CourtListener 10680491

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321 Ga. 204
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S24G0816. THE STATE v. GREEN.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellee Billy Ray Green was convicted of attempt to entice a

child for indecent purposes and other crimes arising from his March

12, 2021 interaction with a 15-year-old female, A. H.1 The Court of

Appeals reversed this conviction as unsupported by sufficient

evidence pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B)

(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and its progeny. See Green v.

State, 371 Ga. App. 259, 262-264 (2) (899 SE2d 493) (2024). The

1 Green was also convicted of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping,

criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment, and simple assault, but only
the conviction for attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes (“attempted
enticement”) is at issue here. This crime is committed “when, with intent to
commit [enticement],” a defendant “performs any act which constitutes a
substantial step toward the commission of [enticement].” OCGA § 16-4-1. See
OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) (“A person commits the offense of enticing a child for
indecent purposes when he or she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the
age of 16 years to any place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or
indecent acts.”). The indictment alleged that Green “attempt[ed] to commit the
crime of [enticement], in violation of [OCGA § 16-6-5], in that said accused did
attempt to entice [A. H.], a child less than 16 years of age, to enter his vehicle
for the purpose of committing indecent acts . . . .”
State sought certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals

misapplied sufficiency standards with respect to this conviction by

treating certain evidence (referred to herein as the “CVS evidence”)

as not relevant to the issue of Green’s intent. We granted review to

consider whether evidence that a defendant made unwanted,

sexually suggestive comments to an adult is evidence relevant to

whether the defendant’s later solicitation, enticement, or taking of

a minor was done “for the purpose of child molestation or indecent

acts.” OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). In this case, we answer our certiorari

question affirmatively and agree with the State that the CVS

evidence is relevant to Green’s intent to entice A. H. Thus, we

conclude that it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold otherwise,

and that, when properly considered in the context of a sufficiency

challenge, the CVS evidence is sufficient on the issue of Green’s

intent to uphold the attempted enticement conviction. Therefore, we

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and affirm

Green’s conviction.

1. Background

2
(a) The evidence presented at trial showed the following.

Around 5:30 p.m. on March 12, 2021, A. H. was walking her dog in

her neighborhood when a car driven by Green pulled up beside her.

Green told A. H. that her father, Jamie — whom Green referred to

by name — had called and asked for Green to bring A. H. to him. A.

H. testified that she did not know or recognize Green, and Jamie

testified to the same. Green then opened the passenger side door of

his car, reached his arm out toward A. H., and gestured for her to

get in. A. H. testified that Green became mad when she declined his

request, but that Green did not threaten her, touch her, or say

anything to her that was sexual in nature. About this same time,

one of A. H.’s neighbors pulled into the neighborhood, and Green

“sped off.” A. H. called her father, and then 911. During the 911 call,

which was played at Green’s trial, A. H. told the operator that “a guy

just tried to kidnap [her],” and she described the perpetrator as a

white male in his 50s or 60s with long hair driving a small red car.

Officers with the Barrow County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”),

including Sgt. William Meeler, responded to A. H.’s location within

3
minutes.2 BCSO Sgt. Garrett Guest also responded to the 911 call

and was a few minutes from A. H.’s location when he spotted a car

in a nearby CVS parking lot that matched the description given by

A. H. Sgt. Guest pulled into the CVS parking lot and made contact

with the driver, who identified himself as Green.3 In their

conversation, Green repeatedly said he had been at the CVS “all

day,” but also gave Sgt. Guest conflicting versions of his activities

that day. A few minutes later, Sgt. Guest entered the CVS to obtain

security camera footage and learned from an employee that Green

had tried to “lure” female CVS employees into his car earlier that

day. When Sgt. Guest walked back outside, he asked Green whether

he had talked to any CVS employees that day, and Green affirmed

he had asked two “young girls” if they wanted to “hang out.” BCSO

officers decided to conduct a showup, and Sgt. Meeler drove A. H. to

2 Sgt. Meeler’s bodycam footage was admitted into evidence, which
depicts A. H. describing the perpetrator, his car, and their encounter.
3 Sgt. Guest’s bodycam footage was admitted into evidence, which depicts

