Glover v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0418
Albert Glover
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Baldwin County
No. 2020SUCR53656

Decided: June 2, 2026

BETHEL, Justice.
Albert Glover was convicted of the malice murder of
Michael Dawson, his cellmate at Baldwin State Prison. 1 Glover
appeals, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support
his conviction, that the trial court committed two evidentiary
errors, that the State violated its obligation to disclose a witness’s
pecuniary interest in testifying, and that trial counsel was
ineffective. Glover also makes a cumulative error argument. For
the reasons that follow, these claims fail, so we affirm.

1 The crimes occurred on December 25, 2019. In November 2020, a
Baldwin County grand jury indicted Glover for malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault. At a June 2022
trial, a jury found Glover guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Glover
to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; the
other counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Glover filed a timely
motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended through new counsel.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying
Glover’s motion for new trial, as amended, on September 9, 2025. Glover filed
a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to this Court’s term
beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
1. Glover first argues that the evidence at trial was not
sufficient to support his conviction as a matter of constitutional
due process because, he says, the State failed to disprove beyond
a reasonable doubt his claim of self-defense. We disagree.
The evidence at trial showed the following. Shortly after
breakfast on the morning of December 25, 2019, Glover alerted
corrections officers that Dawson was “unresponsive” in the cell
the two men shared. 2 Upon entering the cell, officers found the
deceased Dawson face down in the bed with the bedsheets pulled
up to his neck and a cap over his head. “[R]ed strangulation
marks” were visible on Dawson’s neck. Following an autopsy, the
medical examiner concluded that Dawson was first manually
strangled and then strangled with a ligature and opined that, due
to the manner in which pressure was applied, Dawson was face
down at the time of death, and “it took a while for [him] to die[.]”
Dawson’s body also showed signs that he struggled during the
strangulation, including a laceration on his forehead and

2 The record reflects that, at the time of the crimes, Glover was serving
a 20-year sentence for a 2004 conviction for arson. Dawson was serving a
sentence of life in prison for a 2007 conviction for the malice murder of another
inmate while he was incarcerated at Coastal State Prison. The jury did not
hear testimony about Glover’s prior conviction, though, as discussed in
Division 2 below, Glover was permitted to testify about his knowledge of
Dawson’s conviction for murder.
Glover and Dawson had both been diagnosed with schizophrenia. At
the time of the crimes, the men were housed in a “lock-down” cell at their own
request. A prison nurse explained that Dawson, who had been classified as a
“mental health inmate,” requested a transfer from the general population dorm
to a lock-down cell because “he was paranoid” and “hearing voices.” And Glover
testified that he requested to be placed in a lock-down cell because he preferred
to be alone. Despite Dawson’s previous conviction for killing his cellmate and
the self-reported basis for his request to be housed in relative isolation, prison
staff determined it was unnecessary to place Dawson in a cell by himself
because he did not report wanting to hurt himself or others.

2
abrasions on the backs of his hands, arms, and legs. Glover was
subsequently detained and questioned. Glover also was
photographed as part of the investigation, and investigators did
not observe any scratches, abrasions, or other injuries to Glover’s
body.
At trial, Glover advanced a justification defense, asserting
that he killed Dawson to prevent Dawson from sexually
assaulting him, after Dawson made sexual advances toward him.
Glover testified in his own defense. According to Glover’s
testimony, when he and Dawson were first placed in the cell
together two days before the crimes, he asked Dawson what he
was in prison for; Dawson responded that he was in prison for
murder but refused to answer Glover’s question about whom he
had killed. Glover further testified that “just because he’s a
murderer, whoever he killed, … it doesn’t fall back on me because
I can take care of myself.” Glover testified about discord between
himself and Dawson in the days before the crimes, explaining his
preference for a clean jail cell and noting Dawson’s failure to clean
up after himself and keep the cell in order. As to the events
leading up to the murder, Glover testified that he was lying on
the floor trying to sleep when he twice felt something graze his
chest and, thinking it was an insect, tried to swat it away but
instead made contact with Dawson’s finger. Glover then looked at
Dawson and saw Dawson looking back at him “with a smile on his
face.” Glover asked Dawson what he was doing, and Dawson
responded by asking what Glover was “going to do about it.”
Glover admitted that he killed Dawson, and though he refused to
divulge further details about the murder itself, he testified at
some length about the personal offense he took to Dawson’s
perceived sexual advances. Glover emphasized in closing that
sexual assault in prison is “a systemic problem,” that Dawson was
15 years younger than Glover, that aging prisoners are subject to

