim to the Sheriff would

also satisfy the presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1.
22
Decided January 17, 2024.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 364 Ga. App.

XXV.

Penn Law, Darren W. Penn, John D. Hadden; Morgan &

Morgan Atlanta, R. Walker Garrett; Benjamin F. Windham, for

appellant.

Freeman Mathis & Gary, Jack R. Hancock, A. Ali Sabzevari,

Wesley C. Jackson, Jacob E. Daly, for appellees.

Charles M. Cork III; Walker Hulbert Gray & Moore, Kellye C.

Moore, amici curiae.

23