CourtListener 10680513

Texto completo

320 Ga. 806
FINAL COPY

S24A0984. THE STATE v. LEVERETTE.

COLVIN, Justice.

The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Jaylen

Leverette’s motion to suppress incriminating statements he made

during an audio-recorded, custodial interview. The trial court

excluded Leverette’s statements under OCGA § 24-8-824, which

provides in relevant part that a confession is inadmissible if it was

“induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit.” As explained

below, however, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding

that law enforcement officers made statements during the interview

that offered a hope of a benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. Accordingly,

we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the court to consider

in the first instance Leverette’s other asserted grounds for excluding

his statements.

1. On February 25, 2019, a Sumter County grand jury returned

an eight-count indictment against Leverette, Patrick Etheridge,
Christopher Hale, Jr., and Christopher Hale, Sr., charging each

defendant with one count of aggravated assault and one count of

felony murder. In brief, the indictment alleged that, on August 1,

2018, Etheridge drove Leverette to the home of Hale, Sr., where

Leverette fired shots into the home, initiating an exchange of gunfire

in which Hale, Sr., or Hale, Jr., killed a bystander, Jarvis Willis,

while shooting at Etheridge and Leverette’s fleeing vehicle.

On September 15, 2023, Leverette filed a pretrial motion to

suppress custodial statements he had made to a GBI agent on

August 9, 2018. In the motion, Leverette argued that the statements

were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824, the Georgia

Constitution, the United States Constitution, and several United

States Supreme Court precedents.

During a Jackson-Denno1 hearing on November 21, 2023, the

audio recording of Leverette’s custodial interview was admitted into

evidence. During the first hour and 19 minutes of the interview,

which was conducted by GBI Agent Clint Karsten, Leverette waived

1 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

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his Miranda2 rights and said that he had heard about the shooting.

But he said that he did not know why other people were saying that

he was involved in the shooting, and he denied having ever gone to

the location where the shooting occurred.

Major Ralph Stuart entered the room an hour and 20 minutes

into the interview and spoke with Leverette for approximately 11

minutes before leaving. The audio recording of that 11-minute

period, which was the focus of Leverette’s motion to suppress,

showed the following. Major Stuart told Leverette that they could

track the location of Leverette’s phone within three feet of where he

was. He then told Leverette three times that officers did not believe

that Leverette had fired the bullet that killed the bystander, saying:

“Y’all haven’t been accused . . . of firing the shots that killed a man.

I think you need to understand that. Okay? That’s not why we’re

here”; “Nobody thinks for one minute that car that the shots was

fired from killed an innocent person, and I want to make that clear”;

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)

(1966).
3
and “The good news in your corner is you’re not being accused, or

nobody in that car is being accused, of the bullet hitting that man

that died.”

Major Stuart then told Leverette that the agents already knew

what the truth was, and that “[n]ot telling the truth of what actually

happened is going to cause you a lot more trouble than telling the

truth.” Major Stuart asked Leverette, “Do you want to tell this agent

the truth or do you want to go ahead . . . with what you got? ’Cause

what you got is going to drown you.” Then, Major Stuart said

Leverette’s friends and his phone were going to “give [him] up,” told

Leverette that they “already kn[e]w what car [he] was in,” and asked

Leverette if he had ever been in Etheridge’s car before.

Major Stuart went on to discuss how telling the truth would

make Leverette feel and the potential impact on his reputation. He

said: “That little bad feeling you’ve got in your stomach right now, it

can get a lot better just as soon as you tell that man the truth,” or

“it’s fixing to get a lot worse”; “Now you can get rid of that little

uneasy feeling in your stomach right now and tell him what he

4
already knows or you’re going to make it worse”; “Do you want to

look like you’re an honest person or do you want to look like you’re

a liar?”; and “You can walk out that door with a little bit better

feeling in your stomach, not be so queasy, after you tell him the truth

or that little feeling in your stomach is going to come back.”

Shortly after, Major Stuart informed Leverette that his friends

had already given him up, and that Leverette’s phone was going to

verify what they said. Major Stuart further said that Leverette had

made a big mistake by lying, and that the agent was giving him a

chance to “take it back.” Major Stuart then told Leverette, “We want

to hold the man accountable that fired the round, not nobody in the

car. [Hale, Sr., has] been held accountable, him and his son. . . .

That’s what we’re here for.” Major Stuart asked Leverette if he

“want[ed] to tell [the agent] the truth about being in the car.” And

he emphasized again that they did not believe Leverette had shot

the bystander, saying, “We know that nobody in the car even shot

the innocent bystander, much less you.”

Major Stuart also made several statements indicating that

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Leverette was going to get himself into more trouble by lying than

by telling the truth, saying: “You’re not important, but you fixing to

make yourself important”; “So you want to sit here and stick to this

stupid story and make you look like a fool and get held more

accountable for the lie you’re telling now than the one we was asking

you about”; and “your story makes you look like you guilty of

something.”

After Major Stuart left the interview room, Agent Karsten

stated, “We don’t think people in the car shot the person that died.”

And Leverette then made several incriminating statements to Agent

Karsten, admitting that he and Etheridge were present for the

shooting, that there was an exchange of gunfire, and that Leverette

had fired a gun toward the house from the passenger seat of the

vehicle.

The trial court granted Leverette’s motion to suppress his

statements under OCGA § 24-8-824, finding that, although

Leverette’s confession had not resulted from a fear of injury,

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“Leverette confessed under a clear hope of benefit.”3 The court found

that

[Major] Stuart made several statements to Leverette that
he and Eth[e]ridge were not accused of firing the shots
that killed the victim and that he could “make things
worse” by not speaking up about being at the scene. . . .
[Major] Stuart told Leverette he could “walk out that
door” feeling better about the situation if he admitted his
involvement. Finally, [Major] Stuart made several
statements to the defendant that the occupants of the car
were not facing responsibility for the shooting. For
example, [Major] Stuart stated we “want to hold the man
accountable that fired the round . . . not nobody in the
car.”

