State v. Brantley

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0355
The State
v.
Barron Brantley

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
No. 22SC183042

Decided: June 16, 2026

Land, Justice.
Barron Brantley and his girlfriend, Jordyn Angel-
Marie Jones, were indicted for malice murder and other offenses
arising from the death of Jones’s roommate, Alexis Crawford.
Brantley was also indicted for rape and aggravated sexual battery
arising from his alleged sexual assault of Crawford five days be-
fore her murder. 1 After the rape and aggravated sexual battery
charges against Brantley were severed from the other charges in
the indictment, the State moved to admit evidence related to the
sexual assault in the murder trial. The trial court denied that mo-
tion, and pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1, the State appealed from that
ruling. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that evidence of Brantley’s sexual assault of Crawford

1 Crawford was killed on October 31, 2019. Brantley and Jones filed a
pre-trial motion to sever their trials, and the State consented to that motion.
Because Brantley’s and Jones’s trials were severed, the State filed separate
appeals in each case. The State’s appeal in Jones’s case (Case No. S26A0356)
is stricken from this Court’s docket for the reasons set forth in the order issued
in that case.
and Crawford’s reporting of it (collectively, the “sexual assault ev-
idence”) was inadmissible as intrinsic evidence, and in excluding
the sexual assault evidence under OCGA § 24-4-403’s balancing
test. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State and re-
verse. 2
1. Background
(a) In its pre-trial motion seeking to admit the sexual as-
sault evidence, the State proffered the following: On October 26,
2019, Brantley sexually assaulted Crawford in the apartment
Crawford shared with Jones, and Crawford reported that sexual
assault to the police. Brantley told Jones that the sex was consen-
sual and that he “had just merely engaged in oral sex” with Craw-
ford, and Jones became jealous of Crawford.
Five days later, on October 31, 2019, Crawford returned to
the apartment, intending to confront Brantley about the sexual
assault. Jones, however, had told Brantley, who had been “hiding
for several days” from authorities, to stay in the bedroom so as
not to agitate Crawford. Jones and Crawford then began arguing
about the “whole situation,” a reference to Brantley’s alleged sex-
ual assault of Crawford. Brantley “came out of the room in a rage
upon hearing the women arguing.” He then strangled Crawford,
and Jones placed a bag over Crawford’s head. Crawford died as a
result.
(b) In its order denying the State’s motion to admit the sex-
ual assault evidence as intrinsic evidence, the trial court found
that “the evidence shows that Ms. Crawford and Ms. Jones bought
and consumed a bottle of alcohol, became intoxicated, began to

2 This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In State
v. Brantley, 321 Ga. 370 (2025), we reversed the trial court’s order excluding
from evidence incriminating phone calls Brantley made while in jail.

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argue, and then engaged in a physical fight during which they hit,
bit and scratched each other,” and that Brantley “came out of an
adjacent room to stop the fight, but it escalated, resulting in the
death of Ms. Crawford.” The trial court concluded that the alleged
sexual assault evidence was not intrinsic because there was “no
evidence” that the alleged sexual assault and Crawford’s report-
ing of it was “the motive for [Crawford’s] murder” because “[n]ei-
ther of the accused made any statement to that effect.” The trial
court also concluded that the alleged sexual assault evidence was
“not necessary to complete the story of the crime [as] [t]he story
of the fight in the apartment following the consumption of alcohol
is complete on its own” and “[t]he alleged sexual assault of Ms.
Crawford is not part of any witness’s account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of Ms. Crawford.” Finally, the trial court
found that, even if the sexual assault evidence was intrinsic, it
failed the balancing test under OCGA § 24-4-403 because it
“would unduly prejudice the accused.” This appeal followed.
2. Analysis
The State argues that the sexual assault evidence is admis-
sible as intrinsic evidence and that the trial court’s exclusion of
that evidence was an abuse of discretion. We agree.
We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of
evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion and we accept the
trial court’s factual findings when making those decisions unless
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Harris, 316 Ga. 272, 277
(2023). See Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 13 (2012). Even when “a
trial court’s ultimate ruling is subject to only an abuse of discre-
tion review, the deference owed the trial court’s ruling is dimin-
ished when the trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings
of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree.” State v.

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Williams, 316 Ga. 249, 254 (2023) (citation and punctuation omit-
ted).
“Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1)
an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series
of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete
the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the ev-
idence regarding the charged offense.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga.
474, 485 (2017) (cleaned up). “[E]vidence pertaining to the chain
of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime
is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with
the charged crime or forms an integral and natural part of an ac-
count of the crime or is necessary to complete the story of the
crime for the jury.” Id. (punctuation and citation omitted).
“[W]hen we consider what evidence is necessary for the State to
complete the story of the crime, ‘necessary’ is not used in a strictly
literal sense, but rather, refers to what evidence is reasonably
necessary for the State to complete the story of the crime.” Harris
v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 379 (2020). “[I]ntrinsic evidence remains
admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant’s character
at issue.” Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 25 (2021) (citation and punc-
tuation omitted).
(a) First, the trial court abused its discretion when it found
that evidence of Brantley’s sexual assault of Crawford five days
before her death and Crawford’s report of that sexual assault to
authorities provided no evidence of the motive for Crawford’s al-
leged murder. Given the evidence presented, the sexual assault
evidence was relevant to the motivation for Crawford’s killing.
“Sometimes motive evidence is closely linked to the
charged crimes in time and circumstances and constitutes intrin-
sic evidence.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 266 (2022). The State
proffered that the alleged sexual assault occurred only five days

