CourtListener 10680423

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321 Ga. 880
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S25A0062. ARNSDORFF v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Tony Arnsdorff and Scott Pinholster were jointly indicted but

separately tried for malice murder and other crimes related to the

death of Courtney Wells.1 The evidence at trial showed that days

1 Wells died on January 10, 2017. On March 19, 2018, an Effingham

County grand jury returned an indictment that charged both Pinholster and
Arnsdorff, individually and as parties to the crime, with malice murder (Count
1), felony murder (Counts 2, 3), aggravated assault (Counts 4, 5), aggravated
battery (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Counts 7-9), and concealing the death of another (Count 10), all arising from
the shooting death of Wells. Arnsdorff alone was charged with tampering with
evidence (Count 11).
Their trials were severed, and Arnsdorff alone was tried by a jury from
September 9-10, 2019, and found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced
Arnsdorff to life without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1)
followed by a consecutive term of ten years to serve in prison for concealing the
death of another (Count 10) and then a consecutive term of five years to serve
in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
7); he was also sentenced to a term of five years in prison for tampering with
evidence (Count 11) to be served concurrently with Count 10. The remaining
counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Arnsdorff timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later amended
through new counsel. After a hearing on October 13, 2021, the trial court de-
nied the motion for new trial, as amended, on October 24, 2022. On February
15, 2023, Arnsdorff moved to set aside that order because it had not been pro-
vided to his counsel until after the time to appeal had expired. The trial court
granted that motion and reissued the order denying the motion for new trial
before her death Wells got into an argument with Pinholster, with

whom she had a romantic relationship, and left Pinholster’s home to

stay with Arnsdorff for a few days. Then, when Arnsdorff tried to

take Wells back to Pinholster’s home, she refused to go and left

Arnsdorff, who drove to Pinholster’s home alone. Pinholster then

spent the next day trying to find where Wells had gone, all the while

remaining in constant contact with Arnsdorff. Once Pinholster

found out where Wells was staying, Arnsdorff hid in the back seat of

Pinholster’s truck when Pinholster picked Wells up, and he stayed

hidden until they reached a remote area. There, Arnsdorff revealed

himself and punched Wells in the face moments before Pinholster

retrieved a shotgun from the back seat (where Arnsdorff had just

on February 15, 2023. Arnsdorff thereafter filed a notice of appeal from that
order. But because the trial court did not vacate its October 24, 2022 order
before issuing the new one, this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. See
Arnsdorff v. State, Case No. S23A0819 (Ga. May 16, 2023). After the remittitur
was transmitted to the trial court, Arnsdorff filed a second motion to set aside
the order on his motion for new trial on July 10, 2023. On July 3, 2024, the
trial court entered an order that vacated the October 24, 2022 and February
15, 2023 orders and denied the motion for new trial as amended. Arnsdorff
filed a timely notice of appeal from that order on July 25, 2024. His appeal was
docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
been hiding) and shot Wells multiple times. Arnsdorff then helped

move Wells’s body from the roadway, did not report the crime, and

initially lied to the police about what he knew about Wells’s death.

On appeal Arnsdorff contends that his convictions should be

reversed because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he

caused Wells’s death or that he was a party to Pinholster’s crimes

against her. He also contends that the trial court plainly erred by

charging the jury on flight and by instructing the jury that

Arnsdorff’s statements should be received with “great care and cau-

tion.” Finally, he argues in the alternative that if the Court con-

cludes there was sufficient evidence to support his malice murder

conviction, the trial court erred by imposing a five-year felony sen-

tence instead of a misdemeanor sentence for tampering with evi-

dence (Count 11).

Each claim fails. When viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99

SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence of Arnsdorff’s conduct

3
before, during, and after Wells was shot was constitutionally suffi-

cient to show he was a party to the crimes of malice murder and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Even

viewing the evidence as reasonable jurors would instead, see John-

son v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 674 (1) n.2 (889 SE2d 914) (2023), the trial

court’s error in instructing the jury on flight likely did not affect

Arnsdorff’s substantial rights, so he has not shown plain error. He

also has not established plain error in regard to the instruction that

his out-of-court statements should be received with “great care and

caution” because he has not shown that giving this instruction was

a clear and obvious error. Finally, the trial court did not err by im-

posing a felony sentence for tampering with evidence.

