CourtListener 10846012

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 3, 2026

S26A0435. HAMILTON v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Rodriquez Lamont Hamilton appeals his convictions for felony

murder and other offenses, stemming from the fatal shooting of

Jamarius Cowart and non-fatal shooting of Allysia Bryant. 1

Hamilton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1)

1 The crimes occurred on November 2, 2022. On January 23, 2023, a

Glynn County grand jury returned an indictment charging Hamilton with
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault
of Cowart (Count 2), aggravated assault for shooting Bryant (Count 3), and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 4
and 5). At a December 2023 trial, a jury found Hamilton not guilty of malice
murder and guilty of the other counts. On December 21, 2023, the trial court
sentenced Hamilton to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony
murder and consecutive sentences of 20 years in prison for the aggravated
assault of Bryant and 5 years in prison for each of the firearm possession
counts. Hamilton filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended in
May 2025. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order
entered on October 1, 2025. Hamilton filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and
submitted for consideration on the briefs.
denying a motion for mistrial based on an emotional outburst in the

courtroom; (2) denying a motion for mistrial based on testimony by

an officer that Hamilton had invoked his right to remain silent; and

(3) admitting various evidence about prior difficulties between

Hamilton and the victims. Hamilton also makes a cumulative error

argument. We conclude that Hamilton has not shown an abuse of

discretion by the trial court in denying his requests for mistrial and

that any abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence in question

was harmless, and we affirm.

The evidence at trial showed that in November 2022, Hamilton

and Bryant were sharing a home in Brunswick with their children.

They had been in and out of a romantic relationship for the previous

decade, but in November 2022, Bryant had been dating Cowart

instead for about six months. As discussed in more detail below,

Bryant and Hamilton’s relationship had been tumultuous, with

Hamilton at times being violent toward Bryant and stealing her

belongings, both before and after she began seeing Cowart.

Bryant testified at trial as follows. On the night of November

2
2, 2022, Bryant told Hamilton that she was going to church. Instead,

she went to a restaurant in Brunswick where Cowart was working.

When Cowart got off work, Bryant drove off in her car with Cowart

in the passenger seat. At some point, Cowart asked Bryant if a truck

on the road was her “baby daddy cab,” and Bryant looked and

recognized Hamilton’s truck. Shortly thereafter, when stopped at a

red light at the intersection of Crispen and Old Jesup, Bryant

observed Hamilton’s truck stopped next to her car. The passenger

side window of Bryant’s car was down. No words were exchanged,

but Hamilton fired several shots at Bryant’s car. Bryant could see

Hamilton’s eyes and recognized that he was firing her black Glock

.40-caliber handgun — which she had left at home that night — with

his arm out of the window. Bryant was shot in the back, and she

could tell that Cowart had been shot. Bryant continued driving

straight, while Hamilton turned right, before Bryant stopped and

called 911, then encountered police. Bryant had been driving a silver

Chrysler sedan and reported that Hamilton drove a silver Ford F-

150 truck.

3
An officer driving nearby encountered Bryant’s vehicle

approaching at a high rate of speed shortly after 11:00 p.m. Bryant

drove around the officer, stopped her car in the middle of the road,

got out of the car, and ran over screaming that her boyfriend had

been shot. Cowart died at the scene. Bryant told 911 and a

responding officer that her “baby daddy” had shot her boyfriend, told

the responding officer that she believed that she had been shot, as

well, and identified Hamilton by name to the responding officer and

an officer who interviewed her at the hospital.

A motorist, Nicolas Fryar, testified at trial about what he saw

and heard near the intersection of Crispen and Old Jesup at the time

of the shooting. He said he saw a light-colored truck next to a dark-

colored car, the driver of the truck looking “animated.” Just before a

stoplight turned green, he heard a “pop, pop, pop,” after which the

two vehicles drove off fast in opposite directions.

