Rease v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0001
Shanard Deshun Rease
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fayette County
No. 2019R0241

Decided: June 16, 2026

LAND, Justice.
Appellant Shanard Rease was convicted of felony murder
in relation to the strangulation death of his neighbor, Mimi
Perry. 1 On appeal, Rease argues that the trial court erred by ex-
cluding alibi and rebuttal evidence, that the admission of a DNA
expert’s testimony and the State’s mischaracterization of that ev-

1 Perry was killed on May 24, 2019. On June 18, 2019, a Fayette
County grand jury indicted Rease, charging him with malice murder (Count
1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3).
At a trial from January 13 to 17, 2020, a jury found Rease guilty of
Counts 2 and 3. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on Count 1.
The trial court sentenced Rease to serve life in prison without the possibility
of parole for Count 2. Count 1 was nolle prossed, and Count 3 merged into
Count 2 for sentencing purposes.
Rease filed a timely motion for new trial on January 23, 2020, which
was amended through new counsel on September 6, 2022. Following hearings
on April 4 and October 3, 2023, the trial court denied the motion for new trial,
as amended, on June 5, 2024. Rease timely filed a notice of appeal on June 24,
2024. This case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December
2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
idence are reversible errors, that the trial court’s comments ex-
pressed an opinion as to Rease’s guilt, and that his trial counsel
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. 2 For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.
Perry lived on the basement level of her townhome, which had its
own door leading out to the back of the building, and her room-
mate lived upstairs. On May 24, 2019, “a little before 5[:00 p.m.],”
Perry’s roommate heard Perry’s shower running, but she grew
concerned when she did not hear Perry leave the house. 3 She went
downstairs around 6:30 p.m. to check on Perry and found that
Perry was gone but that the lights and TV in her room were still
on. Sometime before 8:00 p.m., a neighbor told Perry’s roommate
that a body was discovered at the end of their building.
Officers were dispatched to the scene at 7:53 p.m. and
found Perry “lying on the ground in a supine position” behind the
apartment building, “naked with several … visible injuries.” An
officer testified that, based on Perry’s “discoloration … it ap-
peared that she had been there for a little while.” A dress and
hairpiece were found just feet away from Perry’s body. The door
leading from Perry’s room to the backyard was “cracked,” and a
search of Perry’s room revealed a damp towel in the hamper and
a hair straightener that was still plugged into the wall and turned
on.
Perry’s autopsy revealed abrasions and bruises throughout

2 In various places throughout Rease’s brief, he fails to recite the cor-
rect standard of review for his claims. We recount his arguments as he does
but then apply the correct standard of review to each.
3 Perry had plans to attend a high school graduation that evening at
7:00 p.m., and Perry’s roommate testified that she “knew that … Perry never
wanted to be late for anything.”

2
her body; several “blunt impact injuries” to her head; and multi-
ple signs of strangulation, including petechiae of the face,4 signif-
icant bleeding in the neck, partially broken thyroid cartilage, and
a broken hyoid bone. The medical examiner who performed
Perry’s autopsy concluded that Perry died of “multiple traumatic
injuries,” including “impacts to her head [and] impacts to parts of
her body, including her face” as well as “manual strangulation.”
As part of their investigation, law enforcement spoke to
Rease, who was Perry’s neighbor, twice. Rease was later identi-
fied as a suspect after investigators discovered that he was on
probation for the aggravated assault of a former female neighbor.
He agreed to go to the police station to talk with investigators.
During his interview, Rease claimed that a couple of days
prior, he had helped Perry move a large planter from her back
porch to her room. When asked about his whereabouts around the
time of the murder, Rease claimed that he was at home most of
the day but walked across the street to a gas station to buy ciga-
rettes shortly after 4:00 p.m. Rease also said that his mother,
Anita Ingram – who lived with him – stopped by the grocery store
after work and got home “a little after five” that evening. When
investigators inquired about some “relatively fresh” “marks,
scratches, cuts, that were in … a crescent shape on [Rease’s] arm
and forearm,” Rease said that he had been injured at work earlier
that day and had reported the injury to his supervisor.
At trial, Rease’s supervisor testified that Rease had not re-
ported any injuries on the day of the murder. Moreover, an officer
testified that he had reviewed the surveillance footage from the
gas station that day – specifically, between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. –