1. Arnsdorff contends that there was not sufficient evidence

that he committed the crimes of malice murder and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony or that he was a party to

4
Pinholster’s commission of those crimes.2 Instead, he says the evi-

dence showed that Pinholster shot and killed Wells, and Arnsdorff

was merely present during the shooting.

In considering whether evidence was constitutionally sufficient

as a matter of federal due process, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict and evaluate whether the evidence au-

thorized rational jurors to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-

sonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Scoggins

v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 833 (1) (896 SE2d 476) (2023). A jury may find

a defendant guilty of a crime if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant directly committed the crime or if he was a “party

thereto,” meaning he “cause[d]” another person to commit the crime,

“aid[ed] or abet[ted]” its commission, or “[i]ntentionally advise[d],

encourage[d], hire[d], counsel[ed], or procure[d] another to commit

2 To the extent that Arnsdorff purports to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting Counts 2-6 and 8-9, those challenges are moot because
those counts either merged or were vacated by operation of law. See, e.g.,
Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 100 (2) n.2 (897 SE2d 368) (2024). And he does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of Count 10 (concealing
a body) or Count 11 (tampering with evidence), so we do not review them. See
Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). We ad-
dress the sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 1 and 7 only.
5
the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), (b) (1)-(4).

(a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evi-

dence at trial showed the following.

On January 15, 2017, the body of a deceased woman, later iden-

tified as Wells, was found 40 or 50 feet from a “really remote” dirt

road. It was later determined that Wells died from multiple shotgun

wounds to the head, neck, torso, and upper extremities. Various per-

sonal belongings were found near Wells’s body, including a letter

with her name on it that had been sent to the address where Pinhol-

ster lived. Investigators later learned that Wells had been in a ro-

mantic relationship with Pinholster.

The police executed a search warrant at Pinholster’s home and

located a fired Remington shotgun shell in a jewelry box, a wooden

box full of Remington and Rio shotgun shells, and two 12-gauge

shotguns, one of which was loaded with Rio shells. A Rio shell was

collected from the crime scene.

A GBI firearms and toolmarks examiner determined that both

the Rio shotgun shell collected near Wells’s body and the Remington

6
shotgun shell found in the jewelry box in Pinholster’s home were

fired from the same firearm. But they were not fired from either of

the shotguns found in Pinholster’s safe.

Soon after the police told Wells’s stepfather about her death,

Pinholster came to Wells’s stepfather’s home to give his condolences

even though Wells’s stepfather had been told he was the only person

outside of law enforcement who had been informed of the death.

Around the same time, Wells’s stepfather saw Arnsdorff driving a

four-wheeler “real slow” across the street. Wells’s stepfather had

seen Wells with Pinholster before and recognized Arnsdorff but did

not know him.

Wells’s brother spoke to Wells on the phone on the day she was

killed. She told him Arnsdorff had kicked her out of his truck and

was going to throw her belongings in a ditch near Wells’s family’s

home. This was the first time Wells had mentioned Arnsdorff to her

brother. Wells also wrote on Facebook that Arnsdorff had her be-

longings in his truck.

On the same day that Wells’s body was found, Sergeant John

7
Bradley of the Effingham County sheriff’s office spoke to Arnsdorff,

who denied knowing anything about Wells’s death. Two days later,

Arnsdorff was interviewed by Investigator Richard Beckum and told

Beckum he had been with Wells on January 8, 2017, until about

12:30 a.m. the next morning. Arnsdorff said that he and Wells had

gotten into an argument, and she left his home and started walking

down Highway 80; Arnsdorff said that was the last time he saw her.

Arnsdorff said that, after Wells left, he went to Pinholster’s home

“for a few minutes” and then to a home in Pembroke, Georgia, where

he stayed until 3:00 p.m. on January 9. Arnsdorff also said he had

“heard a lot of things” including that the Mexican Cartel was after

him and Wells and that the Ghost Face Gangsters were possibly in-

volved. Arnsdorff also gave a written statement that was consistent

with what he told Beckum, and the statement was admitted into

evidence and read to the jury.