Surveillance video from an area business from the night of the

shooting showed a silver pickup truck — which appeared to be a

Ford F-150 and which Bryant identified as Hamilton’s — turning on

4
to Crispen a few minutes before Bryant’s car did. Other surveillance

video showed Bryant’s car passing the truck, which had been parked

along Crispen and began to move only as Bryant’s car approached.

Another video showed the two vehicles side by side at the

intersection of Crispen and Old Jesup, before the sedan proceeded

straight and the truck turned right.

The jury also heard from Zacchaeus Benton, an acquaintance

of Hamilton. Benton recalled a night on which Hamilton arrived

unexpectedly at Benton’s house, which was a few miles away from

the site of the shooting. Hamilton asked for a ride and permission to

leave his truck at Benton’s house. Benton drove Hamilton about five

minutes away and dropped him off at a stop sign. Surveillance video

outside Benton’s house showed a person identified by Benton as

Hamilton arriving at 11:38 p.m. on the night of November 2, 2022,

then leaving with Benton in Benton’s vehicle. On cross-examination,

Benton testified that Hamilton had left his vehicle there before and

that “nothing that night was out of the ordinary” to him. Police found

Hamilton’s truck at Benton’s house. About a month after the

5
shootings, Hamilton turned himself in to law enforcement with the

assistance of counsel.

Shell casings recovered from both the intersection of Crispen

and Old Jesup and Bryant’s vehicle were fired from the same

firearm, bullets recovered from Cowart’s autopsy and a bullet found

in Bryant’s vehicle were fired from the same firearm, and those

casings and bullets all were consistent with being fired from a Glock

.40-caliber pistol. Bryant testified that she never saw her Glock .40-

caliber handgun after the night of the shooting, although police

came and collected the gun’s box months after the shooting. A

detective testified that no .40-caliber handgun was ever recovered in

connection with the case.

Hamilton did not testify at trial. His lawyer emphasized to the

jury that the truck driven by the shooter was a common model and

color, questioned whether Bryant had actually seen the shooter’s

face, and suggested that Bryant may have been influenced by

6
threats from Cowart’s family. 2 Counsel also suggested in closing

that the police had failed to investigate other possible perpetrators,

such as another romantic partner of Bryant or someone involved in

a prior invasion of her home.3 Counsel in closing did not appear to

dispute that Hamilton went to Benton’s house after the shooting,

arguing this was not indicative of Hamilton seeking help after

having committed a crime, as Benton was a mere acquaintance, and

Hamilton had parked his truck there before.

1. On appeal, Hamilton argues that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying Hamilton’s request for a mistrial after an

emotional outburst by Cowart’s family while the State was playing

video footage that showed Cowart’s body. We conclude that

Hamilton has not shown an abuse of discretion.

During the testimony of the officer who first encountered

Bryant after the shooting, the State played the officer’s body-worn

2 Bryant testified that she had been threatened and “jumped” by
members of Cowart’s family since the shooting.
3 Bryant testified that a few months before the shootings, her home with

Hamilton was broken into and the two were held at gunpoint by masked
intruders.
7
camera footage. The transcript indicates that while the video was

playing, someone in the courtroom made an outburst. Defense

counsel requested a bench conference, and the transcript notes two

more outbursts, one while the prosecutor was addressing the trial

court and another while the jury was escorted out of the courtroom;

the transcript also notes that “the family” was escorted out at this

time. Defense counsel initially said, “I don’t know that it quite rises

to the level of a mistrial[.]”But after the prosecutor implied that he

had warned Cowart’s family about the contents of the video and

warned about making outbursts, defense counsel moved for a

mistrial “just due to the level of what just transpired and the fact

that they knew what was there and they knew what was coming.”