(Emphasis in original.) According to the trial court, these

statements constituted “assurances” that Leverette “would not be

charged with offenses holding him ‘responsible’ for the fatal

shooting.” And the court found that these assurances persuaded

Leverette to admit his involvement in the shooting. The State timely

appealed.

2. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in

3 The trial court’s finding that Leverette’s confession was not induced by

fear of injury under OCGA § 24-8-824 has not been challenged on appeal.
Accordingly, we do not address that finding.
7
concluding that Major Stuart offered Leverette a “hope of benefit”

under OCGA § 24-8-824, as that phrase has been defined in our case

law. We agree.

Georgia law provides that, “[t]o make a confession admissible,

it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by

another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”

OCGA § 24-8-824. We have held that “[t]he phrase ‘slightest hope of

benefit’ is not to be understood in the colloquial sense,” and that the

phrase instead “refers to promises related to reduced criminal

punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at

all.” Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 658 (2) (a) (859 SE2d 1) (2021)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

A court must consider “the totality of the circumstances” in

determining whether the defendant’s statement is admissible under

OCGA § 24-8-824. Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 710 (2) (854

SE2d 523) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And we review

a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of a defendant’s

statements de novo where, as here, “the controlling facts can be

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definitively ascertained, exclusively by reference to evidence, such

as a recording of a police interview, that is uncontradicted and

presents no questions of credibility.” Torres v. State, 314 Ga. 838,

851 (2) (e) (iii) (878 SE2d 453) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 39 (1) & n.1 (897

SE2d 432) (2024) (explaining that an appellate court may not resolve

factual disputes, but that an appellate court may rely on undisputed

facts that “definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to

evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of

credibility,” and that “[a]udio or video evidence may match that

description” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Here, the trial court erred in concluding that Major Stuart gave

Leverette assurances that he would not be charged with murder if

he spoke to law enforcement officers about the shooting and thus

erred in concluding that Leverette’s admissions were induced by a

hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. In reaching its conclusion,

the trial court focused on three categories of comments made by

Major Stuart. But our precedent makes clear that none of those

9
comments constituted an impermissible hope of benefit under

OCGA § 24-8-824, that is, a “promise[ ] related to reduced criminal

punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at

all.” Lewis, 311 Ga. at 658 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).

First, the trial court focused on comments made by Major

Stuart that indicated Leverette would make things worse by not

telling the truth. These comments included statements that: “Not

telling the truth of what actually happened is going to cause you a

lot more trouble than telling the truth”; “Do you want to tell this

agent the truth or do you want to go ahead . . . with what you got?

’Cause what you got is going to drown you”; “So you want to sit here

and stick to this stupid story and make you look like a fool and get

held more accountable for the lie you’re telling now than the one we

was asking you about”; and “your story makes you look like you

guilty of something.” But “[i]t is well established that interview

tactics such as telling the [defendant] that he could ‘help himself’ by

telling the truth do not violate OCGA § 24-8-824.” Henderson, 310

Ga. at 712 (2). See also Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 722 (4) (878

10
SE2d 247) (2022) (“Statements that a person . . . ‘ha[s] an

opportunity to help himself out by telling the truth’ do not offer an

improper hope of benefit” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And

we have similarly held that statements indicating that a defendant

will be “on the hook” for a more serious criminal charge if he fails to

tell officers what happened do not violate the statute but instead

permissibly “emphasize[ ] the gravity of the situation” and suggest

that the defendant would be “well served by offering his version of

events.” Dawson v. State, 308 Ga. 613, 619-622 (3) (842 SE2d 875)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Johnson v. State,

295 Ga. 421, 424-425 (2) (761 SE2d 13) (2014) (a detective did not

“indicate that a confession would result in lesser charges,” only that

the defendant “would be well served by offering his version of events

as a means of justifying or mitigating his role in the assaults,” where

he told the defendant that he wanted to hear the defendant’s

“version of events” and warned that the detective could walk out of

the interview “and change this charge from aggravated assault to a

f**[*]ing murder charge”).

11
Second, the trial court focused on a comment in which Major

Stuart said, “You can walk out that door with a little bit better

feeling in your stomach, not be so queasy, after you tell him the

truth.” But “context matters.” Peacock, 314 Ga. at 722 (4). And in

context, Major Stuart’s comment could not reasonably be

interpreted as a promise that Leverette would be released if he told

the truth. Instead, it was another comment in a series of comments

indicating that law enforcement officers already knew that

Leverette was involved in the shooting and that the benefit of telling

the truth was that Leverette would feel better and that he would be

seen as an honest person rather than a liar. Specifically, Major

Stuart had previously said: “That little bad feeling you’ve got in your

stomach right now, it can get a lot better just as soon as you tell that

man the truth,” or “it can get a lot worse”; “Now you can get rid of

that little uneasy feeling in your stomach right now and tell [the GBI

agent] what he already knows or you’re going to make it worse”; and

“Do you want to look like you’re an honest person or do you want to

look like you’re a liar?”

12
Even if Major Stuart’s comment could have been interpreted as

a promise that Leverette would be released after he told the truth,

“a promise regarding release after questioning” does not constitute

an improper promise of benefit related to charges or sentencing but

only a promise of “a collateral benefit” that does not render a

confession inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824. Price v. State, 305

Ga. 608, 610 (2) (825 SE2d 178) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See OCGA § 24-8-825 (“The fact that a confession has been

made under . . . a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it.”).