his interactions with Green in the CVS parking lot.
4
the CVS, where she positively identified Green.4 Green was

subsequently arrested.5

Evidence specific to Green’s interactions with two CVS

employees (the “CVS evidence”) was presented at trial through the

testimony of those employees, both of whom were female, aged 39

and 27, respectively.6 Their testimony collectively showed that

around lunchtime on March 12, Green entered the CVS, feigned

injury, and asked the two employees if they could help him get to his

car. Both declined, offering instead to get their manager or call 911.

Green insisted that he did not want them to call their manager or

4 A “showup” is “[a] police procedure in which a suspect is shown singly

to a witness for identification, rather than as part of a lineup.” Showup, Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
5 In a later search of Green’s car, two softball bats and a stuffed unicorn

were found inside.
6 The trial court held in a pre-trial order that the CVS evidence was

“admissible as intrinsic evidence because it was necessary to complete the
story of the crimes charged in the indictment[,]” and that “the probative value
of the [CVS] evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice,” such that the balance was struck in favor of admissibility under
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). This pre-trial order also held the CVS evidence
was admissible as extrinsic other acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(“Rule 404 (b)”), but “at trial, the State stated that it was simply offering the
[CVS] evidence as intrinsic evidence and withdrew its request for a jury
instruction on other acts evidence.” Green, 371 Ga. App. at 265 (4), n.7.
5
911, and when they went to do so, Green “bolted” out the door to his

car. One of the employees recalled the other suggesting: “I don’t

think that man was hurt . . . I think he was just trying to get us out

there.”

The 27-year-old employee testified that she left for lunch

shortly after this incident and asked her manager to watch her leave

because she was “90 percent sure [Green] was still out there.” When

she returned around 45 minutes later, Green’s car was still in the

CVS parking lot but had been moved into the spot where the

employee’s car had previously been. While this employee “thought

that was very strange,” she did not interact with Green again, but

still asked her manager to watch her leave at the end of her shift

that day.

The 39-year-old employee testified to additional interactions

with Green on March 12. She testified that, when she walked

outside for a smoke break in the afternoon, Green asked her “are you

ready for a good time?” Not wanting to “egg him on,” she ignored

Green, continued to her car, took her smoke break, and went back

6
inside the CVS without incident. Then, at the end of her shift,

around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., the employee walked outside to discover

Green’s car parked next to hers. She told the jury that, “based on the

little comment [Green] made already, it scared the hell out of me,”

so she got her manager and asked him to watch her leave. As she

reached her car, Green told her that he could “show [her] a few

tricks” or “show [her] a few things.” The employee interpreted

Green’s comments as an attempt “to coax [her] to get in [Green’s car]

and go do things with him.”

At the close of the State’s case, Green moved for a directed

verdict on the attempted enticement charge. The transcript reflects

the following:

COUNSEL: . . . I’ll make a motion for directed verdict on
Count Three. Specifically, the victim in the case said that
there was — in any contact between her and Mr. Green,
that there was no mention of any kind of sexual advance.
And based on her statement, I believe that — that as a
matter of law, that Count Three has to be — a directed
verdict would be appropriate as to Count Three.
...
COURT: All right. State’s response, please?
STATE: Yes, Your Honor. Looking at Count Three, it
charges Mr. Green with criminal attempt to entice a child

