Lewis v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 9, 2025

S25A1255. LEWIS v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

George Michael Lewis appeals from his convictions for malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Kendra Weathers. 1 On appeal, Lewis alleges that (1) the evidence

1 The crimes were committed on April 14, 2015, April 26, 2015, and May

5, 2015. In July 2015, a Cobb County grand jury indicted Lewis for malice
murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 4), two counts of
aggravated assault, family violence (Counts 3 and 5), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 6), aggravated stalking (Count 7),
battery, family violence (Count 8), violating family violence order (Count 9),
and contributing to deprivation of a minor (Count 10). Count 8 occurred on
April 14, while Count 9 occurred on April 26. All other counts occurred on May
5. At a jury trial in October 2016, Lewis was found guilty of all counts except
for Count 8. On October 14, 2016, the trial court sentenced Lewis to serve life
in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), a
consecutive term of five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 6), a concurrent term of ten years in prison for
aggravated stalking (Count 7), and twelve months to serve each for violating
the family violence order and for contributing to the deprivation of a minor
(Counts 9 and 10). The other counts were either vacated by operation of law or
merged for sentencing purposes. Lewis timely filed a motion for new trial,
which was amended through new counsel on January 28, 2019. Following a
was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his convictions on Counts

1 through 7, (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the

underlying conduct of his discharged First Offender plea and

sentence, and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the

Jackson-Denno2 hearing. Because the evidence against Lewis in

committing these crimes was overwhelming, evidence of the

underlying conduct of the First Offender offense was properly

admitted into evidence, and the trial court properly denied the

ineffective assistance claim, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

at trial showed that Lewis was in a romantic relationship with

Weathers. The two began living together, along with Weathers’s

children, in 2012 and moved to Georgia around February 2015. In

April 2015, Lewis was charged with battery of Weathers and, as a

condition of his pretrial release, was not to have any contact with

hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on August
12, 2024. Lewis timely filed a notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to
this Court’s August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (1964).

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her. Also in that same month, Shenique Griffith3 and her children

began living in Lewis and Weathers’s apartment.

In the early morning hours of May 5, 2015, Lewis was at the

apartment despite the no-contact order,4 and he and Weathers

began arguing. Griffith was in the room during the argument and

made an audio recording of the incident on her phone, which was

admitted at trial. Weathers told Lewis to leave the apartment and

threatened to call the police if he refused to leave. After this

statement, Lewis pulled out a gun, Weathers screamed and ran out

of the apartment, and Lewis followed, shooting her twice. Griffith

testified that Lewis shot Weathers in the back as she was running

away, but that Griffith did not see the second shot because after the

first shot, she ran to the children who were also in the apartment

and locked them in their room. Lewis was then seen by neighbors

running and getting into his car with the gun and hurriedly driving

3 Shenique Griffith was a friend of Weathers’ whom Weathers offered a

place to live in exchange for help in watching the children.
4 Lewis testified at trial that Weathers had invited him back to the

apartment.
3
off. Weathers died from the two gunshot wounds.

After driving away from the scene of the incident, Lewis left for

Savannah. That same morning, around 8:00 a.m., a Bulloch County

Sheriff’s Department deputy attempted to pull Lewis over around

the Statesboro area. Lewis continued driving, and a chase ensued

over the next 50 miles. Eventually, a Georgia State Patrol officer

performed a PIT maneuver on Lewis’s car, ending the chase as

Lewis’s car crashed. Because Lewis believed that his leg was broken

and he passed out after being handcuffed, Lewis was taken to the

hospital where he was intubated and given medication that put him

in a medically-induced coma so he would not move during a CAT

scan. Hours afterwards, officers transported Lewis back to the police

station in Cobb County once he was medically cleared by the

hospital for transport.

After placing him in the transport vehicle, the officers

transporting Lewis asked him no questions except whether he

needed to use the restroom and whether he felt okay. During

transport, Lewis repeatedly discussed Weathers and Griffith trying

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to “kick [him] out of [his] apartment.” One of the officers

transporting him confirmed that this was “the kind of manner in

which [Lewis] was talking” the “entire time” during transport

regarding what happened with Weathers and Griffith. At some point

during transport, Lewis began hitting his head. Officers told him to

stop, and Lewis briefly stopped before continuing again “at least five

or six different times throughout [the] trip.”