See also Huff v. State, 299 Ga. 801, 803-804 (2) (792 SE2d 368)

(2016) (no improper hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 based

on comments “implying that [the defendant] would be free to see his

children if he admitted his involvement in the crimes,” including

comments “about [the defendant] being present ‘for his children as

they grew up’ and that ‘the truth will set you free’”); Finley v. State,

298 Ga. 451, 453-454 (3) (782 SE2d 651) (2016) (no improper hope of

benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 where a detective told the defendant

that “your quickest way to get to see your children or your quickest

13
way to take a large load off your shoulders, is just to tell the truth”

(punctuation omitted)); Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 629 (4) (754

SE2d 335) (2014) (“While one of the officers interrogating appellant

did tell him he could go home, such statements in context did not

constitute a hope of benefit because no one promised appellant that

he would not be charged with a crime or that he would receive

reduced charges, sentencing or punishment if he made

incriminating statements.”), overruled on other grounds by State v.

Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020).

Third, the trial court focused on comments by Major Stuart

suggesting that the occupants of the car were not responsible for

firing the bullet that struck and killed the victim. In particular, the

trial court highlighted Major Stuart’s statement that “[w]e want to

hold the man accountable that fired the round, not nobody in the

car.” But “[a]gain, context matters.” Peacock, 314 Ga. at 722 (4).

Here, as recounted above, Major Stuart repeatedly encouraged

Leverette to tell the truth about being in Etheridge’s car by

downplaying both Leverette’s moral culpability for the victim’s

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death and law enforcement’s interest in him in comparison with the

person who fired the fatal shot. To that end, Major Stuart repeatedly

emphasized that officers were not alleging that Leverette had fired

the fatal bullet because they knew another man had shot the victim.

Specifically, he said: “Y’all haven’t been accused . . . of firing the

shots that killed a man. I think you need to understand that. Okay?

That’s not why we’re here”; “Nobody thinks for one minute that car

that the shots was fired from killed an innocent person, and I want

to make that clear”; “The good news in your corner is you’re not being

accused, or nobody in that car is being accused, of the bullet hitting

that man that died”; and “We know that nobody in the car even shot

the innocent bystander, much less you.” And Agent Karsten used the

same interrogation technique to exhort Leverette to tell the truth

about being in Etheridge’s car after Major Stuart left the room,

telling Leverette, “We don’t think people in the car shot the person

that died.”

These five statements, each of which was made within minutes

of, and either before or after, Major Stuart’s “accountability”

15
comment, used slightly different terminology to convey that

Leverette should be truthful about being in Etheridge’s car during

the shootout because officers knew Leverette had not fired the fatal

bullet. And because Major Stuart’s comment about who officers

“want[ed]” to hold “accountable” similarly emphasized that officers

knew the people in Etheridge’s car did not fire the fatal bullet and

were focused on the person who did, a reasonable person in

Leverette’s position would have understood the comment as yet

another exhortation to tell the truth about being in Etheridge’s car,

not as a statement that he would face “no charges” if he made

incriminating admissions. Lewis, 311 Ga. at 658 (2) (a) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

The dissenting opinion’s conclusion that Leverette was offered

an impermissible hope of benefit finds no support in our precedent.

An investigator’s comments constitute an impermissible hope of

benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 only if the defendant could have

“reasonably understood” the comments to be “promises related to

reduced criminal punishment.” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 868-869

16
(2) (b), (c) (725 SE2d 320) (2012) (emphasis supplied). See also, e.g.,

Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 374 (2) (744 SE2d 738) (2013)

(focusing on whether the defendant could “reasonably have

understood [an] assurance as a promise that he would not be charged

with crimes . . . even if he admitted his own participation in such

crimes” (emphasis supplied)), disapproved of on other grounds by

Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686 (820 SE2d 640) (2018). And here, even if

Major Stuart’s “accountability” comment could be divorced from its

context and considered in isolation, Leverette could not have

reasonably understood the comment as a promise not to charge him

with murder under our precedent. This is because we have

previously categorized statements indicating that investigators

have “no present intention of charging [the defendant]” as mere

exhortations to tell the truth, rather than as assurances that could

“reasonably [be] understood” as “promise[s] that [the defendant]

would not be charged with crimes.” Edenfield, 293 Ga. at 374-375

(2). And Major Stuart’s “accountability” statement, when considered

in isolation, could have at most conveyed to Leverette a present

17
intention not to charge him with murder because the statement

concerned only who officers “want[ed]” to hold accountable (a

statement about officers’ present desire that might support an

inference about what they presently intended to do), not who officers

“would” hold accountable (a promise about future charging

decisions). Compare id. (no hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824

where “investigators indicated to [the defendant] that they then had

no present intention of charging [him] with anything” because “they

believed [another man] was responsible for killing [the victim]”),

with Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 317, 327 (2) (c) (830 SE2d 195)

(2019) (holding that an investigator’s statements — that, “if you

said, Lieutenant Miller, I’ve been selling for five years[,] . . . there

aren’t any more charges. What you’re charged with now is what

you’re charged with. I’m not going back and charging you” —

constituted “a promise not to bring additional charges — and thus a

hope of benefit — if [the defendant] gave police information about

how long he had been selling XLR11” (punctuation omitted)), and

State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 771-772 (2) (770 SE2d 808) (2015)

18
(holding that a defendant’s statements were induced by an improper

hope of benefit where an FBI agent told the defendant that “he

would ‘keep the murder warrant off’ if [the defendant] talked to

him,” that “one of the things the agent cared most about was

‘keeping [the defendant] out of jail,’” and that “I’m the lead on the

case, and as much as you do for me, I will make sure nothing

happens to you” (punctuation omitted)).