7
for indecent purposes. It talks about the substantial steps
that he took to do that. And whether those constituted
substantial steps, that would be a question for the jury,
but certainly there’s some evidence that he took steps to
do that.
In terms of what his intent was, obviously that’s
something the State has to prove to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. It’s alleged that he did this with the
purpose of committing indecent acts. And [defense
counsel] is correct, there was no testimony about any kind
of explicit sexual advance towards the victim from Mr.
Green, no sexual comment, but the State would argue
that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence on his
intent based on how he was acting that day towards
others. And that gets into the — the intrinsic evidence
with other witnesses from CVS. And what constitutes an
indecent act, that’s also a question for the jury, but the
State would argue there is sufficient evidence to get past
the directed verdict.
COURT: You get the final word on that motion with
respect to that count. Anything else you want to say?
...
COUNSEL: Yeah, and the child themself said that there
was no indication of any sexual advance, and I think
that’s clear, that based on that as to that count, there’s no
substantial step toward doing something that she said
didn’t occur. So we feel like, as a matter of law, that we
should have a directed verdict as to Count Three.
COURT: . . . The Court is inclined to deny the motion and
finds that there may be some — some evidence, albeit
circumstantial, that could put a jury in a position to
conclude that — that the Defendant committed this act.
So I’m just going to — I’m going to deny your motion with
respect to that count.

8
Green then testified in his own defense and gave the jury his

version of events from March 12. He did not deny interacting with

A. H., but characterized their encounter in much different terms.

Green testified that he was on his way to the CVS from his home7

when he saw who he thought was a 40-year-old female friend of his

named Dana Hayne walking in front of the house where a different

friend, George Baker, used to live, so he turned down the road to

talk to her. Though it was not his friend Dana, Green testified that

he pulled over anyway to “ask[ ] her did she know George Baker,”

and when A. H. said she did not, Green “said thank you and drove

off.” Green denied opening the door to his car or gesturing for A. H.

to get in, testified that he did not know A. H.’s father and denied

using his name, said the softball bats were for his “little great

grandson,” and opined that the stuffed unicorn was not his, but

might belong to his niece who would occasionally use his car. At

various points, Green told the jury that harming A. H. “[n]ever

7 The evidence showed that Green lived in the same neighborhood as A.

H.
9
crossed [his] mind” and that “[he] had no intentions of nothing” in

speaking with her, adding that he “would never hurt a child” and

had “never harmed a kid.”

Green also told the jury that, on March 12, like most days, he

spent a large portion of his time in the CVS parking lot “[j]ust

sit[ting] there and play[ing] [his] radio” because it was “something

to do.” Asked about the day in question, Green repeatedly testified

that he did not recall speaking with any CVS employees and denied

entering the CVS. But after being impeached with Sgt. Guest’s

bodycam footage, Green admitted he “might have talked to the two

[CVS employees] at the store.” When confronted about his changing

story, Green admitted that he lied to Sgt. Guest but said he did so

because he consumed “half a pint” of vodka on the morning of March

12, had recently received a DUI, and “didn’t want to go to jail.”

After Green’s testimony concluded, he renewed his motion for

directed verdict on the attempted enticement charge. The trial court

denied the renewed motion without elaboration, stating only that it

“decline[d] to alter its [previous] ruling,” but noted renewal of the

10
motion for the record. At the end of trial, the jury returned guilty

verdicts on each of the four counts charged. Green was sentenced

immediately thereafter.

(b) Green appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals,

where he argued in relevant part that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for directed verdict on the attempted enticement

charge, asserting that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to

sustain it. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 262-264 (2). The Court of

Appeals agreed and reversed this conviction in Division 2 of its

opinion. Id.

The Court of Appeals’ discussion on this enumeration of error

began with a recitation of OCGA § 16-6-5 (a)’s statutory language

and citation to its precedent for the proposition that a conviction for

enticement “‘must [ ] be based upon some evidence that an act of

indecency or child molestation was the intended motivation for the

enticement.’” Green, 371 Ga. App. at 263 (2) (quoting Lasseter v.

