Brown v. Marshall et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
CARL EDWARD BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, DEAN
MARSHALL, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:21-cv-000057-RRB
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Carl Edward Brown, representing himself, filed a Prisoner’s Complaint
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an Application to Waive
Prepayment of the Filing fee, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 Mr. Brown claims that, in
2013, Defendants violated his right to “due process upon an illegal taking of
property, i.e., funds,” when he was transferred from Hudson Correctional Facility
in Colorado, to Spring Creek Correctional Center in Alaska, refusing to reimburse
him for shipping costs through their procedures, and that Defendants’ “collective
failures allowed Plaintiff’s property to be taken in the absence of due process.”2
He sought compensatory damages of $7,500, and punitive damages of $225,000.3
1 Dockets 1, 5, 7.
2 Docket 1 at 3.
3 Id. at 9.
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The Court screened the Complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B),4 and permitted Mr. Brown to show that the 2-year statute of
limitations in his case should be tolled.5
Mr. Brown has filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause, stating
that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he was in the process of
exhausting his remedies in the Alaska state courts, and the Supreme Court for the
State of Alaska denied his Petition for Rehearing on May 14, 2020.6
DISCUSSION
Mr. Brown may not re-litigate the claims or issues he raised or could
have raised in his state court proceedings, as to the same procedures and costs
for shipping his property, when he was transferred from Colorado to Alaska.
Mr. Brown has attached the denial of his Petition for Rehearing to the Alaska
Supreme Court in Brown v. Department of Corrections, Case Number S-16870, to
his Response to the Order to Show Cause.7
4 	See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b); see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)) (liberal construction of
pro se pleadings).
5 Docket 8; see Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht
v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)) (permitting pro se plaintiff to cure deficiencies in
pleadings, unless futile); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (“Section 1983 . . . looks to
the law of the State in which the cause of action arose . . . for the length of the statute of limitations:
It is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.”) (citations omitted); Alaska Stat.
§ 09.10.070.
6 Docket 9.
7 Docket 9-1.
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In its October 2019 decision in Brown v. Department of Corrections,
No. 	S-16870, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	for 	the 	State 	of 	Alaska 	stated 	that, 	“[i]n
September 2013 Brown was transferred from Hudson Correctional Facility in
Colorado to Alaska’s Spring Creek Correctional Center [and] sought to ship three
boxes of his property from Hudson to Spring Creek at DOC’s expense . . . . Brown
[pre]paid for three shipments at a total cost of $105.58. 	In October 2013 Brown
requested reimbursement for his shipping costs.”8 	When the DOC denied the
request 	for 	reimbursement, 	Mr. 	Brown 	unsuccessfully 	challenged 	the 	denial
through prison administrative channels.9
In December 2014 Brown, self-represented, filed a
complaint in superior court. 	Brown named several DOC
employees 	as 	defendants. 	He 	again 	sought
reimbursement for his shipping costs, but he also sought
“compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the
unlawful and unconstitutional deprivation of [his] property
in the absence of due process.”
Brown struggled to serve process on the named
employees. 	Eventually 	he 	amended 	his 	complaint,
naming DOC as the lone defendant. 	The amended
complaint 	was 	directed 	against 	“the 	above-named
defendant and its officers in their personal and official
capacities,” but it was substantively identical to the earlier
version.
DOC moved to dismiss Brown’s complaint. 	While
the motion to dismiss was pending, Brown moved for
summary judgment. 	After Brown moved for summary
8 Brown v. Department of Corrections, No. S-16870, 2019 WL 5588810 at *1 (Alaska Oct. 30,
2019) (unpublished).
9 Id.
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judgment, DOC reimbursed Brown’s inmate account for
the full amount of the shipping costs. It then opposed his
motion 	and 	filed 	its 	own 	cross-motion 	for 	summary
judgment. DOC argued that the reimbursement rendered
Brown’s claim moot.10
Mr. Brown’s motion for summary judgment was denied, the DOC’s
cross-motion was granted, and Mr. Brown
moved to supplement his briefing to establish that he still
had live claims against the named employees. The court
denied his motion, ruling that even if it construed Brown’s
complaint 	to 	include 	the 	named 	employees 	as
defendants it would still conclude that he had “presented
no factual claims, evidence, or legal theory countering
[DOC’s] assertions that qualified discretionary function
immunity shield[ed] the employees from civil liability.”11
Although unfortunate that the DOC reimbursed Mr. Brown for shipping
costs only after he filed a motion for summary judgment in his state civil case, the
legal doctrine of res judicata applies in the current case. 	When a final judgment
has been entered, res judicata prevents a plaintiff from maintaining a new lawsuit,
seeking 	to 	raise 	the 	same 	claims 	against 	the 	same 	defendants 	that 	were
addressed in the first case.12
10 Id. at *1-*2 (paragraph numbering omitted) (noting, “DOC reiterates this argument on appeal.
We elect to reach the merits of this case without deciding whether DOC’s unilateral action could
render Brown’s claim moot.” Id. at *2, n.3).