4 The medical examiner testified at trial that this occurs when “small
blood vessels in the area burst under pressure.”

3
and did not see Rease on the footage. And Ingram testified that,
when she arrived home from the grocery store around 6:00 p.m.,
Rease was present, and they did not leave the house after that.
The State also presented testimony from a DNA expert who
had completed DNA tests on Perry’s fingernails. The expert testi-
fied that there was “about a 50/50 mixture” of two DNA profiles
under Perry’s right-hand fingernails. 5 He testified that there
“would have to be a lot of DNA on the surface that [Perry] was
scratching” to result in that amount of DNA under her nails. The
expert removed Perry’s known DNA profile from the mixture,
leaving the remaining DNA as the “foreign profile,” and this for-
eign profile matched Rease’s DNA. 6
During closing argument, Rease’s trial counsel contended
that Rease’s DNA was transferred to the planter when he moved
it for Perry and that Perry must have touched it later, which
would explain the presence of his DNA beneath her nails. Rease’s
counsel also raised an alibi defense, arguing that Perry was
known to be showering around 5:30 p.m., 7 and that Ingram was
home with Rease between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m.
2. Rease argues that the trial court erred by excluding alibi
and rebuttal evidence. Specifically, he contends that the trial
court’s exclusion of two receipts and a GPS map was improper.
Because any abuse of discretion in excluding this evidence was

5 The DNA under Perry’s left-hand fingernails reflected “at least a sec-
ond individual,” but the DNA expert testified that, because the DNA amount
was so little, there was “limited data” for the additional DNA.
6 Investigators had collected voluntary DNA samples from Perry’s
roommate, ex-husband, ex-husband’s fiancée, and boyfriend. After obtaining a
search warrant, they also collected DNA from Rease.
7 The testimony provided by Perry’s roommate, however, was that she
heard the shower running around 5:00 p.m.

4
harmless, this claim fails.
(a) Prior to trial, Rease filed a “Notice of Alibi Defense” in
accordance with OCGA § 17-16-5(a), 8 explaining that “Ingram
will testify that Mr. Rease was in their shared residence from ap-
proximately 5:55 p.m. when she came home after work and after
grocery shopping until shortly after 8:00 p.m. when law enforce-
ment arrived following the discovery of [Perry]’s body.”
On the second day of trial, Rease’s counsel provided the
prosecution with a bank receipt, 9 a grocery store receipt, 10 and a
GPS map from a “driving app” showing Rease’s driving history
between 3:17 a.m. and 2:58 p.m. on the day of Perry’s murder. The
prosecutor alerted the trial court that he was “just served” with
this evidence and that Rease had failed to provide any of these
documents before trial. The prosecutor contended the defense had
acted in bad faith and sought to exclude the items from evidence.

8 OCGA § 17-16-5(a) provides:
Upon written demand by the prosecuting attorney within ten
days after arraignment, or at such time as the court permits,
stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense
was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days of
the demand of the prosecuting attorney or ten days prior to
trial, whichever is later, or as otherwise ordered by the court,
upon the prosecuting attorney a written notice of the defend-
ant’s intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the
defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense
and the names, addresses, dates of birth, and telephone num-
bers of the witnesses, if known to the defendant, upon whom
the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi unless pre-
viously supplied.
9 The bank receipt documented a check deposit at 9:54 a.m. on the day
of the murder.
10 The grocery store receipt documented a purchase at 5:39 p.m. on the
day of the murder.

