Jones v. Hendrix et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
DIALLIO JONES 	PLAINTIFF
#108191
v. 	CASE NO. 3:25-cv-230 JM
HENDRIX, Officer, et al. 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Plaintiff Diallio Jones, in custody in the Cross County Detention Center, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 2). He also filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, which is granted. (Doc. 1).
I. 	In Forma Pauperis
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner who is permitted to file a
civil action in forma pauperis still must pay the full statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). The only question is whether a prisoner will pay the entire filing fee at the initiation
of the proceeding or in installments over a period of time. Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 716
(8th Cir. 1998). Even if a prisoner is without assets and unable to pay an initial filing fee, he will
be allowed to proceed with his § 1983 claims, and the filing fee will be collected by the Court in
installments from the prisoner’s inmate trust account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
If the prisoner’s case is subsequently dismissed for any reason, including a determination
that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief, the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee will be collected, and no
portion of this filing fee will be refunded to the prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
(“Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma
pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.”); see also Jackson
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v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952 (D. Neb. 2001) (“The Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil
action or files an appeal. Thus, when an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is filed in
such a case, ‘the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the
proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting
Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir.1997)).
Jones has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Accordingly, Jones’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Based on the
information contained in his account information sheet, the Court does not assess an initial partial
filing fee. Jones will be obligated to make monthly payments in the amount of 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to Jones’s prison trust account each time the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00 until the $350.00 filing fee is fully paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
II. 	Screening
Federal law requires courts to screen in forma pauperis complaints, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e),
and prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee,
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to state a claim for
relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying damages should be
dismissed before the defendants are served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is
legally frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989). FED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint must contain enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable. Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed
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liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-1044 (8th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted).
III. 	Discussion
Jones sues Wynne Police Department Officers Hendrix, Mahabir, and Doe in their personal
capacities alleging that, during his September 18, 2025 arrest, he was subjected to excessive force.
(Doc. 2). Specifically, Jones says that one of the officers held his neck in a choke hold while he
searched Jones’s mouth. (Id. at 5). Jones seeks damages.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts
should abstain from interfering in ongoing state proceedings. The Court explained the rationale for
such abstention as follows:
[The concept of federalism] represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44.
Accordingly, a federal court must abstain from entertaining constitutional claims when:
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state proceeding implicates important state
interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise the constitutional
challenges. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 1999); Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1994). If all three questions are answered affirmatively,
a federal court should abstain unless it detects “bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary
circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982).
Jones is currently detained in the Cross County Jail facing state criminal charges for
possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, obstructing governmental operations, second degree
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battery, resisting arrest, and three counts of tampering with evidence by suppressing, concealing,
or removing it. See http.www.crosscountysheriff.org/roster (last accessed October 20, 2025).
Because Arkansas has an important interest in its criminal justice procedures, this Court should
abstain from entertaining his constitutional claims. 	Further, there is no indication of bad faith,
harassment, or any other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.
Having determined that the Court should abstain from entertaining Jones’s claims, it must
decide whether to dismiss, or to stay, the case. Where only injunctive or equitable relief is sought,
dismissal is appropriate. Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, 163 F.3d 475, 481 (8th Cir. 1998).
Jones, however, seeks damages. Accordingly, Jones’s case is stayed and administratively
terminated. Stroud, 179 F.3d at 603-04.
IV. 	Conclusion
1. 	The Clerk of the Court is directed to stay and administratively terminate this
proceeding pending final disposition of Jones’s state criminal charges.
2. 	Jones may file a motion to reopen this case after such final disposition. Any motion
to reopen must be filed within 60 days of that final disposition. If Jones does not file a timely
motion to reopen or a status report by October 20, 2026, then the Court will reopen the case and
dismiss it without prejudice.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to: the Administrator of
the Cross County Detention Center, 1600 South Falls Blvd., Wynne, AR 72396.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of November, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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