Miller v. State

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0296
Christopher Alexander Miller
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Peach County
No. 25CR053

Decided: June 2, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.
Appellant Christopher Miller appeals his convictions for
malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of two-year-old Marcus Ball, Jr. 1 On appeal, Miller

1 The crimes occurred on July 20, 2022. Miller, Wontazious Bivins, and
Jabari Thomas were indicted by a Peach County grand jury on March 17, 2025,
as parties to the crime for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated
on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (one for
assault against Marcus Ball, Jr., and one for assault against his sister, one-
year-old M.B.) (Counts 3 and 4), and two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Counts 5 and 6). Miller was tried separately
from his co-defendants. After a jury trial that ended on May 1, 2025, Miller
was found guilty on all counts of the indictment. On May 2, 2025, the trial
court sentenced Miller to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
malice murder, to 20 consecutive years in prison for the aggravated assault of
M.B., and to five years in prison on each firearm offense, the first sentence to
run consecutively to the life sentence for malice murder and concurrently with
the sentence for aggravated assault and the second sentence to run
consecutively to both the malice murder and aggravated assault sentences.
Miller filed a notice of appeal on May 2, 2025, and his case was docketed in
contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion
for a directed verdict based upon a fatal variance, that there was
insufficient proof of causation, and that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence at trial showed the following. In the days and weeks
leading up to the night of July 20, 2022, animosity had developed
between Miller and Dayquan Williams and his brother, Davonte
Howard, at least in part because Miller and Williams were dating
the same woman. Williams lived in the Lakeview Apartments in
Fort Valley, and one day before the shooting, someone told Miller
to go to a street “over there by Lakeview” to see a person known
as “Chicago,” who was a friend of Williams’s. Miller did so, and
once there, someone shot at him; Miller told the mother of one of
his children that he believed that “they was trying to set him up.”
In addition, about two weeks earlier, Miller and Howard had a
fight at the apartment complex, during which a firearm was
discharged.
On the night of July 20, 2022, Miller, Jabari Thomas,
Wontazious Bivins, and others congregated outside of Building C
at the Lakeview Apartments starting about 9:30 p.m. At the same
time, Williams was standing outside of Building D of the
apartment complex, which is south of Building C, along with
Howard, his friend Jaylon Mitchell, and various other
individuals. Marcus Ball, the victims’ father, arrived home that
night around 10:00 p.m. and saw Williams standing with the
group of individuals in front of Building D. He described the size

this Court to the term beginning in December 2025 and was submitted for a
decision on the briefs.

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of the group as “abnormal.” Williams lived in Building D, next
door to the Ball family.
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on July 20, Lashaquita
Washington parked her car in front of Building C at the Lakeview
Apartments. She remained in her car, which was facing Building
C, and saw Miller, Bivins, and Thomas outside of that building.
About 10:15 p.m., she saw Miller and Bivins with AK-47s, and she
left the apartment complex before any shooting started.
The apartment had numerous surveillance cameras that
recorded the parties’ interactions before the shooting, as well as
the shooting itself, from various angles. Lieutenant Faulks of the
Fort Valley Police Department testified regarding the
surveillance video, narrating the events as they occurred and
identifying the people involved as they appeared on the video. She
had spent her entire life in Fort Valley, had “gr[own] up” and gone
to school with Miller, and also personally knew Thomas, adding
that her sister was married to his cousin. She identified Thomas
on the video, driving a black car with a yellow stripe down the
middle. He parked in front of Building C about 9:37 p.m. About
five minutes later, Thomas got out of his car, and three men
approached and spoke with him. Shortly thereafter, Miller
parked his car in front of Building C and walked to where Thomas
was standing in front of his car with several other men.
According to Lieutenant Faulks, a surveillance video
showed that, about 10:15 p.m., Miller walked across the parking
lot to his car and then walked back to Thomas’s car, along with
another individual who was carrying “what appear[ed] to be an
AK … rifle.” As Miller and his companion were walking back
toward Thomas’s car, Thomas retrieved a gun from his car and
placed it on the ground, and Miller picked it up. Meanwhile,
another individual opened Thomas’s trunk and obtained a gun. A

