CourtListener 10846060

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 5, 2026

S25Y1374. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE DIANNE
WOODARD.

PER CURIAM.

This matter appears for the second time before the Court. In

the Court’s first opinion, In the Matter of Woodard, 321 Ga. 681

(2025) (“Woodard I”), we rejected a petition for voluntary discipline

filed by Stephanie Dianne Woodard (State Bar No. 233695) prior to

the filing of a formal complaint, because the discipline proposed—a

public reprimand—was insufficient as Woodard admitted to

violating Rule 8.4(a)(3) (“[being] convicted of a misdemeanor

involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to

the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”) and (4) (“[engaging] in

professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation”) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”), 1 contained in Bar Rule 4-102(d), in connection with

certain conduct that occurred between July 2018 and September

2022 and led to her pleading guilty to one misdemeanor count of

violating OCGA § 45-11-4(b)(1) (charging a public officer with

“[m]alpractice, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office”) and (5)

(charging a public officer with “[w]illfully and knowingly demanding

more cost than he or she is entitled to by law in the administration

and under the color of his or her office”). See 321 Ga. at 686. In her

renewed petition, Woodard, who has been a member of the State Bar

of Georgia since 1996, reasserts and readmits the conduct and Rule

violations underlying her first petition but proposes a suspension of

three to 12 months. She also requests that any suspension longer

than three months be imposed nunc pro tunc to the date that she

completed her criminal sentence under the First Offender Act,

August 30, 2024, but states that she is willing to accept a non-

retroactive suspension if deemed an appropriate sanction by the

1 The maximum sanction for violations of GRPC 8.4(a)(3) and (4) is
disbarment.

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Court. Through an untimely response and subsequent amended

response, the State Bar urges the Court to accept Woodard’s petition

but requests that the Court impose a 12-month suspension, without

retroactive effect. Given the record before us, we accept Woodard’s

petition and impose a 12-month suspension nunc pro tunc to June

26, 2025, which is the undisputed date that Woodard became an

inactive member of the State Bar.

The conduct underlying the current petition remains the same

since our first review. As recited in Woodard I:

In her petition, Woodard states that, on June 18,
2024, she was indicted by a Hall County Grand Jury on
24 felony counts of criminal misconduct, which was
comprised of 13 counts involving alleged violations of
OCGA § 16-10-20 and 11 counts involving alleged
violations of OCGA § 16-8-2. The 24 counts alleged that,
on 11 occasions, Woodard—while serving as the Solicitor
General of the Hall County State Court—made requests
and received reimbursement for expenses which were not
official expenses for which she was entitled to
reimbursement. Specifically, Counts 1-11 related to
reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council,
the circumstances of which Woodard contends she has
“scant information,” but believes may have resulted
because she improperly sought reimbursement from both
the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and Hall County.
Counts 12 and 13 related to an improper charge for the

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cremation of a dog, which Woodard contends was an
inadvertent and improper charge. Counts 14 and 15
related to cleaning supplies provided to someone Woodard
was rehoming, which she contends was a legitimate
reimbursement request pursuant to the Legal Victim
Assistance Program and which resulted in an indictment
because of the State’s misunderstanding of the Program.
Counts 16 and 17 related to a meal at a restaurant, which
Woodard also contends was a legitimate reimbursement
request. Counts 18-22 related to an improper charge for
an LSAT prep course for Woodard’s daughter, which she
contends happened because someone on her staff saw the
receipt and mistakenly pursued reimbursement. Counts
23 and 24 related to a pillow purchased for Woodard’s son,
which she contends happened because she mistakenly
used the wrong credit card. In total, the amount of
misappropriated funds was $2,219.28 (with $1,190.48
from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and $1,028.80
from Hall County).

