Lane v. Gorup et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
DOUGLAS N. LANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHELSEA GORUP, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00132-SLG-KFR
SCREENING ORDER
On May 24, 2022, Douglas N. Lane, a self-represented prisoner (hereinafter
“Plaintiff”), filed a Prisoner’s Complaint Under The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a Prisoner’s Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee, and a civil cover
sheet.1 	Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a 1) Letter to the Court, 2) First Amended
Complaint (hereinafter “Amended Complaint”), 3) Motion to Appoint Counsel, 4)
Motion for Summary Judgment, and 5) Motion for Relaxation of the Rules.2
The Court now screens Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in accordance with 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.3 The Court will not address Plaintiff’s letter as it is not
in the form of a motion, nor is that the proper method by which to amend a
complaint.4
//
1 Dockets 1, 2, & 4.
2 Dockets 5–9.
3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Local Civil Rule 15.1; Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806
F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2012)) (stating “an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated
thereafter as non-existent.”).
4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (A request to a federal district court must be made by a motion,
which must 1) be in writing, 2) state with particularity the grounds or reasons, and 3)
state the requested relief.); supra note 3.
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I. 	Screening Standard
Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil complaint
filed by a self-represented prisoner seeking a waiver of the prepayment of the filing
fee. 	In this screening, a court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that the action:
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.5
To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts
consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if accepted
as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”6 	In conducting its
review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading and
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.7 Before a court may dismiss any portion
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court
must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and
an opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would
be futile.8 	Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency[.]” 9
II. 	Discussion
Plaintiff alleges due process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
three child support specialists with the State of Alaska’s Child Support Services
5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b).
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In making this determination, a court may consider “materials that
are submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges,
655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)).
7 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
8 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v.
Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
9 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
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Division. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not fully satisfy Rule 8 of Federal Civil
Procedure pleading requirements as it relates to his demand for relief, nor does it
fully meet the elemental pleading requirements of a civil rights action under § 1983,
specifically as it relates to the capacity in which Defendants are sued and the relief
Plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint, but grants
leave to amend in accordance with the guidance provided in this order.
A. Amended Complaint
Plaintiff brings suit against Child Support Specialists Chelsea Gorup, Viola
Hartley, and Paula Baker.10 Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official
capacities.11 Broadly, Plaintiff alleges that the implementation of his child support
obligations violates his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.12
In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that from July 21, 2011, to July 1, 2022,
Defendant Gorup, “along with an unknown justice,” violated his right to due
process.13 	Plaintiff alleges that “an invalid court order stemming from a secret
hearing without any notice” imposed child support obligations on him pursuant to
Alaska Statute 11.51.120(d).14 	Broadly, Plaintiff alleges that these child support
obligations have been implemented “at random and not even used to the care of the
children alleged”; “left my wife and I destitute and homeless”; imposed claims or
liens on property; and “taken emergency relief money.”15
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that from May 23, 2006, to July 1, 2022,
Defendant Hartley, “along with an unknown justice,” violated his right to due
process.16 	Plaintiff alleges that “[o]ver $40,000.00 [in child support has been]
collected and $0 has been paid to my son and his mother causing [irreparable] injury
10 Docket 5 at 2.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 3–5.
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 4.
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to a father son dynamic.”17 	Plaintiff further alleges that the “agency” has placed
liens on taxes, accounts, and his inherited lands, and that “[Defendant Hartley] has
even allowed the collection of money not even owed . . . [and] has been collecting in
part of California, Texas and Nevada based on the same ex parte proceeding
described in claim 1.”18
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that from May 23, 2006, to July 1, 2022,
Defendant Baker, “along with an unknown justice,” violated his right to due
process.19 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Baker allowed “collections of money not even
owed from multiple states.”20
For relief, Plaintiff requests: 1) $56,000.00 in damages; 2) $2,500,000.00 in
punitive damages; 3) an order to “close all cases and cease action return all
property”; and 4) “pay all court and legal costs as well as taxes etc. 	Return all
collected property.”21
B. Failure to State a Claim
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [complainant] is
entitled to relief.” 	A complaint should set out each claim for relief separately and
identify (1) the specific harm that Plaintiff is alleging has occurred to him, (2) when
that harm occurred, (3) where that harm was caused, and (4) who he is alleging
caused that specific harm to him. Importantly, a complaint must also include a
demand for the relief sought.22 This requires that a complaint articulate what relief
a plaintiff requests, for example money damages, injunctive relief, or some other
equitable remedy.
