Almond v. State

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0017
Vincent Almond
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County
No. 21CR1610

Decided: June 2, 2026

LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Vincent Almond challenges his 2023 convictions
for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of
his grandfather Henry Benton. 1 Almond contends that (1) the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Almond be
shackled during trial; (2) the trial court committed plain error by

1 The crimes occurred on August 29, 2020. On June 1, 2021, a DeKalb
County grand jury indicted Almond for malice murder, felony murder,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony. At a trial from April 10 to 14, 2023, the jury found
Almond guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Almond to serve life in
prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive term
of five years for the firearm possession charge. The other counts merged or
were vacated by operation of law. On May 10, 2023, Almond filed a motion for
new trial, which he amended with new counsel on December 20, 2024. After an
evidentiary hearing on March 14, 2025, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion on May 13, 2025. Almond filed a timely notice of appeal,
and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December
2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
allowing the State to introduce an in-life photograph of Benton
through Benton’s daughter; (3) the prosecutor made improper
comments during closing arguments; (4) and trial counsel was
ineffective in not objecting to the in-life photograph and in not
objecting to comments made by the prosecutor in closing
argument. These arguments are unavailing, and thus, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following: In August 2020,
Almond was living with his mother Teresa Almond at her house
in DeKalb County because he had recently lost his job and could
not afford to live on his own. Although Teresa and Almond had a
good relationship, Teresa noticed changes in Almond’s behavior
after he moved in with her, including talking to himself and
having “outbursts.”
On August 29, 2020, Almond’s nine-year-old daughter, who
lived with her mother, was at Teresa’s house visiting Almond.
Almond believed that his daughter had taken some money from
him, and he “had a little outburst.” Almond was “talking loud”
and “was all in [his daughter’s] face.” According to Teresa, the
outburst was “very scary.” After yelling at his daughter, Almond
went to his bedroom. Teresa called 911, asking officers to come
pick up Almond.
Teresa also called her parents, and Benton, Teresa’s father,
and Fannie Benton, Teresa’s mother, came over to her house.
When Benton and Fannie arrived, Benton went to Almond’s
bedroom to talk to him, and soon thereafter, Teresa and Fannie
heard loud voices coming from Almond’s room. When Teresa and
Fannie entered Almond’s bedroom, Teresa saw Almond and
Benton “in each other’s face.” Fannie saw Benton and Almond
reaching down toward the bed, and then she saw Almond get up
holding a gun and then point it at Benton. Fannie hit Almond

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with her cane and said, “Don’t do it” or “Don’t shoot. Don’t shoot.”
Almond fired a single shot, hitting Benton in the center of his
chest. After shooting Benton, Almond said, “y’all was trying to kill
me.” Almond walked out of the room and put the gun on top of a
kitchen cabinet. The gun was a Zastava “black and wooden” gun
that belonged to Almond’s older brother and was kept on an upper
shelf in Teresa’s bedroom closet; Teresa was not aware that
Almond had taken the gun out of the closet.
After the shooting, Teresa called 911 again, and when
officers arrived in response to Teresa’s 911 call, they began CPR
on Benton until paramedics arrived. Benton was transported to
the hospital, where he died from the single gunshot wound. A GBI
firearms examiner testified that to disengage the safety on the
gun required “a little pressure” because “you can’t just, like, flip
it,” but had to put “a little elbow grease behind it” and that
disengaging it was different from a handgun safety. The trigger
pull was six pounds.
At trial, Almond testified that he was in the kitchen and
reprimanded his daughter for taking his money and that Teresa
told him to lower his voice. Almond left the kitchen and went to
his room. Benton came into the room a little while later. Benton
had a “normal demeanor” at first but then “it kind of shifted to
him telling me that I had to leave.” Benton was standing over
Almond as Almond sat on the foot of the bed. Almond said he
wasn’t leaving, and Benton “started getting loud,” but Almond did
not raise his voice. Almond testified, “I try to stand because I want
some distance. And as I stood up it was kind of a push backwards
and I wind up going around the side of the bed.” Almond said that
there was a “tussle” and that Benton, who was “physically fit,”
“put his hands on [him], but he did not “put [his] hands on
[Benton].” Almond explained that he was going to the side of the

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bed, and as he “got closer to the nightstand, it was as if [Benton]
was choking me”; “his hands were locked around my neck. I was
trying to break free from him,” but “he was trying to force me back
down.”
According to Almond, Teresa and Fannie ran into the room,
and Fannie “immediately hit [him] with her cane.” Almond was
backed into the corner of the room, next to the bed, and the gun
was on the bed, partially covered. Almond reached for the gun
because he did not want his family using it against him, and then,
“in a split second,” there “was like a race” for the gun between him
and Benton, and “we kind of tussled back and forth with it.”
Almond also said, “I want to say my mother was involved too,”
and “[a]fter we tussled with it, it immediately went off.” According
to Almond, Benton was about a foot or two away from him when
the gun went off. When asked if he knew if he had his finger on
the trigger, Almond responded, “Honestly, I don’t know.”
Almond claimed that he had gotten the gun from his
mother’s closet the day before after he had “perceived” someone
take something out of the mailbox, “so [he] didn’t want that
situation to escalate to them folks trying to come into the house.”
Almond said that he had never tried to operate the safety, and, in
fact, was not familiar with the gun, had never loaded it, did not
have any ammunition for it, and did not even know if it was
loaded or not.
Portions of Almond’s audio-recorded, custodial statement
were played at trial during the State’s cross-examination of him. 2
In his statement, Almond said it took a couple of times to “knock”

2 At a pretrial hearing on the first day of trial, the State presented
evidence that Almond had waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US 436 (1966), and the trial court determined that Almond made the statement
freely and voluntarily.