State, 197 Ga. App. 498, 499-500 (1) (399 SE2d 85) (1990) (emphasis

omitted)). The Court of Appeals then reasoned that, while the

11
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove “that Green

attempted to entice the minor victim into his vehicle,” that same

evidence was not sufficient to establish “that an act of indecency or

child molestation was the intended motivation for Green’s

attempted enticement of the minor victim.” Green, 371 Ga. App. at

263-264 (2) (cleaned up). With respect to Green’s “intended

motivation,” the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not just

insufficient, but “lacking” altogether, as was the case in Phillips v.

State, 354 Ga. App. 88, 92 (1) (840 SE2d 165) (2020).8 Id. To support

that conclusion, the Court of Appeals observed that A. H. “denied

that Green said anything about wanting to take her somewhere else

to ‘try to have relations with [her]’ or anything similar[,]” and

8 In Phillips, a defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted

enticement and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 354 Ga.
App. at 90-92 (1). There, the evidence at trial showed that the defendant
attempted to entice three different children at three different times and
locations: first, by gesturing at a minor victim for her to come get in his car;
second, by telling a minor victim that he “liked her hair” before asking “if she
wanted to put her bike in the back of his car and go”; and third, by making a
“money gesture” from his car toward a minor victim. Id. The Court of Appeals
reversed each conviction due to an “absence of evidence showing that an act of
indecency or child molestation behind [the defendant’s] apparent attempts to
entice the victims into his vehicle[.]” Id. at 92 (1).
12
rejected the State’s position — the same position maintained on

appeal to this Court — “that Green’s arguably suggestive prior

comments to one of the CVS employees constituted evidence of

Green’s motivation for enticing the minor victim.” Id. Instead, it

reasoned the CVS evidence was “not evidence of the motivation

required” and suggested, as Green argues before this Court on

appeal, that because the unwanted, sexually suggestive comments

comprising the CVS evidence were directed at adults, those

comments had no relevant evidentiary value with respect to Green’s

intent to entice A. H., a minor, for indecent purposes. See id. at 263

(2) (“Green’s comments to the CVS employee, while upsetting, were

directed to another adult and were not evidence of the motivation

required here.”).

In sum, despite the CVS evidence having been admitted at trial

as evidence intrinsic to the charged crimes, see Green, 371 Ga. App.

at 264-266 (4), the Court of Appeals concluded that the CVS evidence

was categorically “not evidence” of the type needed to sustain an

13
attempted enticement conviction. Id. at 262-264 (2).9 Thus, absent

any relevant evidence to establish the intent component for an

attempted enticement, the Court of Appeals analogized the present

case to Phillips, where “the State failed to present any evidence” to

establish the defendant’s intent, such that the evidence presented at

trial was necessarily insufficient. Id. (citing Phillips, 354 Ga. App.

at 92 (1)). Applying that same logic here, the Court of Appeals

reversed Green’s conviction as unsupported by sufficient evidence.

2. Analysis

(a) The enticement statute provides that “[a] person commits

the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or she

solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any

place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or indecent

acts.” OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). Enticement, like all other crimes, requires

9 To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the CVS evidence

in Division 4 was limited to the attempted kidnapping charge, we attribute the
siloed context of its analysis to the fact that this enumeration was
chronologically the last one to be addressed. The record reflects that the CVS
evidence was generally admitted by the trial court for any purpose, rather than
on a limited basis, see OCGA §§ 24-1-104 and 24-1-105, and that the only
request to limit the admissibility of the CVS evidence was from the State and
later withdrawn. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 265 (4), n.7. See n.6, supra.
14
a “joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or

criminal negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-1 (a). See In the Interest of T. B.,

313 Ga. 846, 854 (3) (874 SE2d 101) (2022) (“[C]onduct cannot be

characterized as a ‘crime’ unless, at a minimum, the conduct

satisfies both the ‘act’ element and the ‘intention’ element of a

statutory offense.”) (citing OCGA § 16-2-1 (a)). In the present case,

Green concedes that he satisfied the act requirement for this crime

when he “reached out to A. H. and [tried] to grab at her[,]” and the

Court of Appeals concluded the same. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at

263 (2) (“Here, there was evidence that Green attempted to entice

the minor victim into his vehicle.”). See OCGA §§ 16-6-5 (a) and 16-

2-1 (a). Thus, it is only the intent requirement for this crime’s joint

operation that is at issue here. OCGA § 16-2-1 (a).