Under our precedent, Major Stuart’s comment about not

“want[ing]” to hold anyone in the car “accountable” clearly falls on

the permissible side of the divide between statements that qualify

as a hope of benefit under the statute and those that do not. See,

e.g., Currier v. State, 294 Ga. 392, 399-400 (3) (754 SE2d 17) (2014)

(no improper hope of benefit where a sheriff told the defendant, who

was later charged with felony murder, that “he would be in less

trouble for concealing [a] body” than for murder, that “no one was

going to come after [the defendant] for getting rid of a dead body he

found in his home,” and that “the most [the defendant] could be

charged with would be disposing of a body” if he told the sheriff what

19
he had heard about the body’s whereabouts). Leverette “could not

reasonably have understood this assurance as a promise that he

would not be charged with crimes against [the victim] even if he

admitted his own participation in such crimes.” Edenfield, 293 Ga.

at 374 (2). And for that reason, it is unsurprising that the dissenting

opinion does not cite any analogous case from our Court supporting

the conclusion that Major Stuart’s comment here constituted a

promise related to reduced criminal punishment.4

Because the trial court erred in excluding Leverette’s

statements under OCGA § 24-8-824 but failed to consider his

challenges to the admissibility of his statements based on the

Georgia Constitution, the United States Constitution, and certain

United States Supreme Court precedents, we vacate the trial court’s

order suppressing Leverette’s statements and remand for further

proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur,

4 Although the dissenting opinion casts doubt on our current hope-of-

benefit case law, neither the dissenting opinion nor the parties argue that we
should overrule that precedent or chart a new course in this case. Accordingly,
we apply the law as it stands.
20
except Boggs, C. J., Peterson, P. J., and Warren and Pinson, JJ., who
dissent.

LAGRUA, Justice, concurring.

I join the majority’s holding that Leverette’s statements to law

enforcement were not induced in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 “by

the slightest hope of benefit” under our current precedent. I write

separately because I question whether Leverette’s statements

implicate OCGA § 24-8-824 in the first instance since they do not

amount to a confession. See OCGA § 24-8-824 (“To make a confession

admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being

induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear

of injury.”) (emphasis supplied). Instead, his statements are merely

admissions, OCGA § 24-8-824 does not expressly mention

admissions, and our caselaw extending this statute’s rule to

admissions stands on shaky ground.

As early as 1879, this Court recognized a distinction between

confessions and admissions. See Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600, 603

21
(1879) (granting new trial where defendant admitted being present

at the crime’s commission, but denied guilt, such that a jury

instruction on confessions was improper). We have reiterated that

distinction consistently and on numerous occasions since then. See

e.g., Covington v. State of Ga., 79 Ga. 687, 690 (7 SE 153) (1887)

(distinguishing confessions from admissions); Owens v. State, 120

Ga. 296, 298 (48 SE 21) (1904) (same); Clarke v. State, 165 Ga. 326,

331 (140 SE 889) (1927) (same); Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 771

(2)-(3) (48 SE2d 522) (1948) (same); Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175,

177 (1) (657 SE2d 863) (2008) (same), overruled on other grounds by

Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 434-435 (3) (b) (883 SE2d 317) (2023);

Thomas v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 30 (2) (b) (838 SE2d 801) (2020) (same).

Our General Assembly has also long recognized the difference in

these two terms of art. See OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All admissions shall

be scanned with care, and confessions of guilty shall be received with

great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other

evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”); Johnson v. State, 61 Ga.

305, 308 (1878) (observing that “[t]he 3792 section of the Code

22
declares, that ‘all admissions should be scanned with care, and

confessions of guilty should be received with great caution’”).

So, what’s the difference? We summed it up well in Walsh v.

State: “An admission differs from a confession in that a confession

acknowledges all of the essential elements of the crime.” 269 Ga.

427, 429-430 (1) (499 SE2d 332) (1998).5 Put simply, in a confession,

“the entire criminal act is confessed.” Clarke, 165 Ga. at 331 (citing

Owens, 120 Ga. at 298). Admissions, on the other hand — which we

have at times referred to as “mere incriminating statements” — do

not acknowledge every essential element of the crime. Instead, these

statements come up short of a true confession for one reason or

another. See English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2) (796 SE2d 258)

(2017) (“[I]n an admission, only one or more facts entering into the

5 Our caselaw distinguishing admissions from confessions on the basis of

the crime’s essential elements stands in some tension with another line of
cases, where we have described the difference between admissions and
confessions as being “whether the statement is offered by the accused as
exculpatory or inculpatory[.]” See Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 126-127 (2)
(205 SE2d 210) (1974) (concluding that a statement which did not establish all
essential elements of the crime was nonetheless a confession within the
meaning of OCGA § 24-8-824, such that jury instruction on confessions was
not error, because the main fact was admitted without justification or excuse
and “the statement [wa]s not one from which the jury could infer innocence”).
23
criminal act are admitted, while in a confession, the entire criminal

act is confessed.”) (cleaned up); Thomas, 308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b) (“A

mere incriminating statement is made where the accused, though

admitting to damaging circumstances, nonetheless attempts to deny

responsibility for the crime charged by putting forward exculpatory

or legally justifying facts.”) (cleaned up). See also Covington, 79 Ga.

at 690 (“When a person only admits certain facts from which the jury

may or may not infer guilt, there is no confession. We may use the

word confessions for admissions, but to sum up mere inculpatory

admissions and denominate them a confession, implies that they

amount to a confession of guilt.”).

In the present case, Leverette’s statements do not amount to a

confession to the crimes for which he was indicted because they do

not acknowledge all the essential elements of aggravated assault. 6

The State can only obtain a conviction at trial on this charge if it

proves, among other elements, that Leverette assaulted another

6 Because aggravated assault is the predicate felony for the felony
murder charge, if Leverette’s statements do not amount to a confession to
aggravated assault, they cannot constitute a confession to felony murder.
24
person within the meaning of the simple assault statute, OCGA §

16-5-20 (a). See Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 87 (3) (a) (901 SE2d 149)

(2024) (citing to pattern jury instructions for elements of aggravated

assault); OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). To satisfy this element, the State must

prove Leverette either “attempt[ed] to commit a violent injury to the

person of another” or “commit[ted] an act which place[d] another in

reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.”

OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). But Leverette’s statements do not establish

either on their own. His admission that he fired a weapon at Hale,

Sr.’s home does not establish that he attempted to commit a violent

injury to the person of another. While facts presented at trial might

allow a jury to infer that Leverette attempted to do so, his admission

does not establish that he knew the home to be occupied at the time

he fired the shot.7 Moreover, his statements do not establish that his

firing of a weapon at Hale, Sr.’s home placed anyone in reasonable

7 Leverette said that he knew Hale, Jr., was outside the home, but that

he aimed at the home itself, rather than at Hale, Jr. Additionally, the presence
of vehicles in the driveway does not establish whether Leverette knew someone
was in the home when he fired the shot.
25
apprehension of immediately receiving violent injury. Again, while

facts presented at trial might support that conclusion, Leverette’s

statements do not suggest that he knew his act of firing the weapon

caused someone else to be placed in reasonable apprehension of

immediately receiving a violent injury. For these reasons,

Leverette’s statements amount to admissions, and do not rise to the

level of a confession, as the State will be put to its proof at trial, and

the jury will be required (at least on these facts) to draw some

inferences for the State to obtain a conviction. See Covington, 79 Ga.

at 690 (“When a person only admits certain facts from which the jury

may or may not infer guilt, there is no confession.”).

With respect to confessions, it has long been the rule that only

voluntary confessions are admissible against a defendant at trial.

See State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 780 (3) (b) (770 SE2d 808)

(2015) (observing pre-founding common law rule that confessions

“made under threats and promises” were inadmissible at trial). The

first statutory iteration of the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824

was derived from this common law “threats and promises” principle

26
but differed in its word choice: “To make a confession admissible, it

must have been made voluntarily without being induced by another,

by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” See

Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 780 (3) (b) (citing Ga. Code of 1863, § 3716).

Once codified, the law in Georgia became that a confession was

deemed involuntary if induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the

remotest fear of injury, and the statutory language of that rule has

remained substantively unchanged to this day.8

Neither OCGA § 24-8-824 nor any of its predecessors says

anything about “admissions” or “incriminating statements.”

Instead, each iteration of the rule refers only to a “confession,” i.e.,

a statement that “acknowledges all of the essential elements of the

crime.” Walsh, 269 Ga. at 429-430 (1). On its face, this suggests the

8 Compare McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 466 (182 SE 618) (1935) (“In

all of the Codes of Georgia (1863, § 3716; 1868, § 3740; 1873 and 1882, § 3793;
Penal Code of 1910, § 1932; Code of 1933, § 38-411), the rule governing the
admissibility of confessions is embodied in the following pungent language: ‘To
make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without
being induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of
injury.’”), with former OCGA § 24-3-50 (“To make a confession admissible, it
must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”), and OCGA § 24-8-824
(same).
27
rule does not apply to admissions. After all, “when we consider the

meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly

meant what it said and said what it meant[,]” and nothing has ever

been said by the General Assembly about admissions or

incriminating statements in the context of this rule. Deal v.

Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (cleaned

up). See id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (“[W]e must afford statutory text its

plain and ordinary meaning . . . if the statutory text is clear and

unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our

search for statutory meaning is at an end.”) (cleaned up). And yet,

despite our recognition of the difference between these two types of

statements, at some point along the way, we began to treat them as

one and the same for purposes of this rule without the General

Assembly ever telling us to do so.

Putting aside the lack of support in the text itself, I have doubts

about our precedent supporting the extension of this rule to mere

incriminating admissions. The most recent precedent directly on

point is Vergara, where we expressly “reject[ed] the State’s

28
argument that [former] OCGA § 24-3-50 does not apply to Vergara’s

statements to law enforcement because they constitute

incriminating statements rather than a confession.” 283 Ga. at 177

(1).9 There, we said that “[i]t has long been the law in this State that

the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the

same as that applied to a confession” and overruled several cases

“[t]o the extent that [they] hold otherwise.” 283 Ga. at 177 (1).10

However, to support that proposition and the overruling of

precedent, we engaged in no independent analysis and gave no

consideration to any of the factors that make up our modern

approach to stare decisis.11 See id. Instead, we simply pointed to

three cases in support of a conclusion that “the rule as to the

9 We reaffirmed Vergara in Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 771 (2) n.4, where we

similarly rejected the State’s attempt to draw a distinction between “full
confessions and mere incriminatory statements” in the context of the rule set
out at OCGA § 24-8-824.
10 Among the cases overruled by Vergara was Carruthers v. State, which

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress statements made prior to formal custodial
interrogation on the basis that the defendant’s “statement did not constitute a
confession, and, therefore, [OCGA] § 24-3-50 is inapplicable.” 272 Ga. 306, 313
(5) (528 SE2d 217) (2000) (citations omitted) (decided under former code).
11 See Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 156 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 544) (2022)

(describing stare decisis considerations).
29
admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that

applied to a confession.” See id. at 177 (1) (citing Fletcher v. State,

90 Ga. 468, 469 (17 SE 100) (1892), Fuller v. State, 109 Ga. 809, 811-

812 (35 SE 298) (1900), and Turner, 203 Ga. at 771 (3)). Strictly

speaking, however, none of those cases truly support the proposition

asserted.

In Fletcher, for example, the opinion authored by then-Chief

Justice Bleckley suggested that it was “the practice in this State” to

exclude involuntary admissions in 1892 but then specifically noted

a lack of “any direct adjudication upon the precise question” of

whether the rule excluding involuntary confessions also applied to

admissions. 90 Ga. at 469. The Fletcher Court then assumed without

deciding that the rule applied to both types of statements for

purposes of the case before it. See id. (“[b]ut grant[ing] that the same

rule holds with respect to criminating admissions as with respect to

confessions of guilt . . .”). Ultimately, that assumption did not bear

on the holding in the case, which dealt with whether the trial court

erred by allowing the jury to be present during a preliminary

30
examination of the law enforcement officers who elicited admissions

from the defendant in seeking to determine whether those

statements were voluntary. See id. at 469-470 (concluding that any

error arising from the jury’s presence during the preliminary

examination was harmless because “the admissions were in fact free

and voluntary, and were therefore properly receivable in evidence,”

but ultimately reversing conviction due to insufficient evidence).