Following the indictment, Woodard and the State began
negotiations and agreed that the matter would be best
settled by a nolle prosequi of the felony charges and
Woodard entering a guilty plea to one misdemeanor count
of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b) (1) and (5). According
to Woodard, the State was concerned as to whether there
was sufficient evidence to prove scienter or intent, as
required for the indicted felony charges. Nevertheless, as
Woodard admitted that her conduct constituted a breach
of her duty as a public official, such that there was enough
showing of criminal culpability to sustain a misdemeanor
conviction under OCGA § 45-11-4, she entered her guilty
plea under the First Offender Act and received 12 months
on probation, which was to be terminated upon full and
timely payment of restitution.

4
Woodard I, 321 Ga. at 682–83 (footnotes omitted).

Based on those facts, Woodard originally requested that this

Court issue a public reprimand. But this Court concluded that the

requested discipline was insufficient, as the facts supporting

Woodard’s violations make her case more like two prior disciplinary

cases in which this Court imposed six-month and 18-month

suspensions rather than the cases relied upon by Woodard in which

this Court imposed public reprimands. Given that, this Court

rejected Woodard’s petition, without prejudice, to permit Woodard

to file a renewed petition seeking voluntary discipline more

consistent with the cases cited by this Court.

Accepting that invitation, Woodard’s renewed petition now

seeks a suspension of three to 12 months, with a request that, if the

Court determines that a suspension longer than three months is an

appropriate sanction for her conduct, the Court, in its discretion,

consider imposing that suspension nunc pro tunc to August 30, 2024,

which is when Woodard completed her criminal sentence. In

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support, she offers the same mitigating factors previously

recognized by this Court in Woodard I and continues to offer no

aggravating factors.2 To support her request that any lengthier

suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc, Woodard adds that she “has

not talked to a potential client, has not sought a legal position and

has not been involved in any legal practice whatsoever since her

resignation from office August 9, 2024.” She further offers that,

“[e]arlier in this process, she asked the State Bar to be placed on

Inactive Status pending the outcome of this proceeding.”

2 In relying on the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(1992), Woodard offered the following: that she has no disciplinary history; that
she lacked a dishonest or selfish motive; that she was experiencing personal or
emotional problems due to her suffering from a physical ailment and the death
of a family member; that she made a timely good faith effort to make
restitution and rectify the consequences of her misconduct; that she cooperated
fully with GBI and provided full disclosure to the State Bar; that she has a
good character and reputation, as she has volunteered her time to many
laudable activities for her community; that she was suffering a physical
disability; that she received additional penalties and sanctions for her conduct,
including intense media coverage and her resignation from her position as the
Solicitor General of Hall County; and that she has expressed remorse. See
Woodard I, 321 Ga. at 684 (citing ABA Standard 9.32(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g),
(h), (k) and (l)). Woodard further offered in mitigation that the State and trial
court recognized that her conduct was more appropriately characterized as a
misdemeanor, as shown by the State’s agreeing to a nolle prosequi for all 24
felony counts and accepting a plea to one misdemeanor count, and by the trial
court’s sentencing Woodard as a first offender and imposing a probated
sentence to cease upon payment of restitution. Id.

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In response, the State Bar recommends that the Court accept

Woodard’s petition. Although the State Bar’s position with respect

to the applicable mitigating and aggravating factors in this case has

not changed since this Court’s first review, the State Bar now agrees

with the Court’s conclusion in Woodard I that, given the seriousness

of Woodard’s violations, the presumptive penalty for Woodard’s

misconduct is a suspension of between six and 18 months and

recommends that the Court impose a 12-month suspension. 3

However, the State Bar urges the Court to impose the suspension

without retroactive effect, arguing that Woodard has failed to meet

the requirements for a suspension nunc pro tunc to August 30, 2024,

as set out by In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (2010), and

that a suspension nunc pro tunc is insufficient based on the Court’s

conclusions in Woodard I that a public reprimand was insufficient

3 The State Bar previously agreed in response to Woodard’s original
petition that eight out of the nine mitigating factors that Woodard lists from
the ABA Standards apply to her case but insisted that two aggravating factors
also apply, that is, Woodard’s substantial experience in the practice of law and
her illegal conduct. See Woodard I, 321 Ga. at 685 (citing ABA Standard 9.22(k)
and (l)). But, based on those factors, the State Bar previously supported
Woodard’s original request for a public reprimand. See id.