At trial, Lewis testified that during an argument, Weathers

pulled out a gun, and it went off as Lewis was trying to grab it from

her. Not knowing that Weathers had been shot, Lewis then ran to

his car and left because he was scared.

1. Lewis first contends that the evidence was not sufficient as

a matter of constitutional due process to sustain his convictions on

Counts 1 through 7. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

as a matter of constitutional due process, we view the evidence

presented in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether

a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979).

5
Questions about the weight and credibility of evidence, the

inferences to be drawn from it, and the resolution of any conflicts in

the evidence are left to the jury. See Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56,

59 (2024).

As an initial matter, we note that any argument that the

evidence was insufficient concerning Lewis’s aggravated assault

guilty verdicts (Counts 3 and 5), and attendant felony murder guilty

verdicts (Counts 2 and 4), is moot because the trial court merged or

vacated all those counts. See Eggleston v. State, 309 Ga. 888, 890-91

(2020). Thus, we limit our sufficiency review to Count 1 (malice

murder),5 Count 6 (possession of a firearm during the commission of

a felony),6 and Count 7 (aggravated stalking). 7

5 “A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with

malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another
human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1(a).
6 “Any person who shall have on or within arm’s reach of his or her person

a firearm … during the commission of, or the attempt to commit: (1) Any crime
against or involving the person of another … and which crime is a felony,
commits a felony.” OCGA § 16-11-106(b)(1).
7 A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such

person, in violation of a bond to keep the peace posted pursuant to
Code Section 17-6-110, temporary restraining order, temporary
protective order, permanent restraining order, permanent

6
Lewis argues that the evidence is insufficient as Lewis was one

of two eye-witnesses to the shooting – the other being Griffith – and

his testimony matches the physical evidence presented by the State,

whereas Griffith’s testimony does not. However, this is no more than

disagreement with the jury’s resolution of any conflicts in the

evidence and assessment of the weight and credibility of the

evidence. And the evidence against Lewis was very strong. Lewis

was subject to a protective order prohibiting him from having

contact with Weathers. And although Lewis claimed that Weathers

had invited him to the apartment, which the jury was authorized

not to believe, Griffith testified that during the argument between

Lewis and Weathers, Weathers told Lewis to leave, thereby revoking

any consent for Lewis to be at the apartment. See State v. Burke,

287 Ga. 377, 379 (2010) (under OCGA § 16-5-91(a) “[t]he contact

protective order, preliminary injunction, good behavior bond, or
permanent injunction or condition of pretrial release, condition of
probation, or condition of parole in effect prohibiting the behavior
described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or
contacts another person at or about a place or places without the
consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and
intimidating the other person.
OCGA § 16-5-91(a).
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with the victim in violation of the protective order must also be

‘without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing

and intimidating’ him or her”) (quoting OCGA § 16-5-91(a)). The

incident was also audio recorded on Griffith’s phone. After shooting

Weathers, Lewis immediately fled the scene and engaged in a high-

speed chase with officers to escape capture. We conclude that this

evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Lewis’s convictions on

Counts 1, 6, and 7 as a matter of constitutional due process.

2. Lewis also contends that the trial court erred in admitting

into evidence the conduct underlying his discharged First Offender

plea and sentence because a First Offender plea and discharge is not

admissible for any purpose.8 In support, Lewis relies on former

OCGA § 42-8-62(a), which provided that completion of first-offender

probation “completely exonerates the defendant of any criminal

purpose and shall not affect any of his civil rights or liberties; and

the defendant shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction.”9

9 OCGA § 42-6-62(a) was amended effective July 1, 2016, and that

8
During the trial, before Lewis testified, the parties brought to

the court’s attention a potential issue regarding the State’s plan to

cross-examine Lewis under OCGA § 24-6-608(b)(1) (“Rule 608(b)(1)”)

about the incident underlying Lewis’s First Offender plea to

employment insurance fraud. The State represented that the First

Offender plea and sentence would not be tendered to the jury and

would be used only to refresh Lewis’s recollection if he denied the

conduct underlying the plea. The trial court ruled that such a cross-

examination would be admissible under Rule 608(b) as it “goes to

the Defendant’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”

