Rancourt et al v. Bolger et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
LOREN RANCOURT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HON. CHIEF JUSTICE JOEL
BOLGER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:21-cv-00189-JMK
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS
Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	At Docket 19 is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Michael
Shaffer; at Docket 22 is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Joel Bolger, Gregory Miller,
Pamela Washington, Heather Fuentes, and Ryan Montgomery-Sythe; and at Docket 27 is
a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Municipality of Anchorage (“the Municipality”).
Mr. Rancourt filed a combined opposition at Docket 30.1 	Defendants Shaffer and the
Municipality replied at Docket 33. Defendants Bolger, Miller, Washington, Fuentes, and
Montgomery-Sythe replied at Docket 34. Mr. Rancourt filed a “Supplementary Exhibit”
1 Mr. Rancourt filed a Notice at Docket 31 acknowledging that his opposition violated the
Local Rules, in particular for being overlength. 	The Court appreciates the Notice and accepts
Mr. Rancourt’s opposition as filed regardless of those violations.
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at Docket 38. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss at
Dockets 19, 22, and 27.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Loren Rancourt, representing himself, filed his First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) on October 15, 2021, in which he alleges various civil rights violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by persons involved in state court cases in which he was or is a party.2
For all defendants and claims, Mr. Rancourt’s FAC states that “the policy or custom of this
official’s government agency violates my rights, and I seek injunctive relief,” and he
appears to name these defendants in their official capacity.3 	However, Mr. Rancourt
requests monetary damages, in addition to “an order requiring defendant(s) to void 3AN-
18-00830CI, S-1777, cease prosecution (3AN-18-11635CR), void 3AN-18-06027CI, [and]
cease removing children under 25.24.150(G)(H).”4 He also requests declaratory relief that
“[AS] 25.24.150(G)(H) violates rights (criminal punishments, due process, indentured
servitude, life, liberty, happiness)” and seeks revisions to various municipal and state laws.5
The Court takes judicial notice6 of several state court matters relevant to
Mr. Rancourt’s FAC:
2 See 	generally 	Docket 	9. 	The 	Court 	previously 	dismissed 	without 	prejudice
Mr. Rancourt’s original Complaint. See Dockets 1; 5.
3 Docket 9 at 1–3.
4 Id. at 30–31.
5 Id. at 31.
6 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without
requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact. . . .” B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019); see also Foster Poultry Farms v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., 868 F. Supp.
2d 983, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of publicly available records
. . . from other court proceedings.”) (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (additional citation omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
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(1) 	An 	active 	criminal 	case, 	3AN-18-11635CR, 	in 	which
Mr. Rancourt is charged with violating a domestic violence protective order, failure
to appear, and making false statements under oath (“the pending criminal case”);7
(2) 	Four petitions for review and one petition for hearing seeking
appellate review of judicial actions in his pending criminal case, all of which were
denied;8
(3) 	A consolidated appeal in the Alaska Supreme Court (“the civil
appeal”) that upheld two civil orders: one granting a long-term domestic violence
protective order against him (3AN-18-00830CI) (“domestic violence case”), and
one awarding sole custody of Mr. Rancourt’s child to the child’s mother and
ordering Mr. Rancourt to pay child support (3AN-18-06027CI) (“child custody
case”).9
Mr. Rancourt’s first three claims are against the Municipality and the
Municipal 	Prosecutor, 	Michael Shaffer, for 	prosecuting 	the pending criminal case.
Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendant Shaffer violated his “right to life, liberty, and security
of persons” by filing charges against him in state court.10 He alleges that Defendant Shaffer
7 Mun. of Anchorage v. Rancourt, 3AN-18-11635CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 4, 2018).
8 Rancourt v. Mun. of Anchorage, No. A13591 (Alaska Ct. App. April 16, 2020);
Rancourt v. Mun. of Anchorage, No. A13532 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2019); Rancourt v. Mun.
of Anchorage, No. A13531 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2019); Rancourt v. Mun. of Anchorage,
No. A13502 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2019); and Rancourt v. Mun. of Anchorage, No. S17671
(Alaska Feb. 4, 2020).
9 See Loren R. v. Sharnel V., No. S-17198, 2020 WL 4200124 (Alaska July 22, 2020).
The Court understands Mr. Rancourt’s reference to “S-1777” in his Complaint as referring to the
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment issued in this appeal, which was listed as “MO&J No. 1777.”