Then there is Fuller, which, after distinguishing confessions

from admissions, suggested that “the sounder view of the law

touching the admissibility of such declarations on the part of one

charged with crime is to exclude them, if not voluntarily made, upon

the same principle as the defendant’s statement would be excluded

if it amounted to a direct confession of guilt.” 109 Ga. at 811-812.

Immediately thereafter, however, the Fuller Court stated that “it is

not necessary to decide directly this question, or to undertake to

reconcile authorities, or determine the weight of authority upon the

subject” of whether admissions and confessions are treated the same

for purposes of exclusion under the rule because, “under the facts of

31
this case, we think there is nothing in the record which indicates

that this statement of the defendant was not freely and voluntarily

made[.]” Id. at 812. Again, we did not directly hold nor answer the

question of whether the rule excluding involuntary confessions

applied to admissions because, even if it did, the statements in this

case were voluntary, and thus admissible without respect to their

characterization. See id. at 811-814.

Finally, the Turner Court held that the trial court erred by

allowing a defendant’s incriminating statement to be admitted at

trial because it was elicited by a sheriff’s suggestion that telling the

truth would result in a lighter sentence. 203 Ga. at 770-771 (1), (2),

and (3). The Turner Court did not itself conclude admissions were

treated the same as confessions for purposes of exclusion but merely

cited to Fuller, 109 Ga. 809, and Mill v. State, 3 Ga. App. 414 (60 SE

4) (1908), for the proposition that “the rule as to [a mere

incriminating statement’s] admissibility is the same as that applied

32
to a confession.” Id. at 771 (3).12

As best I can tell, this Court has never fully examined when,

and on what basis, the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824 was

extended to admissions. It might be that, in a case from a past era,

we clearly did so and soundly concluded that involuntary admissions

12 Much like the Vergara Court, in Turner, we simply cited to cases to

support our asserted proposition without conducting any additional analysis.
See 203 Ga. at 771 (3). Moreover, like Vergara, the cases upon which Turner
relies do not persuasively support that proposition.
As explained above, Fuller expressly pointed out that it was not
“decid[ing] directly this question” of whether the rule applied to both
confessions and admissions. 109 Ga. at 812. Mill, for its part, was a one-
sentence decision from the Court of Appeals — which does not bind us in the
first instance — stating only that “[i]nculpatory admissions, as well as plenary
confessions, in order to be admissible against the defendant must be voluntary,
and not induced by ‘the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury.’”
3 Ga. App. at 414. Mill’s support for that statement was drawn from Johnson
v. State, 1 Ga. App. 129 (57 SE 934) (1907), which applied the rule applicable
to confessions to the admissions made in that case. However, I see little
precedential value in Johnson’s reasoning, since the Court of Appeals found
that the rule applied despite observing that the statements were not “admitted
. . . as a confession, or as evidence of inculpatory admissions that might tend
to show the defendant’s guilt[,]” and in light of outside circumstances which
the opinion suggests may have influenced its outcome. See id. at 131-132 (“In
arriving at the conclusion in this case that these statements are not admissible,
we have been influenced not only by the language itself, but by the situation
presented by the evidence, — the dominating power and influence of the white
man who had arrested, as he states, on mere suspicion without a warrant, a
negro, and unlawfully searched him, his wife, and his house, and was taking
him to jail.”). It is further worth observing that this Court has never cited to
Johnson, and the Court of Appeals has only done so on a handful of occasions,
with the most recent instance being more than a half-century ago. See Bryant
v. State, 132 Ga. App. 186 (207 SE2d 671) (1974).
33
were subject to exclusion; but if that is so, my research has revealed

no such case. More likely, in my view, is that we have simply relied

upon past assumptions of this Court without scrutiny. At a

minimum, I have doubts about whether we should continue to rely

upon Vergara given its misplaced citations and lack of analysis.13

To be clear, while it is an open question in my mind whether

the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824 applies to admissions, I

do not mean to suggest that involuntary admissions would in all

cases be admissible at trial. Instead, it is my view that the

admissibility of such statements should be evaluated as a matter of

constitutional due process, consistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and its progeny, rather

than under what appears to be a judicially created rule extending

OCGA § 24-8-824 to admissions. In the appropriate case, I encourage

13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas,

308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) (794 SE2d
118) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere
admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statute only applies to
confessions. See OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All admissions shall be scanned with care,
and confessions of guilt shall be received with great caution. A confession
alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”).
34
my colleagues to join me in taking a closer look at this issue so that

we may provide clarity on the same.14

PETERSON, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

1. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because,

even under our current interpretation of OCGA § 24-8-824, we

cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that Leverette’s

statements were induced by the hope of a benefit. Here, Major

Stuart’s statement that “[w]e want to hold the man accountable that

fired the round, not nobody in the car” is reasonably understood to

mean that Leverette would not be charged or arrested for the death

of the “innocent person” if he acknowledged that he was in the car.15

14 Of course, the General Assembly could also preemptively resolve my

concerns by clarifying whether OCGA § 24-8-824 applies to admissions as well
as confessions.
15 Our precedent has not articulated consistently the appropriate

standard for determining whether a confession is inadmissible under OCGA §
24-8-824. Compare Golden v. State, 310 Ga. 538, 542-543 (2) (852 SE2d 524)
(2020) (analyzing whether the defendant’s statement was induced by an
impermissible hope of benefit under “the totality of the circumstances”
(citation and punctuation omitted)), with Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869-870
(2) (c) (725 SE2d 320) (2012) (analyzing whether the defendant could have
“reasonably understood” law enforcement’s statements as offering a hope of