5
When asked if the items would be used “in support of the alibi
defense,” Rease’s counsel responded, “No,” but that the driving
map would be “in support of rebuttal” if the State challenged
Rease’s statement about going to the gas station.
Rease’s counsel conceded that Ingram had been in posses-
sion of Rease’s cell phone since the day of Perry’s death, but coun-
sel asserted that he did not obtain the phone from her until just
prior to trial. And he admitted that he had amended a witness list
on the first day of trial to include an investigator who would tes-
tify about the GPS map but did not provide the prosecution with
a copy of that map at that time. The trial court also pointed out
that Rease’s counsel had been in possession of the receipts for at
least six days prior to disclosing their existence to the State.
Rease’s counsel explained that there were “[j]ust too many pieces
on the chessboard” and that “[w]e don’t have the resources to do
all these things.”
The court noted that Rease’s counsel could have attached
the receipts to the alibi notice, which referenced Ingram’s antici-
pated testimony, when the notice was filed shortly before trial.
And as for the GPS map, the trial court explained that it was dis-
inclined to require the State to “do some kind of [rushed] analysis
of [Rease’s] phone” and concluded that the State would be de-
prived of a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence. The court also
determined that, whether or not there had been a discovery vio-
lation, unless the cell phone was admitted, the GPS map was in-
admissible under the best evidence rule. See OCGA § 24-10-1002
(“To prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph shall be required.”). Ul-
timately, the court ruled that “the [grocery store] receipt, the
bank receipt, and the GPS record, are excluded from evidence.
And no witness shall mention any of those three documents.”

6
(b) “A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude ev-
idence is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Tarver v.
State, 319 Ga. 165, 169 (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“[W]e will reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s abuse of
discretion in excluding evidence only if the exclusion was harm-
ful.” Mbungu v. State, 322 Ga. 564, 567 (2025). To determine
whether a nonconstitutional error was harmful, we ask “whether
it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the ver-
dict.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding the GPS map and receipts at trial, we con-
clude that any such error was harmless. The GPS map merely
shows Rease’s driving history between 3:17 a.m. and 2:58 p.m. on
the day of Perry’s murder and indicates that he arrived home at
2:58 p.m. and did not drive anywhere else. This places him near
the scene at least two hours prior to Perry’s death. And to the
extent it shows that he traveled to the gas station, he did so prior
to 3:00 p.m. Therefore, any contention from the State that Rease
did not visit the gas station when he claimed to – shortly after
4:00 p.m. – would not have been rebutted by this evidence. The
map, therefore, does not support either an alibi or rebuttal de-
fense, despite Rease’s arguments to the contrary.
As for the receipt evidence, the bank receipt placed Ingram
at the bank prior to work on the day of the murder, but she was
not asked at trial about her whereabouts that morning and did
not testify to such. Moreover, the grocery store receipt only cor-
roborated Ingram’s uncontradicted testimony that she picked up
groceries after work and arrived home around 6:00 p.m. Rease’s
presence at the apartment when Ingram got home does not pro-
vide him with an alibi defense because this evidence shows that
Ingram was not home with Rease between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., and

7
the State’s theory of the case was that Perry was murdered in that
window of time.
And though the other evidence of Rease’s guilt may not be
overwhelming, the evidence against him was strong. In particu-
lar, Rease was near Perry’s apartment during the window of time
that she was murdered, there was an unusually large quantity of
his DNA under Perry’s fingernails, and there were unexplained
defensive wounds on his arms on the day of the murder.
Thus, it is highly probable that the exclusion of this evi-
dence, even if it was the product of error, did not contribute to the
verdict, and this claim fails. See Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668,
676–78 (2021) (where date and time of victim’s death was un-
known, potential alibi witness offered only vague details of de-
fendant’s whereabouts, and the other evidence of the defendant’s
guilt was strong, any error in excluding the witness’s testimony
was harmless); Graves v. State, 303 Ga. 305, 308–09 (2018) (any
error in exclusion of alibi evidence was harmless where the evi-
dence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and “the alibi
testimony was of limited probative value, because it specified no
time at which [the defendant] was at his mother’s house, and a
witness presented by the State testified that [the defendant] was
indeed at his mother’s house that night, after the time of the mur-
ders” (footnote omitted)); De La Cruz v. State, 303 Ga. 24, 27
(2018) (exclusion of alibi evidence was harmless where alibi wit-
ness was only with defendant until midnight, evidence showed
that victim was murdered between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., and
the excluded evidence would have been cumulative of other testi-
mony).
3. Rease argues that the testimony provided by the State’s
DNA expert and the State’s mischaracterization of that evidence
are reversible errors necessitating a new trial. Specifically, Rease

8
challenges certain statements made by the prosecutor during the
State’s opening and closing statements as well as testimony from
the State’s DNA expert. We reject Rease’s contentions.
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor
stated that
the DNA matched. … But what’s the frequency of
the DNA profile that Mr. Rease has? How many peo-
ple have the same kind of DNA profile that he has?
DNA can match with different kinds of frequency. ...
What’s the frequency of the kind of DNA Shanard
Rease has with anybody else? This is a number
called one hundred septillion. This is the frequency,
or I think a better way of putting it would be the lack
of frequency, of Shanard Rease’s DNA with that of
everybody else. … And really it’s more than every-
body else, because you may know there are not this
many people on the earth. That’s how infrequent it
is. That’s how particular it is. That’s how it is close
to being said that it is his and his alone.