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few minutes later, Thomas went back to his car and retrieved
another gun, putting it into his waistband. At the same time,
Miller’s vehicle pulled out of its parking spot and began to exit
the parking lot near the group. Before it did so, Miller, while
holding a gun, walked over to the driver’s side of his vehicle before
walking around to the passenger’s side and then returning to the
group. Miller subsequently walked into a breezeway of Building
C and then returned to the parking lot, with a “weapon strapped
over his shoulder.” At 10:33 p.m., the group, including Miller and
Thomas, was congregating near a white truck parked in front of
Building C, and Miller’s car returned to the apartment complex.
About 10:41 p.m., Thomas, with the weapon in his waistband,
walked into the breezeway toward the back of Building C. At that
time, other members of the group were near or behind the white
truck, and some, including Miller, were obscured from view.
About 10:42 p.m., shots were fired from the truck in front
of Building C toward Building D and from Building D toward the
individuals behind the truck. A man wearing the type and color
of clothes worn by Williams that night was taking cover in the
breezeway of Building D and firing shots toward Building C.
While shots were being exchanged in front of Buildings C and D,
Thomas and another individual were in the back of Building C
exchanging gunfire with an unidentified gunman firing from the
direction of Building D. Back in front of Building C, after the shots
were fired, Miller ran from behind the white truck toward his car
holding a gun and Thomas ran back through the breezeway to his
vehicle; both men drove away from the apartment complex.
During the shootout, two bullets penetrated the exterior
wall of the apartment in Building D in which the Ball family lived.
One bullet struck the concrete slab of the apartment building, and
the other penetrated an interior room, exited that room through

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a wall, and entered the victims’ bedroom. At that time, the oldest
sister of M.B. and Marcus Ball, Jr., was holding M.B. in one arm
and Marcus Ball, Jr., in the other arm. The sister testified that
she heard a gunshot and then looked down and saw that her
younger siblings had been struck by a bullet. That bullet first
struck M.B. in the shoulder and then Marcus Ball, Jr., in the
head, causing his death. Numerous shell casings were found
behind and to the side of the white truck that Miller and his
companions were hiding behind in front of Building C, as well as
in and in front of the breezeway of Building D. Rifle casings were
found only in front of Building C; some were “AK-47 SKS type
round[s]” and some were “M-16 AR-15 type round[s].” The
victims’ apartment was behind the breezeway of Building D from
which shots were fired. After the shooting, Marcus Ball, Sr., ran
outside holding his son and saw numerous people running into
Williams’s apartment. A law enforcement officer spoke with
Williams after the shooting and described him as being “visibly
upset.” Although Williams acknowledged, in response to a
question from the prosecutor, that he told that officer that a
“b**ch a** N word just shot at me. When I catch him, I’m going
to kill him,” Williams testified that he was inside his apartment
at the time of the shooting. There was also evidence that an
argument between Miller and Williams over their interest in the
same woman led to the shooting.
2. Miller contends that the evidence was constitutionally
insufficient to support his convictions because, according to
Miller, the State failed to provide proof that either he or one of his
companions fired the shot that entered the victims’ apartment.
We disagree.
When this Court evaluates a due process challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, “we view all of the evidence presented

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at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2018). “This Court
does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony but
rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility
of the evidence.” Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 420 (2023) (quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, a defendant is guilty of a charged
offense “upon proof that the crime was committed and that [he]
was a party to it.” Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744 (2012)
(quotation marks omitted), and under OCGA 16-2-20(a),(b)(3), a
person is a party to a crime if he, among other things,
“[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime.”
“Conviction as a party to the crime requires proof of a common
criminal intent, which the jury may infer from the defendant’s
presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator
before, during, and after the crimes.” Badie v. State, ___ Ga. ___
(2026), S26A0051, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026).
Under that standard, the evidence summarized above was
sufficient to show, contrary to Miller’s contention, that either
Miller or one of companions fired the shot that killed Marcus and
injured his sister. Here, Washington saw Miller and Bivins with
rifles shortly before the shooting, and surveillance video showed
that Miller and his companions, who had numerous firearms,
were gathering and communicating with each other in front of
Building C beginning about an hour before the fatal shooting. The
video shows that they then sheltered themselves behind and
around the white truck in front of Building C and fired numerous
shots toward the intended victim, Williams, who was located in