//
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 5.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 8.
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
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Factual allegations may not be speculative but must plead “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”23 	While a complaint need not contain every precise,
factual detail, “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are
insufficient to state a claim.24 	A complaint is insufficiently pled if it offers “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”25 	A complaint that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not meet
the required pleading standard.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacks a permissible demand of relief because
he sues Defendants in both their individual and official capacities and seeks
damages. Defendants sued in their official capacities may only be sued for injunctive
relief, not damages. While Plaintiff’s demand for damages is clear, the type of
injunctive relief he may be seeking as required for any official capacity claims is not
sufficiently articulated to meet Rule 8 pleading requirements. If Plaintiff chooses to
file a second amended complaint, he must select the appropriate capacity and
corresponding relief for each Defendant.
C. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have specific required elements that a plaintiff
must plead. Section 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” 	but 	provides 	“a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	rights 	[found] 	elsewhere.”26
Constitutional rights are those conferred by the U.S. Constitution to individual
citizens. 	Section 	1983 	can 	be 	used 	as 	a 	mechanism 	for 	enforcing 	the 	rights
guaranteed by a particular federal statute only if (1) the statute creates enforceable
rights and (2) Congress has not foreclosed the possibility of a § 1983 remedy for
23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
24 Id.
25 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
26 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979))
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violations of the statute in question.27 	Section 1983 does not provide a cause of
action for violations of state law.28
In order to plead a proper § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege plausible facts
that if proven would establish each of the required elements of: “(1) a violation of
rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately
caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.”29 At present,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to meet these core elements.
Importantly in a § 1983 action, claims must demonstrate causation, or show
how the alleged defendant, acting under color of state law, violated the plaintiff’s
federal rights. 	A person deprives another of a federal constitutional or statutory
right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to
do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’”30 The required causal
connection “may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by
others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to
inflict’ constitutional harms.”31
Section 1983 requires that a defendant must be “acting under the color of state
law.”32 	To act under the color of state law, a complaint must allege that the
defendants acted with state authority as state actors.33 	The question of whether a
person who has allegedly caused a constitutional injury was acting under the color
of state law is a factual determination. 34 A defendant has acted under color of state
27 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,
1027-28 (9th Cir. 1999).
28 Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007).
29 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
30 Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. Of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).
31 Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743).
32 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
33 West, 487 U.S. at 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
34 See Brunette v. Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002).
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law where he or she has “exercised power ‘possessed by the virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.’”35 As alleged, Defendants work for the State of Alaska’s Child Support Services
Division; accordingly, this element has been met.
i. 	Capacity
In a § 1983 action, a state actor defendant may be sued in either an individual
or an official capacity. 	The Amended Complaint names Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities, and impermissibly seeks damages from official
capacity defendants.
a. Individual Capacity
In order for a defendant to be individually liable under § 1983, that defendant
must personally participate in an alleged rights deprivation.36 “In a § 1983 action,
the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable
cause of the claimed injury.”37 A defendant sued in her individual capacity may be
held liable for money damages.38 	In order for Plaintiff to sue a defendant in an
individual capacity, he must allege facts as to each defendant that if proven would
demonstrate that the named defendant (1) personally participated in depriving
Plaintiff of his rights and (2) that the defendant’s actions caused Plaintiff’s injury.
b. Official Capacity
In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff may sue a defendant in an official capacity as an
alternate way of pleading a claim against the governmental entity for which that
individual is an officer or employee.39 	A plaintiff suing a defendant in her official
capacity is not required to allege the “named official's personal involvement in the
35 West, 487 U.S. at 49 (internal citations omitted); see also Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091,
1097 (9th Cir. 1979) (establishing that when state officials are administering a federal
funded program, the state officials are still acting under the color of state law).