Several months later, Sergeant Bradley and Erick Riner, a for-

mer investigator for the district attorney’s office, interviewed

8
Arnsdorff. Arnsdorff was not under arrest at the time of the inter-

view. Arnsdorff told them that Wells had been “in and out of his life

for a few years.” Arnsdorff said he was at Pinholster’s home when

Pinholster and Wells got into an argument. Wells then put her be-

longings in Arnsdorff’s truck, and Arnsdorff drove Wells to his home,

where they stayed for around three days.

Arnsdorff said he learned that Pinholster had a letter for Wells

and that he planned to drive Wells to Pinholster’s home to collect

the letter on January 8. But when Wells learned he was driving her

to Pinholster’s home, she got out of the truck and walked toward her

family’s home, and Arnsdorff continued to Pinholster’s home alone.

Wells’s belongings were still in Arnsdorff’s truck when he arrived at

Pinholster’s home, and Pinholster went through the belongings and

found items that belonged to his daughter and “got mad.” Pinholster

then took a .38-caliber revolver and “went looking for” Wells. While

Pinholster was looking for Wells, he remained in touch with

Arnsdorff. Meanwhile, Arnsdorff went to a hotel in Pembroke where

9
he said he smoked marijuana with another person, watched televi-

sion, and fell asleep.

At first, Arnsdorff told investigators that he did not have

“firsthand knowledge of what had happened to [Wells].” Arnsdorff’s

account “changed, however, as the interview continued.” He said

Pinholster told him he knew where Wells was and “ordered”

Arnsdorff to lie down in the back seat of the truck as Pinholster went

looking for Wells. Pinholster then drove the truck to a home where

he picked up Wells and then drove to a dirt road. Arnsdorff remained

in the back seat or floorboard of the truck as Pinholster drove. Wells

“started bad-mouthing Arnsdorff” (who was still hiding in the back

seat) and “telling lies about him,” so he sat up when Pinholster told

him to and “punched [Wells] in the mouth.” Arnsdorff also said that

Wells had a “photo of him on [her] cell phone that could be incrimi-

nating” and he wanted her to delete it.

According to Arnsdorff, Wells then got out of the truck, and he

moved to the front passenger seat. Pinholster then reached under

the back seat, pulled out a shotgun, positioned the shotgun across

10
Arnsdorff’s chest and out the passenger window, and fired at Wells

five or six times. After that, Pinholster got out of the truck and

Arnsdorff heard “multiple” gunshots.

Arnsdorff said that after Pinholster shot Wells, he got back in

the truck and started to drive away but then turned around and

went back to where they had left Wells’s body. Pinholster took

Wells’s cell phone, left, and later “destroyed the phone” and threw it

out the passenger window. (But Arnsdorff said this was not the

phone with the supposedly incriminating photo on it.) Pinholster

then turned the truck around and again returned to Wells’s body.

Pinholster and Arnsdorff pulled her body out of the roadway and to

the nearby wood line where her body was found on January 15.

Records for cell phones associated with Pinholster and Wells

were introduced into evidence through a Verizon Wireless records

custodian. These records included copies of text messages, call infor-

mation, and cell site information. Investigators also received records

11
from AT&T for a phone number that was associated with Arnsdorff.3

Unlike Verizon, AT&T does not store the contents of text messages.

The records showed that Wells’s phone called Pinholster’s

phone at 5:35 a.m. on January 9, 2017, and the call lasted a little

over 58 minutes. Just after 6:30 that morning (so right after the call

between Pinholster’s phone and Wells’s phone ended), Pinholster’s

phone placed a call to Arnsdorff’s phone then sent a text to

Arnsdorff’s phone saying, “Bubba, you’ve got to call me back right

now. She just called me, I know where she’s at, and she’s supposed

to be coming here.” Pinholster’s phone also called Wells’s phone a

second time, soon after calling and texting Arnsdorff’s phone, and

that call lasted around 12 minutes. Pinholster’s phone then sent an-

other text to Arnsdorff’s phone: “Call me back now.” There were then

several calls made between Pinholster’s phone and Arnsdorff’s

phone, which lasted a total of almost 42 minutes. After this series of

calls, Pinholster’s phone called Wells’s phone twice, then called

3 The State introduced the AT&T phone records along with a declaration

of authenticity. See OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (6); 24-9-902 (11).
12
Arnsdorff’s phone again.