The trial court denied the mistrial and admonished members of

Cowart’s family who had returned to the courtroom. The trial court

indicated it was going to instruct the jury, but before the jury was

brought back into the courtroom, the trial court stated, “I know

that’s not your preferred way to handle it,” and, “I know that’s your

backup request.” The court then charged the jury as follows:

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Ladies and gentlemen, before we broke we had [a] little
incident in the courtroom. I know everybody noticed it.
The family of the victim had an outburst. I would instruct
you to disregard the outburst or outcry that was in court,
that was in the courtroom. Your verdict, when you get to
it, should be a verdict based upon the evidence according
to law I give you. You should not show favor or sympathy
to one side or the other. It’s your duty to consider all the
facts objectively without favor, affection or sympathy to
either party, so I instruct you to disregard any instances
like that. Hopefully, that won’t happen again but you can
understand why it does happen, but it should not affect
your decision in the end, when you get to decide the case.

After the trial court instructed the jury, it asked, “Any additional

instructions?” Defense counsel stated, “no,” and did not renew her

request for a mistrial.

Pretermitting whether this enumeration of error was

preserved,4 Hamilton has not shown an abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s ruling. “A trial court generally has broad discretion in

deciding whether to grant a mistrial, and great deference is afforded

to a court’s determination that a mistrial was not necessary.”

Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 573, 576 (2021). “The measures a trial

4 But see Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 866 (2023) (where defendant fails

to renew motion for mistrial following trial court’s curative instruction, he
waives issue of denial of mistrial for appeal).
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court takes in response to a courtroom outburst are within the

court’s discretion unless a fair trial is not possible without a new

trial.” Id. “Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when

it takes prompt, thorough, and curative action.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). “When juries are given curative instructions following

such outbursts, they are presumed to follow them in the absence of

proof to the contrary.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the trial court admonished family members about the

outburst. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the

outburst in detailed remarks. Although Hamilton suggests that the

curative instruction was insufficient because the State’s case was

weak, the State’s case included a clear eyewitness identification of

Hamilton as the shooter by someone who knew him well,

corroborated by other evidence. And Hamilton otherwise has not

even attempted to argue with any specificity how the outburst of

which he complains — the nature of which is not detailed in the

record — affected the verdicts or pointed to any evidence that the

jury disregarded the instruction. Therefore, he has not shown

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reversible error. See Thomas, 311 Ga. at 576–77 (no abuse of

discretion in denial of mistrial after victim’s son screamed at the

defendant, “You killed my daddy,” during trial in the courtroom,

even where multiple members of the jury indicated the outburst

caused them concern, where court received reassurance from all

jurors that the outburst would not impair their ability to be fair and

impartial and told the jury to disregard the outburst and that the

man who made the outburst was excluded from the courthouse);

Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 154–55 (2018) (trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial after a witness

under cross-examination said repeatedly, “Y’all done killed

somebody,” and “Y’all going to hell,” where the court directed the

jury to disregard the outburst); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 323–25

(1981) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to declare a mistrial after the father of the victim lunged at

the defendant and screamed, “You’ll pay,” “You’re liable,” and

“[Y]ou’re going to get it,” where the court gave a curative instruction

and asked jurors whether the outburst would affect their verdict).

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2. Next, Hamilton argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Hamilton’s request for a mistrial after a

detective testified about Hamilton’s refusal to make a statement to

law enforcement when he was arrested.

Testifying at trial about Hamilton turning himself in to law

enforcement, a detective volunteered without prompting that

Hamilton “was not willing to make a statement at that time.” The

jury was excused at the request of the prosecutor, who told the court,

“Obviously that was not a planned response. In fact, the detective

and I had talked about this during the lunch break about not making

any reference.” Hamilton’s counsel made a motion for a mistrial,

citing both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and the Georgia Constitution and arguing that “[a] curative

instruction will not fix this.” The trial court denied the motion. The

trial court gave a curative instruction instructing the jury to

disregard the detective’s statement as improper:

Ladies and gentlemen, just before we broke the officer
gave testimony about the defendant refused to give a
statement when he first turned himself in. The State

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always has an unalterable burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in these cases, and the defendant has an
absolute right to remain silent. So it was improper, the
statement that was made was not done intentionally, but
it — but it was a statement that came out inadvertently
to you. So I’m going to instruct you to completely
disregard that statement about him not giving a
statement when he turned himself in. That has nothing
— he has an absolute right to do that. It should not be
regarded by you in any manner whatsoever.

