GARDEI v. TAYLOR et al.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S25G1209
Carl Gardei
v.
Keybo Taylor, in his individual capacity, et al.
On Writ of Certiorari from the Court of Appeals
No. A25A0336
Argued: April 21, 2026 — Decided: October 14, 2026
LAND, Justice.
In the second appearance of this case before our Court, Ap-
pellant Carl Gardei contends that the Court of Appeals erred
when it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing his fourth
amended petition for declaratory relief. In that petition, Gardei
alleged that the continued enforcement of the statutory require-
ments regarding sex offender registration, OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq.
(“the Registry Act”), violated his constitutional rights and that he
should no longer be required to register as a sex offender. The
trial court dismissed on the ground that the issue presented by
the declaratory judgment action was moot because recent revi-
sions to the Registry Act provided Gardei with the ability to re-
quest removal from the registration requirements of the act. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on different grounds, con-
cluding that Gardei sought an impermissible advisory opinion.
We granted certiorari and, for the reasons that follow, vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. Because the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

2
the basis for the trial court’s ruling, choosing instead to affirm
that ruling on an alternative right-for-any reason basis that we
reject, it should now on remand address the enumerations of error
Gardei raised. If, after doing so, it concludes that the trial court’s
basis for dismissing the declaratory judgment action was in error,
it should vacate the trial court’s dismissal order and direct the
trial court to adjudicate on the merits Gardei’s claim for declara-
tory judgment.
1. Factual Background and Procedural History
Gardei, who was convicted out of state for several sexual
offenses, sought a declaratory judgment concerning his continu-
ing registration obligations after he moved to Georgia. Despite
the uncertainty that he alleged concerning his future obligation,
the trial court dismissed his declaratory judgment action, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
As summarized by the Court of Appeals:
In 1992, Gardei pleaded guilty to a number of of-
fenses in Arizona, including multiple counts each of
kidnapping, attempted sexual assault, and sexual
abuse. After his release from prison in 2003, Gardei
moved to New Mexico, where he was required to reg-
ister as a sex offender for a period of ten years. In
2009, Gardei moved to Georgia. According to Gardei,
he contacted the DeKalb County Sheriff’s Office and
an unnamed deputy advised Gardei that he would
be required to register as a sex offender in Georgia.
On August 12, 2009, Gardei registered as a sex of-
fender in Gwinnett County.
In 2018, Gardei sent a letter to the Gwinnett County

3
sheriff’s department and the GBI, requesting his re-
moval from the sex offender registry. The GBI re-
sponded that he would not be removed from the reg-
istry, alleging that Gardei remained subject to the
requirements of the Registry Act because the crime
of sexual abuse in Arizona has the same or similar
elements as the crime of aggravated assault with the
intent to rape in Georgia, and the crime of sexual as-
sault in Arizona has the same or similar elements as
attempted rape in Georgia.1 The letter further ex-
plained that although Gardei’s Arizona convictions
predated the effective date of Georgia’s sex offender
registry on July 1, 1996, Gardei was released from
prison in Arizona in 2003, when the registry already
was in existence. The GBI, however, advised Gardei
that he could petition a Georgia court for relief pur-
suant to OCGA § 42-1-19, and if granted such relief,
the GBI would comply with the court order.
In October 2018, Gardei filed a petition for declara-
tory relief in the Superior Court of DeKalb County
against R. L. “Butch” Conway, in his official and in-
dividual capacities as the then sheriff of Gwinnett
County; Vernon M. Keenan, in his official and indi-
vidual capacities as the then director of the GBI; and
Attorney General Christopher Carr. In his petition,
Gardei alleged that the respondents’ continued en-
forcement against him of the statutory requirements
governing the Registry Act violated his constitu-
tional rights as: (1) he has never been convicted of a
1 There is no indication in the record that anyone from the Gwinnett
County Sheriff's Office responded to Gardei’s letter.