10 Docket 9 at 4–5.
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violated his due process rights by “conspir[ing] with [Defendant Ryan Montgomery-Sythe]
to prevent Plaintiff from access to court” when Defendant Shaffer filed perjury charges
against Mr. Rancourt on “information he knew to be false,” namely, financial documents
that Mr. Rancourt provided to the court clerk.11 	Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendant
Shaffer violated his “right to life” by filing failure to appear charges against him when he
missed a pretrial hearing due to “a stay home advisory” after the 2018 earthquake.12
Mr. Rancourt asserts a claim against the Municipality by alleging that “[t]he policy or
custom of [Defendant Shaffer’s] government agency violates my rights,”13 and includes
the Municipality as “Defendant Shaffer’s agency” in his claims against Defendant
Shaffer.14 Specifically, Mr. Rancourt alleges that “Defendant Shaffer’s agency schemes to
conceal a parent’s right to protect children in not providing an emergency exception to
AMC 8.30.105(A)(1),” which is the statute under which Defendant Shaffer charged him
with violating a civil protective order.15
Mr. Rancourt’s fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, fourteenth, fifteenth,
sixteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth claims are against Alaska Superior Court Judge
Gregory Miller and relate to Mr. Rancourt’s child custody case, which was ultimately
upheld in the civil appeal. 	Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendant Miller violated his
“criminal process” rights by making a finding of domestic violence in Mr. Rancourt’s child
11 Id. at 6.
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id. at 2.
14 Id. at 4–5.
15 Id. at 5.
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custody case and by “coercing plaintiff to testify without: counsel, notice, or witnesses.”16
He alleges that Defendant Miller violated his “right to freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment” by ordering Mr. Rancourt’s child to be “removed for at least 9 months” and
requiring conditions for supervised visitation.17 In multiple counts, Mr. Rancourt alleges
that Defendant Miller violated his due process rights by making “a paternity declaration
without any notice to Plaintiff” and “order[ing] child support with contested paternity”;18
holding a custody hearing without adequate notice of the allegations against him and
“schem[ing] to prevent affirmative defenses” in the child custody case;19 and “seiz[ing] a
child without a probable cause hearing.”20 He alleges that Defendant Miller violated his
“freedom from indentured servitude” by ordering child support payments.21 	He alleges
that Defendant Miller violated his “freedom of speech” when he “found protected speech
to be ‘Domestic Violence,’ having no authority to find D.V.: 	without 6th amendment
protections, using a low evidentiary standard,” that is, when Defendant Miller admitted
Mr. Rancourt’s text messages as evidence against him.22 He alleges that Defendant Miller
violated his “freedom from unreasonable seizures” when he “unreasonably seized a child
until the ‘Domestic Violence’ intervention is paid and completed,” and ordered that
Mr. Rancourt complete a class that cost $1,800.23 	He alleges that Defendant Miller
16 Id. at 8.
17 Id. at 9–10.
18 Id. at 11.
19 Id. at 14–15.
20 Id. at 16.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Id. at 25.
23 Id. at 26.
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violated his “freedom from invasion of privacy” when he “ordered every interaction
between Plaintiff and minor child be monitored, in person, by a third party supervisor.”24
He alleges that Defendant Miller violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution when he “issued criminal punishments based on his ‘guilty’ conviction,”
while he was “in criminal trials, had been imprisoned, and faced further criminal
prosecution.”25
Mr. Rancourt’s seventh claim is against former Alaska Supreme Court Chief
Justice Joel Bolger. Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendant Bolger violated his due process
rights by “void[ing] an entire record of preserved legal arguments with no authority to do
so,” “consipir[ing] to aid fraudulent concealment” by suppressing evidence, and “forc[ing]
litigants in criminal hearings to testify in civil hearings” in Mr. Rancourt’s civil appeal
before the Alaska Supreme Court.26
Mr. Rancourt’s tenth and twelfth claims are against Anchorage District Court
Judge Pamela Washington and again relate to his child custody case, which ultimately was
upheld in the civil appeal. He alleges that Defendant Washington violated his right to “life,
liberty and security of persons” by “order[ing] a minor child to the sole care of Sharnel
Vale,” despite Mr. Rancourt’s concerns of “child neglect or abuse occurring in Sharnel
Vale’s home,” and by “conspir[ing] with Defendant Fuentez and Miller to prevent Plaintiff
presenting legitimate safety concerns of minor child to the court.”27 	He alleges that