36 Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010).
37 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
38 See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016).
39 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
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acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional violation.”40 	Instead, a
plaintiff must only (1) “identify the law or policy challenged” and (2) “name the
official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.”41
However, a defendant sued in her official capacity may not be sued for damages,
only for injunctive relief.42 In order for Plaintiff to sue a defendant in their official
capacity, he must (1) identify the policy he challenges and (2) demonstrate that that
particular defendant is able to respond to the injunctive relief he requests.
As stated above, if Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he
must select the appropriate capacity and corresponding relief for each Defendant.
ii. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
a. Protected Property Interest
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.”43 	A deprivation of property in violation of the Due Process
Clause may be either a substantive or procedural claim. For either type of claim, a
plaintiff must establish they have been deprived of a protected property interest and
that the state’s procedures did not comply with due process.44
To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) a property interest protected by the Constitution; 2) a deprivation of that interest
by the state; and 3) a lack of process.45 	At the fundamental level, procedural due
process requires “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” before a state can
deprive a person of a protected property interest.46 To succeed on a substantive due
process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a deprivation of a protected property
40 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
41 Id.
42 Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10.
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
44 American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).
45 Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008).
46 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990).
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interest, and 2) that the defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and offends “the
community’s sense of fair play and decency.”47
Plaintiff appears to allege sufficient facts to establish a violation of his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as they relate to a protected
property interest.
b. Interference with Parent-Child Relationship
Parents and children possess a liberty interest in companionship and society
with each other, which is protected by the Due Process Clause.48 	A claim of
interference 	with 	the 	parent-child 	relationship 	may 	be 	brought 	as 	either 	a
procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim. 	Procedural due
process claims typically arise when a state official removes a child from her parent’s
care. For such claims, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will
not 	be 	separated 	from 	their 	children 	without 	due 	process 	of 	law 	except 	in
emergencies."49 Substantive due process claims typically involve egregious conduct
or the use of excessive force. 	But official conduct only violates substantive due
process when it "shocks the conscience."50 	There are two standards under the
overarching test of whether the official’s conduct "shocks the conscience": the more
demanding "purpose to harm" standard and the lesser "deliberate indifference"
standard.51 	To determine which of the two standards govern, courts look at the
context of the events leading to the deprivation.52
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges “irreparable injury to the father son dynamic”
47 Marsh v. Cnty of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
48 Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds
by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Kelson v. City of
Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1985).
49 Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mabe v.
San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001)).
50 Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilkinson v.
Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010)).
51 Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).
52 See Id.
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because of the child support improperly taken from him, without due process, and
the misuse of those funds.53 Plaintiff appears to allege sufficient facts to establish a
violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as
it relates to a protected liberty interest.
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Because Plaintiff challenges his child support obligations without sufficient
factual detail, the Court cannot determine at this time whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. First, the Court cautions Plaintiff that to the extent he
seeks 	to 	challenge 	the 	state 	court 	order 	and 	judgment 	of 	his 	child 	support
obligations, the Court may have to abstain because federal district courts do not have
appellate jurisdiction over state courts.54 Second, if Plaintiff has ongoing state court
actions regarding the support or custody of his children, this Court may have to
abstain because federal district courts may not interfere with ongoing enforcement
proceedings in state courts.55
III. 	CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not fully satisfy the Rule 8 pleading
requirements as it relates to his demand for relief, nor does it fully meet the
elemental pleading requirements of a civil rights action under § 1983, specifically as
it relates to the capacity in which Defendants are sued and the corresponding relief
Plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint, but grants
leave to amend in accordance with the guidance provided above.
