In the Matter of Mylee McKinney

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26Y0581
In the Matter of Mylee McKinney

Decided: June 16, 2026

PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is currently before the Court on
the report and recommendation of Special Master Patrick E. Lon-
gan, filed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-214, who recommends that re-
spondent Mylee McKinney (State Bar No. 122143), be disbarred
for her violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 3.2, 8.1(a), and
8.4(a)(4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or
“Rules”) found in Bar Rule 4-102(d), in connection with four client
matters – State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7997,
8001, 8036, and 8037 – contained in two formal complaints. 1 The

1 The Formal Complaint underlying two of the matters, SDBD Nos.
7997 and 8001, has a lengthy history before us. A Notice of Discipline related
to those two matters, along with seven others, was originally filed in this Court
in March 2025, in which the State Bar sought to disbar McKinney without ad-
ditional process because McKinney failed to provide a sworn response to the
Notice of Investigation as required by Bar Rule 4-208.3(b). However, in May
2025, we referred the matter to the Special Master to determine whether
McKinney ought to be deemed to be in default. See S25Y0888 (May 6, 2025
order). Upon referral, the Special Master held a hearing – which McKinney
attended via Zoom – and issued a report in which he determined that McKin-
ney was not in default with respect to 7997 and 8001 because she had previ-
ously filed sworn responses, and, accordingly, those matters were referred to
the State Bar to issue the formal complaint underlying the instant matter. See
In the Matter of McKinney, 323 Ga. 430 (2026). As to the other seven matters,
maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 8.1(a), and
8.4(a)(4) is disbarment, and the maximum penalty for a violation
of Rules 1.4, 1.5, and 3.2 is a public reprimand. McKinney, who is
in default, has not filed any exceptions to the Special Master’s
report and recommendation, and the time has run for her to do
so. See Bar Rule 4-218. Having reviewed the record before us, we
agree that disbarment is appropriate under the facts of this case.
In August 2025, McKinney acknowledged service of the two
formal complaints, but she did not answer them or otherwise re-
spond. Accordingly, the Special Master entered an order granting
the State Bar’s motion for default for failure to answer the formal
complaints in October 2025. As deemed admitted based on her
default, see State Bar Rule 4-212, the Special Master made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to
each disciplinary case.
SDBD No. 7997: In March 2024, a client retained McKin-
ney to appear on his behalf at a hearing scheduled for April 11,
2024, regarding a child custody matter, and paid $5,000 as an in-
itial retainer. The day before the hearing, McKinney and the cli-
ent had a telephone discussion to prepare for the hearing. McKin-
ney told the client that she thought it would be in his best interest
to continue the hearing and engage in settlement negotiations.
The client agreed on the condition that McKinney would request
a new hearing as soon as possible, and a few days later, McKinney
sent the client a parenting plan for him to review and approve.
She then sent him a bill for another $5,000, which the client

after the Special Master determined that McKinney was in partial default as
to some of the alleged Rules violations, we concluded that default should have
been opened in full as to all pending matters and remanded the matters to the
State Bar for it to proceed on all remaining Rules violations pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-208.4, et seq. Id. It appears that these matters remain pending.

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promptly paid. On May 1, the client sent McKinney a text about
the new hearing date, but McKinney was unable to provide one.
On June 17, 2024, the client emailed McKinney about the court
date, but she did not respond. The client then checked the trial
court’s records and discovered that McKinney had not made an
entry of appearance in the case. Two days later, the client emailed
McKinney a copy of an affidavit to which she did not respond. On
July 1, 2024, the client emailed McKinney terminating her as
counsel and requesting a refund. McKinney did not respond to the
request and has not issued a refund.
Based on her default for failing to answer the formal com-
plaints, the Special Master concluded that McKinney admitted to
violating Rules 1.2(a), 2 1.3, 3 1.4, 4 1.5(a), 5 3.2, 6 and 8.4(a)(4). 7
SBDB No. 8001: In September 2023, a client retained

2 Providing that, “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concern-
ing the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
3 Providing that, “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence … means that a law-
yer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully
abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
4 Providing that “[a] lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any
decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent …
is required[]; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which
the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of matter; and (4) promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.”
5 Providing that, “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee[.]”
6 Providing that, “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
7 Providing that it shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “en-
gage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation.”

