In the Matter of Charles M. Dalziel, Jr

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26Y0257
IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES M. DALZIEL, JR.

Decided: May 19, 2026

PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report
and recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who rec-
ommends that Charles M. Dalziel, Jr. (State Bar No. 203730) be
suspended for at least six months for his conduct in this matter
and that he not be reinstated until a licensed psychologist or psy-
chiatrist certifies that he is mentally competent to practice law.
We previously imposed a six-month suspension on Dalziel with
the same condition for reinstatement. See In the Matter of Dalziel,
322 Ga. 212 (2025) (“Dalziel I”). Because Dalziel has not yet com-
plied with this condition for reinstatement, he remains sus-
pended.
In the current matter, the State Bar filed a formal com-
plaint against Dalziel, who has been a member of the State Bar
since 1980, charging him with violating Rules 1.6(a), 1 and 3.1(a) 2

1 Rule 1.6(a) states in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall maintain in
confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a cli-
ent[.]” The maximum sanction for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.
2 Rule 3.1(a) provides that “[i]n the representation of a client,” a lawyer
shall not “file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take
other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another[.]”
The maximum sanction for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.
and (b) 3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or
“Rules”) by disclosing confidential client information and by filing
and litigating a frivolous lawsuit designed to harass a law firm
(“the Law Firm”) into paying his attorney fees. Dalziel failed to
respond to the formal complaint and the Special Master granted
the State Bar’s motion for default, such that the allegations al-
leged in the formal complaint were deemed admitted. The Special
Master then held a hearing, which Dalziel failed to attend, on ag-
gravating and mitigating factors and issued his report and rec-
ommendation. Neither party has filed exceptions in this Court.
After our review of the record, we conclude that the appro-
priate sanction is a six-month suspension with the condition that
Dalziel not be reinstated until a licensed psychologist or psychia-
trist certifies that he is mentally competent to practice law. Fur-
ther, we conclude that this suspension should run consecutive to
Dalziel’s current suspension, such that this six-month suspension
will begin after Dalziel provides a certification that he is mentally
competent to practice law, as required by Dalziel I.
1. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
(a) Findings of Fact
Based on the facts in the formal complaint, which were
deemed admitted by Dalziel’s default, and the evidence intro-
duced at the hearing on aggravating and mitigating factors, the
Special Master recounted the following. Dalziel’s client in this
matter first sought legal assistance for a securities matter from

3 Rule 3.1(b) provides that “in the representation of a client,” a lawyer
shall not “knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law.” The maximum sanction for a violation of this Rule is a
public reprimand.

2
the Law Firm. The Law Firm could not assist but provided the
client with a list of three attorneys who had experience in securi-
ties matters. Dalziel was on that list, and the client subsequently
hired Dalziel to represent him. At the time, Dalziel and his law
practice were in “an extremely dire financial situation.” After the
client did not pay Dalziel for his services, Dalziel filed a lawsuit
against the Law Firm and several of the Law Firm’s attorneys,
alleging that the Law Firm had hired him to represent the client
and that the Law Firm and its lawyers were therefore responsible
for his fees. Dalziel’s lawsuit had no basis in law or fact and was
filed to try to harass the Law Firm into paying Dalziel’s attorney
fees. Further, in his verified complaint, Dalziel disclosed confi-
dential information about the client’s matter.
Through counsel, the Law Firm filed a motion to dismiss,
which the trial court granted. The dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, and this Court denied petition for writ of certi-
orari. The Special Master further explained that, at the eviden-
tiary hearing, counsel for the Law Firm testified that the Law
Firm paid $95,572.58 in legal fees to defend itself against Dal-
ziel’s “frivolous” lawsuit and that Dalziel sent lawyers at the Law
Firm threatening emails and showed up at their offices which re-
sulted in him being added to the Law Firm’s building security list
to refuse him admission. Counsel also described dealing with Dal-
ziel “as a juxtaposition of him being polite and professional [while]
also being aggressive and untethered to facts of reality.”
Dalziel’s behavior led to the State Disciplinary Board initi-
ating a grievance against him. In his response to the grievance,
Dalziel again unnecessarily disclosed confidential information
about his representation of the client, including the legal strategy
that he employed as well as the content of attorney-client commu-
nications.