3
more frequent “challenges” from younger inmates, and that
Glover reasonably viewed Dawson’s actions that night—“[a] killer
touch[ing] him sexually and dar[ing] him to do something about
it”—as a threat against which he had to defend himself.
On appeal, Glover argues that the trial evidence
established that he acted in self-defense because Dawson’s
mental health, his admission that he had previously killed
someone, and his touching Glover “all in the context of an
understaffed, isolated prison environment combined to create a
scenario” under which Glover reasonably believed deadly force
was necessary to defend himself. And he asserts, in light of that
evidence, that the State failed to disprove that he acted in self-
defense. We disagree.
When this Court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence
as a matter of constitutional due process, we ask “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
“Our review leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and
reasonable inferences to be made from the evidence.” Yarn v.
State, 305 Ga. 421, 423 (2019).
To justify the use of deadly force, a defendant must prove
that he “reasonably believe[d] that such force [was] necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself.” OCGA § 16-3-
21(a). “A homicide is not so justified if the force used by the
defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would believe
was necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act.” Frison
v. State, 323 Ga. 156, 160 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).
“When a defendant raises a justification defense at trial, the State

4
has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. But “[q]uestions about the existence of justification are
for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in
support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a
[killing] was not done in self-defense.” Goodson v. State, 305 Ga.
246, 248 (2019).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence authorized the jury to find that Glover intended to kill
Dawson and to reject Glover’s claim of self-defense. Indeed,
Glover’s self-defense claim was less than compelling—the defense
was advanced primarily through the argument of counsel with
Glover detailing the events leading up to the murder and
admitting to killing Dawson but refusing to provide any details
about the killing. And the only evidence offered in support of that
defense was Glover’s own self-serving testimony, which the jury
was authorized to reject. See Gude v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 863
(2022) (“[Appellant] claimed that the shooting was an act of self-
defense based on [the victim’s] allegedly aggressive and
unwelcome sexual advances toward him, but the jury was entitled
to reject [appellant’s] self-serving version of the events.”).
Moreover, evidence that Dawson was strangled while lying face-
down, that he struggled during the attack, and that “it took a
while for [him] to die,” all while Glover suffered no visible injuries,
contradicts the self-defense claim. See Willerson v. State, 312 Ga.
369, 373 (2021) (“Given the brutality of the attack against the
victim, the extent of the victim’s injuries, and the fact that
[appellant] suffered no injuries in the altercation, the evidence
presented by the State was sufficient to contradict the self-
defense claim.”). In short, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Glover’s claim of
self-defense and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
malice murder. See id. Accordingly, this claim fails.

5
2. Glover next contends that the trial court erred by
excluding a certified copy of the transcript of the hearing at which
Dawson pleaded guilty to murder, which Glover sought to admit
in support of his self-defense claim.3 In a pre-trial motion in
limine, the State argued that the transcript was irrelevant to the
issues in the case absent evidence that Glover acted in self-
defense. In response, Glover asserted that the evidence should “be
admitted as relevant evidence under [OCGA §] 24-4-402.” Glover
further argued that, when Dawson told Glover he had killed
someone, he “used it as sort of an implied threat” and, as such,
the prior conviction was relevant to show that Dawson was both
“willing[ ] to use violence to the point of killing somebody” and
“not afraid to take the law into his own hands.” While Glover
asserted that he knew that Dawson had previously killed
someone, he conceded that he was unaware that the victim was
another inmate. Finding no evidence to tie the circumstances of
Dawson’s conviction to the charged crimes, the trial court
excluded the transcript, but indicated a willingness to reconsider
the issue at trial.
At trial, following his testimony on direct, Glover again
raised the issue of admitting the guilty plea transcript, arguing it
was relevant to corroborate his testimony that Dawson admitted
to killing someone. The trial court affirmed its ruling excluding
the transcript. Now, on appeal, Glover asserts that the transcript
was admissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) to corroborate his

3 The transcript reflects that Dawson and his cellmate were jointly
charged with killing a third inmate who had been convicted of child
molestation and reckless conduct by an HIV-infected person. According to
Dawson, the inmate had threatened to infect Dawson and Dawson’s cellmate
with HIV, so he and his cellmate discussed “what they needed to do to stop”
the other inmate. Dawson and his cellmate ultimately lured the inmate into
their cell under the pretext of sharing drugs with him and then strangled him.