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before Crawford’s killing and that Crawford was the only witness
to the alleged sexual assault. Thus, the killing of Crawford elimi-
nated the only witness to the alleged sexual assault. Moreover,
Crawford reported the sexual assault to authorities, and the
State’s proffer was that Brantley was hiding from those authori-
ties when Crawford decided to confront him about the incident.
This is evidence from which a juror would be entitled to make a
reasonable inference of motive, and the trial court’s exclusion of
it was an abuse of discretion. See Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862,
867 (2019) (“Jurors are normally entitled to make reasonable in-
ferences from circumstantial evidence regarding all sorts of facts,
including the facts necessary to find defendants guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of capital crimes.”). See also Heade, 312 Ga. at
26 (evidence that appellant murdered another man eight days be-
fore he murdered the victim was admissible as intrinsic evidence
of appellant’s motive for shooting the victim because “killing [the
victim] after the car crash would delay the police response to the
crash and eliminate the only witness”).
(b) Second, the sexual assault evidence was admissible as
intrinsic evidence because it was both necessary to complete the
story of the alleged crimes for the jury and inextricably inter-
twined with the evidence regarding the charged offenses.
The State proffered that Jones told officers she could not
remember what the fight that led to Crawford’s death was about
but that she thought it was about the “whole situation,” which the
jury would be authorized to conclude referred to Crawford’s alle-
gations and reporting of the alleged sexual assault days earlier.
See Worthen, 304 Ga. at 867. Whether or not Brantley sexually
assaulted Crawford, the fact that they had engaged in sexual ac-
tivity and Crawford reported it as sexual assault just a few days
before Crawford’s death formed an “integral and natural part” of

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the account of the subsequent argument and alleged murder and
was necessary to complete the story to the jury, as this evidence
could explain why Crawford and Jones got into the fight that im-
mediately preceded Crawford’s death and provided insight as to
the motive for Crawford’s killing. The trial court’s conclusion that
this evidence was not intrinsic therefore constituted an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Williams, 302 Ga. at 486 (evidence of defend-
ant’s HIV status and sexual assault of the victim’s sister three
days prior to the victim’s murder was necessary to complete the
story for the jury because it helped explain why the victim was at
the defendant’s home on the night of the murder); Heade, 312 Ga.
at 25 (evidence of defendant’s prior assault of his codefendant was
reasonably necessary to complete the story as it explained why
the codefendant was scared of the defendant and why she had a
cast on her leg that defendant tried to remove to evade detection
from authorities).
3. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
the sexual assault evidence under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”).
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under
Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117,
126 (2019). Under Rule 403, “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”
“[T]he exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary
remedy which should be used only sparingly.” Burns, 306 Ga. at
126 (cleaned up). “The major function of Rule 403 is to exclude
matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the
heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Id. (cleaned up). “In
close cases, balancing under Rule 403 should be in favor of admis-
sibility of the evidence.” Biggs v. State, 323 Ga. 546, 551 (2026)
(cleaned up).

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Probative value depends in part on the “marginal worth of
the evidence,” meaning “how much it adds … to the other proof
available to establish the fact for which it is offered.” Olds v. State,
299 Ga. 65, 75–76 (2016). Probative value also “depends … upon
the need for the evidence.” Id. at 76. “When the fact for which the
evidence is offered is undisputed or not reasonably susceptible of
dispute, the less the probative value of the evidence.” Id. When
assessing unfair prejudice, “the primary concern is that a jury will
decide a case on an improper basis, commonly, though not neces-
sarily, an emotional one.” Burns, 306 Ga. at 126 (cleaned up).
Here, the sexual assault evidence was highly probative. As
explained above, this evidence was necessary to explain the fight
that led to Crawford’s death and was inextricably intertwined
with the evidence underlying the crimes in the indictment, as it
occurred only five days prior to Crawford’s death and provided a
motive for that alleged murder. Further, the State had a strong
need for the admission of this evidence, as it provided the only
explanation of motive and the reason for the fight that led to the
alleged murder. And though the sexual assault evidence was prej-
udicial, it was not unfairly so given that the likelihood it would
cause a jury to decide the case on an improper basis was low. See
Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431, 441-42 (2024) (evidence may be un-
fairly prejudicial under Rule 403 if offered to prove “a criminal
defendant’s bad character or his propensity for violence”). Under
these facts, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that
the danger of unfair prejudice to Brantley substantially out-
weighed the probative value of the evidence. Middlebrooks v.
State, 310 Ga. 748, 751 (2021) (“[A]ll inculpatory evidence is in-
herently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.”
(cleaned up)). See Biggs, 323 Ga. at 555 (holding that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim’s

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prior violent act against the defendant under Rule 403 “[g]iven
the significant probative value of the evidence … and the minimal
risk of unfair prejudice”); Burns, 306 Ga. at 126 (affirming the
Court of Appeals’s reversal of a trial court’s exclusion of evidence
under Rule 403 where the trial court abused its discretion in ex-
cluding the evidence). 3
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Peterson,
C.J., disqualified.

3 Our ruling is limited to the trial court’s blanket exclusion of the sex-
ual assault evidence as not intrinsic and violative of Rule 403. If there are other
objections that Brantley wishes to assert with respect to specific items of evi-
dence proffered by the State, he may assert those objections on remand. We
take no position on the merits of any such objections.

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