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discipline for Woodard’s misconduct and the facts underlying

Woodard’s case make it more like cases in which the Court imposed

six-month and 18-month suspensions. The State Bar notes that

Woodard’s sole support for making her suspension nunc pro tunc is

her assertion that she ceased practicing law on August 9, 2024, yet

she did not notify the State Bar that she wanted to transfer her Bar

membership to inactive status until June 26, 2025, which was after

the Court rejected her original petition. The State Bar further notes

that Woodard failed to mention her allegedly refraining from the

complete practice of law in her original petition, despite its potential

importance to the Court’s consideration at that time, and that her

original petition stated that Woodard “has been a dedicated member

of the State Bar of Georgia … [and is] a member of the Prosecuting

Attorneys Council.” (Emphasis added). The State Bar also argues

that Woodard’s resignation was not a voluntary action, as it was

required by her plea deal to resolve the criminal charges against her

and occurred only after both her indictment and an investigation

into her actions conducted by an investigative journalist became

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widely publicized. The State Bar lastly notes that the plea deal did

not require her to cease practicing law entirely.

In her reply, Woodard does not contest the State Bar’s claims

that she has not shown sufficient evidence for a suspension nunc pro

tunc to August 30, 2024, or that June 26, 2025, was the date she

elected to transfer her State Bar membership to inactive status but

asks this Court to consider that, as of her September 2025 filing of

her reply, she had not practiced law for more than a year.

Given that Woodard’s renewed petition now seeks discipline

consistent with this Court’s directive in Woodard I, the issues now

before the Court are the suspension’s appropriate length and

whether the suspension, if longer than three months, should be

imposed nunc pro tunc. As discussed below, we conclude that a 12-

month suspension imposed nunc pro tunc to June 26, 2025, is

appropriate as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to others, and

as an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics

of the profession.” In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (1981).

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Suspension Length

As we explained in Woodard I, 321 Ga. at 685–86, this case

appears most like In the Matter of Williams, 284 Ga. 96 (2008), in

which we imposed a six-month suspension to sanction an Assistant

District Attorney who participated in a scheme initiated by the

District Attorney to steal county funds and pleaded guilty to a single

violation of OCGA § 45-11-5, and In the Matter of Adams, 291 Ga.

768 (2012), in which we imposed an 18-month suspension to sanction

an attorney who misrepresented the number of hours worked while

representing indigent clients and overbilled the judicial circuit’s

Indigent Defense Program in excess of $10,000. While Woodard

acknowledges this, she asserts that her circumstances are still

distinguishable, such that she urges the Court to impose a three-

month suspension rather than the longer suspensions imposed in

those cases.

Woodard asserts that Williams is distinguishable from her case

because it involved an intentional scheme to steal large amounts of

public funds and resulted in its initiator, Williams’s co-conspirator,

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being disbarred and sentenced to six years in prison, whereas

Woodard’s acts were not intentional, the amount of misappropriated

funds was comparatively small, and her sentence included no prison

time. But, as this Court has explained, “each case must be largely

governed by its particular facts,” Dowdy, 247 Ga. at 493, and the

facts in this record support the conclusion that most, if not all, of

Woodard’s conduct was intentional. Indeed, she pleaded guilty to §

45-11-4(b)(5), meaning that she admitted that she “willfully and

knowingly” demanded more cost than she was entitled to by law.