24 Id. at 27.
25 Id. at 29.
26 Id. at 12–13.
27 Id. at 17.
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Defendant Washington violated his due process rights when she “removed a minor child
from Plaintiff’s care in a hearing without discovery (fraudulent concealment).”28
Mr. Rancourt’s eleventh and eighteenth claims are against state court clerk
Ryan Montgomery-Sythe and relate to processing paperwork that Mr. Rancourt attempted
to file with the Alaska court system. 	He alleges that Defendant Montgomery-Sythe
violated his due process rights when he “returned petitions with no authority to do so,” and
erroneously “demanded financial disclosures to Plaintiff in order to gain access to the Court
of Appeals.”29 	He alleges that 	Defendant 	Montgomery-Sythe violated the Fourth
Amendment when he “ordered a search of Plaintiffs’ finances before he could be heard in
the Court of Appeals,” in violation of “Appellate Rule 209(b).”30
Finally, Mr. Rancourt’s thirteenth claim is against state court clerk Heather
Fuentes and again relates to processing Mr. Rancourt’s filings with the Alaska court
system. He alleges that Defendant Fuentes violated his right to due process by withholding
petitions, motions, and evidence.31 	Specifically, he alleges that she “withheld petitions
until Plaintiff was served a DVPO order,” “sent back petitions . . . as being under ‘the
wrong case number,’” and sent back his notice of appeal.32
28 Id. at 20.
29 Id. at 19.
30 Id. at 28.
31 Id. at 22.
32 Id. at 22–23.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss
a complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This means
that the facts alleged by the complaint do not amount to a claim under any cognizable legal
theory.33 To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain enough facts that, if
taken as true, would state a legal claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”34 As such,
the Court assumes that the facts alleged in the complaint are true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.35 	“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court
may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the
complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”36 	However, conclusory
statements, unwarranted inferences, and naked assertions of law will not suffice; “they
must be supported by factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss.37
Overall, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “if it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”38 	A court may dismiss a complaint based on an affirmative defense, but
only if “the defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the
33 Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015).
34 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
35 Id. (quoting Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012)).
36 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007).
37 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.
38 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Loc. 341 v. Main Bldg. Maint., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d
995, 1000 (D. Alaska 2020) (quoting Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912,
923 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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complaint.”39 In this situation, a motion to dismiss will only be granted if the affirmative
defense “raises no disputed issues of fact.”40
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint is based on the actions of prosecutors, judges, and
court personnel that were taken as part of their official duties. 	As such, Defendants are
immune from Mr. Rancourt’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Rancourt’s
request for injunctive relief as it relates to the actions of the judges and court personnel is
barred by the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Last, Mr. Rancourt’s request for injunctive
relief is barred by both the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines.
A. 	Defendants Bolger, Miller, and Washington are Entitled to Absolute Judicial
Immunity
Mr. Rancourt has brought claims against judges with whom he disagrees.
However, judges and those performing judge-like functions have absolute immunity from
42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage suits for judicial acts.41 Since 1872, the Court has recognized
that in order to ensure the proper administration of justice, a judge “in exercising the
authority vested in him, be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
39 ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sams
v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he assertion of an affirmative defense
may be considered properly on a motion to dismiss where the allegations in the complaint suffice
to establish the defense.”)).
40 Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
41 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (holding that judge’s order
authorizing sterilization of 15-year-old girl without her knowledge was unconstitutional, but judge
was immune from suit because order was a judicial act); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.4
(9th Cir. 1985) (“Judicial immunity is not limited to judges. 	All those who perform judge-like
functions are immune from civil damages liability.”) (citations omitted).
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personal consequences to himself.”42 A judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority;
rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all
jurisdiction.”43 To wit, absolute judicial immunity applies “no matter how erroneous the
[alleged] 	act 	may 	have 	been, 	how 	injurious 	its 	consequences, 	how 	informal 	the
proceedings, or how malicious the motive.”44
Thus, a judge only lacks immunity if (1) the alleged acts were non-judicial
in nature, and (2) the judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”45 Both prongs
of this test are construed in favor of immunity.46 To determine if a given action is judicial,
the court will analyze whether:
(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events
occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered
around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events
at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation
with the judge in his or her official capacity.47
To determine if the judge acted within jurisdiction, the court will analyze “whether the
judge was acting clearly beyond the scope of subject matter jurisdiction in contrast to
personal jurisdiction.”48
42 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872); see also Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,
1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the
jurisdiction of their courts.”) (citing id.).