On direct examination, the State’s DNA expert, who per-
formed the DNA analysis on Perry’s fingernails, confirmed that
“there was a DNA match between one of the contributors in [the]
right-hand fingernail swabbing” and Rease. He further testified
that he calculated a statistic “based off the [foreign] evidence pro-
file” to represent how often he would expect to see that profile in
the entire population and concluded that the “frequency of the
foreign DNA profile in a given population would be expected to
occur one in one hundred septillion.” 11 The expert explained that

11 He clarified that the frequency he generated was “not the frequency

9
he “would have to test an additional hundred septillion individu-
als before [he] would see that DNA profile occur again,” so he
“would not expect to see this DNA profile again in the world’s pop-
ulation.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor again referenced
the DNA evidence as follows:
After all the lies, and we can make a list of them, all
of the lies, all the contradictions, all the new stories
… this is what these folks base their defense on. This
is what these folks need you to believe to ignore this
DNA evidence of one and one hundred septillion.
And you know, I got some of that wrong, but the
DNA scientist set me right about, and you should
have that in your notes. After all of that, after all of
these lies, these folks want you to base your belief
that the DNA under her right-hand fingernails came
from this pot and that he helped her move the pot.

To start, Rease’s challenges regarding the prosecutor’s
comments on the statistical significance of the DNA evidence dur-
ing the State’s opening and closing statements are waived on ap-
peal. Because these statements are not considered evidence and
Rease made no objection to the remarks at trial, the issue is
waived and plain error review does not apply. See Huff v. State,
315 Ga. 558, 564 (2023) (“[O]pening statements are not consid-
ered evidence, and failure to timely object to a remark in opening

of Shanard Rease” but was “based off the evidence profile itself” from the sam-
ple gathered from Perry’s fingernails. Moreover, he confirmed that the statistic
was not “an estimate of how frequent or infrequent [Rease’s] DNA profile would
be in the general population,” but rather showed “how frequent or infrequent
the foreign profile [he] generated from the evidence is seen in the population.”

10
statements waives the issue on appeal.”). See also Callaway v.
State, 321 Ga. 186, 193 (2025) (claim that prosecutor’s closing ar-
gument was improper was “waived because [the defendant] did
not object to the closing argument at trial … and claims that im-
proper statements were made in closing argument are not subject
to review for plain error”). Accordingly, these claims of error con-
cerning the prosecutor’s comments fail.
As for Rease’s argument regarding the expert’s trial testi-
mony, Rease argues that the expert mistakenly indicated that the
frequency he calculated was based on Rease’s DNA rather than
on the foreign profile collected from Perry’s fingernails. Because
Rease did not object to this testimony at trial, we review this
claim for plain error only. See Samuels v. State, 323 Ga. 629, 638
(2026). To establish plain error, Rease “must point to a legal error
that was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond
reasonable dispute, affected his substantial rights, and seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Carter v. State, 317 Ga. 689, 693 (2023) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “We need not analyze all of the ele-
ments of this test when, as in this case, the defendant has failed
to establish one of them.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Rease does not demonstrate any error or defect, much less
an obvious one, in the expert’s testimony, so his claim fails. The
expert permissibly testified that the large amount of foreign DNA
under Perry’s right fingernails was unusual, that the foreign
DNA profile generated was a match for Rease’s DNA, and that
there was an extremely low statistical probability of finding this
foreign profile again in the entire population. And the expert
clearly articulated that his statistic was not generated from
Rease’s DNA profile, specifically, but was generated from the for-
eign profile found under Perry’s nails. See Nundra v. State, 316