4
crime in Georgia; (2) he is no longer required to reg-
ister as a sex offender in any other state; (3) he “does
not currently fit any of the definitions of an individ-
ual who is required to register [as a sex offender] un-
der OCGA § 42-1-12 (e)”; (4) he would not have been
required to register as a sex offender if his offenses
of conviction had occurred in Georgia; and (5) a Geor-
gia resident convicted of the same crimes as Gardei’s
1992 Arizona convictions would not be required to
register as a sex offender in Georgia. Gardei sought
a declaration that OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq. is uncon-
stitutional, and that he is not subject to the obliga-
tions imposed on sex offenders under the Registry
Act. Gardei also sought injunctive relief enjoining
further enforcement of the requirements of the Reg-
istry Act against him, as well as an award of attor-
ney fees and costs.
In November 2018, Gardei filed an amended peti-
tion, dropping Carr as a party-defendant. Conway
and Keenan moved to dismiss Gardei’s petition. In
February 2019, Gardei moved to substitute D. Victor
Reynolds in his official and individual capacities as
director of the GBI after Keenan retired from that
position. 	In 	March 	2019, 	Gardei 	filed 	a 	sec-
ond amended petition for declaratory relief against
Conway and Reynolds in their individual capacities
only, which Conway and Reynolds moved to dis-
miss. In May 2019, Gardei filed a third amended pe-
tition, adding allegations concerning injuries sus-
tained from being listed on the registry of sex offend-

5
ers, which Conway and Reynolds also moved to dis-
miss.
In an order dated June 20, 2019, the trial court dis-
missed Gardei’s petition on the ground that his
claims for relief were time-barred under OCGA § 9-
3-33, the two-year statute of limitation for personal
injury claims, because Gardei had initially regis-
tered under the Registry Act in 2009. Th[e] Court [of
Appeals] 	affirmed 	in 	a 	divided 	panel 	opinion.
See Gardei 	v. 	Conway, 	357 	Ga. 	App. 	539
(2020) (“Gardei 	I”). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	granted
Gardei’s petition for certiorari and reversed th[e]
Court[ of Appeal]’s judgment. Gardei v. Conway, 313
Ga. 	132, 	141 	(2022) (“Gardei 	II”). 	Specifically,
the Gardei II Court held that (1) actions brought un-
der the Declaratory Judgment Act were subject to
statutes of limitation, even though the Act did not
include any limitation period; (2) Gardei’s action for
declaratory judgment — arguing that enforcement
of the Registry Act violated his federal and state con-
stitutional rights — was governed by the two-year
limitation period applicable to actions for personal
injury; and (3) his claims seeking prospective declar-
atory relief had not accrued, and thus, the two-year
limitation period governing the action had not begun
to run. Id. at 135-141. On remand, th[e] Court [of
Appeals] adopted the Supreme Court’s opinion as its
own, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and
remanded 	the 	case 	for 	further 	proceedings 	con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. See Gar-
dei v. Conway, 365 Ga. App. 142, 142 (2022) (“Gardei

6
III”).
Upon remand, Gardei filed a “motion to amend par-
ties and then to dismiss former parties.” Gardei
sought to add Michael Register, who replaced Reyn-
olds as Director of the GBI and to dismiss Reynolds
from the suit. The motion likewise sought to dismiss
Conway from the action and add Keybo Taylor, who
had assumed the role of sheriff of Gwinnett County.
The court granted Gardei’s motion. On February 3,
2023, Gardei filed an amended petition (his fourth)
for declaratory relief against Taylor and Register in
their individual capacities, again raising constitu-
tional grounds related to the enforcement of the Reg-
istry Act. Taylor and Register filed separate answers
to the petition. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. In August 2023, Gardei sought
to substitute Chris Hosey for Register as the director
of the GBI. 2
Prior to ruling on the parties’ motions for summary
judgment, the trial court sua sponte dismissed Gar-
dei’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief on
July 2, 2024 as moot.3 The court highlighted that the
revised Registry Act (effective July 1, 2024) now pro-
vides that a person required to register under the
2 Both Gardei and Register agree that Register should not be a party
in this case.
3 The record contains no indication that the trial court ruled on Gar-
dei’s request to substitute Hosey for Register prior to dismissing the action.

7
Registry Act may petition a superior court for re-
lease from registration requirements if the person
[w]as convicted of a sexual offense and required to
register under the laws of another state or territory,
under the laws of the United States, under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, or in a tribal court
and: [h]as completed all prison, parole, supervised
release, and probation for the offense which required
registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 and
meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c) (1)
(A) through (c) (1) (F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2; and
[h]as been removed from the registry in the other
state or territory and can provide the court with doc-
umentation supporting the same.
OCGA § 42-1-19(a)(5)(A)-(B). From this statutory
language, the court reasoned that Gardei now pos-
sesses a statutory vehicle to request removal from
the 	registration 	requirements 	of 	the 	Registry
Act. Gardei filed a motion for reconsideration in the
trial court, but the record on appeal does not contain
a ruling on this motion. Gardei filed a timely notice
of appeal from the court’s July 2, 2024 dismissal or-
der.
Gardei v. Taylor, 375 Ga. App. 402, 403–06 (2025) (“Gardei
IV”).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Gardei’s pe-
tition under the right-for-any reason rule, declining to accept the
trial court’s reliance on the revised Registry Act as a basis for dis-
missal but nonetheless concluding that the action was properly
dismissed because any ruling by the trial court would constitute