To obtain a conviction under OCGA § 16-6-5 (a), the State must

establish that the defendant acted with the requisite intent — that

is, the State must offer evidence from which a rational trier of fact

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

15
enticed10 a minor victim “for the purpose of child molestation or

indecent acts.”11 That a defendant possessed such an intent must be

proven whether the crime is charged as a completed offense or as an

attempted offense. See OCGA § 16-4-1 (“A person commits the

offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific

crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step

toward the commission of that crime.”).

In the decision below, the Court of Appeals discounted the CVS

evidence on a categorical basis as not relevant to Green’s intent

because the comments comprising the CVS evidence were directed

at adults, rather than children. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 263 (2).

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

10 While we refer to enticement throughout this opinion given the facts

of this case, a defendant’s soliciting or taking of a child can also satisfy the act
requirement. See OCGA § 16-6-5 (a).
11 The Code does not define the “indecent acts” referred to in OCGA § 16-

6-5 (a), and we need not do so today. That said, the State’s theory at trial was
that Green sought to entice A. H. for the purpose of committing acts that were
sexual in nature, and Green’s briefing accepts that acts sexual in nature would
be included among those contemplated by the statute.
16
evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”). We have said that

“[r]elevance is a binary concept — evidence is relevant or it is not.”

Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 546 (1) (802 SE2d 234) (2017) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Moreover, relevance under Rule 401 is

distinct from probative value. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75 (2)

(786 SE2d 633) (2016) (“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency’

to prove or disprove a fact, whereas the probative value of evidence

derives in large part from the extent to which the evidence tends to

make the existence of a fact more or less probable.”) (emphasis in

original).

Here, Green’s intent was a fact of consequence to the

determination of the attempted enticement charge because he

pleaded not guilty to that charge. See Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2)

(“[I]ntent was put in issue by the defendant entering a plea of not

guilty. That such a plea puts the State to its burden of proving each

and every element of the crimes charged is beyond dispute.”).

Accordingly, if the CVS evidence has any tendency to make it more

or less probable that Green acted with the requisite intent — that

17
is, more or less probable that Green’s act of enticing A. H. was for

the purpose of committing child molestation or an indecent act —

then the evidence is relevant.

We conclude that the CVS evidence is relevant to Green’s

intent in this case, as it has some tendency to make it more probable

that Green’s enticement of A. H. was done for the purpose of

committing child molestation or an indecent act. In Olds, we

explained

that evidence that an accused committed an intentional
act generally is relevant to show — the evidence, in other
words, has some tendency to make more or less probable
— that the same defendant committed a similar act with
the same sort of intent, especially when the acts were
committed close in time and in similar circumstances.

Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2) (emphasis in original). Such is the case here.

The record establishes that, in the span of approximately six

hours, Green interacted with three members of the opposite sex: 15-

year-old A. H. and the two CVS employees. Green attempted to get

each of these women into his car under false pretenses and through

the use of deception — first, by feigning injury at the CVS and later,

by telling A. H. that her father, whom Green referred to by name,
18
had requested Green pick her up. Less than an hour before Green

encountered A. H., he made unwanted, sexually suggestive

comments to one of those CVS employees, telling her that he could

“show [her] a few tricks” or “show [her] a few things,” which that

employee interpreted as an attempt by Green “to coax [her] to get in

[Green’s car] and go do things with him” that were sexual in

nature.12 Because Green’s interactions with the CVS employees, and

in particular, his interaction with the employee that he offered to

“show a few tricks,” were “committed close in time and in similar

circumstances” to his interaction with A. H., that evidence has some

tendency to make it more probable that Green acted with a similar,

sexually-related intent with respect to his attempted enticement of

A. H. Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2). As such, the CVS evidence is relevant

to Green’s intent for the attempted enticement conviction.