11
Ga. 1, 14 (2023) (trial court did not plainly err in admitting testi-
mony showing that it was “two billion times more likely” that the
DNA from the evidence matched the defendant than a random
individual). Accordingly, the expert’s testimony was not im-
proper, and the trial court did not commit any error, let alone
plain error, by allowing it at trial.
4. Rease argues that certain comments the trial court made
expressed an opinion as to Rease’s guilt. We are not persuaded.
(a) The jury began deliberations at 2:07 p.m. on January
16, 2020, and the trial judge proposed that the jury deliberate un-
til 5:00 p.m. The jury re-entered the courtroom at 4:43 p.m., at
which time the trial judge commented on the schedule for further
deliberation. Because the next day was Friday and the following
Monday was a holiday, the trial judge inquired as to what the
jurors thought would be “most availing and productive for the
scheduling of [their] further deliberations[.]”The trial judge also
made them aware that he had to attend an out-of-town conference
the following week, but that he would return if they had any ques-
tions or reached a verdict while he was away. Prior to excusing
the jurors to resume their deliberations, the trial judge asked
them to “guide [the court] in whether [they] want[ed] to stay into
the evening or not. And if not, what time [they] wish[ed] to resume
in the morning, being mindful … of the scheduling matter next
week.” The jury continued deliberations until 6:20 p.m. that even-
ing and resumed deliberations the next morning. At 12:10 p.m.,
they sent a note to the court: “We are unable to come to a unani-
mous decision on one of the counts, and it seems unlikely that we
will be able to.” The court marked the note as an exhibit, and the
following bench conference took place:
COURT: And response from the State?

12
STATE: I would just urge the [c]ourt to make -- ob-
viously to clarify with the jury that they’ve reached
a verdict on -- that that means that they’ve reached
a verdict on two of the counts.

COURT: Right.

STATE: And then -- and then urge the [c]ourt to re-
ceive the jury’s verdict.

COURT: Okay. And what do you say?

DEFENSE: Yes, sir. That would be fine. Thank you.

After the jury returned to the courtroom, the foreperson con-
firmed the situation described in the note, and the following dis-
cussion ensued:
COURT: [Y]ou’re seeking direction as to that situa-
tion?

FOREPERSON: Right. I mean, our jury form allows
us to do unanimous verdicts only. So if that’s not
looking possible, what do we do?

COURT: Right. The answer after conferring with
counsel is to reach unanimous verdict if you can on
the two counts as to which you’ve told me you’ve
reached unanimous verdict. I’m not directing that
you reach a unanimous verdict. I’m just stating that
if you have reached unanimous verdict on two
counts, so mark the jury verdict form and leave the
count as to which you have not reached unanimous
verdict blank. Sign the jury verdict form, date it, ad-

13
vise the bailiffs that you’ve reached unanimous ver-
dict as to two counts, if that is true, and if indeed you
have reached unanimous verdict. … And notify the
bailiff and we’ll return you back here and receive the
verdict as to those unanimous counts. … Nothing the
[c]ourt is saying here is mandating, directing, or ei-
ther suggesting that you reach unanimous verdict on
any count, much less the two counts, whatever they
are, that you -- whichever they are that you’ve men-
tioned to me in this question and in our discussion
that you’ve reached.

The jury exited at 12:18 p.m. and returned at 12:31 p.m. with a
verdict form that left Count 1 blank but found Rease guilty on
Counts 2 and 3.
(b) Because Rease did not object to the court’s statements
during trial, we again review this claim for plain error. See Stur-
key v. State, 319 Ga. 156, 158–59 (2024). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-
8-57(a)(1), “[i]t is error for any judge, during any phase of any
criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opin-
ion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as
to the guilt of the accused.” The statute is “violated only when a
trial court’s instruction, considered as a whole, assumes certain
things as facts and intimates to the jury what the judge believes
the evidence to be.” Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 423 (2016)
(cleaned up).
Here, neither the court’s comments about its schedule for
continuing deliberations nor its statements regarding the jury’s
inability to reach a verdict on all of the counts of the indictment
were improper. The court’s scheduling discussion did not imply
that the jury needed to reach a verdict – much less any particular
verdict – quickly. Rather, the court laid out potential timelines