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McKinney for a family law matter for a flat fee of $2,500. The cli-
ent had frequent issues with McKinney failing to communicate
with her. The client had informed McKinney that her husband
was verbally and mentally abusive and they had three small chil-
dren. The client made multiple appointments to speak with
McKinney on her “Calendly site”; however, McKinney did not ap-
pear at these appointments. The client last heard from McKinney
in July 2024, and in August 2024, she “Googled” McKinney and
learned that her office was permanently closed and her website
was no longer active.
Based on her default, the Special Master concluded that
McKinney violated Rules 1.2(a),1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), and 3.2.
SDBD No. 8036: A client retained McKinney in January
2024 to domesticate a Nevada child custody agreement. In Febru-
ary 2024, McKinney provided the client with a “stamped-filed”
copy of a Petition for Registration of a Foreign Child Custody De-
termination, Modification of Custody and Visitation and Request
for Emergency Hearing (“Petition”). The file stamp purported to
show the Petition was filed in Bryan County on February 8, 2024,
and a specific case number was listed. When the client continued
to have issues communicating with McKinney, she contacted the
Bryan County clerk’s office to check the status of her case and
discovered that the file stamp she was provided with matched an-
other case not related to her matter and which also did not involve
McKinney. The clerk further confirmed that McKinney had not
filed anything on behalf of the client in Bryan County. When the
client confronted McKinney about this, McKinney told the client
that McKinney had made a mistake and refunded her the $2,500
she paid. McKinney’s conduct led to the client being arrested for
not sending her child to her ex-husband for spring break, and the

4
client had to hire another attorney to handle the matter she orig-
inally hired McKinney to handle, as well as a contempt charge.
McKinney responded to the initial Notice of Investigation in this
matter. In her response, she stated that she must have “acci-
dentally clicked into another case’s draft filing and uploaded the
documents,” and that, although the documents were initially ac-
cepted by the court clerk’s office, they were then rejected “due to
me filing the matter into the incorrect case by mistake.” The re-
sponse also included a screenshot of a “PeachCourt” list of cases
for “Mylee McKinney” that included a reference to the client’s case
name with a filing date and time. However, the reference to the
case name was in a different type face and color and did not in-
clude a reference to a case number the way the other five listed
cases did. Further investigation determined that McKinney had
fabricated the pleading with the false file stamp to cause the cli-
ent to believe McKinney had taken appropriate action on her case
when she had not done so.
Based on her default, the Special Master concluded that
McKinney admitted to violating Rules 1.2(a),1.3, 1.4(a), 3.2,
8.1(a), 8 and 8.4(a)(4).
SDBD No. 8037: In 2020, McKinney represented a client in
an uncontested divorce, but the case was dismissed when the cli-
ent and his wife reconciled. In late 2022, the client contacted
McKinney about filing for divorce again, but she was working for
a firm on personal injury matters and so she referred him to an-
other attorney. However, in September 2023 when she left the
firm, the client hired McKinney to take over his divorce. Shortly
after the client engaged her, McKinney stopped communicating
with him. The client’s wife served discovery on the client through

8 Providing that “a lawyer in connection with a … disciplinary matter,
shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]”

5
McKinney, and McKinney did not respond by the discovery dead-
line and failed to respond or otherwise object to the wife’s subse-
quent motion to compel. McKinney then filed a late notice of con-
flict for a hearing scheduled October 30, 2023, asking that the cli-
ent’s matter be continued, but it was not rescheduled. The trial
court then entered a temporary order in the matter on November
8, 2023, and opposing counsel signed for McKinney with express
permission, although the client had not given McKinney permis-
sion to agree to the terms of the temporary order. In December
2023, the trial court granted the client’s wife’s motion to compel
because McKinney had not contested it, and the trial court or-
dered the client and McKinney to respond to the outstanding dis-
covery within 10 days. McKinney failed to notify the client or oth-
erwise respond to the order. The client’s wife filed a motion for
sanctions in January 2024, and in February 2024, the client filed
a request for the withdrawal of McKinney as his counsel. In
March 2024, the court conducted a hearing on the motion for sanc-
tions and McKinney appeared virtually and argued that she had
provided some discovery responses but then admitted that her re-
sponses were not otherwise compliant, and stated that she had
intended to provide more discovery and had intended to withdraw
at the client’s request but did neither. The trial court ordered her
to pay $1,500 in attorney fees and ordered her removed from the
case. In addition, as the client begged McKinney to take action in
the case, McKinney sent texts to the client that were “unprofes-
sional and abusive” and then she eventually stopped communi-
cating with the client altogether and never responded to the griev-
ance.
Based on McKinney’s default, the Special Master found
that she violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2.
After finding these violations, the Special Master looked to