And, while the amount of funds involved in Woodard’s crimes is

relevant to assessing the injury caused by her misconduct, it is only

part of the Court’s consideration when imposing discipline. See In

the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 211 (2021) (in determining the

appropriate sanction to impose, we consider the following factors:

“the duty violated; the lawyer's mental state; the potential or actual

injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and the existence of

aggravating or mitigating factors.” (citations omitted)). Finally,

comparing her sentence to that received by Williams’s co-conspirator

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is unavailing inasmuch as Williams, himself, received a sentence

very similar to Woodard’s for his crime (i.e., a sentence under the

First Offender Act of one year of probation which could be

terminated early upon certain conditions). See Williams, 284 Ga. at

96.

With respect to Adams, Woodard points out that the State Bar

there recommended the 18-month suspension that was ultimately

imposed, the petitioning attorney had a prior investigative panel

reprimand, and the county’s Indigent Defense Governing Committee

(as well as others) submitted letters opposing the petition for

voluntary discipline. See 291 Ga. at 769. While there are notable

differences from this case, Woodard’s circumstances still appear

materially similar to the circumstances in Adams, such that

disfavoring a lengthier suspension in favor of a shorter, three-month

suspension is inappropriate for this case. Both Adams and

Woodard’s case involve violations of GRPC 8.4(a)(4), which is

“among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be

charged.” Woodard I, 321 Ga. at 685. Adams also similarly

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concerned conduct that involved multiple offenses, spanning a

significant amount of time (there, a year), in which the petitioning

attorney was indicted for several counts of violating the same

criminal statutes that comprised Woodard’s indictment (17 counts

charged under OCGA § 16-12-20 and 17 counts charged under

OCGA § 16-8-2). See Adams, 291 Ga. at 768–69. Moreover, unlike

Adams, Woodard’s case involves a guilty plea to a misdemeanor and

a resulting violation of GRPC 8.4(a)(3) that this Court must

consider. That additional violation supports imposing a lengthier

suspension than three months, especially since, “as a public official,

Woodard was in a position of power and responsibility, and when

considering the appropriate sanction to impose this Court is

concerned about the public’s confidence in the profession.” Woodard

I, 321 Ga. at 685 (cleaned up).

Woodard offers no authority supporting the imposition of a

suspension of less than six months in her case, and we have found

none. However, she presents several mitigating factors, which the

State Bar mostly agrees are applicable, and those factors support a

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shorter suspension rather than a longer one. That said, the State

Bar notes as aggravating factors Woodard’s substantial experience

in the legal profession and her commission of a crime. And the only

documentation for two of Woodard’s mitigating factors—that she

suffered from personal and emotional problems due in part to a

physical ailment and that she was suffering from a physical

disability due to that same ailment—is a medical record dated long

after the misconduct occurred. Considering the seriousness of the

admitted Rule violations, the Court’s conclusions regarding the

underlying conduct in Woodard I, and the record, the imposition of

a 12-month suspension is appropriate here.

Nunc Pro Tunc Request

Because of the general difficulty of the State Bar and this Court

determining whether and when an attorney ceased practicing law,

we have explained that:

[W]hen an attorney requests entry of a suspension or
voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s
responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily
stopped practicing law, the date on which their law
practice ended, and that they complied with all the ethical

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obligations implicated in such a decision, such as
assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating
the transfer of client files and critical information about
ongoing cases to new counsel.

Onipede, 288 Ga. at 157. 4 The State Bar specifically contests that

Woodard has shown that she voluntarily stopped practicing law by

August 30, 2024, as required by Onipede, 5 and argues that a

suspension nunc pro tunc is insufficient based on the Court’s

conclusions in Woodard I about the appropriate level of sanctions.