On cross-examination, the State challenged Lewis’s account of

the shooting and immediately thereafter asked Lewis several

questions about whether “[b]ack in 2004 … [he] received some

unemployment insurance money” that was “more money than [he

was] entitled to … [b]ecause [he] made false representations to the

Department of Labor” Lewis responded “[y]es” to this line of

amended version no longer contains this language. This language is now found
in OCGA § 42-8-60(i). For purposes of this analysis, we assume that the former
version applies because Lewis’s claim fails under either version of the statute.
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questioning. There were no further questions regarding that

incident.

Rule 608(b)(1) provides:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character
for truthfulness ... may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. Such instances may however, in the discretion
of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of
the witness: (1) Concerning the witness’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness[.]

Even though Lewis entered a First Offender plea to employment

insurance fraud, which was not admitted into evidence, the specific

facts of Lewis’s conduct were a proper subject of inquiry on cross-

examination under Rule 608(b)(1). The specific instance of the

conduct underlying the First Offender Offense – false

representations to the Department of Labor in order to receive more

unemployment insurance money than what he was entitled to – is

the type of fraudulent conduct that pertains to his character for

untruthfulness. See Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v.

GTE Directories Corp., 37 F3d 1460, 1464 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Acts

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probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b) include such acts as

forgery, perjury, and fraud.” (emphasis added)).10 And Rule 608 does

not include any sort of carve-out for when that conduct happens to

have resulted in a first-offender conviction. Moreover, former OCGA

§ 42-6-62(a) does not address whether evidence of the conduct

underlying the first-offender conviction may be introduced at trial.

Therefore, we conclude that this line of questioning was proper

under Rule 608(b)(1).

Lewis further argues that the trial court erred in admitting

this evidence under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). 11 However, even

assuming that Lewis preserved this objection for ordinary appellate

review,12 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining

10 Because Rule 608 is materially similar to Federal Rule of Evidence

608, we look to federal case law in applying Rule 608. See State v. Almanza,
304 Ga. 553, 556 (2018).
11 OCGA § 24-4-403 provides:

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
12 Despite Lewis’s failure to explicitly object to the admission of this

evidence under Rule 403, the trial court conducted a Rule 403 analysis and

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that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “The exclusion of

evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should

be used only sparingly.” Jones v. State, 311 Ga. 455, 464 (2021)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “The probative value of evidence

is a combination of its logical force to prove a point and the need at

trial for evidence on that point.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 263

(2022) (punctuation omitted). Lewis’s credibility was a significant

issue at trial, especially considering his attack on the credibility of

Griffith, the only other eyewitness to the killing. On the other hand,

Lewis’s fraudulent conduct was not similar to the charged crimes,

nor was it particularly inflammatory. Given the limited nature of

the State’s inquiry and the trial court’s preclusion of the prosecutor’s

ability to use extrinsic evidence of the First Offender plea and

sentence, there was little, if any, danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or waste

ruled that the “probative value is not substantially outweighed by either unfair
prejudice or confusion of the issues with the jury.” «V10. 113»
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of time.

3. Finally, Lewis contends that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance at the Jackson-Denno hearing. Prior to trial, a

Jackson-Denno hearing was held regarding the statements made by

Lewis while being transported back to Cobb County. At the hearing,

Lewis argued that the statements were not voluntary since Lewis

was under the influence of drugs and should be excluded on that

basis. However, while Lewis’s trial attorney had Lewis’s medical

records from the hospital to support his contention that his

statements were not voluntary, the medical records were not

certified, nor did he have a witness at the hearing to introduce those

records. The trial court indicated that it was inclined to allow

admission of Lewis’s statements but reserved ruling pending a

review of the certified medical records, which counsel later obtained

and submitted to the court before trial. After reviewing the medical

records, the trial court orally ruled on the morning of trial that

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Lewis’s statements were voluntary and admissible.13