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the safety off the gun. On redirect, Almond explained his
statement about the safety by saying, “I know the safety is on, so
in the midst of it, I guess, [Benton] hitting me and we tussling for
it, it had to take power for me to hit the safety off.”
1. Almond contends the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering that he be shackled over his objection, without
considering any special circumstances that would have warranted
shackling, and without giving particularized reasons as to why
the shackling was required. While we have concerns about the
shackling of Almond under these particular circumstances, we see
no reversible error.
On the first day of trial, Almond’s trial counsel objected
that Almond was “wearing leg irons” and asked that they be
removed. Trial counsel argued that it was a “due process
violation” to require shackling where there was no indication that
Almond would be a threat to anyone in the courtroom. The trial
court summarily denied the request, without giving any
explanation at all about the necessity for the enhanced security
measure.
As we have recently reiterated, shackling should occur “as
a last resort.” Kam v. State, slip op. S26A0215 at 17 (May 19,
2026). To ensure that shackling does not occur as a routine
practice, we have said that a trial court should require shackling
only after considering any case-specific security concerns and any
less restrictive measures available to address those concerns. See
Hill v. State, 308 Ga. 638, 644 (2020).
However, even assuming that the shackling here was not
permissible under our case law, we have said that a new trial is
not required if the State overcomes the presumption of harm by
demonstrating that the shackling was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Wallace v. State, 320 Ga. 272, 283 (2024).

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In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court
concluded that the State met its burden of showing that the
shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically,
the trial court found that, although Almond testified at the
motion-for-new-trial hearing that “he remembered moving slowly
[when he testified at trial] because of the shackles,” there was
“absolutely no credible evidence that [Almond’s] restraints were
ever visible to, or viewed by, the jury at any point in time”; that
table skirts were draped around the front and sides of the table
where Almond was seated, “concealing [Almond’s] legs from the
view of the jury”; and that Almond was brought into and out of
the courtroom while the jury was absent. The trial court further
found, as a matter of fact based on its own independent
recollection and standard practice, that Almond “did not walk to
the witness stand while wearing leg shackles in the presence of
the jury” and “was not in handcuffs or leg shackles during his
testimony.”
Our review of the record shows that the trial court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous, and we agree that the State
has met its burden of demonstrating harmless error. Here, the leg
irons were not visible to the jury at any time; there was no
evidence in the record that the shackles impaired Almond’s
ability to confer with his lawyer; and the evidence against Almond
was strong and included the eyewitness testimony of Teresa and
Fannie. See Wallace, 320 at 284–85 (concluding that the State
carried its burden of demonstrating harmless error from
presumed error in shackling defendant where the shackles were
not visible to the jury and the evidence against Wallace was
strong). Accordingly, this claim fails.
2. Almond contends that the trial court committed plain
error by allowing the prosecutor to introduce into evidence an in-

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life photograph of Benton through Teresa. The photograph
showed Benton, against a neutral background, from the chest up
and wearing a cruise line t-shirt. Teresa identified Benton’s
photograph as a fair and accurate representation of Benton, and
there is no indication in the record that Teresa displayed any
emotional reaction in doing so. Almond said he had no objections.
Because Almond did not object, we review the claim for plain error
only. 3 See OCGA § 24-1-103.
To establish plain error, an appellant must show “that an
error occurred, was not affirmatively waived, was clear and
obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and affected his substantial
rights.” Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 706 (2025). Here, Almond’s
claim fails because, even if Almond had objected, the trial court
was not required to exclude the photograph. We have previously
determined that there was no abuse of discretion in the admission
of in-life photographs of the victim under similar circumstances.
See Gude v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 865–66 (2022) (concluding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting single in-life
photograph depicting the victim standing alone against a neutral
background where the victim’s mother’s testimony about the
photograph was brief and her emotional response when doing so
was no greater than similar emotion she displayed at other points
in her testimony); Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 237–38 (2021)
(concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting, through a non-family member, a single in-life

3 We have previously said that we review a claim of evidentiary error
for plain error even when trial counsel affirmatively states “no objection.” See
Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 799 (2016) (“Inasmuch as appellant did not
object to the admission of this evidence and affirmatively stated he had no
objection to the admission of the evidence in question, our review is for plain
error under Georgia’s new Evidence Code. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d).”).