Although we agree with the State Bar that Woodard has not shown

sufficient evidence to support a suspension nunc pro tunc to August

30, 2024, we conclude that the record sufficiently supports a

4 Bar Rule 4-219(b) provides, in part, that, “[a]fter a final judgment of

disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of
Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in
Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent
them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take
all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients.”
5 As an elected official without legal clients of the sort that could be

notified as required by Bar Rule 4-219(b), upon Woodard’s resignation from her
position as the Solicitor General of Hall County, there were no additional steps
required to comply with her ethical obligations. See In the Matter of Coomer,
320 Ga. 430, 439 n.10 (2024) (imposing a suspension nunc pro tunc after
noting, inter alia, that the respondent represented that he ceased practicing
law once appointed to the Court of Appeals such that, upon his removal from
the bench and thereafter refraining from the practice of law, there were no
additional steps necessary to comply with Bar Rule 4-219(b)).

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suspension nunc pro tunc to June 26, 2025, which is the undisputed

date that Woodard became an inactive member of the State Bar.

With respect to the date that Woodard voluntarily ceased

practicing all law, Woodard claims that she stopped practicing law

on August 9, 2024, when she resigned as part of her negotiated plea.

However, as noted by the State Bar, Woodard’s guilty plea did not

require that she stop practicing law entirely. Thus, the sole support

for a suspension nunc pro tunc to August 30, 2024, is Woodard’s

bare, unsworn assertion that she voluntarily stopped practicing law

before that date. While the Court could credit that allegation,

Woodard did not allege in her first petition that she had ceased

practicing law, despite its mitigating nature, and she did not

transfer her Bar membership to inactive until a couple of weeks

before filing the current petition. Those facts, which Woodard does

not dispute, call her allegation into question. That said, sufficient

support exists for a suspension nunc pro tunc to June 26, 2025, the

date upon which the State Bar asserts, and Woodard does not

contest, that Woodard informed the State Bar’s Membership

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Department of her inactive status. See also Bar Rule 1-202(a)

(providing that an attorney wishing to become an inactive member

of the State Bar contact the Membership Department and “elect to

be transferred to Inactive Status membership provided that the

member: (1) is not engaged in the practice of law; (2) does not hold

himself or herself out as a practicing lawyer or attorney; (3) does not

occupy any public or private position in which the member may be

called upon to give legal advice or counsel; and (4) does not examine

the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law for

the benefit of another person, company, or corporation”). Thus, it is

undisputed that Woodard voluntarily elected to become an inactive

member of the Bar on June 26, 2025. Finally, with respect to the

State Bar’s argument that a suspension imposed nunc pro tunc is

inconsistent with the Court’s conclusions in Woodard I that a public

reprimand is insufficient and that this case is more like cases in

which the Court imposed six-month and 18-month suspensions, we

disagree.

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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record sufficiently

supports the imposition of a 12-month suspension nunc pro tunc to

June 26, 2025.6

Conclusion

Having reviewed the record, we accept Woodard’s petition for

voluntary discipline and impose a 12-month suspension nunc pro

tunc to June 26, 2025, as an appropriate sanction for Woodard’s

admitted violations of GRPC Rule 8.4(a)(3) and (4). We conclude that

this sanction adequately serves the purpose of imposing discipline

as expressed by this Court in Dowdy, 247 Ga. at 493, as it penalizes

Woodard for her misconduct but also considers her mitigating

circumstances; deters other attorneys from committing similar

misconduct; and assures the public that the ethics of the profession

will be maintained, including in cases involving misconduct by

public officials. See Dowdy, 247 Ga. at 493. Because there are no

6 Here, Woodard has made clear that she is willing to accept any
suspension of up to 12 months without retroactive effect. Therefore, imposing
a suspension nunc pro tunc to July 26, 2025, rather than August 30, 2024, is
not a greater sanction than what Woodard requests in her petition. Cf. In the
Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 472 (2020).

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conditions on Woodard’s reinstatement other than the passage of

time, there is no need for her to take any action either through the

State Bar or this Court to effectuate her return to the practice of

law. Instead, the suspension based on this opinion will expire by its

own terms 12 months from June 26, 2025. Woodard is reminded of

her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Twelve-month
suspension nunc pro tunc to June 26, 2025. All the Justices concur.