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the breezeway of Building D. 2 In doing so, Miller and his
companions were also firing in the direction of the victims’
apartment, which was located behind Williams. Although
Williams and his companions were also firing shots, they were
firing them toward Building C, in the opposite direction of the
victims’ apartment. Moreover, immediately after the victims’
sister heard the shots, M.B. and Marcus Ball, Jr., were each
struck by the same bullet. Finally, immediately after the shooting
Miller and his companions fled the crime scene. This evidence was
constitutionally sufficient for the jury to conclude that Miller or
one of his companions fired the shot that struck the victims. In
sum, even if Miller himself did not fire the fatal shot, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain his convictions at least
as a party to the crimes. See Badie ., ___ Ga. at ___ , slip op. at 3-
5 (explaining that “we have repeatedly held that participating in
a gunfight in a crowded area is enough to support a conviction for
malice murder as a party to the crime” and holding that evidence
that the defendant and his companions opened fire on a group of
people, killing one and injuring four, was sufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction for malice murder crimes as party to the
crime); Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 325, 328 (2022) (holding that
evidence that the defendant assisted in planning a shooting,
participated in it by driving a vehicle, communicated with other

2 Although Williams testified that he was inside his apartment at the
time of the shooting, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
he was outside, participating in the shootout, including evidence that his
dispute with Miller was the reason for the shootout, that Marcus Ball, Sr., saw
Miller outside his apartment in the breezeway of Building D shortly before the
shooting, that people ran into Williams’s apartment immediately after the
shooting, that video footage showed that a person firing shots from the
breezeway of Building D was wearing the type and color of clothes that
Williams wore that night, and that Miller acknowledged that someone had shot
at him.

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participants, and fled after the crimes authorized conviction as a
party to the crime of malice murder); Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656,
658 (2013) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
defendant’s convictions as a party to the crime where he did not
fire the shot that struck the victim but where he and his
companions went to a crowded pool and engaged in a shootout in
which a bystander was shot); Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 745
(2012) (holding that, even if the defendant’s companion, and not
the defendant, “fired the fatal shot” that killed the victim, the
evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for
murder as a party to the crime, as the evidence showed that the
defendant and his companion were engaged in a common
enterprise at the time of the shooting).
This conclusion is not overcome by any of Miller’s specific
arguments. For instance, he argues, correctly, that no forensic
evidence tied any shell casings found at the scene to any gun
owned by him or his companions. Miller also notes that the
investigator who testified about finding the bullet holes in the
victims’ apartment said that he could not say when the bullet
holes were created and that he never saw the children and their
injuries and could not say whether the bullet that entered the
bedroom wall was the one that struck the children. However,
“[a]lthough the State is required to prove its case with competent
evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any
particular sort of evidence.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 758, 761–62
(2024) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]t is the role of the
jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the
credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts
adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence
insufficient.” Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 387-88 (2018) (quotation
marks omitted).

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3. Miller claims that there was a fatal variance between the
indictment and the trial evidence and that the trial court erred in
ruling otherwise. Specifically, Miller contends that there was a
fatal variance because the indictment charged him with
intentionally shooting M.B. and Marcus Ball, Jr., while the
evidence at trial showed that Williams, and not the children, was
the intended target of the gunfight. Miller claimed at trial and
claims on appeal that he therefore had no notice that he would
have to defend against evidence that he intended to harm
Williams and that that intent would be transferred to Marcus and
M.B.
We “no longer employ an overly technical application of the
fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. The true
inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in
proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the
substantial rights of the accused.” Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 759
(2017) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, a variance is not
fatal “if the allegations inform the accused as to the charges
against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not be
taken by surprise by the evidence at trial, and are adequate to
protect the accused against another prosecution for the same
conduct.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 767 (2020).
To begin, the malice murder and aggravated assault counts
of the indictment tracked the language of the relevant statutes
and sufficiently apprised Miller of the nature and substance of
the criminal charges against him. See Brown v. State, 307 Ga. 24,
28 (2019). Although Miller points to the fact that the evidence at
trial showed that the intended victim was Williams and not the
children, he fails to offer any reason as to how the indictment’s
failure to name Williams as the intended victim prevented him
from presenting a viable defense to charges against the children