The court then asked jurors to raise their hands if they could not

follow the instruction; no one raised a hand. After the curative

instruction was given, the defense renewed its motion for mistrial;

the trial court did not respond, and examination of the detective

resumed.

Whether to grant a mistrial due to an improper comment on a

defendant’s silence is a matter for the trial court’s discretion that an

appellate court will not disturb “unless there is a showing that a

mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.”

Parker v. State, 309 Ga. 736, 738 (2020) (quotation marks omitted).

The detective’s remark may well have been an impermissible

comment on Hamilton’s silence. But we need not decide that

question, because even if it was, the trial court acted within its
13
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The comment was non-

responsive to the prosecutor’s question and made in passing.

Further, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the remark

as improper. The jury is presumed to have followed that instruction.

See id. at 739. And Hamilton has not offered any proof to rebut that

presumption. Hamilton argues the weakness of the State’s case —

as evidenced, he says, by the length of the jury’s deliberations and a

note indicating that the jury thought that law enforcement did a

poor job investigating — is itself evidence that the jury may not have

followed the trial court’s instructions. 5 But this is mere speculation

as to what may have influenced jurors who had initially voted to

acquit and therefore insufficient to show jurors disregarded the

instructions. Cf. Bradley v. State, 234 Ga. 664, 668 (1975) (rejecting

claim of error in denial of mistrial, where defendant’s argument as

5 The transcript indicates that the jury received the case around
lunchtime on the third day of trial and returned its verdict midmorning the
following day. During deliberations, the jury sent the court several notes, first
stating it was “deadlocked 50 50,” then indicating it was at eight votes for
guilty and four for not guilty, then that it was “at a stalemate” at that vote
despite being told to continue deliberating. In one note, the jury stated, “The
only thing we agree on is the cops did a shoddy job.”
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to how prosecutor’s remark may have been considered by the jury in

disregard of curative instructions was “speculative” and “unlikely”).

And, as noted above, the State’s case was not weak. Therefore, this

enumeration of error fails. See Parker, 309 Ga. at 738–39 (trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial based on

a detective’s nonresponsive testimony that the defendant “didn’t

speak” and “didn’t say anything” where the trial court instructed

jury to disregard the comment, and the defendant provided no

evidence that the jury disregarded the court’s instruction).

3. Hamilton argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting evidence of “prior ‘bad acts’ and/or ‘prior difficulties’”

between him and the victims. Hamilton argues that the evidence did

not meet the criteria for admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-404(b)

(“Rule 404(b)”) and did not qualify as intrinsic evidence. He also

argues that the evidence should have been excluded under OCGA §

24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting at least some of this evidence as intrinsic,

and any error in the admission of the rest of the evidence was

15
harmless.

The State filed a pre-trial motion to admit evidence of prior

difficulties between Hamilton and the victims as intrinsic evidence.

The defense responded that the evidence was not intrinsic,

amounted to mere allegations supported by nothing more than

Bryant’s word, and was prejudicial and would lead to confusion of

the issues. The State amended its motion to include specific

incidents, attaching incident reports as documentation. At a pretrial

hearing on the matter, the State argued that the evidence would

show a pattern of violence and controlling behavior exhibited by

Hamilton and that this evidence was admissible as intrinsic

evidence or in the alternative under Rule 404(b) for the purpose of

showing Hamilton’s motive. The defense continued to object,

referencing its prior brief and arguing that there was a lack of

evidence that certain incidents had occurred. The trial court granted

the State’s motion, finding that the evidence was intrinsic because

it was necessary to complete the story of the crime and inextricably

intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offenses, as

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well as admissible under Rule 404(b) to show motive. The court also

found under Rule 403 that the probative value of the evidence was

not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.