At Lewis’s motion for new trial hearing, one of the arguments

made by Lewis’s counsel was that trial counsel was ineffective

because counsel was inadequately prepared for the Jackson-Denno

hearing as counsel did not have a witness who could introduce the

medical records into evidence or a certification of the records. In the

order denying the motion for new trial, the court found that the

claims that trial counsel “failed to have Defendant’s medical records

certified” and “failed to subpoena a witness to introduce those

records” were “mooted by the Court’s reservation of ruling on the

motion and by subsequent review of the records.” The court also

ruled that Lewis “cannot show harm” because the trial court

reviewed the medical records prior to making its ruling. The trial

court also considered and rejected Lewis’s arguments that trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to provide additional authority by

letter-brief after being invited to do so by the trial court.

13 The trial court did not memorialize the oral ruling in a written order

until several years later.
14
On appeal, Lewis argues that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in three ways: (1) counsel did not subpoena an expert

witness to testify to Lewis’s medical records regarding the narcotics

in his system during the time Lewis made the statements; (2)

counsel did not have Lewis’s medical records certified by or before

the Jackson-Denno hearing; and (3) counsel did not provide

additional legal authority in a letter- brief when asked to do so by

the court.

To prevail on these claims, Lewis must show both deficient

performance and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 US 668, 687 (1984). To show deficient performance, Lewis “must

demonstrate that counsel performed counsel’s duties in an

objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances

and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Payne v. State,

314 Ga. 322, 328–29 (2022). “The law recognizes a strong

presumption that counsel performed reasonably,” and Lewis “bears

the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Blocker v. State, 316

Ga. 568, 578 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Lewis “must

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show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer

did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (citation

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Lewis “must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Zayas

v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

If either prong is not met, we need not address the other. Id.

As for the failure to subpoena an expert witness to introduce

the medical records and the failure to have the medical records

certified at the time of the Jackson-Denno hearing, Lewis cannot

show prejudice. Even assuming that counsel was deficient in failing

to have the medical records certified at the Jackson-Denno hearing

or to have a witness present to introduce the records, it is

undisputed that counsel subsequently submitted the certified

medical records to the trial court and that the trial court, upon

review, concluded that Lewis’s statements were voluntary and

admissible.

Moreover, to the extent Lewis is asserting that counsel was

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deficient in failing to present an expert witness to support that

Lewis’s statements were involuntarily given, trial counsel testified

that he investigated the claim, including consulting with an

emergency room nurse about the drugs that were administered, and

decided not to call an expert witness. Trial counsel stated that he

learned “from [the] consultation” that “these drugs that he was given

had a very short acting time and would not have been still effective

on – by the time he got – gets driven back to the – to the county,” so

“that’s the reason why I didn’t go down the avenue of retaining an

expert.” This was a reasonable strategic decision, and counsel was

not deficient. See Guzman-Perez v. State, 310 Ga. 573, 577 (2020)

(“Typically, the decision whether to present an expert witness is a

matter of trial strategy that, if reasonable, will not sustain a claim

of ineffective assistance.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

As for the failure to provide a letter-brief, the trial court

determined that trial counsel largely made the same arguments at

the Jackson-Denno hearing that appellate counsel says should have

been asserted in the letter-brief. And counsel testified at the motion

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for new trial hearing that he further investigated the effects of

narcotics and determined that Lewis was no longer under the effect

of the narcotics at the time of transport. Moreover, counsel did

additional legal research and because he did not find any cases

supporting that Lewis’s statements were involuntarily made under

the circumstances of this case, he chose not to submit an additional

letter-brief. “An attorney’s decision about which defense to present

is a question of trial strategy.” Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Unless the choice of

strategy is objectively unreasonable, such that no competent trial

counsel would have pursued such a course, we will not second-guess

counsel’s decisions in this regard.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also, Rosenbaum v. State, 320 Ga. 5, 11-12 (2024)

(same). Because choosing not to provide additional authority by

letter-brief after the hearing was a strategic decision and was not

objectively unreasonable, counsel’s failure to do so was not deficient.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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