(b) Having concluded that the CVS evidence is relevant to

12 These facts distinguish the present case from Phillips, where the
defendant’s words and conduct toward minors were not supported by any facts
to suggest that a defendant’s intent was sexual in nature. See 354 Ga. App. at
91-92 (1).
19
Green’s intent and that the Court of Appeals erred by categorically

disregarding it, we turn to whether the evidence presented at trial

on the issue of Green’s intent was sufficient. We conclude that it

was.

In a sufficiency review, “we view the evidence presented at trial

in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether it

was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which

he was convicted.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 245 (1) (892 SE2d

737) (2023). In so doing, we “leave[ ] to the jury the resolution of

conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the credibility

of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts

to ultimate facts.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Among

those matters left for a jury’s consideration is whether a defendant

acted with the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged. See

Poole v. State, 312 Ga. 515, 518-519 (863 SE2d 93) (2021)

(“[C]riminal intent is a question for the jury, and it may be inferred

from that person’s conduct before, during, and after the commission

20
of the crime.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); OCGA § 16-2-6

(“A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention but

the trier of facts may find such intention upon consideration of the

words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances

connected with the act for which the accused in prosecuted.”). See

also Bryan v. State, 371 Ga. App. 769, 776 (1) (b) (903 SE2d 160)

(2024) (“Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectible

only inferentially, and the law accommodates this.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted); OCGA § 24-14-9 (“In arriving at a verdict, the

jury, from the facts proved, and sometimes from the absence of

counter evidence, may infer the existence of other facts reasonably

and logically consequent on those proved.”).

While Green testified that “[he] had no intentions of nothing,”

when interacting with A. H., a jury is permitted to draw reasonable

inferences, including on the issue of intent, from his denial and other

evidence presented at trial. Here, we think the jury could reasonably

infer Green’s intent with respect to his enticement of A. H. from the

relevant and intrinsic CVS evidence, as that evidence demonstrated

21
that Green’s prior actions, “which took place on the same day, and

in one instance, shortly before the incident with the victim[,]” Green,

371 Ga. App. at 265 (4), were motivated by a purpose that was sexual

in nature. The fact that Green’s sexually-related overtures toward

the employee that he offered to “show a few tricks” were frustrated

by the employee’s rejection of his efforts also increases the probative

value of that evidence with respect to Green’s intent when he

encountered A. H. less than an hour after being rejected.

Additionally, “jurors [are] authorized to consider their disbelief

in [a defendant’s] testimony — and the inconsistencies between it

and the eyewitness accounts of others — as substantive evidence of

his guilt” where “some corroborative evidence exists for the charged

offense[.]” Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 498 (2) (a) (893 SE2d 724)

(2023) (citation and punctuation omitted); Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga.

261, 263-264 (2) (773 SE2d 263) (2015). Green himself offered

corroborative evidence for the attempted enticement conviction by

admitting that he approached A. H. on March 12. Moreover, Green’s

testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of both A. H. and the

22
CVS employees in several material respects. For example, Green

denied opening the door to his car, gesturing for A. H. to get in, or

using the name of A. H.’s father, despite A. H. testifying to those

facts, and he denied entering the CVS on March 12, but the CVS

employees testified that he did so twice. When confronted about

those inconsistencies on cross-examination, Green told the jury that

he “d[id]n’t have a clue” why his story was different from theirs. In

the face of these inconsistencies, the jury was authorized to reject

Green’s version of events and treat his inconsistent testimony as

substantive evidence of his guilt. See Maynor, 317 Ga. at 497-498 (2)

(a) (concluding that jury was authorized to reject defendant’s

testimony that he acted in self-defense where the only evidence

offered in support of that defense was the defendant’s self-serving

statements).13

3. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the CVS evidence

13 We also note that the jury could infer consciousness of guilt from
Green’s flight from the scene of his encounter with A. H. See Jenkins v. State,
313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022).
23
presented at trial was relevant under Rule 401 and sufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to establish Green’s intent for

the attempted enticement conviction. Accordingly, the decision of

the Court of Appeals is reversed in part.