35
benefit), and Kessler v. State, 311 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (858 SE2d 1) (2021)
(analyzing whether the defendant’s confession was “actually induced” by the
alleged hope of benefit).
It seems to me that the best way to make sense of our caselaw is that the
applicable standard has two parts: one objective and one subjective. First,
courts determine whether the State made statements that objectively could be
viewed by a reasonable defendant as offering an impermissible hope of benefit
(or threatened injury), considering all the relevant circumstances. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 573 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 208) (2022) (concluding
after “[r]eviewing the exchange as a whole” that the record supported the trial
court’s conclusion that “no person in [the defendant’s] position would have
believed that the interviewing detective was making a credible death threat”);
Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 400 (3) (768 SE2d 486) (2015), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (noting that
the “[a]ppellant’s personal belief . . . does not render his statements
involuntary” under precursor to OCGA § 24-8-824 and concluding that under
“the totality of the circumstances” that the trial court’s conclusion that the
statement was voluntarily made was not erroneous); Edenfield v. State, 293
Ga. 370, 374 (2) (744 SE2d 738) (2013), disapproved of on other grounds by
Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 706 (11) (a) n.3 (820 SE2d 640) (2018) (“When its
context is considered, it becomes clear that [the defendant] could not
reasonably have understood [law enforcement’s] assurance as” an
impermissible hope of benefit.); Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 181 (1) (657
SE2d 863) (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by Clark v. State, 315 Ga.
423, 435 (3) (b) n.16 (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (concluding under “the totality of
the circumstances that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position” would
not have understood the officer’s statements as an impermissible hope of
benefit); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 110-111 (3) (686 SE2d 239) (2009),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 303-304 (3) (812
SE2d 225) (2018) (rejecting defendant’s contention that “a person in [the
defendant’s] position would have reasonably viewed [an officer’s] statement”
as an impermissible hope of benefit “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances”);
Gober v. State, 264 Ga. 226, 228 (2) (b) (443 SE2d 616) (1994) (holding that a
statement “was not a threat, and was not otherwise reasonably likely to induce
a fear of injury” “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances”); Duke v. State,
268 Ga. 425, 426 (2) (489 SE2d 811) (1997) (holding that “[u]nder the totality
of the circumstances” the defendant “could not reasonably have believed that,
if he implicated himself in his statement, officers . . . would not charge him
with any crime whatsoever”). In context, this repeated use of “totality of the

36
In fact, that’s precisely how I (and the trial court) understand that

statement. And Leverette’s incriminating statements followed

Major Stuart’s statement such that they seem likely to have been

induced by it, as the trial court also found. In response, the majority

asserts that our understanding is unreasonable because Major

Stuart’s “accountable” statement should be understood as simply

another exhortation to tell the truth, because he had also told

Leverette several times that Leverette should tell the truth. But

circumstances” is best understood not as an uncritical importation of the
distinct federal due process voluntariness standard, see State v. Franklin, 318
Ga. 39, 42 (3) (897 SE2d 432) (2024), but as a directive that a reviewing court
consider all the relevant context in determining whether the statement
objectively offered a hope of benefit or threat of harm.
Second, if a statement did offer a hope of benefit or threaten harm, a
court must then determine whether that statement actually induced the
defendant’s confession. See, e.g., Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 326 (2) (b) (830
SE2d 195) (2019) (reasoning that a statement is inadmissible under OCGA §
24-8-824 if (1) law enforcement has promised an impermissible hope of benefit
and (2) the benefit actually induced the defendant’s statement); Lewis v. State,
311 Ga. 650, 658 (2) (a) (859 SE2d 1) (2021) (pretermitting whether law
enforcement’s statements constituted an impermissible hope of benefit and
concluding that the defendant “failed to demonstrate that the statements
induced his [ ] confession”); Pulley v. State, 291 Ga. 330, 332 (2) (729 SE2d 338)
(2012) (reasoning that “the voluntariness of a statement does not depend solely
upon whether it was made in response to promises, rather, the court must
determine voluntariness by judging the totality of the circumstances” and “the
key inquiry is whether the alleged promise actually induced the statement that
Appellant seeks to suppress”) (cleaned up). The combination of these two
considerations seems to me sensible in the light of the text of the statute.
37
those other statements by Major Stuart are not “context” that

changes what strikes me as the clear meaning of his “accountable”

statement, they were simply other attempts to convince Leverette to

talk. In short, even a faithful application of our precedent — with all

of its current flaws — leads to the conclusion that Leverette’s

statement was induced by the hope of a benefit, and thus the trial

court did not err in excluding it. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

2. That said, I also take this opportunity to offer an additional

observation about the statute at issue today. Our caselaw

interpreting OCGA § 24-8-824 has departed far from the statutory

text.

We routinely claim that when “statutory text is clear and

unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our

search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Star Residential, LLC v.

Hernandez, 311 Ga. 784, 785 (1) (860 SE2d 726) (2021) (quoting Deal

v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013)). The

statute we encounter today requires that for a confession to be

admissible, it must “have been made voluntarily, without being

38
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear

of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-824. This statute is apparently an exception

to our plain meaning rule, because — over and over and over again

— our recent precedent has flatly ignored and contravened its text.