Bryant testified at trial that she and Hamilton began dating

while they were still in high school and that Bryant became violent

toward her after high school. She also described him taking her

belongings on occasion; she said she would “always get it back but

just on his time.” Bryant testified as follows about incidents

described in the amended notice, as well as an incident involving

damage to her car about a month before the shooting:

• In a December 2016 incident that prompted Bryant to call
police, while Bryant was pregnant with her second child,
Bryant and Hamilton had argued; she recalled the argument
may have been “about cheating.” Bryant found Hamilton
taking her bed apart so that he could take it with him when he
left their shared apartment. Hamilton “jacked [her] up by the
shirt and pinned [her] on the bed[.]” Hamilton swung a bedrail
at Bryant, hitting her in the face. He took a gun out of his
pocket and started beating it on a dresser.

• In April 2019, after Bryant and Hamilton argued and she was
“ignoring him,” Bryant went to a friend’s house. Hamilton
blocked Bryant’s car from leaving the friend’s house by parking

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behind it while the two were arguing and tried to force her to
get out of the car. Bryant summoned police as a result of this
incident, as well. 6
• In July 2019, Bryant was trying to break up with Hamilton and
ignoring his calls and texts. Hamilton found Bryant at her
friend’s house and took the keys from the inside of her vehicle,
leading Bryant to make a police report. Hamilton later told
Bryant that he put her keys in a mailbox.

• Shortly after Bryant began seeing Cowart, Hamilton sent
Bryant a text message saying, “I found you,” along with a photo
of her car at Cowart’s house. When Bryant tried to leave, her
car was not working. She suspected that Hamilton, who was a
mechanic, had disabled her car.
• At some point after Hamilton found out about Bryant seeing
Cowart, Hamilton and Cowart reported to Bryant that they
had run into one another at a convenience store, and Bryant
later saw Hamilton following Cowart.

• About a month before the shooting, while Bryant was at
Cowart’s house, Hamilton slashed Bryant’s tires, “unhooked
something” related to her tires, and “switched the computer” in
her car. Bryant suggested in her testimony that Hamilton
admitted to her that he did these things to her car that day.7
Bryant did not report this incident to police.

• About a week before the shooting, when Bryant told Hamilton
that she was not going to stop seeing Cowart, Hamilton

6 The State also admitted through Bryant’s testimony a written
statement that she had given to a prosecutor about this incident, saying it was
a “misunderstanding” and Hamilton was “not violent at all.”
7 When asked if Hamilton said anything to her about this, she replied,

“Yes. That’s how I knew not to move the car that day. … He said that he
unhooked my tires, or did something with the — I don’t know — he unhooked
something.”
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punched Bryant in the face; police responded, but Bryant told
them it was a misunderstanding.

Although Hamilton is not clear about the basis on which each

of these incidents should have been excluded, we nevertheless

analyze his claims. For ease of analysis, we address the incidents in

two categories: those incidents occurring before Bryant began seeing

Cowart and those occurring after she began seeing Cowart.

(a) Starting with the more recent incidents, those taking

place after Bryant began seeing Cowart, Hamilton argues generally

that the evidence is not necessary to tell the story of the charged

crimes and therefore is not intrinsic and that Bryant should not

have been allowed to testify about the incidents because there was

not sufficient evidence that the incidents occurred. We do not see

any reversible error in the admission of this evidence.

First, Hamilton cannot claim any error in the admission of

Bryant’s testimony regarding the incident in which Hamilton

followed Cowart after running into him at a convenience store. This

incident appears to have been referenced in the State’s amended

notice, and the State asked Bryant about this incident outside of the
19
presence of the jury in the middle of her trial testimony. But she did

not testify about this incident before the jury until the defense asked

her about it on cross-examination. 8 Thus, Hamilton cannot

challenge the admission of this particular testimony. See Adkins v.