8
an improper advisory opinion. As the basis for its holding, the
Court of Appeals relied on the fact that Gardei’s most recent
amended petition only sought “prospective relief”—that he does
not have to comply with the Registry Act’s registry require-
ments—and does not “assert claims based on past renewals of his
registration.” See Gardei IV, 375 Ga. App. at 408. For the reasons
discussed below, the analysis of the Court of Appeals was flawed,
requiring us to vacate its decision and remand the case to it for
further proceedings.
2. Legal Analysis
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”), courts
“are authorized to declare rights and other legal relations of any
interested party petitioning for such declaration in cases of actual
controversy and in any civil case in which the ends of justice so
require.” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 96 (2024) (cleaned
up) (quoting OCGA § 9-4-2(a)–(b)). The Act is to be “liberally con-
strued and administered[,]” and its stated purpose “is to settle
and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status, and other legal relations.” OCGA § 9-4-1. See also
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc., 321 Ga.
771, 791 (2025) (explaining that the “purpose” of the Act is to “re-
move the cloud of uncertainty with regard to the propriety of some
future act or conduct, which is properly incident to [a plaintiff’s]
alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reason-
ably jeopardize his interest” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
A party is entitled to a declaratory judgment if there are
circumstances showing [a] necessity for a determi-
nation of the dispute to guide and protect the plain-
tiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to
the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is
properly incident to his alleged rights and which if

9
taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize
his interest.
Morgan v. Guar. Nat’l Cos., 268 Ga. 343, 344 (1997) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “Thus, to state a claim for declaratory judg-
ment, a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable con-
troversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncer-
tain legal relations.” City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 285 Ga. 231,
234–35 (2009).
Actions for declaratory and injunctive relief necessarily
seek future relief, and that is precisely what Gardei sought in his
petition for declaratory judgment. See Floam, 319 Ga. at 89, 99
(“A request for declaratory relief is a request for prospective re-
lief—relief from the threat of wrongful acts and injuries yet to
come.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). By contrast, “[w]hen
a declaration of rights would not direct the plaintiff’s future con-
duct or would merely determine rights that had already accrued,
relief under the Act is unavailable.” Eternal Vigilance, 321 Ga. at
791 (emphasis supplied). See also Floam, 319 Ga. at 97 (collecting
cases). In other words, “[w]here the rights of the parties have al-
ready accrued and the party seeking the declaratory judgment
does not risk taking future undirected action, a declaratory judg-
ment would be ‘advisory.’” Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210,
214 (1999) (“no declaratory judgment may be obtained which is
merely advisory, or fruitless, or which merely answers a moot or
abstract question” (cleaned up)).
Here, Gardei’s fourth amended petition sought relief from
uncertainty concerning his future obligation to register as a con-
victed sex offender. Rather than defeating his claim for declara-
tory relief, the fact that he sought prospective relief concerning
his future obligation supported that claim. Because Gardei’s
claims show “a necessity for a determination of the dispute to

10
guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity
with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which
is properly incident to his alleged rights and which if taken with-
out direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest,” he has
properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment as to the applica-
bility of the Registry Act. See Baker, 271 Ga. at 214. The Court of
Appeals therefore erred in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of
Gardei’s petition on this basis. Accordingly, we vacate that deci-
sion and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 4 See Hotels.com, 285
Ga. at 237.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All
the Justices concur except Pinson, J., disqualified.
4 We recognize that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dis-
missal under the right-for-any reason rule and therefore did not rule on the
reason given by the trial court for its dismissal of Gardei’s declaratory judg-
ment action. Specifically, the Court of Appeals expressed no opinion concerning
whether the revisions to the Registry Act that were adopted the day before the
trial court’s ruling somehow mooted his claim for declaratory relief. We are
skeptical that the trial court’s dismissal can be upheld on this basis, but we
leave that issue for resolution by the Court of Appeals on remand. If the Court
of Appeals concludes that dismissal was not authorized by these revisions, it
should vacate the trial court’s dismissal order and remand the case to the trial
court with direction that it adjudicate Gardei’s claim for declaratory relief on
the merits. We express no opinion on the merits of Gardei’s underlying declar-
atory judgment action.