43 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351).
44 Trapp v. State, 53 P.3d 1128, 1130 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d
1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)).
45 O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Stump, 435
U.S. at 356–57).
46 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076.
47 Id. at 1075–76.
48 Id. at 1076.
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Here, Mr. Rancourt alleges conduct that is clearly judicial and under the state
court’s jurisdiction. 	His claims against Judge Miller and Judge Washington, described
above, all involve specific findings and actions taken by each Judge as the presiding official
in Mr. Rancourt’s child custody case and/or domestic violence case. The Alaska Superior
Court and the Alaska District Court have subject matter jurisdiction over these cases.49
The claims against Chief Justice Bolger challenge his findings and conduct in Mr.
Rancourt’s civil appeal. 	The Alaska Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over Mr.
Rancourt’s child custody case and domestic violence case.50 	The findings of judges in
cases which they preside over are, definitionally, “normal judicial function[s],” and here,
the decisions by Judge Washington, Judge Miller, and Justice Bolger were clearly issued
under the proper jurisdiction of the Alaska District Court, Alaska Superior Court, and
Alaska Supreme Court, respectively.51
Even Mr. Rancourt’s various conspiracy allegations—assuming they are
true—would be considered judicial acts within the court’s jurisdiction. 	In Ashelman v.
Pope, the Ninth Circuit overruled its previous decision in Beard v. Udall that held a judge
liable for conspiring to incarcerate a defendant.52 In overruling that case, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the “ultimate act” produced by the conspiracy was a temporary restraining order,
49 See Alaska Stat. § 22.10.020; Alaska Stat. § 22.15.030; see also New Alaska Dev. Corp.
v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding judicial immunity in divorce case
because Alaska state courts are courts of general jurisdiction and may preside over divorce
proceedings).
50 See Alaska R. App. P. 520.
51 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075; New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1302.
52 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 (overruling Beard v. Udall, 648 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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which was judicial in nature because the court had jurisdiction to grant such an order.53
Here, Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendants Miller, Washington, and Bolger conspired to
violate his rights by holding a hearing without notice, making certain evidentiary findings
that suppressed evidence, and making findings in the case that otherwise prevented his
ability to be heard.54 Here, like in Beard, the “ultimate acts” that resulted from the alleged
conspiracies were judicial in nature and within the courts’ jurisdictions.55
Because Defendants Miller, Washington, and Bolger are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity, Mr. Rancourt’s claims for damages against them are DISMISSED.
B. 	Defendants Fuentes and Montgomery-Sythe are Entitled to Absolute Judicial
Immunity as Court Clerks
Absolute judicial immunity extends to those persons appointed by the court
to “administer the affairs of litigants.”56 Court officials “who act at the behest of a judge
or pursuant to a court order are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit as to
those actions.”57 This includes the clerk of court and deputy clerks through whom filing
petitions or other court documents is done.58
Mr. Rancourt alleges that Defendants Fuentes and Montgomery-Sythe
violated his rights by incorrectly processing various filings or other paperwork in his state
court cases. His allegations directly stem from Defendants’ actions in the course of their
53 Id. at 1077.
54 See “Background,” supra at 4–6.
55 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 (“We therefore hold that a conspiracy between judge and
prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper,
nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors.”).
56 New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989).
57 Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted) (collecting cases).
58 Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).
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employment as court clerks.59 Thus, they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because
they acted as agents of the court and were operating under the court’s proper subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Rancourt’s various state court cases.
Because Defendants Fuentes and Montgomery-Sythe are entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial 	immunity, 	Mr. 	Rancourt’s 	claims 	for 	damages 	against 	them 	are
DISMISSED.