That evening, Pinholster’s phone called both Wells’s and

Arnsdorff’s phones several times between 5:12 p.m. and 8:41 p.m.

Pinholster’s phone continued to communicate with both Wells’s and

Arnsdorff’s phones that night. At 11:18 p.m., Pinholster’s phone sent

a text to Arnsdorff’s phone: “You ready??” Less than a minute later,

Pinholster’s phone sent two texts to Wells’s phone: “Are you coming

over Babydoll?” and “I’m still up.” A text from Wells’s phone said,

“Yea,” and then Pinholster’s phone sent another text to Wells’s: “I

wanna go dirt road ridin[g.]” A reply came from Wells’s phone: “Well,

give me a sec[ond], bring the best stuff you got and I’ll go with.” Pin-

holster’s phone then called Wells’s phone (the call lasted less than

two minutes), and his phone then immediately called Arnsdorff’s

phone twice. Pinholster’s phone then sent a text to Arnsdorff’s

phone: “Call me man[,] right now[.] It’s so f**king important[.] Call

me back right now[.]” Pinholster’s phone then placed a call to Wells’s

phone that lasted less than a minute; sent a text to Wells’s phone:

13
“Really?”; and placed another call to her phone that lasted 58 sec-

onds. Pinholster’s phone then sent a series of text messages to

Wells’s phone: “I’m not gonna come if you’re not gonna answer the

phone baby. I don’t know where you are.”; “Babydoll. I need you to

call me now. I’m not joking. I know where your at already”; “Are you

ready for me to come get you?”; “I’ve got everything you need. Are

you ready?”; “And I mean everything!”; “And I talked to [T]ony

[Arnsdorff]. I know where your stuff is too.” Pinholster’s phone then

placed another call to Wells’s phone that lasted less than one mi-

nute.

The phone records showed that at 12:34 a.m. on January 10,

2017, Wells’s phone was located on Shirley Drive, near the home

where Pinholster picked her up. The records showed that Wells’s

phone sent a text message to Pinholster’s phone at 1:06 a.m. but it

was not received on his phone until after 2:01 a.m., which suggested

Pinholster’s cell phone was powered off or out of service at the time

the text message was sent. The last “ping” on Wells’s phone was at

2:02 a.m., one minute after Pinholster’s phone was powered on and

14
it received the delayed text message. Cell site location data placed

both Wells’s and Pinholster’s phones at Riverside Drive at that time.

AT&T’s “true-call record” showed that Arnsdorff’s cell phone was lo-

cated at a motel in Pembroke, Georgia at that time.

Two hours later, at 4:14 a.m., Pinholster’s phone sent a text to

Wells’s phone that was never received. It read, “I just wanted to let

you know I made it home a while ago, lol. Sorry. I hope you’re gonna

be ok at that roach motel.” There were no further messages between

Pinholster’s phone and Wells’s phone after that.

(b) The evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s

finding that Arnsdorff was guilty of malice murder. The required

criminal intent for malice murder — whether the defendant directly

committed the crime or was a party to another’s direct commission

— is malice, which incorporates the intent to kill. See Scoggins, 317

Ga. at 836 (1) (a); OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). And although presence alone