14
for the jurors to continue their deliberations. And at no point did
the court provide any commentary that suggested Rease’s guilt or
intimated to the jury what the judge believed the evidence to be,
and Rease points us to none.
Rease argues that “the trial court receipt of communica-
tions from the foreperson and contemporaneous oral responses
thereto were improper and contrary to law,” citing Lowery v.
State, 282 Ga. 68, 76 (2007). 12 But the record reflects that the
court followed the proper procedure for handling the jury’s note
about their inability to reach “a unanimous decision on one of the
counts.” See Suggs v. State, 310 Ga. 762 (2021) (holding that the
trial court complied with Lowery where the court received a jury
note, marked it as an exhibit in the presence of counsel and dis-
cussed the note and intended response with counsel before bring-
ing in the jury). And from this note, the court inferred – during a
bench conference – only that the jury had likely reached unani-
mous verdicts on the other two counts and discussed the proper
response with the parties. Neither party objected.
Upon the jury’s return to the courtroom, the court ex-
plained to the jurors how they should handle a partial verdict, “if
that is true,” but reminded them that “[n]othing the [c]ourt is say-
ing here is mandating, directing, or either suggesting that you
reach unanimous verdict on any count.” See Ingram v. State, 290
Ga. 500, 504 (2012) (where, after receiving an inconsistent ver-
dict, the trial court “specifically admonished the jurors that they

12 In Lowery, 282 Ga. at 76, we instructed that trial courts are required
to have jurors’ communications submitted to the court in writing; to mark the
written communication as a court exhibit in the presence of counsel; to afford
counsel a full opportunity to suggest an appropriate response; and to make
counsel aware of the substance of the trial court’s intended response in order
that counsel may seek whatever modifications counsel deems appropriate be-
fore the jury is exposed to the instruction. That is what the trial court did here.

15
were authorized to find appellant guilty of the lesser or the
greater offense and that the court was not in any way, shape, or
form telling them how the verdict should read,” the court’s com-
ments “were limited to a clarification of procedures” and did not
constitute a basis for reversal (cleaned up)). Rease also argues
that the “return of the verdict so quickly” following the court’s
comments implies that “the trial court’s instructions and sugges-
tions had an undesirable and prejudicial effect on Rease’s guilt
and jury deliberations.” But, given the jurors’ implication that
they had already reached unanimous verdicts on two of the counts
and would not likely be able to reach such a verdict on the third
count, it is not surprising that it did not take them long to return
to the jury room and re-cast their votes on those two counts pur-
suant to the court’s instructions.
Because none of the court’s remarks or responses to the
jury’s note expressed any opinion as to Rease’s guilt (or that the
jury was required to reach a unanimous verdict on any count),
Rease has failed to show error, let alone plain error. See Sturkey,
319 Ga. at 159 (identifying no error, plain or otherwise, where
judge’s questions to a witness did not “indicate, either impliedly
or expressly,” that the judge viewed the evidence as conclusive of
the defendant’s guilt); Smart, 299 Ga. at 423 (identifying no plain
error where the record was clear that “the judge was not com-
menting on the evidence but, instead was merely explaining the
nature of the case” to potential jurors, which “in no way consti-
tuted the type of direct comment on the substance or weight of
the evidence that we have held to violate OCGA § 17-8-57”).
5. Rease argues that trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance through deficient preparation and perfor-
mance. These claims fail.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

16
defendant must prove both deficient performance by his counsel
and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 687 (1984). To prove deficient performance, a defendant must
show that his attorney performed his duties in an objectively un-
reasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light
of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687–88. The law rec-
ognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed reasona-
bly, which the defendant bears the burden of overcoming. Id. at
689. And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form
the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed
such a course.” Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2014) (citation
omitted).
Even when a defendant has shown that his counsel’s per-
formance was constitutionally deficient, the defendant also must
prove resulting prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. To do so, the defendant must establish that but
for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable
probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 US at 694. “It is not enough ‘to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 US 86, 104 (2011) (quot-
ing Strickland, 466 US at 693). Rather, the defendant must
demonstrate a “reasonable probability” of a different result,
which is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 US at 694. “If either Strickland prong
is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Palmer
v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (2018). In all, the burden of proving a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a heavy one. See Har-
rington, 562 US at 105.
(a) Rease asserts 17 instances of ineffective assistance but