C. 	Mr. Rancourt Cannot Bring a Claim for Injunctive Relief Based on the Actions
of Defendants Bolger, Miller, Washington, Fuentes, and Montgomery-Sythe
In addition to monetary damages, Mr. Rancourt requests that this Court
“void” the civil judgments in 3AN-19-00830CI, 3AN-18-06027CI, and the consolidated
civil appeal that upheld those decisions.60 	This request for relief relates to his claims
against Justice Bolger, Judge Miller, and Judge Washington, and potentially relates to his
claims against the court clerks, Defendant Montgomery-Sythe and Defendant Fuentes. He
also requests that the Court “cease prosecution” in his pending criminal case, which also
potentially relates to his claims against Defendant Montgomery-Sythe and Defendant
Fuentes.61
Any request for injunctive relief as it relates to Defendants Bolger, Miller,
Washington, Fuentes, and Montgomery-Sythe is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the
59 See “Background,” supra at 7.
60 Docket 9 at 30–31.
61 The Court is unsure whether the conduct alleged in claims eleven, thirteen, and eighteen
against Defendants Montgomery-Sythe and Fuentes relate to filings in Mr. Rancourt’s civil or
criminal cases. The Court’s analysis is unaffected, since any claims for injunctive relief against
judicial actions taken by judicial officers are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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statute states that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Mr. Rancourt has
not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable.
Thus, he cannot bring an action for injunctive relief against these Defendants because, as
discussed, those claims are predicated on actions taken by judicial officers in their official,
judicial capacity.
As such, Mr. Rancourt’s claims for injunctive relief based on the actions of
Defendants Bolger, Washington, Fuentes, and Montgomery-Sythe are DISMISSED.
D. 	Defendant Shaffer is Entitled to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, and Any
Claim Against Him for Malicious Prosecution First Requires a Favorable
Ruling
Mr. Rancourt names Municipal Prosecutor Michael Shaffer as a defendant
for bringing charges against him with which he disagrees. 	Prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct that is “intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”62 The focus of this inquiry is the nature
or function of the prosecutor’s activity,63 and like judicial immunity, prosecutorial
immunity is broadly construed.64 	The Supreme Court has decided that “acts undertaken
by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial”—
including “evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial”—are
62 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975
(9th Cir. 2005).
63 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
64 Id. at 1078.
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entitled to absolute immunity.65 Similarly, “[w]here a prosecutor acts as an advocate ‘in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case,’ absolute immunity applies.”66
Thus, Defendant Shaffer is not a proper defendant in this case. 	The Ninth
Circuit overruled its previous decision in Beard v. Udall that held a prosecutor liable for
filing charges that he or she knew to be “baseless.”67 	In overruling that case, the Ninth
Circuit noted that although the prosecutor initiated a prosecution unauthorized by law, “he
had performed a quintessentially prosecutorial act—filing criminal charges” and should
have been immune.68 Here, Mr. Rancourt claims that Defendant Shaffer violated his rights
when he filed three separate criminal charges against him. 	This is precisely the type of
conduct that is protected by prosecutorial immunity, and Defendant Shaffer enjoys
immunity from Mr. Rancourt’s claims for damages.
The Court liberally construes Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint as including a claim
for malicious prosecution under the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.
However, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, a
plaintiff must show that: 	(1) the defendant initiated charges against the plaintiff without
probable cause; (2) the malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure; and (3) the prosecution
65 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009) (immunity applied where a prosecutor’s administrative error in the
plaintiff’s specific criminal trial constituted an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim).
66 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431).
67 Id. at 1078 (overruling Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1981)).
68 Id. at 1077.
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did not end in a conviction. 69 Because Mr. Rancourt’s criminal case is pending, he cannot
bring a claim for malicious prosecution.
Mr. 	Rancourt’s 	claims 	for 	damages 	against 	Defendant 	Shaffer 	are
DISMISSED.
E. 	The Younger Abstention Doctrine Bars Mr. Rancourt’s Claims that Relate to
his Pending Criminal Case
Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint attacks certain findings and actions in his pending
criminal case. In addition to monetary damages, he requests that this Court issue an “order
requiring defendant(s) to cease prosecution” in his pending criminal case.70 This request
for relief relates to his claims against Defendants Shaffer and the Municipality, and
potentially relates to his claims against Defendant Montgomery-Sythe and Defendant
Fuentes.71
A federal court will not issue an order that interferes with a pending state
criminal 	proceeding 	except 	in 	extraordinary 	circumstances, 	“where 	the 	danger 	of
irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”72 	This is called the Younger abstention
doctrine. Younger applies when:
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the
proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an
69 Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. ___, No. 20-259, slip op. at 5–6 (2021); see also id. at 10–
11 (Alito, J. dissenting).
70 Docket 9 at 31.
71 See Docket 9 at 4–7, 19, 22–23, 28. The Court is unsure whether the conduct alleged in
claims eleven, thirteen, and eighteen against Defendants Montgomery-Sythe and Fuentes relate to
filings in Mr. Rancourt’s civil or criminal cases. 	If the conduct relates to his civil cases, those
claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, discussed below.