is not enough to convict someone of a crime, a defendant’s “presence,

companionship, and conduct before, during, and after” the crime

may authorize the jury to reasonably infer he shared the criminal

15
intent of the person who directly committed the crime. See Scoggins,

317 Ga. at 836 (1) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the

evidence at trial showed that both Arnsdorff and Pinholster had ar-

gued with Wells in the days before she was killed. There was also

evidence that, while Pinholster directly communicated with and ar-

ranged to meet Wells on the night he shot her, Pinholster also re-

mained in continuous contact with Arnsdorff as he made those ar-

rangements. The evidence of the timing and contents of Pinholster’s

text messages and phone calls to Wells and Arnsdorff leading up to

the shooting authorized the jury to reasonably infer that Pinholster

was updating Arnsdorff about his plans to meet Wells throughout

the day. The evidence also showed that Arnsdorff hid from Wells in

the back seat of Pinholster’s truck when they picked Wells up, and

Arnsdorff remained hidden as Pinholster drove Wells to the remote

location where he later shot her. When they got to the remote loca-

tion, Arnsdorff revealed himself, punched Wells, and moved to the

front passenger seat of the truck, and Pinholster retrieved his shot-

gun from the back seat, where Arnsdorff had been hiding moments

16
before, and shot Wells. So the jury could infer that Arnsdorff knew

about the shotgun. Considering these inferences together, the evi-

dence — when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty

verdict, see id. at 833 (1) — authorized the jury to conclude that Pin-

holster kept Arnsdorff informed of his progress in locating and ar-

ranging to meet with Wells in the hours leading up to her death, and

Arnsdorff hid in the back seat with the shotgun because the two men

shared an intent to shoot and kill Wells, with whom they had each

recently argued. Even if the evidence showed that Pinholster, not

Arnsdorff, pulled the trigger, the jury was authorized to infer from

Arnsdorff’s admitted presence during the crime combined with his

conduct before — including his argument with Wells, calls and texts

with Pinholster as Pinholster sought to locate and arranged to meet

Wells, his hiding in the back seat when Pinholster picked up Wells,

and his punching Wells in the face — and after — including helping

move Wells’s body from the roadway and not reporting the crime —

that he shared Pinholster’s criminal intent to kill Wells. See id. at

836 (1) (a). So there was sufficient evidence that Arnsdorff was a

17
party to the crime of malice murder. See id.

that Arnsdorff was guilty of possession of a firearm during the com-

mission of a crime. For this offense, it is not necessary for the State

to prove that the defendant personally possessed a weapon as long

as it proves he acted as a party to this crime. See Stroud v. State,

318 Ga. 744, 750-751 (2) (900 SE2d 619) (2024). Because the evi-

dence showed that Wells died from gunshot wounds inflicted by Pin-

holster, and we have already concluded that the jury was authorized

to conclude that Arnsdorff shared Pinholster’s criminal intent to

shoot Wells, there was sufficient evidence that Arnsdorff was a party

to the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony. See id.

2. Arnsdorff contends that the trial court erred by instructing

the jury that it could consider evidence of flight and that it should

consider his out-of-court statements with “great care and caution.”

As Arnsdorff acknowledges, he did not object to either instruc-

tion at trial, so we review these claims only for plain error. See Baker

18
v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 161 (2) (907 SE2d 824) (2024); OCGA § 17-8-

58 (b). To establish plain error, a defendant must show that an error

was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reason-

able dispute, and affected his substantial rights, meaning that it

likely affected the outcome. See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2). And

if that showing is made, then we have the discretion to remedy the

error if it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public repu-

tation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and punctuation omit-

ted). If any one of these requirements is not met, a claim of plain

error fails. Id.

(a) At the State’s request, the trial court gave the following in-

struction to the jury on flight:

Ladies and gentlemen, evidence of alleged flight has
been introduced. Such evidence is governed by the rules
concerning circumstantial evidence you have already
been given. Furthermore, you may only consider it if you
find more likely -- if you find it more likely than not that
the Defendant actually committed the acts and that the
reason was to evade the charges on trial now.

We have long held that it is clear and obvious error to instruct

a jury that it may consider evidence of a defendant’s flight. See

19
Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 219 (4) (a) (850 SE2d 90) (2020) (citing

Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 518 (3) (b) (397 SE2d 683) (1990)). So

Arnsdorff has shown that the trial court committed a clear and ob-

vious error.