State, 301 Ga. 153, 156 (2017) (“A defendant generally cannot

complain on appeal about the admission of evidence that he

introduced himself, even when he does so after the trial court has

overruled his objection to the admissibility of that evidence.”). And,

at any rate, this evidence was properly admitted as intrinsic for the

reasons discussed below.

Regarding Bryant’s testimony about Hamilton’s various

actions after she began seeing Cowart, “[e]vidence is intrinsic when

it pertains to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and

set-up of the crime, and is admissible so long as it is linked in time

and circumstances with the charged crime, forms an integral and

8 In his primary brief to this Court, Hamilton suggests that Bryant
testified about this incident to the jury on direct examination. But the portion
of her direct testimony he cites for this proposition does not contain any
reference of this incident.
20
natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete

the story of the crime for the jury.” Hughes v. State, 312 Ga. 149, 152

(2021) (cleaned up). Accord United States v. Edouard, 485 F3d 1324,

1344 (11th Cir. 2007). “There is no bright-line rule regarding how

close in time evidence must be to the charged offenses, or requiring

evidence to pertain directly to the victims of the charged offenses,

for that evidence to be admitted properly as intrinsic evidence.”

Hughes, 312 Ga. at 152 (quotation marks omitted). “We review a

trial court’s ruling admitting evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of

discretion.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the evidence of Hamilton’s actions after she began seeing

Cowart showed Hamilton’s anger over Bryant’s relationship with

Cowart. The evidence thus served to explain why Hamilton shot

Bryant and Cowart, helping to refute the defense theory that some

other perpetrator had committed the shooting. 9 The trial court

9 Indeed, Hamilton attempted to show that he was not actually upset

about Bryant’s relationship with Cowart. In particular, on cross-examination
of Bryant, Hamilton elicited Bryant’s testimony that despite their tumultuous
and violent relationship and Bryant’s knowledge that she had been seeing

21
therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence

at issue was reasonably necessary to complete the story for the jury

and was therefore intrinsic. See Hughes, 312 Ga. at 152–53

(evidence that the defendant had vandalized a car of the murder

victim’s grandmother was properly admitted as intrinsic because it

helped to show the tension between the defendant and members of

the victim’s family and why the defendant was not permitted in the

victim’s home and thus was followed out of the home by the victim

before shooting the victim); Clark v. State, 306 Ga. 367, 373–75

(2019) (evidence that the defendant hit and pushed the murder

victim’s wife was properly admitted as intrinsic, as it provided

context for the charged offenses by explaining why the family did

not want the defendant in the home and why the victim followed the

defendant outside of the home to make sure that he left); Williams

v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 486–87 (2017) (evidence about the defendant’s

Cowart for months, when Hamilton encountered Cowart at the convenience
store there were “no words, … no argument, no fight, no, nobody shot
anybody[.]” The acts at issue helped the State to dispute Hamilton’s suggestion
that he was accepting of Bryant’s relationship with Cowart.
22
HIV status and prior sexual assault of non-fatal stabbing victim ―

the sister of the murder victim ― was intrinsic because it helped

explain why the sister refused the defendant’s advances, the

impetus for her declaration to the defendant that their relationship

was over and they would never be alone again, and the increasing

friction and conflict between the two that culminated in the crimes).