Judgment reversed in part. All the Justices concur.

Decided March 4, 2025.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 371 Ga. App.

259.

J. Bradley Smith, District Attorney, Andrew M. Brill, Assistant

District Attorney, for appellant.

Donna A. Seagraves, Kathleen J. Anderson, Kali A. Haney, for

appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 4, 2025

S24G0816. THE STATE v. GREEN.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellee Billy Ray Green was convicted of attempt to entice a

child for indecent purposes and other crimes arising from his March

12, 2021 interaction with a 15-year-old female, A.H. 1 The Court of

Appeals reversed this conviction as unsupported by sufficient

evidence pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (III) (B)

(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and its progeny. See Green v.

1 Green was also convicted of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping,

criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment, and simple assault, but only
the conviction for attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes (“attempted
enticement”) is at issue here. This crime is committed “when, with intent to
commit [enticement],” a defendant “performs any act which constitutes a
substantial step toward the commission of [enticement].” OCGA § 16-4-1. See
OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) (“A person commits the offense of enticing a child for
indecent purposes when he or she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the
age of 16 years to any place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or
indecent acts.”). The indictment alleged that Green “attempt[ed] to commit the
crime of [enticement], in violation of [OCGA § 16-6-5], in that said accused did
attempt to entice [A.H.], a child less than 16 years of age, to enter his vehicle
for the purpose of committing indecent acts . . .”
State, 371 Ga. App. 259, 262-264 (2) (899 SE2d 493) (2024). The

State sought certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals

misapplied sufficiency standards with respect to this conviction by

treating certain evidence (referred to herein as the “CVS evidence”)

as not relevant to the issue of Green’s intent. We granted review to

consider whether evidence that a defendant made unwanted,

sexually suggestive comments to an adult is evidence relevant to

whether the defendant’s later solicitation, enticement, or taking of

a minor was done “for the purpose of child molestation or indecent

acts.” OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). In this case, we answer our certiorari

question affirmatively and agree with the State that the CVS

evidence is relevant to Green’s intent to entice A.H. Thus, we

conclude that it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold otherwise,

and that, when properly considered in the context of a sufficiency

challenge, the CVS evidence is sufficient on the issue of Green’s

intent to uphold the attempted enticement conviction. Therefore, we

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and affirm

Green’s conviction.

2
1. Background

(a) The evidence presented at trial showed the following. Around

5:30 p.m. on March 12, 2021, A.H. was walking her dog in her

neighborhood when a car driven by Green pulled up beside her.

Green told A.H. that her father, Jamie – whom Green referred to by

name – had called and asked for Green to bring A.H. to him. A.H.

testified that she did not know or recognize Green, and Jamie

testified to the same. Green then opened the passenger side door of

his car, reached his arm out toward A.H., and gestured for her to get

in. A.H. testified that Green became mad when she declined his

request, but that Green did not threaten her, touch her, or say

anything to her that was sexual in nature. About this same time,

one of A.H.’s neighbors pulled into the neighborhood, and Green

“sped off.” A.H. called her father, and then 911. During the 911 call,

which was played at Green’s trial, A.H. told the operator that “a guy

just tried to kidnap [her],” and she described the perpetrator as a

white male in his 50’s or 60’s with long hair driving a small red car.

Officers with the Barrow County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”),

3
including Sgt. William Meeler, responded to A.H.’s location within

minutes. 2 BCSO Sgt. Garrett Guest also responded to the 911 call

and was a few minutes from A.H.’s location when he spotted a car in

a nearby CVS parking lot that matched the description given by

A.H. Sgt. Guest pulled into the CVS parking lot and made contact