But Arnsdorff’s claim of plain error fails because he has not

established that this instructional error likely affected the jury’s

verdict.4 See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2). The trial court’s instruc-

tion, although improper, referred to Arnsdorff’s “alleged flight” and

instructed the jury that it could “only consider” this circumstantial

evidence of guilt “if” the jury found he had “actually committed the

acts” of flight to “evade the charges on trial now.” See Rawls, 310

Ga. at 219 (4) (a). This particular instruction likely did not “cause[ ]

the jury to give undue weight to the flight evidence.” Id. The only

evidence offered by the State that Arnsdorff “fled” was the evidence

that he did not stay at the crime scene or report the crime after Wells

was shot. And that evidence was only a small piece of the balance of

4 The parties do not contend that the error was affirmatively waived, and

nothing in the record appears to indicate so. See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2).
20
evidence against Arnsdorff, which was significant. See id.

In assessing harm from an instructional error, we “review the

record de novo” and “weigh the evidence as we would expect reason-

able jurors to have done.” See Johnson, 316 Ga. at 674 (1) n.2 (cita-

tion and punctuation omitted). Viewed in that way, there was sig-

nificant evidence that Arnsdorff had argued with Wells soon before

she was killed, was in constant communication with Pinholster be-

fore they picked up Wells on the night she was killed, hid from Wells

in the back seat of Pinholster’s truck where the shotgun was located,

and helped move her body. Given this evidence, the specifics of the

jury instruction, and the limited evidence of flight, there is little rea-

son to believe that the instruction caused the jury to give undue

weight to the flight evidence in reaching its guilty verdict, such that

it likely affected the jury’s verdict. See Rawls, 310 Ga. at 219-220 (4)

(a). So Arnsdorff has not shown that this error likely affected his

substantial rights and, thus, has not established plain error. Id.

(b) The trial court gave the following charge to the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, you should consider with

21
great care and caution, the evidence of out of court state-
ments allegedly made by the Defendant offered by the
State. You, the jury, may believe in any such statement
in whole or in part, believing that which you find to be
true and rejecting that which you find to be untrue. You,
alone, have the duty to apply the general rules for testing
the believability of witnesses and to decide what weight,
if any, you should give to all or any part of the statement.
A Defendant’s out of court statement that is not supported
by other evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction,
even if you believe the unsupported statement.

Arnsdorff contends that the trial court plainly erred by giving this

instruction, pointing to a pair of Court of Appeals decisions that dis-

couraged the use of this charge and called for the pattern charge to

be revised. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 359 Ga. App. 688, 692 (2) n.3

(859 SE2d 845) (2021); McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350, 353 (3)

(667 SE2d 142) (2008). But neither decision held that giving this in-

struction was error, see id., and this Court has held that giving it

was not a clear and obvious error, see Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 792-

795 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021). See also OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All

admissions shall be scanned with care, and confessions of guilt shall

be received with great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated

by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”). So the alleged

22
error was not clear and obvious, which means that Arnsdorff has not

established plain error for this claim either. Id.

3. Arnsdorff contends that the trial court erred by imposing a

felony sentence for tampering with evidence and that the court

should have imposed a misdemeanor sentence instead. This claim

fails. We have interpreted OCGA § 16-10-94 to require imposing a

misdemeanor sentence if the defendant tampered with evidence for

the purpose of obstructing his own prosecution, even when the un-

derlying crime is a felony. See Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 770

(2) (c) (873 SE2d 150) (2022) (citing Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 268

(3) (857 SE2d 447) (2021)).5 But a person who tampers with evidence

“involving the prosecution or defense of a felony and involving an-

other person shall be guilty of a felony” and must be sentenced to

5 We noted in Goodman that this interpretation, which appears to have

been uncritically imported from a Court of Appeals decision, is doubtful. See
id. at 770 (2) (c) n.7 (referring to English v. State, 282 Ga. App. 552, 553-556
(2) (639 SE2d 551) (2006)). But we explained there that “our case law is binding
until overruled, this case presents a poor vehicle to reconsider it, and consid-
erations of stare decisis might warrant retaining it in any event.” Id. Just so
here. And added to that, neither party has asked us to revisit that interpreta-
tion here, and Arnsdorff’s felony sentence would be upheld whether or not that
precedent were reconsidered.
23
serve at least one year in prison and up to ten years if the felony

prosecution being tampered with was for a “serious violent felony,”

which includes murder. See OCGA §§ 16-10-94 (c); 17-10-6.1 (a) (1).