11 Id. at *2 (paragraph numbering omitted).
12 See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dept. of State, 673 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies only where there is ‘(1) an identity of
claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.’”) (internal citation
omitted).
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Mr. Brown appealed the grant of summary judgment to the DOC,
arguing that the named employees are the “real parties
in interest,” that he has “established a due process claim
of constitutional magnitude,” that he is entitled to punitive
damages, and that his claims are not moot. The question
whether Brown intelligently ceded his claims against
DOC is not before us; neither is the question whether the
named 	employees 	actually 	remained 	parties 	to 	the
litigation because the superior court 	determined that
Brown’s claims would fail even if he had preserved them
against the named employees.13
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling:
“[O]fficials 	being 	sued 	in 	their 	private 	capacity 	for
discretionary acts performed as part of their official duties
are 	protected 	by 	at 	least 	qualified 	immunity.” 	To
overcome 	qualified 	immunity, 	not 	only 	must 	a
constitutional violation be found, but also the plaintiff
must show that “the right allegedly violated was ‘clearly
established,’ which occurs where the ‘contours of the
right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable 	official
would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.’” 	Even if Brown could establish that the named
employees misread the relevant Policies and Procedures
and that their interpretation impaired his constitutional
rights, the record contains no evidence that they had any
reason to be aware of this alleged constitutional violation.
Again, 	bare 	allegations 	of 	“flagrant” 	conduct 	do 	not
suffice 	to 	overcome 	the 	protection 	of 	qualified
immunity.14
Mr. Brown has previously had the chance to litigate his claims, as he
admits in his Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, when he explains
13 Brown v. DOC, 2019 WL 5588810 at *2.
14 Id. at *3.
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that he “exhausted” his remedies in the state courts.15 Because this Court is not a
court of appeals for state court decisions, the Court may not address Mr. Brown’s
formerly litigated case.16 	The proper court to obtain review of a final state court
decision is the United States Supreme Court.17
Further, a litigant “cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by
alleging conduct by the defendant not alleged in his prior action[s] or by pleading
a new legal theory.”18 	Thus, permitting Mr. Brown to file an amended pleading
would be futile. 	As explained by the Supreme Court, res judicata “is not based
solely on the defendant’s interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit,
but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.”19
15 Docket 9 at 2 (“The time for federal appeal was not available until Plaintiff exhausted all possible
state remedies.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (requiring exhaustion of “the remedies available in
the courts of the State” before bringing a petition for habeas corpus in federal court).
16 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review . . . of those judgments”); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923) (“The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”); D.C. Ct. of Apps. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review
final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.”).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1257; see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] federal district
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of
a state court. The United States Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear
such an appeal.”).
18 McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
19 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (citation omitted).
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that a complaint may be
dismissed when it “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.”20 Such
is the case here.
If for any reason Mr. Brown is not barred from re-litigating the case he
lost in the state courts, then the statute of limitations has run. 	That is, if he is not
attempting to re-litigate or appeal his state court case, then the two-year statute of
limitations ran when Mr. Brown completed exhausting his administrative remedies
at the prison in 2014.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. 	This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Any outstanding motions are DENIED as moot.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment accordingly.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2021 at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Ralph R. Beistline
RALPH R. BEISTLINE
Senior United States District Judge
20 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former § 1915(d))
(quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988), and citing Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 30 (1992) (recognizing Congress’s concern that “a litigant whose filing fees and court
costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits”) (quotation omitted)); but see Headwaters,
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A court may, sua sponte,
dismiss a case on preclusion grounds ‘where the records of that court show that a previous action
covering the same subject matter and parties had been dismissed.’ . . . However, ‘[w]here no
judicial resources have been spent on the resolution of a question, trial courts must be cautious
about raising a preclusion bar sua sponte, thereby eroding the principle of party presentation so
basic to our system of adjudication.’”) (quoting Evarts v. W. Metal Finishing Co., 253 F.2d 637,
639 n.1 (9th Cir.1958) (emphasis added), and Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. at 412–13).
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