6
testimony that he had knowledge of Dawson’s prior murder
conviction and to show that his fear of Dawson was reasonable,
citing in support of this argument United States v. James, 169
F3d 1210, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (concluding that
extrinsic evidence of victim’s past violent acts was admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to corroborate defendant’s
testimony that she had reason to fear the victim based on “stories
… of … a remarkable character of atrocity” told to the defendant
by the victim).
“A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Tarver
v. State, 319 Ga. 165, 169 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). “But
we will reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s abuse of
discretion in excluding evidence only if the exclusion was
harmful.” Mbungu v. State, 322 Ga. 564, 567 (2025). And to
determine whether a nonconstitutional error was harmful, we ask
“whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding this evidence at trial and that Glover
preserved this error for ordinary appellate review, 4 we conclude

4 We question whether this claim is preserved for ordinary appellate
review. Glover argued below and maintains on appeal that the evidence at
issue was admissible to corroborate his testimony that he had knowledge of
Dawson’s prior conviction for murder. But from our review of the record, it does
not appear that, in raising this issue in the trial court, Glover argued that this
evidence should have been admitted under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) or cited the
decisional law he points to on appeal. Instead, he asserted only that the
evidence was admissible “as relevant evidence under [OCGA §] 24-4-402.” See
Walton v. State, 322 Ga. 401, 407–08 (2025) (argument that trial court should
have excluded evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) was not preserved for

7
that any such error was harmless. As noted above, Glover argued
at trial that he killed Dawson in self-defense to prevent Dawson
from sexually assaulting him, and he attempted to show that his
fear of Dawson was reasonable in light of his knowledge that
Dawson had previously killed someone. See Willerson, 312 Ga. at
373 (“[T]he critical factor in a justification defense is whether a
defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person under the
circumstances.” (quotation marks omitted)). To that end, Glover
was permitted to testify on direct examination about his
knowledge that Dawson was in prison for murder. As such, the
excluded evidence was at least somewhat cumulative of Glover’s
own testimony. And contrary to Glover’s argument, the transcript
of the hearing at which Dawson pleaded guilty to murder does not
actually corroborate his testimony that Dawson told him he had
been convicted of murder. It would merely corroborate that
Dawson in fact had been convicted of murder. But that was not a
fact in dispute at trial. Although no evidence was presented of
that conviction beyond Glover’s testimony, the State did not
dispute it. Nor did the State dispute whether Glover knew of that
conviction at the time of the killing.
Moreover, Glover’s self-defense claim was weak and was
substantially undermined by Glover’s own testimony. In effect,
Glover testified that, while Dawson’s murder conviction caused
him to be wary of Dawson, Glover could take care of himself,

appellate review where appellant’s motion in limine made no reference to that
statute and instead asserted only that the evidence at issue was not relevant
under OCGA § 24-4-402 and was more prejudicial than probative under OCGA
§ 24-4-403). See also Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 732, 736 n.3 (2025) (“[W]here a
defendant advances on appeal a different theory of admissibility than he
argued at trial, the claim is not preserved for ordinary appellate review.”). But
we need not resolve this issue because Glover’s claim fails even under ordinary
review.