3
Additionally, in his response, Dalziel also threatened that
the Law Firm must report a contingent liability of 68 million dol-
lars to its auditor and leveled personal attacks on the trial judge
who heard his case, the three Court of Appeals judges who heard
his case, and two Justices of this Court. Dalziel accused the State
Disciplinary Board of being “ignorant” of the law.
(b) Rule Violations
Based on this conduct, the Special Master concluded that,
through his default, Dalziel admitted to his violation of Rule
1.6(a) when he disclosed confidential client information in his re-
sponse to the grievance filed against him, and that the violation
was also supported by the record. The Special Master also con-
cluded that, through his default, Dalziel admitted to his violation
of Rule 3.1(a) and (b) by filing and litigating a frivolous lawsuit
designed to harass the Law Firm into paying attorney fees to Dal-
ziel, and the record supported a finding that Dalziel violated this
Rule.
(c) ABA Standards
In considering the appropriate level of discipline, the Spe-
cial Master applied the framework set out in the ABA Standards,
which provide that, when imposing a sanction, “a court should
consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the law-
yer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mit-
igating factors.” ABA Standard 3.0. The Special Master deter-
mined that Dalziel violated his duty to his client by unnecessarily
revealing confidential information relating to his representation
and that Dalziel violated his duty not to abuse the legal system.
In addressing Dalziel’s mental state, the Special Master con-
cluded that Dalziel’s conduct was knowing and intentional and he
violated the Rules in an attempt to benefit himself. In addressing

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the injury caused, the Special Master concluded that Dalziel’s dis-
closure of the client’s confidential information which was not re-
sponsive to any claim or defense could cause potential injury to
the client, but that because the client was not called as a witness
during the hearing on aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the extent of any actual injury is unknown.
The Special Master also concluded that several aggravat-
ing factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.22 applied, including prior
disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrong-
ful nature of his conduct, and substantial experience in the prac-
tice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22(a), (b), (c), (d), (g), and (i). As
for mitigating factors, the Special Master opined that while the
record demonstrated that Dalziel may have been experiencing
personal and emotional problems at the time of these events, be-
cause of his default and failure to attend the hearing, there was
no direct evidence to support this factor. See ABA Standard
9.32(c). See also In the Matter of Bell, 313 Ga. 615, 617–18 (2022)
(declining to consider personal and emotional issues in mitigation
where the respondent failed to offer evidence that any mental con-
ditions impacted her ability to practice law). The Special Master
did note, however, that during the prior disciplinary matter, the
State Bar introduced a psychological evaluation that demon-
strated that Dalziel has a long history of significant mental health
issues and alcohol abuse. See Dalziel I, 322 Ga. at 214.
(d) Recommended Discipline
The Special Master then determined that because the max-
imum sanction for a Rule 3.1 violation is a public reprimand, the
focus of his disciplinary recommendation was Dalziel’s violation
of Rule 1.6(a), and concluded that Dalziel should be suspended for
no less than six months. In reaching this conclusion, the Special

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Master explained that “[t]here is a fundamental difference be-
tween unprofessional behavior, how a lawyer should act, and un-
ethical behavior, what a lawyer shall not do in violation of the
GRPC” and that when Dalziel’s “verbosity and hyperbole” are re-
moved from the situation, the recommended sanction is “suffi-
cient to penalize the offender for his wrongdoing, deter other at-
torneys from engaging in similar behavior, and inform the gen-
eral public that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profes-
sion.” In the Matter of Breault, 318 Ga. 127, 136 (2024). Addition-
ally, the Special Master recommended that Dalziel not be rein-
stated until a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that
he is mentally competent to practice law.
(2) This Court’s Analysis and Recommendation
Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree that Dalziel
violated Rule 1.6(a) on two separate occasions by intentionally
and unnecessarily disclosing confidential information related to
the representation of his client and that Dalziel’s violations were
aggravated by his prior disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or self-
ish motive, a pattern of misconduct, his refusal to acknowledge
his wrongful conduct, multiple offenses, and his substantial expe-
rience as a lawyer. However, we question whether Dalziel’s con-
duct violated Rules 3.1(a) and (b), as his frivolous lawsuit against
the Law Firm was not filed “[i]n the representation of a client” or
“on behalf of the client” as required by this Rule. But because we
conclude that a six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction
for Dalziel’s multiple violations of Rule 1.6(a) and that the addi-
tional Rule 3.1 violations—which carry the maximum sanction of
a public reprimand—would not change the sanction in this case,
we need not resolve this issue. See Dalziel I, 322 Ga. at 217 (im-
posing a six-month suspension for Dalziel’s violation of Rule