72 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971); see also Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918
F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A federal court may abstain under Younger in three categories
of cases: (1) parallel, pending state criminal proceedings . . .”).
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adequate 	opportunity 	in 	the 	state 	proceedings 	to 	raise
constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to
enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state
judicial proceeding.”73
The Younger abstention doctrine applies both to claims for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and claims for injunctive and declarative relief.74
Here, Mr. Rancourt seeks direct federal intervention in his pending criminal
case via an injunction to enjoin the case, an award of damages, and a declaration that an
emergency exception is constitutionally required to the laws under which he was charged.
He pleads that he is innocent of his perjury charge, pleads an affirmative defense to his
failure to appear charge, and challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which he
was charged with violating a civil protective order.75 This is precisely the situation where
federal intervention is unwarranted under Younger: 	(1) the state criminal proceeding is
ongoing; (2) the state has an important interest in prosecuting violations of its own court
orders; (3) Mr. Rancourt can adequately raise his constitutional challenges in the state
proceedings; 	and 	(4) 	his 	requested 	relief 	would 	directly 	enjoin 	the 	proceedings.76
Mr. Rancourt had not pleaded any danger of great and immediate irreparable harm that
would make abstention inappropriate, and he does not argue that the statute is facially
73 Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2019).
74 Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 	In general, a claim for
damages will be stayed under Younger rather than dismissed; however, a court still may dismiss
the claim when dismissal is indicated for some other reason. 	“A damages claim that is plainly
frivolous, for example, might not save an action.” Id. at 982 n.18.
75 Docket 9 at 4–7.
76 See Page, 932 F.3d at 901–02; see also Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th
Cir. 2021) (finding that Younger factors were satisfied in challenge to pending state court murder
proceeding).
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unconstitutional.77 He is not in custody or otherwise subject to a deprivation of physical
liberty.78 	If Mr. Rancourt’s case proceeds to trial and he is acquitted of the charges, his
rights will be fully vindicated. Mr. Rancourt’s allegations suggest that Defendants had a
reasonable basis to pursue the charges against him—indeed, Mr. Rancourt states that the
perjury charges against him were based on documents that Mr. Rancourt provided the court
clerk, that he violated the civil protective order (but that he was justified in doing so), and
that he failed to appear due to an emergency stay-at-home order.79 While being subject to
double jeopardy may give rise to great and irreparable harm, Mr. Rancourt’s claim that he
was subject to “double jeopardy” because Defendant Miller considered Mr. Rancourt’s
criminal charges during the child custody case is legally baseless, even assuming the
Complaint’s factual allegations are true.80
In short, Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint appears to purely be a collateral attack
on his pending criminal case in state court. This Court will not issue an order that interferes
with the pending state criminal when Mr. Rancourt has an adequate opportunity to present
those constitutional challenges during his state court proceedings and does not face
irreparable harm.
Mr. Rancourt’s claims relating to his pending criminal case are DISMISSED.
77 See World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding that an exception to abstention applies “under extraordinary circumstances
where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate” or when the statute is “flagrantly
and patently violative” of the Constitution).
78 See Bean, 986 F.3d at 1134.
79 Docket 9 at 4–7.
80 See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995) (explaining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishing a defendant twice for the same criminal offense).
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F. 	The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Mr. Rancourt’s Claims that Relate to his
Civil Appeal
Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint attacks certain findings and actions in three closed
civil proceedings in state court: one case granting a long-term domestic violence protective
order against him; one case awarding sole custody of Mr. Rancourt’s child to the child’s
mother and ordering Mr. Rancourt pay child support; and the consolidated appeal in the
Alaska Supreme Court that upheld those two orders. 	In addition to monetary damages,
Mr. Rancourt requests an order requiring Defendants to “void” those decisions.81 He also
challenges the constitutionality of Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(G)–(H), which establishes a
presumption against awarding child custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence,
and 	requests 	an 	order 	requiring 	Defendants 	to 	“cease 	removing 	children 	under
25.24.150(G)(H)” and declaratory relief that the statute is unconstitutional.82
The 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	“prohibits 	a 	federal 	district 	court 	from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court
judgment.”83 A de facto appeal has occurred “when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her
injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state
court judgment.”84 	If the plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal, then Rooker-Feldman
81 Docket 9 at 30–31.
82 Id. at 31.
83 Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
84 Id. at 1140 (finding that allegations of extrinsic fraud committed by adverse party on
the state court was not a de facto appeal because it was not an error by the state court); see also
Ismail v. Cnty. of Orange, 693 Fed. App’x 507, 510 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that allegations of
extrinsic fraud that the state court had already addressed were barred by Rooker-Feldman).