See also United States v. Weeks, 716 F2d 830, 832 (11th Cir. 1983)

(evidence that federal undercover agent was investigating stolen

cars was intrinsic to charged crime of assault of a federal officer, as

the investigation into stolen vehicles explained the agent’s presence

with the defendant and his associates and their animosity toward

him). 10

Hamilton argues that this evidence was not established by

sufficient proof. But Bryant testified to these incidents at trial. And

10 Our decision in Harris v. State, 321 Ga. 87 (2025), relied on by
Hamilton, is different in that it involved evidence of domestic violence toward
a previous partner, not the murder victim, admitted under Rule 404(b),
purportedly to show absence of accident or mistake and that the defendant had
a “motive to control intimate partners with violence.” See id. at 95–101. Here,
the evidence at issue involved actions by the defendant toward the victims of
the charged crimes themselves and thus was necessary to complete the story
of the crimes.
23
“[t]he testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to

establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-14-8. To the extent that Hamilton

argues that Bryant’s testimony about these events included

improper speculation, particularly about his involvement in

disabling her car, assuming such an argument was even preserved,

“a lay witness may testify in the form of opinions which are

‘[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness[.]’” Sims v. State,

321 Ga. 627, 634 (2025) (quoting OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(1)).

Particularly given Hamilton’s experience as a mechanic, and given

Bryant’s testimony suggesting that Hamilton admitted to one of the

incidents, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion to the

extent that it permitted Bryant to testify about her belief about

Hamilton’s responsibility for problems with her car. See Sims, 321

Ga. at 634–35 (witness’s testimony that he believed the defendant

was “taking up” for another was properly admitted given that it was

rationally based on his observations).

“Of course, intrinsic evidence may be ‘excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

24
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.’” Hughes, 312 Ga. at 153 (quoting Rule 403). “In reviewing

issues under Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most

favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and

minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). As explained above, the evidence at issue was probative in

explaining the context of the charged crimes and Hamilton’s

relationship with the victims, which helped the State make its case

that Hamilton, and not another perpetrator, was the one who

committed the shootings. The evidence in question might have had

some unfair prejudicial effect, whether by suggesting to the jury that

Hamilton had a propensity for violence or other abusive behavior or

by inviting the jury to return a guilty verdict in this case to punish

him for those previous uncharged acts. But whatever such effect it

might have had was mitigated by the fact that Bryant was the

State’s primary witness both to the shootings and to the prior acts

at issue. Hamilton’s defense was that Bryant was not credible, and

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so if the jury were skeptical that Hamilton committed the shootings,

it likely would be skeptical of Bryant’s testimony as to the prior acts,

as well. Rule 403 was satisfied here. See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 307

Ga. 618, 622–23 (2020) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in

deciding that the probative value of evidence of a prior beating of the

victim by the defendant was not substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, as the “evidence did not show merely that

the appellant had engaged in a prior act of domestic violence, but,

instead, it showed the nature of the relationship between the

appellant and [the victim] and his motive in shooting her”).

(b) Regarding the evidence of earlier actions by Bryant

toward Hamilton before she started seeing Cowart, Hamilton makes

similar arguments, as well as arguing that these incidents were too

remote in time from the charged crimes to be admissible. We

recognize that this evidence presents closer questions of

admissibility either as intrinsic evidence or under Rule 404(b). But

pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting this evidence, we easily conclude that any abuse of

26
discretion was harmless here.

“It is fundamental that harm as well as error must be shown

for reversal.” Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165, 169 (2024) (quotation

marks omitted). See also OCGA § 24-1-103(a) (“Error shall not be

predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless

a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). “The test for

determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly

probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Kirby v.

State, 304 Ga. 472, 478 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). “In

determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record

de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable

jurors to have done so.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, to the extent that the evidence of acts by Hamilton prior

to Bryant’s involvement with Cowart would prejudice the jury by

showing that Hamilton had previously acted abusively by acting

violently toward Bryant, taking her belongings, and impeding her

movements, this evidence is cumulative of the evidence that we

already have determined was properly admitted as intrinsic — the

27
evidence of Hamilton’s actions expressing his anger with Bryant’s

relationship with Cowart, which also involved Hamilton acting

violently, interfering with Bryant’s use of her belongings (i.e., her

car), and impeding her movements.

Moreover, as noted above, given that the evidence at issue

largely consisted of Bryant’s own testimony, and Hamilton’s defense

turned on Bryant’s credibility, it is unlikely that the jury’s decisions

as to guilt turned on Bryant’s testimony about these prior incidents.