8
casting doubt on the assertion that Glover killed Dawson out of
fear of injury. Indeed, Glover, having chosen to take the witness
stand, never testified that he killed Dawson on the belief that he
was in imminent danger. Rather, Glover’s testimony strongly
supported the inference that he killed Dawson in retaliation for
Dawson’s perceived disrespect or as a result of earlier
disagreements between the two men in the days before the killing.
Specifically, Glover testified that he had “an issue” with Dawson,
pointing to Dawson’s disruptive and “erratic” behavior in the cell,
Dawson’s failure to employ the standards of cleanliness that
Glover expected, and Dawson’s refusal to follow Glover’s
directions about maintaining the cell. And as to his reaction to
Dawson’s perceived sexual advances, Glover testified that he
viewed those advances not as a threat of bodily injury but as a
personal offense: “I’m nobody’s punk, you don’t try me like that.
Yeah, he touched a nerve, seriously. Mental health is my thing,
playing against my masculinity … . I don’t play that same sex.
But if they do, that’s on them. That’s all about respect.” Thus, it
is highly probable that the exclusion of the transcript of the
hearing at which Dawson pleaded guilty, even if it was the
product of error, did not contribute to the verdict, and this claim
fails. See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 567–68 (exclusion of evidence of
victim’s threats against appellant was harmless where excluded
evidence was similar to other evidence admitted at trial and
appellant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver, 319 Ga. at 169–
73 (any error in exclusion of evidence about victim’s prior acts to
show appellant’s state of mind was harmless because excluded
evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and
appellant’s self-defense claim was weak).
3. In his third claim of error, Glover argues that the State
failed to comply with its obligations under Brady v. Maryland,
373 US 83 (1963), and OCGA § 17-16-4, the reciprocal discovery

9
statute, to disclose evidence of a witness’s pecuniary interest in
testifying, and that he should be granted a new trial as a result.
Specifically, during trial, the prosecutor informed trial counsel
and the trial court in an on-the-record discussion that the
witness, a former cellmate of Glover’s who had not yet taken the
stand, had requested financial compensation in exchange for
providing information about the case. Defense counsel’s response
to that revelation was, “He asked you for money.” The prosecutor
provided additional information about the request, after which
the trial court asked Glover’s counsel if there was “[a]nything
else … [she] want[ed] to put on the record.” Defense counsel did
not argue that the State’s disclosure amounted to a violation of
either Brady or the reciprocal discovery statute and instead
simply responded, “Not on this subject[.]” Thus, the record shows
that Glover failed to raise the issue of a Brady violation or a
violation of the reciprocal discovery statute at trial, though he had
an opportunity to do so, and these claims are waived for purposes
of appellate review. See Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 179 (2010)
(where appellant had opportunity at trial to raise Brady objection
based on State’s disclosure of ballistics report on morning of trial
but failed to do so, issue was waived on appeal); Danenberg v.
State, 291 Ga. 439, 442 (2012) (failure to object at trial to
purported violation of reciprocal discovery statute waived
appellate review of issue).
4. Glover asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the
statement of his former cellmate because, he says, the State failed
to lay a foundation to admit the statement as a prior inconsistent
statement. Glover did not object to the admission of this
statement at trial on the basis of a lack of foundation, so this claim
is reviewed only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d); Johnson
v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 686 (2023). To show plain error, Glover must
show: (1) there was a legal error that was not affirmatively

10
waived; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected
his substantial rights, meaning it likely affected the outcome of
the proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See
Washington v. State, 312 Ga. 495, 498 (2021). Glover cannot
establish plain error because the record shows that the alleged
error was affirmatively waived when trial counsel strategically
decided to use portions of the statement to bolster Glover’s self-
defense claim.
Specifically, the record shows that, when the State moved
to admit the cellmate’s statement, Glover’s trial counsel initially
objected on the basis that the prosecutor intended to play a
redacted recording of the statement and that certain redacted
portions of the statement were relevant to the case. Counsel
explained that the cellmate “hypothesizes there are reasons Mr.
Glover didn’t get along with [Dawson], and it’s because [Dawson]
was bisexual. And I think that goes directly to our claim of what
happened here. My client is claiming that Mr. Dawson touched
him.” When the prosecutor indicated that she did not have an
unredacted copy of the statement with her, Glover’s counsel
responded that it was “acceptable” for her simply to question the
detective about that portion of the interview. When asked by the
trial court, counsel confirmed that she was withdrawing her
objection and would instead question the detective about the
statement.
As we have recognized, “[i]n evaluating the first prong of
the plain error test, a strategic decision to refrain from objecting
may constitute the equivalent of an affirmative waiver.”
Washington, 312 Ga. at 499 (quotation marks omitted). See also
Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 865 (2020) (“[T]he appellate court
can conclude that the defendant intentionally relinquished or