53 Dkt. 5 at 4.
54 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (establishing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that federal
district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a state court); see
also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curium); quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
55 Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (extending the
abstention principles established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) to civil matters).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. 	The Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The Court grants leave to amend.
2. 	The Prisoner’s Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee at Docket 2
is GRANTED. Should Plaintiff state a claim in his amended pleadings, a separate fee
order shall issue. 	The Court cautions Plaintiff that the Court may only waive
prepayment of the $402.00 filing fee and that the entire fee must be collected
incrementally in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1915(b).
3. 	Motion 	Requesting 	Volunteer 	Attorney 	at 	Docket 	6 	is 	DENIED 	AS
PREMATURE. 	However, the Court advises Plaintiff that generally a person has no
federal right to an appointed attorney in a civil action.56 Additionally, although the
Court may request a volunteer attorney in exceptional cases, it has no power to make
a mandatory appointment.57
4. 	The Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 8 is DENIED AS PREMATURE,
because there is no operative complaint. Further, a motion for summary judgment
must comply with Rule 56 of Federal Civil Procedure and traditionally occurs after
discovery and evidence gathering has occurred.
5. 	The Motion for Relaxation of Rules at Docket 9 is DENIED. A self-represented
litigant is bound by the same procedural rules that govern other litigants.58 A court
may act with leniency towards a self-represented litigant for procedural violations,
but the litigant is not excused from the rules that govern court proceedings.59 	To
the extent that Plaintiff is concerned regarding service, there is no operative
complaint to serve upon Defendants at this time. 	Should Plaintiff state actionable
56 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth
Amendment does not govern civil cases.”); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.”).
57 Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301-08 (1989).
58 King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v.
Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012).
59 Motoyama v. Hawaii, Dept. of Transp., 864 F.Supp.2d 965, 976 (2012).
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claims in amended pleadings, the Court will issue an order giving guidance on proper
service at that time.
6. 	Plaintiff has until November 14, 2022 to file either:
a. 	Second Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiff restates his claims with
additional factual details. 	Any Second Amended Complaint should be on the
Court’s form, which is being provided to Plaintiff with this order. An amended
complaint replaces the prior complaint in its entirety.60
b. 	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, in which Plaintiff elects to withdraw his
action and preserve his claims for litigation at a later date.
7. 	If Plaintiff does not file either a Second Amended Complaint or a Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal by November 14, 2022, this case may be dismissed without
further notice to Plaintiff.61
8. 	Each litigant is responsible for keeping a copy of each document filed with the
Court. 	When a litigant mails a document to the Court, the litigant will receive a
Notice of Electronic Filing (“NEF”) from the Court that will indicate when that
document was filed on the docket and the docket number of the document. 	Copies
of documents that have been filed with the Court may be obtained from the Clerk’s
Office for $0.50 per page. In the event of special circumstances or serious financial
need, a party may file a motion asking for the cost of copies to be waived or reduced.
9. 	At all times, Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address.
Such notice shall be titled “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” This notice must not
include any requests for any other relief, and it must be served on any Defendant’s
attorney who makes an appearance in this case. Failure to file a notice of change of
address may result in the dismissal of this case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
10. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff the following forms with this
60 Local Civil Rule 15.1.
61 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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Screening Order
Lane v. Gorup, et al.
3:22-cv-00132-SLG-KFR
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Order: (1) PS01 Prisoner’s Civil Rights Complaint with “SECOND AMENDED”; (2)
form PS21, Pro Se Notice; (3) form PS 12, Pro Se Motion; (4) form PS23, Notice of
Change of Address; and (5) the District Court’s handbook, “REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN
ALASKA ’ S F EDERAL COURT.”
DATED this 13th day of October, 2022 at Anchorage, Alaska.
s/ Kyle F. Reardon
KYLE F. REARDON
United States Magistrate Judge
District of Alaska
Case 3:22-cv-00132-SLG-KFR Document 11 Filed 10/13/22 Page 13 of 13