17
has listed the majority of these claims “in a cursory manner.” Ri-
ley v. State, 321 Ga. 112, 120–21 (2025) (rejecting appellant’s “list
of generalized assertions of his trial counsel’s alleged failings” be-
cause it did not “show in what respect his counsel’s performance
was deficient” (cleaned up)). Because Rease has not provided any
meaningful argument or citations to authority or to the record for
most of these claims, he has failed to meet his heavy burden of
proving that trial counsel’s alleged failures amounted to ineffec-
tive assistance. See id. at 120–21 (collecting cases). The claims
not specifically addressed below are rejected for this reason. As
for the ineffective assistance claims supported by at least limited
substantive argument, we address – and reject – each in turn.
(b) Rease first argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he failed to highlight the weaknesses of the
State’s evidence – such as the State’s overreliance on DNA evi-
dence, lack of eyewitnesses, and the responding officer’s failure to
notice any injuries to Rease’s body – in closing. But we cannot say
that it was objectively unreasonable, and therefore deficient, for
trial counsel to focus his argument on Rease’s statements to law
enforcement that supported his theory of defense, rather than fo-
cusing on the potential weaknesses in other pieces of the State’s
evidence.
“With respect to closing argument, defense counsel is per-
mitted wide latitude and is not ineffective simply because another
attorney might have used different language or placed a different
emphasis on the evidence.” Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298
(2021) (cleaned up). In closing, counsel emphasized his theory
that Rease’s DNA was found under Perry’s fingernails because he
recently helped her move a planter. Counsel also downplayed the
significance of the DNA evidence itself by criticizing the State’s
failure to conduct additional testing on the DNA evidence from

18
Perry’s left fingernails and neck, which he contended would have
established the identity of the murderer. See Padgett v. State, 322
Ga. 121, 123–24 (2025) (concluding that there was no deficiency
where counsel, in closing, strategically attempted to downplay in-
criminating DNA evidence – noting that the DNA could have been
deposited when the victim and defendant “tussle[d]” two days be-
fore the victim’s body was found – and instead emphasized the
DNA evidence found on other tested items which could not be at-
tributed to the defendant). Moreover, counsel argued the circum-
stantial nature of the case by focusing the jury’s attention on the
State’s burden of proof, the “significant deficits” in the evidence,
and the “flaws” in the State’s case.
At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that
his “strategic position was to explain the reason that there might
have been DNA produced by Mr. Rease on fingernails … that were
taken from [Perry]. And it was our strategy to show that DNA
could be transferred in other ways from what was alleged by the
State[.]”
Counsel’s strategic decisions about what to highlight and
what to downplay during his closing argument were not so pa-
tently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have fol-
lowed such a course. Rease, therefore, has not shown that his
counsel’s performance was deficient. See Padgett, 322 Ga. at 124
(“Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s decision not to em-
phasize the DNA evidence … was objectively reasonable.”).
(c) Rease next argues that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance for failing to serve timely discovery of the GPS map
and receipts to the State. But even assuming that trial counsel’s
failure to provide the State with this evidence was deficient,
Rease has not shown that he was prejudiced by such failure.
As explained in Division 1, the GPS map merely reflected

19
Rease’s whereabouts at least two hours prior to the murder, and
the receipts only corroborated Ingram’s uncontradicted testi-
mony. This evidence does not provide Rease with an alibi defense
placing him at a location other than the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission or otherwise exclude the possibility of his
guilt. Rease, therefore, has not demonstrated that the outcome of
his trial would likely have been different had counsel provided
timely notice of this evidence and had it been introduced at trial.
See Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 447–48 (2016) (though trial
counsel failed to ensure that certain evidence was produced to the
State or adduced at trial, the evidence was “merely cumulative of
other witnesses’ descriptions … and [the defendant’s] own testi-
mony,” so the defendant showed no prejudice).
(d) Rease also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
his failure to object to the State’s “comment on [Rease’s] silence”
during closing. Specifically, the prosecutor posited to the jury:
“[E]ven though there may be some pieces missing, there may be
some things unknown, or … known only to [Rease] who declined
to tell th[e] police officer about them. … [D]on’t you still know
what you’re seeing?”
Rease fails to cite any legal authority to support his asser-
tion that the prosecutor’s comments were improper. Nevertheless,
trial counsel’s decision not to object to these remarks was objec-
tively reasonable. Prosecutors are afforded “wide latitude in the
conduct of closing argument, the bounds of which are in the trial
court’s discretion.” Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505, 510–11 (2017)
(cleaned up). Moreover, they are “allowed to argue inferences that
may reasonably be made from the evidence presented at trial.” Id.
at 515.
The prosecutor’s statement here can reasonably be under-
stood as a reference to the holes in the stories that Rease told law

