Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
MEGAN VARNELL 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	4:25-cv-00552-LPR-JJV
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration, 	DEFENDANT
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
INSTRUCTIONS
This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States District Judge Lee P.
Rudofsky. 	The parties may file specific objections to these findings and recommendations and
must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be filed with the
Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A copy
must be served on the opposing party. The district judge, even in the absence of objections, may
reject these proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
Plaintiff, Megan Varnell, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration to deny her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded Plaintiff had not been under a
disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, because jobs existed in significant
numbers she could perform despite her impairments. (Tr. 26-38.)
This review function is extremely limited. A court’s function on review is to determine
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole
and to analyze whether Plaintiff was denied benefits due to legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d
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185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).
In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, courts must consider evidence that detracts
from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it; a court may not, however,
reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence would have supported
an opposite decision. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
The history of the administrative proceedings and the statement of facts relevant to this
decision are contained in the respective briefs and are not in serious dispute. Therefore, they will
not be repeated in this opinion except as necessary. 	After careful review of the pleadings and
evidence in this case, I find the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and
Plaintiff’s Complaint should be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff is young – only thirty-seven years old. (Tr. 50.) She is a high school graduate and
attended some college. (Id.) 	She has no past relevant work. (Tr. 37.)
The ALJ1 found Ms. Varnell has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the period
from her alleged onset date of July 10, 2018, through the date she was last insured on March 31,
2019. 	(Tr. 28.) 	She has “severe” impairments in the form of “rheumatoid arthritis; migraines;
hypertension; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; major depressive disorder; and generalized
1 The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant was
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment;
(3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed
impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the
claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or
combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in
significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(g) and 404.1520(a)-(g).
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anxiety disorder.” (Tr. 29.) 	The ALJ further found Ms. Varnell did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or equaling an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. 2 (Tr. 30-32.)
The ALJ determined Ms. Varnell had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a
reduced range of light work. (Tr. 32.) Because Plaintiff had no past relevant work, the ALJ utilized
the services of a vocational expert to determine if jobs existed that Plaintiff could perform despite
her impairments. (Tr. 73-76.) Based in part on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff could perform the jobs of bakery worker, assembly worker, and poultry
dresser - despite her limitations. (Tr. 37-38.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined Ms. Varnell was
not disabled. (Tr. 38.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for a review of the ALJ’s decision, making
his decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 	(Tr. 14-18.) 	Plaintiff filed the instant
Complaint initiating this appeal. (Doc. No. 2.)
Ms. Varnell has a somewhat lengthy history of mental health treatment. 	The issues she
raises are mainly whether she has the mental ability to engage in the workforce.
In support of her Complaint, Ms. Varnell argues that the ALJ rendered his decision without
relying on medical opinions to assist him in assessing her work limitations due to her multiple
impairments. 	(Doc. No. 9 at 10-16.) 	She says, “The lack of any medical interpretation of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments whatsoever can mean only one thing: the ALJ impermissibly drew
his own inferences about Plaintiff’s functional ability from his lay interpretation of the medical
reports. This type of lay evaluation of mental health evidence is prohibited.” (Id. at 11.)
The Commissioner responds:
2 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526.
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The Eighth Circuit has squarely and repeatedly rejected this line of argument,
explaining in plain terms that “there is no requirement that an RFC finding be
supported by a specific medical opinion.” Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1353, 1360
(8th Cir. 2022); accord Twyford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 929 F.3d 512, 518
(8th Cir. 2019); Winn v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 894 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir.
2018); Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016). This is because “the
RFC is a decision reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical
professionals nor determined exclusively based on the contents of medical
records.” Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2020). Thus, it is the task of
the ALJ—not a medical professional—to “determine a claimant’s RFC based on
all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of [her] limitations.”
Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 730 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Schmitt, 27 F.4th at
1360); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). Accordingly, the Court “will not
disturb an ALJ’s RFC finding so long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence in
the record as a whole.’” Austin, 52 F.4th at 730 (quoting Schmitt, 27 F.4th at 1361).
(Doc. No. 12 at 4-5.)
I have carefully considered Plaintiff’s argument and the Commissioner’s response. I find
the Commissioner’s response to be highly persuasive. I agree that the Eighth Circuit has already
decided this issue favorably to the ALJ.
As Plaintiff points out, “The record in this case is voluminous.” (Doc. No. 9 at 12.) Given
the voluminous record, the ALJ had the ability to sift through the more than four thousand pages
and make a comprehensive determination.