11
abandoned a known right if the appellate court can discern a
tactical reason on the part of the defense for failing to take
appropriate action to preserve that right.” (quotation marks
omitted)); Tyner v. State, 305 Ga. 326, 331 n.4 (2019) (“[T]rial
counsel’s sound strategy does not become plain error at appellate
counsel’s urging.” (quotation marks omitted)). And the record
here clearly shows that Glover, by choosing to withdraw his
objection and to incorporate portions of the statement into his
theory of defense, intentionally relinquished any claim that the
trial court erred by admitting the evidence. See Washington, 312
Ga. at 499; Griffin, 309 Ga. at 865–66. This claim thus fails at the
first step of plain-error review.
5. Glover next argues that trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance. To prevail on this claim,
Glover bears the burden of showing both that his counsel’s
performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered
prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient
performance, Glover must show that trial counsel “performed his
duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms,
which is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong
presumption that counsel performed reasonably.” Lee v. State,
318 Ga. 412, 420 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). And to
establish prejudice, Glover must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have
been different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Glover argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to object to the admission of his former cellmate’s
statement, discussed in Division 4 above, asserting that there was
no foundation for the admission of the statement as a prior

12
inconsistent statement. 5 But Glover “does not argue, much less
demonstrate, that the State could not have provided additional
foundational support” for the admission of the cellmate’s
statement if his counsel had objected. Vivian v. State, 312 Ga.
268, 273–74 (2021). Glover’s failure to make this showing dooms
his ineffective assistance claim. See id. (rejecting ineffectiveness
claim where appellant failed to demonstrate that the State could
not have provided further foundation to support admission of
challenged evidence had trial counsel objected); Lee, 318 Ga. at
428–29 (same).
In any event, as we discussed in Division 4 above, the
record shows that trial counsel made the strategic decision not to
object to the statement’s admission and instead to use portions of
that statement to support Glover’s theory of defense. See Blalock
v. State, 320 Ga. 694, 700 (2025) (“[T]he making of objections falls
within the realm of trial tactics and strategy and thus usually
provides no basis for reversal of a conviction.” (quotation marks
omitted)). It is well settled that forgoing an objection to allow the
admission of evidence that supports the theory of defense is a
reasonable trial strategy, and Glover makes no effort to
demonstrate otherwise. See Griffin, 309 Ga. at 867 (“Given
counsel’s founded, reasonable belief that [appellant] was best
served by using this evidence to his advantage instead of objecting
to it, counsel’s decision amounted to reasonable trial strategy that
does not constitute deficient performance.”). As such, Glover has

5 At trial, defense counsel asserted that the State intended to introduce
the cellmate’s statement as a prior inconsistent statement, but counsel’s basis
for that assertion is unclear. The record reflects that the State filed a pretrial
notice of its intent to introduce the cellmate’s statement pursuant to OCGA §
24-4-404(b) for the purposes of showing Glover’s intent, opportunity, and
preparation, and at a subsequent hearing, the State advanced that same
argument.

13
failed to show that trial counsel performed deficiently, and his
ineffective assistance claim fails. See id. at 866 (“[I]f [an
appellant] fails to show either deficiency or prejudice, this Court
need not examine the other prong of the Strickland test.”).
6. Finally, Glover contends that the cumulative effect of
errors at his trial requires reversal of his conviction. To establish
cumulative error, however, Glover must show that “at least two
errors were committed in the course of the trial, and that,
considered together along with the entire record, the errors so
infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied him a
fundamentally fair trial.” Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 769 (2025)
(cleaned up). Because we have assumed only one error by the trial
court—excluding evidence of Dawson’s prior conviction—and
concluded that trial counsel did not perform deficiently, Glover
cannot show that at least two errors occurred. As such, “there is
no basis for evaluating the cumulative effect of errors,” and this
claim fails. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P. J., not participating.

14