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dictates that the district court cannot review any issues presented in the suit that are
“inextricably intertwined” with the de facto appeal.85
Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is generally a narrow exception to
this Court’s jurisdiction, here, it undoubtedly bars Mr. Rancourt’s claim. Mr. Rancourt’s
allegations against Defendants Bolger, Miller, and Washington challenge the legal rulings
and procedural findings in his domestic violence case, child custody case, and related
appeal.86 His claims against Defendants Montgomery-Sythes and Fuentes stem from the
state court clerks’ administrative procedures as applied to him.87 	His injury stems from
alleged “legal errors by the state court,” and as a remedy, he seeks relief from that
judgment.88 Mr. Rancourt’s Complaint shows that he presented his case in the state court,
where Defendants considered and rejected it, and now Mr. Rancourt turns to federal court
with hopes for a different outcome. As the Supreme Court explained, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”89 His suit in federal court
is a de facto appeal from the Alaska Supreme Court’s consolidated order that upheld the
Judges’ orders in his domestic violence and child custody cases. As this Court explained
in its first Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice,
85 Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142 (citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483
n.16 (1983)).
86 See “Background,” supra at 4–6.
87 See “Background,” supra at 7.
88 See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140.
89 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
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[b]ecause this Court is not a court of appeals for state court
decisions, the Court may not decide a formerly litigated state
case. The proper court to obtain review of a final decision of a
state’s highest court is the United States Supreme Court. . . .
Mr. Rancourt sets forth his version of state court cases and
decisions with which he disagrees. This Court, however, may
not revisit those cases and decisions. Instead, Mr. Rancourt’s
remedy is in the appeals’ process.”90
Thus, this Court has no jurisdiction over Mr. Rancourt’s claims that are appeals of his
domestic violence case, his child custody case, or his civil appeal.
The Court does note that Mr. Rancourt’s prayer for relief casts his First
Amended Complaint as a constitutional challenge to Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(G)–(H),
which establishes the presumption that a parent with a history of domestic violence may
not be awarded custody of a child.91 	The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not “prohibit a
plaintiff from presenting a generally applicable legal challenge to a state statute in federal
court, even if that statute has previously been applied against him in state court litigation.”92
However, Mr. Rancourt’s First Amended Complaint does not present a general or facial
challenge to Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(G)–(H). Rather, as discussed, he seeks a review of
his individual case, and, at most, challenges Judge Miller’s findings under Alaska Stat.
§ 25.24.150(G)–(H) as using a “low evidentiary standard” when the Judge used text
messages as evidence of domestic violence.93 This is not a facial or general challenge of
the law, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.
90 Docket 5 at 8–10 (citations omitted).
91 Docket 9 at 30–31.
92 Mothershed v. Justs. of Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005).
93 Docket 9 at 25.
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Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rancourt’s de facto
appeal of his state court cases, those claims seeking review of his domestic violence case,
child custody case, or civil appeal are DISMISSED.
G. 	Further Amendment is Futile
“It is well-established that a court may dismiss an entire complaint with
prejudice where plaintiffs have failed to plead properly after ‘repeated opportunities.’”94
Previously, the Court provided an explanation of the deficiencies of Mr. Rancourt’s
original Complaint.95 	The First Amended 	Complaint continues 	to have the same
deficiencies. 	As 	discussed, 	Mr. 	Rancourt’s 	claims 	relate 	to 	pending 	and 	settled
proceedings in state court, with which this Court will not interfere, and he names
Defendants who enjoy absolute immunity from his claims. 	Futility exists when “the
allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure
the deficiency[.]”96 Therefore, the Court finds that further amendment in the federal court
would be futile, and Mr. Rancourt’s First Amended Complaint is dismissed without leave
to amend.
94 Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Neubronner v. Milken,
6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)).
95 See generally Docket 5.
96 See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	above 	reasons, 	Mr. 	Rancourt’s 	First 	Amended 	Complaint 	is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2022, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Joshua M. Kindred
JOSHUA M. KINDRED
United States District Judge
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