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photograph of the victim pictured alone). Because the trial court
would not have abused its discretion in overruling an objection,
Almond has failed to demonstrate that an obvious error occurred.
See Jackson v. State, S25A1498, slip op. at 13–15 (927 SE2d 266)
(Mar. 3, 2026) (concluding that appellant failed to show the
existence of an obvious error for purposes of plain error review,
where, under our case law, the trial court would not have abused
its discretion in excluding the evidence, even if appellant had
objected).
3. Almond also raises three claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. Prevailing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires that an appellant prove deficient performance and
resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, an appellant must
overcome the “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable and demonstrate that trial counsel’s
acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable, considering all
the circumstances at the time and in the light of prevailing
professional norms. Id. at 688–89. “[D]ecisions regarding trial
tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness
claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no
competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Sneed v.
State, slip op. S26A0409 at 6 (2026 WL 1072439 (April 21, 2026)
(quotation marks omitted). To establish the required prejudice,
Almond must show that, but for his attorney’s unprofessional
errors, there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 US at 694.
“If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not
examine the other prong.” Copney v. State, 322 Ga. 794, 798
(2025) (quotation marks omitted).
(a) Almond first asserts that his trial counsel was deficient

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in failing to object to the introduction of the in-life photograph of
Benton. However, at the hearing on the motion for new trial,
Almond did not ask trial counsel why he did not object. And we
have said that trial counsel is not deficient for failing to make
every conceivable objection. See Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573,
578–79 (2020) (explaining that trial counsel is not deficient for
failing to make every conceivable objection but is “only deficient
for failing to lodge those objections that every reasonable attorney
would have lodged”). Thus, we cannot say here that trial counsel
was deficient in failing to object to the in-life photograph of
Benton. See Glenn v. State, 296 Ga. 509, 511–12 (2015)
(concluding that appellant failed to show that trial counsel was
deficient in failing to object to a single in-life photograph
identified by the victim’s mother where trial counsel did not
believe identification was an issue and the focus of the defense
was justification).
(b) Almond next contends that his trial counsel was
deficient for failing to object during closing arguments to the
prosecutor’s alleged misstatements of testimony. Specifically,
Almond contends that the prosecutor mischaracterized the
medical examiner’s testimony in arguing that Benton’s wound
was not a contact wound and mischaracterized the evidence in
arguing that Benton was not standing up when he was shot. With
respect to both these comments, trial counsel testified at the
hearing on the motion for new trial that he did not object because,
when he has made similar objections in other cases, “the judge
typically says the jury will remember what the evidence was,” so
he “didn’t think that the Court would uphold [his] objection.”
Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s strategic decision to
forgo an objection was not patently unreasonable. See Sneed, slip
op. S26A0409 at 8–10 (concluding that appellant failed to show
that trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to prosecutor’s

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comment that allegedly misstated the evidence).
(c) Almond also contends that the prosecutor improperly
asserted her personal beliefs about the veracity of Almond and
Teresa. 4 In discussing Almond’s testimony, the prosecutor stated
that Almond “was not lying for once,” when he acknowledged on
redirect that “I knew the safety was on,” which was inconsistent
with his testimony on direct that he was not familiar with the gun
and had never tried to operate the safety. In discussing Teresa’s
testimony, the prosecutor stated, “Now, her testimony is worthy
of belief. She told you what happened, relived one of the worst
days of her life.” Immediately after this statement, the prosecutor
argued that Teresa’s testimony was corroborated by the crime
scene photos.
Although Almond failed to ask his trial counsel at the
motion for new trial hearing why he did not object to these
comments, we conclude that a competent attorney may have
reasonably determined that the prosecutor’s comments were well
within the scope of the wide latitude granted prosecutors to argue
reasonable inferences from the evidence, including those that
touch on the credibility of witnesses. See Lee v. State, 317 Ga. 880,
887–88 (2023) (concluding that trial counsel was not deficient in
failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks that were permissible
arguments about the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence,
rather than statements about the prosecutor’s personal belief as
to the veracity of witnesses). Thus, Almond has failed to meet his

4 In a separate enumeration of error, Almond asserts that all the
prosecutor’s comments in closing arguments were improper and require
reversal of his convictions. But Almond did not assert any objection to the
prosecutor’s comments, so he has waived any appellate review of this alleged
error. See Walker, 312 Ga. at 236–37 (holding that the failure to object to
allegedly improper statement in closing argument waives any appellate review
of error, including for plain error).

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burden of showing that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to
object to this aspect of the prosecutor’s closing argument.
For all these reasons, Almond’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel fail. 5
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

5 Almond summarily asserts that reversal is required under State v.
Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14 (2020). However, even assuming that a Lane cumulative
error analysis applies to the one trial court error we have assumed—the
shackling of Almond at trial—we also concluded that trial counsel did not
perform deficiently in any respect. Accordingly, there is nothing to assess
cumulatively, and thus, this claim fails. See Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 713
(2025) (concluding that cumulative error claim under Lane failed where
appellant “failed to establish more than one error at trial”).

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