6
the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for determin-
ing the appropriate level of discipline, see In the Matter of Morse,
266 Ga. 652, 653 (1996), and considered the duty violated, McKin-
ney’s mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by her
misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors. See ABA Standard 3.0. Regarding the first three considera-
tions, the Special Master concluded that disbarment was the pre-
sumptive penalty for her: (1) Rule 8.4(a)(4) violations, given her
intentional dishonesty and deceitfulness; (2) Rule 8.1(a) violation
based on her intentional deception in one client matter, which
also caused harm to her client; and (3) Rules 1.3 and 1.2 violations
given that she willfully disregarded her clients’ matters and with-
out just cause abandoned all of her clients and failed to abide by
their direction, causing harm to them. See ABA Standards 4.41
(lack of diligence); 4.61 (lack of candor); 5.11(b) (failure to main-
tain personal integrity); and 6.21 (abuse of the legal process). As
for her Rules 1.5(a), 1.4, and 3.2 violations, the Special Master
determined that McKinney’s retention of client fees, and her fail-
ures regarding communication and to expedite litigation were
negligent, such that the presumptive penalty for these violations
was a reprimand. See ABA Standard 4.43 (lack of diligence); ABA
Standard 6.2 (abuse of the legal process); and ABA Standard 7.3
(duties owed as a professional).
As for aggravating factors, the Special Master determined
that McKinney acted with a dishonest and selfish motive, see
ABA Standard 9.22(b); engaged in a pattern of misconduct in the
representation of all four clients, see ABA Standard 9.22(c); ad-
mitted to committing multiple offenses, ABA Standard 9.22(d);
and refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct
by not responding to the formal complaints. See ABA Standard
9.22(g). In addition, the Special Master found that one of her cli-
ents was a vulnerable victim, see ABA Standard 9.22(h), and that

7
McKinney had displayed indifference to making restitution by not
refunding the fees paid to her, see ABA Standard 9.22(j). 9
The Special Master found that the only mitigating factor
was that McKinney did not have any disciplinary history. See
ABA Standard 9.32(a).
Considering McKinney’s misconduct and the “dominance”
of aggravating factors, the Special Master recommended disbar-
ment. The Special Master noted that McKinney’s violations of
Rule 8.4(a)(4) alone would justify her disbarment, see In the Mat-
ter of West, 300 Ga. 777, 778 (2017) (concluding that Rule 8.4(a)(4)
is “among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be
charged”), and considering this violation in conjunction with her
other violations, the recommendation of disbarment is in accord
with similar cases. See In the Matter of Tuggle, 319 Ga. 687, 697
(2024) (disbarring attorney on State Disciplinary Review Board’s
report and recommendation, who had no prior disciplinary history
for violating Rule 8.4(a)(4) and other Rules, and who caused ac-
tual or potential injury to vulnerable clients, and showed a lack
of remorse); In the Matter of Holliday, 308 Ga. 216, 217–18 (2020)
(disbarring attorney in default on three notices of discipline, who
had substantial experience in the practice of law and no prior dis-
ciplinary history, for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, and
8.4(a)(4)). In addition, the Special Master noted that McKinney’s
violation of Rule 8.1(a) by fabricating a pleading in SDBD No.

9 The Special Master also considered it aggravating that McKinney
fabricated a pleading to the State Disciplinary Board’s investigator to deceive
her into believing that she had taken appropriate action in SDBD No. 8036.
See ABA Standard 9.22(f). However, where an attorney is charged with a vio-
lation of Rule 8.1(a) as was the case here, the Court does not allow the same
actions to be used as an aggravating factor. See, e.g., In the Matter of Hood,
320 Ga. 440, 445 n.15 (2024); In the Matter of Cleveland, 317 Ga. 515, 518 n.13
(2023).

8
8036 also warranted disbarment, especially in conjunction with
her violations of Rule 8.4(a)(4). See In the Matter of David-Vega,
318 Ga. 600, 608–09 (2024) (disbarring attorney on State Disci-
plinary Review Board’s report and recommendation, who submit-
ted fabricated email and text messages during disciplinary pro-
ceedings); In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 417–18 (2022)
(disbarring attorney on State Disciplinary Review Board’s report
and recommendation, for violating Rules 8.1 and 8.4(a)(4), among
other Rules). Finally, the Special Master concluded that McKin-
ney’s pattern of abandoning clients also would, by itself, warrant
disbarment. See, e.g., Cleveland, 317 Ga. at 515 (disbarring attor-
ney in default on two notices of discipline for abandoning eight
clients and defaulting in the disciplinary process); In the Matter
of Greene, 320 Ga. 527 (2024) (disbarring attorney in default on a
notice of discipline for abandoning three clients). In conclusion,
considering the duties McKinney violated, her mental state, the
harm or potential harm she caused to her clients, the aggravating
and mitigating factors, and Georgia case law, the Special Master
recommended disbarment.
Upon our review of the record, we agree with the Special
Master that McKinney violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 3.2,
8.1(a), and 8.4(a)(4) and that disbarment is warranted under the
circumstances of this case. Moreover, the multitude of cases cited
by the Special Master highlight that disbarment is consistent
with the discipline imposed in similar cases.
Accordingly, it is ordered that the name Mylee McKinney
be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in
the State of Georgia. 10 McKinney is reminded of her duties under

10 To the extent any other pending disciplinary matters involving

9
Bar Rule 4-219(b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

McKinney are pending in this Court, see generally supra n.1, they will be
placed on the Court’s inactive docket and held, in the event McKinney elects to
submit an application for reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of
Georgia.

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