That provision applies here: the indictment charged Arnsdorff with

tampering with evidence “involving the prosecution of the offense of

Scott Pinholster, a felony, with intent to prevent the apprehension

of Scott Pinholster, another person” by moving Wells’s body and de-

stroying her cell phone. Because Arnsdorff was charged with and

convicted of moving Wells’s body and destroying her phone to pre-

vent Pinholster’s apprehension and prosecution for felonies,

Arnsdorff was properly sentenced for felony tampering with evi-

dence. See OCGA § 16-10-94 (c).

Judgment affirmed. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ., concur.

24
Decided June 24, 2025.

Murder. Effingham Superior Court. Before Judge Peed.

Robert L. Persse, for appellant.

Daphne J. Totten, District Attorney, Keith McIntyre, Matthew

Breedon, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm,

Matthew B. Crowder, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys

General, for appellee.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 24, 2025

S25A0062. ARNSDORFF v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Tony Arnsdorff and Scott Pinholster were jointly indicted but

tried separately for malice murder and other crimes related to the

death of Courtney Wells. 1 The evidence at trial showed that days

1 Wells died on January 10, 2017. On March 19, 2018, an Effingham

County grand jury returned an indictment that charged both Pinholster and
Arnsdorff, individually and as parties to the crime, with malice murder (Count
1), felony murder (Counts 2, 3), aggravated assault (Counts 4, 5), aggravated
battery (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Counts 7-9), and concealing the death of another (Count 10), all arising from
the shooting death of Wells. Arnsdorff alone was charged with tampering with
evidence (Count 11).
Their trials were severed, and Arnsdorff alone was tried by a jury from
September 9-10, 2019, and found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced
Arnsdorff to life without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1)
followed by a consecutive term of ten years to serve in prison for concealing the
death of another (Count 10) and then a consecutive term of five years to serve
in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
7); he was also sentenced to a term of five years in prison for tampering with
evidence (Count 11) to be served concurrently with Count 10. The remaining
counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Arnsdorff timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later amended
before her death Wells got into an argument with Pinholster, with

whom she had a romantic relationship, and left Pinholster’s home to

stay with Arnsdorff for a few days. Then, when Arnsdorff tried to

take Wells back to Pinholster’s home, she refused to go and left

Arnsdorff, who drove to Pinholster’s home alone. Pinholster then

spent the next day trying to find where Wells had gone, all the while

remaining in constant contact with Arnsdorff. Once Pinholster

found out where Wells was staying, Arnsdorff hid in the backseat of

Pinholster’s truck when Pinholster picked Wells up, and he stayed

hidden until they reached a remote area. There, Arnsdorff revealed

through new counsel. After a hearing on October 13, 2021, the trial court de-
nied the motion for new trial, as amended, on October 24, 2022. On February
15, 2023, Arnsdorff moved to set aside that order because it had not been pro-
vided to his counsel until after the time to appeal had expired. The trial court
granted that motion and reissued the order denying the motion for new trial
on February 15, 2023. Arnsdorff thereafter filed a notice of appeal from that
order. But because the trial court did not vacate its October 24, 2022 order
before issuing the new one, this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. See
Arnsdorff v. State, S23A0819 (Ga. May 16, 2023). After the remittitur was
transmitted to the trial court, Arnsdorff filed a second motion to set aside the
order on his motion for new trial on July 10, 2023. On July 3, 2024, the trial
court entered an order that vacated the October 24, 2022 and February 15,
2023 orders and denied the motion for new trial as amended. Arnsdorff filed a
timely notice of appeal from that order on July 25, 2024. His appeal was dock-
eted to the term of court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a de-
cision on the briefs.
2
himself and punched Wells in the face moments before Pinholster

retrieved a shotgun from the backseat (where Arnsdorff had just

been hiding) and shot Wells multiple times. Arnsdorff then helped