Thompson et al v. PACCAR Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Lila Thompson, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PACCAR Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00093-PHX-KML
ORDER
Willis Jeval Thompson and others died in a car crash involving a Kenworth tractor
trailer designed and sold by defendant PACCAR Inc. (Doc. 1 at 3, 8.) Willis’s mother, Lila
Thompson, filed “this wrongful death [suit] for herself and on behalf of all statutory
beneficiaries of [Decedent] Thompson” against PACCAR alleging product liability
theories. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The complaint was filed in January 2025, the court issued a
scheduling order in May 2025, and the fact discovery period ends in January 2026. (Doc.
1, 27.)
On October 28, 2025, non-party Lateshia EagleTail filed a “Motion to Intervene and
Substitute Personal Representative as Party Plaintiff.” (Doc. 71.) EagleTail is Lila
Thompson’s daughter and Willis’s sister. That motion argues EagleTail was appointed “as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Willis Jeval Thompson pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-
3703(A).” (Doc. 71 at 1-2.) And according to EagleTail, under Arizona’s wrongful death
statute, A.R.S. § 12-612(A), “only the Personal Representative may bring and maintain a
wrongful death action for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries.” (Doc. 71 at 2.)
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Therefore, EagleTail requests she be substituted “as the proper Party Plaintiff in place of
any unauthorized individuals.” (Doc. 71 at 4.) EagleTail also argues she should be allowed
to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Lila Thompson filed an opposition that argues
there is no requirement a wrongful death action be brought by the personal representative.
(Doc. 77 at 4.) According to Lila Thompson, EagleTail’s motion represents her “simply
trying to insert herself into a matter that does not involve her.”1 (Doc. 77 at 5.)
On December 3, 2025, EagleTail filed what appears to be a similar motion to the
one she filed in October, although this second motion is more difficult to understand. The
December motion is titled “Emergency Motion to Intervene and Substitute Personal
Representative as the Sole Lawful Plaintiff, to Vacate Void Filings Based on Fraudulent
Standing, and for Formal Recognition of Heirship, Standing, and Personal Representative
Authority Under A.R.S. §§ 12-612 & 14-3703.” (Doc. 89.) The filing complains again that
Lila Thompson is the named plaintiff on behalf of herself and other statutory beneficiaries.
(Doc. 89 at 2.) And EagleTail again asserts that under Arizona law, “[t]he Personal
Representative must control the wrongful-death action.” (Doc. 89 at 2.)
On December 15, 2025, EagleTail filed a third motion requesting, among other
things, “federal oversight, tolling, vacatur of void orders, formal recognition of lawful heir
and personal representative.” (Doc. 102.) That motion appears to present many of the same
arguments and seek the same type of relief as her earlier motions but is also premised on
Willis’s ex-wife having been improperly named as a plaintiff in this case. She is not, and
her name appears nowhere in the complaint. (See Doc. 1.)
EagleTail’s three motions are premised on an incorrect understanding of Arizona
law. Arizona law “requires that an action for wrongful death be brought by a designated
plaintiff (the decedent’s ‘surviving husband or wife, child, parent or guardian, or personal
representative’), for and on behalf of a statutory beneficiary (the decedent’s ‘surviving
1 There was a related suit in state court against different defendants than the present suit.
(Doc. 77-1 at 9.) The full state court record is not available but it appears Lila Thompson
and Tondra Doss were both plaintiffs, Thompson in her capacity as mother of Willis and
Doss in her capacity as the mother of Willis’s child. (Doc. 77-1 at 9, 13.) EagleTail filed
multiple motions in the state proceeding attempting to be substituted as the named plaintiff.
The state court denied those requests.
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husband or wife, children or parents, or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent’s
estate’).” Benedict v. Total Transit Inc., 499 P.3d 339, 344–45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). That
language means the personal representative of an estate can bring suit but, when statutory
beneficiaries are alive, the claim must be brought on behalf of those statutory beneficiaries.
Edonna v. Heckman, 253 P.3d 627, 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“To be sure, had there been
no other surviving statutory beneficiaries, the personal representative of Edward’s estate
could have brought a wrongful death claim for the estate’s benefit.”). In other words, a
decedent’s estate “is not a proper beneficiary” if any statutory beneficiary is alive. Knauss
v. DND Neffson Co., 963 P.2d 271, 278–79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); see also Gonzales v.
Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 775 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“a decedent’s estate
may bring an action to recover damages only if the decedent is survived by neither spouse
nor children”).
As Willis’s mother, Lila Thompson is a proper plaintiff, and she is entitled to bring
this suit on behalf of herself and all other beneficiaries. Wilmot v. Wilmot, 58 P.3d 507, 511
(Ariz. 2002) (beneficiary who files suit is fiduciary for other beneficiaries “both in
conducting and settling the action and making distribution of proceeds to each of the other
beneficiaries at the conclusion”). And because Lila Thompson and Willis’s minor child are
alive, Willis’s estate is not a proper beneficiary. In these circumstances, EagleTail as
personal representative need not be the named plaintiff. And because the estate will not be
a proper beneficiary, EagleTail has no cognizable interest such that intervention as of right
is merited. Sweet v. Cardona, 121 F.4th 32, 48 (9th Cir. 2024) (intervention as of right
requires among other things “a significantly protectable interest relating to the subject of
the action”).
/
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Based on Arizona law, EagleTail is not entitled to the relief she seeks and she must
not file future motions seeking that relief. Any future motions will be summarily denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the Motions to Intervene (Doc. 71, 89, 102) are DENIED.
Dated this 18th day of December, 2025.
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