Smith v. Hoss et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
STANLEY E. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE TERRENCE HASS, et al.,1
Defendants.
Case No. 4:22-cv-00007-SLG-KFR
SCREENING ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING COMPLAINT
On 	March 	7, 	2022, 	Stanley 	E. 	Smith, 	a 	self-represented 	prisoner
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), filed a Prisoner’s Complaint under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “Complaint”), a civil cover sheet, and a
Prisoner’s Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee.2 Subsequently,
Plaintiff filed an untitled motion that requests counsel, his release from
custody, and to have his charges dismissed.3 	Plaintiff also filed a Motion to
Amend his Complaint requesting the Court substitute the correct spelling of
Defendant Hass’s and Defendant Knowles’s names.
1 The Court amends the caption of this case to reflect the proper spelling of Judge
Terrence Hass’s name.
2 Dkts. 1–3.
3 Dkt. 5.
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The Court now screens Plaintiff’s Complaint in accordance with 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil
complaint filed by a self-represented prisoner. In this screening, a court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action:
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.4
To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts
consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if
accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”5 	In
conducting its review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented
plaintiff’s pleading and give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.6
4 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	In making this determination, a court may consider
“materials that are submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v.
Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d
668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)).
6 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
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Before a court may dismiss any portion of a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must provide the
plaintiff 	with 	a 	statement 	of 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	the 	complaint 	and 	an
opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so
would be futile.7 Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent
with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency[.]”8
DISCUSSION
I. 	Complaint
Plaintiff brings suit against Alaska Superior Court Judge Terrence Hass,
Assistant District Attorney R. Christopher Knowles, and Assistant Public
Defender Nathaniel Hainje in their official capacities.9
In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hass violated his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. 	Plaintiff alleges that after three
representation hearings, Defendant Hass refused to appoint him a different
public defender. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hass “stated that if I need an
attorney I can pay for one or represent myself,” and that “Judge Hass violated
7 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht
v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
8 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1986).
9 Dkt. 1 at 2.
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my right to have a competent attorney represent me.”10 Plaintiff also makes
a broad allegation that a former public defender told him there is racism at
the Bethel Courthouse.11
In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Knowles violated his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Knowles, as the presiding District Attorney, failed to take any action on “the
violations that my attorney or Judge did on my cases.”12 Plaintiff asks “for a
full[-]scale investigation on the Bethel [C]ourt [S]ystem[.]”13
In Claim 3, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hainje violated his right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment by 1) failing to argue for lower
bail; 2) stating Plaintiff had a lengthy criminal history and that his bail was
appropriate; 3) visiting him in person only once and speaking to him on the
phone only three times; 4) failing to provide discovery; 5) refusing to
investigate the case; and 6) declining to file motions to dismiss.14
For relief, Plaintiff seeks 1) an order to be released without bail, and 2)
his cases be dismissed “on all counts/and cannot be reopened.”15
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 4
13 Id.
14 Id. at 5.
15 Id. at 8.
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The 	Court 	takes 	judicial 	notice 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	pending 	state 	court
criminal action State of Alaska v. Stanley Smith, 4HB-20-00010CR. The State
of Alaska has charged Plaintiff with eight counts of Class B Felony Assault in
the Second Degree, three counts of Class C Felony Assault in the Third Degree,
and one count of Unclassified Felony Sexual Assault in the First Degree.16 The
Court notes that Plaintiff had Representation Hearings on December 16, 2020,
May 17, 2021, and August 21, 2021.17 A calendar call is scheduled for June 22,
2022.18
II. 	Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself a source of
substantive rights,” but provides “a method for vindicating rights [found]
elsewhere.”19 	For relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “plead that
(1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of
rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.”20 	To act under the
color of state law, a complaint must allege that the defendants acted with
16 State of Alaska v. Stanley Smith, 4HB-20-00010CR (Party Charge Information).
17 State of Alaska v. Stanley Smith, 4HB-20-00010CR (Events).
18 Id.
19 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
20 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
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state authority as state actors.21 	Furthermore, a defendant must be eligible
for suit. 	None of the individuals sued by Plaintiff in this case are proper
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be
dismissed.
a. Defendant Hainje
A lawyer appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a state court
proceeding is "as a matter of law, ... not a state actor."22 	Such a lawyer,
whether from the Office of Public Advocacy, Public Defender’s Agency, or by
contract is “no doubt, paid by government funds and hired by a government
agency.”23 	This method of payment and retention, however, does not matter,
as the lawyer’s role in this scenario is “to represent [their] client, not the
interests of the [government entity paying their fees].”24 In this way, a court-
appointed lawyer is no different than a privately retained attorney, who in
21 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)).
22 See Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003).
23 Id., citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (recognizing that the
public 	defender 	performs 	“a 	lawyer’s 	traditional 	functions” 	in 	the 	lawyer’s
traditional adversarial role).
24 Id.
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no way can be considered a state actor, but whose “duties and obligations [to
the client] are the same.”25
Defendant 	Hainje 	is 	an 	attorney 	with 	the 	State 	of 	Alaska 	Public
Defender Agency. 	Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that would release him
from state custody and dismiss his state court criminal charges. 	As a
threshold matter, Defendant Hainje cannot provide the relief requested.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations center on disagreements with Defendant
Hainje’s representations to the Alaska Superior Court and his litigation
strategy. 	Defendant Hainje, 	as court 	appointed 	counsel 	to 	an indigent
defendant, is not a state actor as a matter of law. 	Therefore, he cannot be
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
b. Defendant Hass
A state court judicial officer is a state actor. 	However, “[j]udges and
those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage
liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”26 	Moreover, judicial
25 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318-19.