Over 150 years ago, the Georgia Code first incorporated a

provision forbidding the admission of any confession that was

“induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear

of injury.” See Ga. Code of 1860, § 3716.16 This evidentiary rule, as a

16 This appears not to have been the result of legislative action by the

General Assembly, but was instead derived by the codifier from two decisions
of this Court. See Rafe v. State of Ga., 20 Ga. 60 (1856); Stephen v. State of Ga.,
11 Ga. 225 (1852); see also Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd.
of Comm’rs, 315 Ga. 39, 58 (2) (c) (ii) n.14 (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (noting that
early codes were compiled differently from current practice, and that “many
statutes appeared in those codes that had never been individually enacted by
the General Assembly; instead, they were legal principles often derived from
decisions of this Court”). The only actions of the General Assembly regarding
this statute appear to be the regular adoption of codes as a whole (which, of
course, the Single Subject Matter Paragraph prohibits from changing the law).
See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Par. III (“No bill shall pass which refers
to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is
expressed in the title thereof.”); cf. Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 784 (142
SE 111) (1928) (observing in the context of considering conflict between
legislative acts that “we cannot give to an act of the legislature adopting a Code
the same effect as we give to an act dealing with a single subject-matter, and
promulgating a single principle of law”).

39
matter of text, has remained materially identical since then and now

appears in OCGA § 24-8-824. For decades, Georgia courts applied

the statute as written and excluded confessions that were so

induced. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 113 Ga. 1039, 1039 (39 SE 846)

(1901) (“[A]ny advice to a [defendant] under arrest, by the officer

having her in custody, to the effect that if she knew anything she

had better tell it, vitiates a confession induced thereby.”); Green v.

State, 88 Ga. 516, 516 (15 SE 10) (1891) (concluding confession was

inadmissible when defendant was told “if you know anything, it may

be best for you to tell it”).

The Green Court emphasized that, although “it is difficult to

draw a precise line between” admissible and inadmissible

confessions, courts should “adhere closely to the plain” language of

the statute. 88 Ga. at 518. As a result, confessions were generally

excluded as involuntary if the defendant was advised that providing

information would serve his or her self-interest, while confessions

induced by exhortations to tell the truth were admissible, as they

did not “tend to produce a false statement.” Wilson v. State, 19 Ga.

40
App. 759, 765, 769 (92 SE 309) (1917) (noting the difference between

the advice to “tell the truth,” which would not render a confession

inadmissible, and a statement that “it will be better for [a defendant]

to tell,” which would render a confession inadmissible because it

would induce a party to offer a “confession, regardless of its truth or

falsity”); see also McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 471 (182 SE 618)

(1935) (“There is a material difference between a statement to a

prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and one

wherein he is told that it would be better for him to make a

confession.” (emphasis in original)).

But more recently, this rule has changed, even though the

statutory text has not. See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258 (4)

(271 SE2d 168) (1980) (holding that defendant’s admissions

following officer’s statement of “something to the effect that it looked

like [the defendant was] in a heap of trouble and it would behoove

him if he shot straight with us” was admissible); Arline v. State, 264

Ga. 843, 843-844 (2) (452 SE2d 115) (1995) (holding that an

incriminating statement was admissible even though the detective

41
“told [the defendant] that the trial court might consider that he was

not the triggerman and that he cooperated with the police”). Tension

developed in the caselaw. Compare King v. State, 155 Ga. 707, 715-

716 (118 SE 368) (1923) (holding that a confession was inadmissible

when it was induced by the officer’s statement that “as a general

rule courts were lighter on those who did not give them much

trouble” even though the officer also told the defendant that he

“could not promise him anything” and the decision was ultimately

“a matter for the judge”) with State v. Summers, 173 Ga. App. 24,

26-27 (2) (325 SE2d 419) (1984) (holding that an incriminating

statement was admissible despite the officer’s promise that he

“would tell the district attorney of [the defendant’s] cooperation and

thereby possibly lighten any sentence” because the officer cautioned

that “only the judge could reduce the charge or the sentence”). And

then, in 1996, we removed the tension by judicially rewriting the

statute to conclude that “slightest hope of benefit” instead meant

little more than an express statement that the suspect’s charge or

sentence would be reduced. See White v. State, 266 Ga. 134, 135 (3)

42
(465 SE2d 277) (1996).17

Now, all this said, I am not at all sure that the statute is

necessary these days. Federal law protects defendants from coerced

confessions both through requiring Miranda18 warnings and

through the application of the totality of the circumstances test for

voluntariness under the Due Process Clause. If the statute does

much more than those two federal protections already offer and thus

excludes confessions made voluntarily and with full knowledge of

the rights included within Miranda warnings, the statute (which,

again, the General Assembly has never actually enacted) may do

more than the General Assembly would like. And if it doesn’t do

17 In White, the Court — without any analysis of the statutory text or

prior precedent — asserted that “the promise of a benefit that will render a
confession involuntary under OCGA § [24-8-824] must relate to the charge or
sentence facing the suspect.” 266 Ga. at 134 (3) (emphasis added) (citing
Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 27, 28 (1) (230 SE2d 849) (1976)). But Johnson does
not support this proposition. Rather, in Johnson, the Court held that a promise
of a lighter sentence falls within the ambit of OCGA § 24-8-824; nothing in the
opinion limited OCGA § 24-8-824 to promises relating to charging or
sentencing. 238 Ga. at 27-28 (1). Courts now repeatedly parrot White’s
unsupported assertion. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869 (2) (b) (725
SE2d 320) (2012); In the Interest of D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 488-489 (2) (669
SE2d 471) (2008); Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484, 485 (2) (660 SE2d 521) (2008);
Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 184 (4) (501 SE2d 562) (1998).
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

43
more, then litigation about it merely wastes the time of courts,

lawyers, and the public. But so long as the General Assembly leaves

the statute on the books, we should at least consider whether we

should apply it as it’s written and as it was historically understood.

This, however, is not the case in which to consider changing

course. Even under our current precedent, the trial court did not err

in excluding Leverette’s statement. I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Justice

Warren, and Justice Pinson join this dissent.

44
Decided February 18, 2025.

Murder. Sumter Superior Court. Before Judge Sizemore.

Lewis R. Lamb, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan

H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for

appellant.

Eric L. Gay; Shingler & McMillan, Douglas R. McMillan, for

appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 18, 2025