20
enforcement over the course of his conversations with them. Since
it is not improper for the State to comment on key details left out
of a defendant’s pre-trial statements to police, such a remark is
materially different than a comment on a defendant’s refusal to
talk at all. See e.g., Fadesire v. State, ___ Ga. ___, S26A0174, slip
op. at 2–3 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026) (2026 WL 739095) (while prosecu-
tor’s comment during closing “may have been an oblique reference
to the right to remain silent,” it was not improper where he “did
not refer specifically to [the defendant’s] decision not to testify”
and the statement was made to “address[ ] a weakness in the
State’s case”).
Because the comment was not “obviously” improper, a rea-
sonable lawyer in Rease’s counsel’s place could have determined
that an objection to the prosecutor’s statement “would have been
meritless” or “might have called more attention to [the defend-
ant]’s silence than the remark itself.” See Fadesire, S26A0174,
slip op. at 3 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026) (2026 WL 739095). Rease has,
therefore, failed to show that his counsel was deficient in this re-
spect.
(e) Rease baldly asserts that the State “repeatedly accused
Rease of creating lies and stated his personal belief of the veracity
of the witnesses and evidence submitted.” But Rease fails to iden-
tify a single instance in the record to support his broad allegation.
See Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 739 (2018) (“It is not this
Court’s job to cull the record on behalf of [the defendant] to find
alleged errors.” (cleaned up)). Rease has not indicated with any
specificity what his counsel should have objected to or how he was
prejudiced by counsel’s supposed failure to object to these uniden-
tified comments. See Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 n.21 (2024)
(“To the extent [the defendant] has not identified specific in-
stances of these alleged deficiencies, he has not carried his burden

21
of showing that his lawyer performed deficiently.”). His claim of
ineffective assistance, therefore, fails.
6. To the extent Rease contends that the cumulative effect
of errors at his trial requires reversal of his convictions, this claim
also fails. Under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (2020), we must
“consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court
errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient perfor-
mance of counsel.” To establish cumulative error, a defendant
must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course
of the trial” and that “the multiple errors so infected the jury’s
deliberation that they denied the [defendant] a fundamentally
fair trial.” Id. at 21 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Because we assumed error in Division 1 relating to the trial
court’s exclusion of the GPS map and receipts and assumed defi-
ciency in Division 5(c) relating to trial counsel’s failure to timely
serve the State with this evidence, we now consider whether the
cumulative prejudicial impact of these errors requires a new trial.
We concluded above that the trial court’s alleged error and coun-
sel’s presumed deficiency did not contribute to the verdict and
that there was no reasonable probability that the result of Rease’s
trial would have been different in the absence of the presumed
errors. Even considering the combined effect of these presumed
errors, we see no basis for reversal. Rease, therefore, has failed to
establish that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial. See Dick-
erson v. State, 323 Ga. 389, 402 (2026) (“Though we assumed
without deciding the presence of several errors in the course of
[the defendant’s] trial, they each produced very little, if any,
harm, as explained in the respective divisions above.”); Jackson
v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 106–07 (2023) (considering several assumed
errors and finding no cumulative prejudicial impact that would

22
require a new trial).13
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

13 In three of the enumerations of error in Rease’s brief – addressed in
Divisions 2, 3, and 5 above – Rease asks this Court to grant him a new trial “in
accordance with” OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. “Whether to grant a new trial on
the general grounds [OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21] is a decision left to the sole
discretion of the trial court.” See Gines v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S25A1305,
S25A1306, S25A1307, slip op. at 34–35 (Ga. Mar. 12, 2026). Rease does not
argue that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under the general
grounds, and we lack the authority to substitute our discretion for that of the
trial court.

23