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or surprised him at trial. Id. (holding that where the indictment
charged the defendant with attempted armed robbery by pointing
a gun at the victim and demanding his money, there was no fatal
variance where the proof at trial did not show a verbal demand
for the property, as the indictment tracked the language of the
statute and sufficiently informed the defendant of the nature and
substance of the criminal charge and as the defendant did not
show that she “was unable to present a viable defense” to the
charge or was “surprised or misled at trial” (quotation marks
omitted)). Accord Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 767 (2020) (rejecting
the defendant’s fatal variance claim in part because the defendant
failed to show “how the indictment impaired his ability to present
a defense”). In fact, the record shows that Miller raised a defense
to the State’s theory of the case, arguing in closing that the jury
should reject the State’s theory that Williams was the intended
victim, as well as the State’s reliance on the doctrine of
transferred intent, because Williams testified that he was inside
his apartment at the time of the shooting. See Eubanks v. State,
317 Ga. 563, 582–83 (2023) (rejecting a defendant’s claim that the
indictment failed to enable him to present an intelligent defense
on the ground that the record showed that the defendant did
present defenses against the alleged crimes).
Moreover, the doctrine of transferred intent is firmly
rooted in Georgia law. See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 362 (2022)
(explaining that “[u]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, when
an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful
act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the
actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the
original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the
one who actually suffered from it”); Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga.
126, 127 (1996) (same); Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 343 (1904)
(same). Therefore, Miller should not have been surprised at trial

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that the State named in the indictment the individuals who
actually suffered from Miller’s original intent and relied on the
doctrine of transferred intent at trial. See Bradshaw v. Richey,
546 U.S. 74, 76–77 (2005) (holding that the defendant could not
claim unfair surprise that the doctrine of transferred intent,
“firmly rooted in Ohio law,” was applied to his case (quotation
marks omitted)).
Finally, because the indictment against Miller recounted
in detail the incident for which Miller was charged and convicted,
it was adequate to protect Miller from being prosecuted again for
the same offense. See Brown, 307 Ga. 28. Accord State v. Grube,
293 Ga. 257, 262 (2013) (holding that an indictment was sufficient
to protect the defendant against another prosecution for the same
conduct where it, among other things, specified the conduct being
charged and named the date on which the conduct took place).
For these reasons, Miller’s fatal variance claim fails.
4. Miller contends that the trial court erred by failing to
charge the jury on the lesser included charge of involuntary
manslaughter based on the underlying unlawful act of reckless
conduct. Miller contends that this charge was warranted by
evidence that he, either alone or as a party to the crime,
committed the misdemeanor of reckless conduct when he or one
of his companions fired a weapon in the direction of the victims’
apartment. We disagree.
“A person commits the offense of involuntary
manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he
causes the death of another human being without any intention
to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.”
OCGA § 16-5-3(a). To warrant this charge, “the unlawful act
underlying the unintentional death of the victim must be an act
other than a felony.” Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 636 (2025)

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(quotation marks omitted). Here, the act of Miller and his
companions of firing weapons at Williams and other individuals
amounted to the felony of aggravated assault. See OCGA § 16-5-
21 (a)(2), (b). The trial court therefore properly denied Miller’s
request to charge on involuntary manslaughter. See Sims, 321
Ga. at 636-637 (holding that the defendant was not entitled to an
instruction on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter because
his act of discharging a firearm constituted the felony of
aggravated assault); Chambliss v. State, 318 Ga. 161, 167 (2023)
(holding that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the
jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter based on the
theory that the defendant committed the misdemeanor of reckless
conduct by striking the victim in the head with a loaded gun, as
that act amounted, instead, to the felony of aggravated assault).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

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