26 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (in
determining if an action is judicial, courts focus on whether “(1) the precise act is a
normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the
controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the
events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge
in his or her official capacity.”). 	“These factors are to be construed generously in
favor of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.”
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immunity extends to preclude prospective injunctive relief against a state
court judge for acts or omissions made in that judge’s official capacity.27 This
judicial 	immunity 	is 	immunity 	from 	lawsuit, 	not 	just 	from 	ultimate
assessment of damages, and it cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith
or malice.28
Defendant Hass is a judicial officer in the Alaska Superior Court.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that would release him from state custody and
dismiss his state court criminal charges. 	While Defendant Hass, in theory,
could grant or respond to such relief, Defendant Hass is bound by Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Alaska Statutes, the Alaska Constitution, and his
duty as a judicial officer to preside over criminal cases in Alaska Superior
Court. 	Plaintiff’s allegations focus on his disagreements with his court
appointed counsel and Defendant Hass’s refusal to appoint a different defense
attorney. 	This decision, as well as Defendant Hass’s presiding role over
Plaintiff’s prior representation hearings, are acts performed in his official
capacity. As a judicial officer acting in his official capacity by presiding over
27 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
28 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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Plaintiff’s state court criminal matter, Defendant Judge Haas is immune from
suit as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
c. 	Defendant Knowles
District attorneys are state actors; however, prosecuting attorneys are
immune from suit. 	Prosecutorial immunity protects government attorneys
when they are acting pursuant to their judicial role as an advocate for the
state, performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the 	criminal 	process.”29 	A 	prosecutor’s 	absolute 	immunity 	extends 	to
“initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case,”30 including eliciting
witness testimony, arguing motions, and pretrial court appearances.31
However, 	“[a] 	prosecutor's 	administrative 	duties 	and 	those
investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the
initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to
absolute immunity.”32 	Further, a prosecutor can be held accountable for
29 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
30 Id.
31 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1991).
32 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
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malicious prosecution. But for any such claim to go forward, a claimant must
provide plausible factual details and more than just conclusory allegations.33
Most importantly, a claim for malicious prosecution cannot proceed
until the termination of the prior criminal proceeding has occurred in favor
of the accused.34 	This “avoids parallel litigation over the issue of probable
cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic]
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the
creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction.”35
Defendant Knowles is a prosecuting attorney for the State of Alaska.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that would release him from state custody and
dismiss his state court criminal charges. While Defendant Knowles, in theory,
could respond to such relief, Defendant Knowles is bound by Alaska Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Alaska Statutes, the Alaska Constitution, and his duty as
an advocate for the State of Alaska to prosecute suspected crimes. Plaintiff’s
33 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (stating that pleadings which “are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
34 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 47, 484 (1994).
35 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
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allegations focus on Defendant Knowles lack of action regarding Plaintiff’s
disagreement with his court appointed counsel and Defendant Hass’s decision
to appoint him a new attorney. 	Generally, a prosecuting attorney may not
intercede or interfere with the relationship of a defense attorney and their
client.36 	As a prosecuting governmental attorney complying with the rules
imposed upon him as part of an ongoing judicial proceeding, Defendant
Knowles is immune from suit as a matter of law. 	Therefore, he cannot be
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CONCLUSION
Defendants 	are 	not 	proper 	defendants 	or 	are 	immune 	from 	suit.
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In addition, no defendants may be substituted under these facts; therefore,
amendment is futile.37
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:
1. 	This action should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted and the futility of amendment.
36 See generally United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1066–74 (9th Cir.
2003), as amended (May 19, 2003); see also Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469,
1471 (9th Cir.1985); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557–58 (1977).
37 Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”).
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2. All pending motions should be DENIED AS MOOT.
3. A dismissal under these circumstances should be a strike as required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, et al., 590 U.S. ___, 140
S.Ct. 172 (2020).38
4. The Clerk of Court should issue a final judgment.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2022 at Anchorage, Alaska.
s/Kyle F. Reardon
KYLE F. REARDON
United States Magistrate Judge
District of Alaska
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court may designate a magistrate
judge 	to 	hear 	and 	determine 	matters 	pending 	before 	the 	Court. 	For
dispositive matters, a magistrate judge reports findings of fact and provides
recommendations to the presiding district court judge.39 A district court judge
38 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner who files more than three actions or
appeals in any federal court in the United States which are dismissed as frivolous
or malicious or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, from
bringing any other actions without prepayment of fees unless the prisoner can
demonstrate that he or she is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”
39 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
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may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s
order.40
A party may file written objections to the magistrate judge’s order
within 14 fourteen days.41 Objections and responses are limited to five (5)
pages 	in 	length 	and 	should 	not 	merely 	reargue 	positions 	previously
presented. 	Rather, objections and responses should specifically identify the
findings or recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and any
legal authority in support. Reports and recommendations are not appealable
orders. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be
filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.42
40 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
41 Id.
42 See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
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