6
1.15(I)(c) and pretermitting consideration of whether Dalziel vio-
lated Rules 1.6(a) and 1.16(d) “because it would not change the
appropriate discipline”).
In determining that a six-month suspension is appropriate
for Dalziel’s Rule 1.6(a) violation, we note that this Court has not
addressed many Rule 1.6(a) violations and, in the matters con-
cerning such a violation, a wide range of sanctions have been im-
posed. See, e.g., In the Matter of Breault, 321 Ga. 338, 347 (2025)
(“Breault II”) (six-month suspension for attorney who violated
Rules 1.1, 1.6(a), 1.16(a)(3), and Rule 3.5(d)); In the Matter of
Farmer, 307 Ga. 307, 310 (2019) (disbarment for attorney who vi-
olated Rules 1.2(a), 1.6(a), 1.8(b), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5(d), 4.4, 8.4(a)(1),
and 8.4(a)(4)); In the Matter of Skinner, 295 Ga. 217, 219 (2014)
(public reprimand for attorney who violated Rules 1.4 and 1.6).
Looking at these cases for guidance, we conclude that the instant
matter is distinguishable from Farmer—where we imposed dis-
barment—because in that case, the attorney violated nine addi-
tional Rules; was liable in a civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations action for multiple acts of racketeering, in-
cluding attempted theft by extortion, attempted bribery, intimi-
dation of a court officer, and influencing witnesses; submitted
more than 500 frivolous filings in his client’s case; directed his
client to refuse to participate in a custody evaluation; and will-
fully refused to appear at a contempt hearing, which resulted in
him being held in contempt. See 307 Ga. at 308–10. We also con-
clude that the instant matter is distinguishable from Skinner—
where we imposed a public reprimand—because in that case “a
number of mitigating circumstances” were applicable, including
that the attorney had no prior disciplinary history, lacked a dis-
honest or selfish motive, accepted responsibility for her miscon-
duct, was cooperative in the disciplinary proceedings, expressed
remorse, and was experiencing personal and emotional problems

7
during the relevant time. See 295 Ga. at 219.
Instead, this case is more like Breault II, where we imposed
a six-month suspension. In that case, the attorney improperly and
unnecessarily disclosed damaging confidential client information
to the district court on two occasions in response to opposing
counsel’s motions to revoke his pro hac vice admission. See 321
Ga. at 340–42. The attorney also engaged in disruptive behavior,
including making an unannounced visit to his clients’ home after
they terminated his representation and continued attempts to
contact them. See id. Further, the Special Master presiding over
that matter determined that seven out of the 11 aggravating fac-
tors set forth in ABA Standard 9.22 applied. See id. at 344. Here,
Dalziel also improperly and unnecessarily disclosed confidential
client information on two separate occasions, engaged in disrup-
tive behavior, and several aggravating factors are applicable.
Given the similarities between Dalziel’s conduct and the conduct
of the attorney in Breault II, we conclude that a six-month sus-
pension is appropriate for Dalziel’s misconduct as well. Further,
although the attorney in Breault II violated additional Rules, in
mitigation he had no prior disciplinary history and had been sanc-
tioned by the district court for the same conduct. See ABA Stand-
ard 9.32(a) & (k). Here, because of Dalziel’s default and failure to
participate in the hearing, the Special Master did not consider
and thus did not identify any factors in mitigation. Moreover, we
note that neither the State Bar nor Dalziel have filed exceptions
to the Special Master’s report and recommendation of a suspen-
sion of at least six months.
Therefore, we order that Dalziel be suspended from the
practice of law for six months and, given his conduct, that he not
be reinstated until a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifies
that he is mentally competent to practice law. We further order

8
that this suspension will run consecutively to his current suspen-
sion, such that it will commence after Dalziel has complied with
the conditions for reinstatement imposed in Dalziel I, which also
requires him to obtain a certification that he is mentally compe-
tent to practice law. See In the Matter of Lang, 295 Ga. 220 (2014)
(“Lang II”) (imposing an additional one year suspension for an at-
torney based on his Rule violations to run consecutively to attor-
ney’s ongoing suspension). 4 When Dalziel believes that the condi-
tions for his reinstatement imposed in this matter have been met,
he shall demonstrate compliance in a petition for reinstatement
submitted to the Review Board, which will then issue a report and
recommendation to this Court. Dalziel shall not undertake the
practice of law until this Court issues an opinion granting his pe-
tition for reinstatement. Dalziel is reminded of his duties under
Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Six-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement.
All the Justices concur, except Peterson, C.J., and Pinson, J., not
participating.

4 We note that although we determined in Lang II that the attorney’s
second suspension should run consecutive to the first suspension, we did not
consider whether the attorney should first be required to comply with the con-
ditions for reinstatement we imposed in In the Matter of Lang, 292 Ga. 894
(2013), which included obtaining a certification from a licensed psychologist or
psychiatrist certifying that the attorney is fit to return to the practice of law.
However, here, given Dalziel’s conduct in this matter and evidence of his men-
tal health issues and alcohol abuse, as detailed in Dalziel I, we expressly re-
quire that he satisfy the mentally-competent certification requirement for re-
instatement imposed in Dalziel I before the suspension imposed in this matter
begins to run.

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