Hamilton argues that the jury’s notes to the court during

deliberations showed that the error was harmful. But given that the

case turned on Bryant’s credibility about the identity of the shooter,

it is highly probable that Bryant’s additional testimony about the

history of her relationship with Hamilton did not affect the verdict,

especially given that it was cumulative of the intrinsic evidence of

Hamilton’s reaction to Bryant’s relationship with Cowart. Thus, we

conclude that any error in admission of the more temporally remote

incidents was harmless. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at 487 (any prejudice

from erroneous admission of defendant’s prior armed robbery was

28
harmless in that jury was aware that he had committed other

violent crimes and the evidence of guilt was compelling).

4. Finally, Hamilton argues that cumulative errors in his

trial warrant reversal. We have assumed only one error, in the

admission of a certain category of evidence, and determined that any

such error did not prejudice Hamilton. There are no errors to

consider together with this evidentiary ruling. Thus, this claim lacks

merit. See Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 808–09 (2021).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua and

Land, JJ., who concur specially in Division 3 (b).

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LAGRUA, Justice, concurring specially.

Because I believe that evidence of the prior incidents between

Hamilton and Bryant—who was also a victim in this case—before

Bryant started seeing Cowart was admissible to show motive under

OCGA § 24-4-404(b) and was also admissible as prior difficulties and

as intrinsic evidence, I specially concur in Division 3 (b) of this case.

See Lowe v. State, 314 Ga. 788, 793 (2022) (concluding that evidence

showing the appellant “violently lashed out at [the victim] when he

was angry with her” would have been “relevant as a prior difficulty

to show motive” because it “showed the tumultuous nature of their

relationship”); Payne v. State, 313 Ga. 218, 222 (2022) (“Under

OCGA § 24-4-404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior acts towards

another person may be admissible into evidence when the defendant

is accused of a criminal act against that person, where the nature of

the relationship between the defendant and the victim sheds light

on the defendant’s motive in committing the offense charged.”

(quotation marks omitted)). See also Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 25

(2021) (concluding that prior incidents involving the appellant were

30
admissible as intrinsic evidence because they were “part of the chain

of events leading to the charged crimes” and were “reasonably

necessary to complete the story for the jury,” insofar as they

explained the appellant’s motivation and offered context to other

witnesses’ accounts of what occurred before the crimes at issue).

In this case, the evidence of prior difficulties between Hamilton

and Bryant told the story of a tumultuous relationship rife with

violence and jealousy that Hamilton exhibited towards Bryant,

which ultimately led to the shootings of Bryant and Cowart and

resulted in Cowart’s death. The first incident the majority

pretermits concerned an argument in 2016 during which Hamilton

pinned a pregnant Bryant to the bed and hit her in the face with a

bedrail. The next incident pretermitted by the majority concerned

an argument in 2019 where Hamilton followed Bryant to a friend’s

house, blocked her from leaving in her car, and tried to forcefully

remove her from the car. The final incident also occurred in 2019

when Hamilton hid Bryant’s car keys after she attempted to break

up with him.

31
There is nothing more intrinsic than the tumultuous and

violent acts that occurred during Hamilton’s relationship with

Bryant to tell the story of his inability to leave Bryant alone and,

when he ultimately discovered she was seeing someone else, to kill

that person. This is the very definition of what it means to be

intrinsic—something so inextricably intertwined that one piece

cannot exist without the other. See Felton v. State, 920 SE2d 667,

677 (2025) (holding that “[e]vidence pertaining to the chain of

events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is

properly admitted” as intrinsic evidence “if it is linked in time and

circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and

natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete

the story of the crime for the jury”).

For these reasons, I specially concur in Division 3 (b) but

concur fully in the remainder of the opinion.

I am authorized to state that Justice Land joins in this special

concurrence.