Moreover, I note that Plaintiff has cited to no medical provider that undercuts the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff is unable to “understand, remember, and carry out simple, but not
complex, instructions” while performing light work. (Tr. 32.) Plaintiff cites to various parts in
the record where “she reported feeling ‘miserable’ and ‘not doing much,’ mostly staying home in
her apartment, feeling exhausted all the time, and being unable to work due to chronic pain that
exacerbated her mental health symptoms. (Tr. 1796, 1843, 1851).” (Doc. No. 9 at 13.) But while
Plaintiff made these subjective complaints to her doctors, objective examinations revealed nothing
to support a claim of disability. 	(Tr. 1798, 1844.) 	And it appears that the ALJ focused on the
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objective findings over Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. 	(Tr. 34-36.) 	As the ALJ noted in his
opinion:
In August of 2019, while at Southeast Arkansas Behavioral Healthcare, the
claimant was cooperative, and her appearance was appropriate (Ex. 23F/112). The
claimant’s eye contact was good, and her speech was clear and coherent (Ex.
23F/112). The claimant described her mood as “good”, and her affect was
responsive (Ex. 23F/112). The claimant’s thought processes were logical, and she
was negative for delusions and hallucinations (Ex. 23F/112). The claimant’s
concentration was grossly intact (Ex. 23F/112). The claimant’s memory was intact,
and her fund of knowledge was adequate (Ex. 23F/112). The claimant was alert and
oriented, and she denied having a history of suicidal thoughts (Ex. 23F/112). The
claimant’s impulse control, insight, and judgment were all described as grossly
intact (Ex. 23F/112).
(Tr. 35.)
So given the Eight Circuit authority and the objective evidence the ALJ relied upon, I find
no reversible error here. His decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ incorrectly evaluated her subjective symptoms. 	(Doc.
No. 9 at 16-20.) The ALJ analyzed Ms. Varnell’s subjective symptoms considering Social Security
Ruling 16-3p. (Tr. 32-36.) That ruling fairly tracks Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.
1984), which states:
The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the degree of severity of
subjective complaints alleged is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the
credibility of the testimony and complaints. 	The adjudicator must give full
consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,
including the claimant’s prior work record, and observations by third parties and
treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as:
1. the claimant’s daily activities;
2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;
3. precipitating and aggravating factors;
4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;
5. functional restrictions.
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The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the claimant’s subjective complaints
solely on the basis of personal observations. 	Subjective complaints may be
discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole.
Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).
After close review, I find the ALJ fairly evaluated Ms. Varnell’s subjective complaints. In
doing so, the ALJ concluded:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.
Turning to the medical evidence, the objective findings in this case fail to provide
strong support for the claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations.
More specifically, the medical findings do not support the existence of limitations
greater than the above listed residual functional capacity. The undersigned notes
that it is the claimant’s responsibility to put forth evidence showing she had an
impairment and how severe it is during the period she alleges disability (20 CFR
404.1512 and 416.912). The Administrative Law Judge has the authority to make a
determination that the claimant’s impairments are not incapacitating to the extent
alleged. 	Although 	the 	subjective 	element 	of 	incapacity 	is 	an 	important
consideration 	in 	determining 	disability, 	the 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	has
discretion to evaluate the claimant’s statements and to arrive at an independent
judgment, in light of medical findings and evidence regarding the true extent of the
incapacity alleged by the claimant. The issue of the value of the claimant’s
statements in this case cannot be discussed analytically in absolute terms but must
be measured by degree. The claimant testified, and understandably may honestly
believe that her impairments are disabling. However, it is the duty of the
undersigned to accurately determine the degree of her impairments based upon the
totality of all of the other evidence of record. The undersigned has evaluated the
claimant’s subjective complaints and other allegations in accordance with 20 CFR
404.1529 and 416.929; and SSR 16-3p. The claimant’s statements about the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence of record.
(Tr. 34.)
Given this limited review, second-guessing an ALJ’s assessment of subjective symptoms
is an agonizing task. And being mindful of the “substantial evidence” test in these cases, the record
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contains adequate objective medical evidence to support the ALJ’s determination here. Igo v.
Colvin, 839 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2016).
While not specifically referred to in the ALJ’s decision, at least some of Plaintiff’s doctors
did not find any basis for her inability to work. These providers stated, on several occasions, “she
needs to be strong enough to go and seek a job that she cannot stay at home without working with
the excuse of headaches.” (Tr. 378, 532, 536, 540, 543, 546, 643, 940.) Realizing these were from
records in 2018, this still undercuts her subjective allegations.
Plaintiff had the burden of proving her disability. E.g., Sykes v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 284, 285
(8th Cir. 1988). Thus, she bore the responsibility of presenting the strongest case possible. Thomas
v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1991). 	Plaintiff has simply not met that burden. 	The
record contains ample support as a whole that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support [the] conclusion” of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
see also, Robertson v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 1991).
Ms. Varnell’s counsel has done an admirable job advocating for her rights. But it is not
the task of a court to review the evidence and make an independent decision. 	Neither is it to
reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his
findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole which supports
the decision of the ALJ. E.g., Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,
956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).
I have reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ’s decision, the transcript of
the hearing, and the medical and other evidence. There is ample evidence on the record as a whole
that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion" of the ALJ in this
case. 	Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Reutter ex rel. Reutter v. Barnhart, 372
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F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision is not based on legal error.
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that the final decision of the Commissioner be
affirmed, and that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 19th day of November 2025.
___________________________________
JOE J. VOLPE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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