Waichulaitis et al v. Sloat et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jade Waichulaitis, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Michael Sloat, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00900-PHX-SMB
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants City of Chandler (the “City”), Lydia Ravelo,
Matthew Loper, Matthew Figley, Hiago Pereira, and Ryan Stover’s (collectively, the “City
Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 29).
The Motion has been fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part
Defendants’ Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case stems from Plaintiff Jade Waichulaitis’ (“Jade”) allegation that he was
falsely arrested and charged with aggravated assault. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 11.) The FAC alleges
the following. On April 17, 2024, Jade observed Defendant Michael Sloat (“Sloat”)
stealing a gas can from his driveway. (Id. at 5–6 ¶ 30.) Jade did not know Sloat at that
time. (Id. at 6 ¶ 30.) Jade confronted Sloat, who subsequently recorded Jade with his
phone. (Id.) Jade attempted to grab the phone. (Id. ¶ 31.) Sloat then attacked Jade while
holding the gas can. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) During the altercation, Jade tried to retrieve the gas
can from Sloat, but the cap came lose spilling gas on Jade and Sloat. (Id. ¶ 32.)
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As Jade backed towards his front door, Sloat followed him. (Id. ¶ 33.) Jade then
“acted in self-defense against [Sloat] to protect his house.” (Id.) Sloat and Jade disagreed
as to whether Jade used a rock in self-defense or produced a lighter during the altercation.
(Id. ¶ 34.) Jade incurred multiple bruises and a cut on his forehead. (Id. ¶ 36.)
Jade told his mother, Sharon Waichulaitis (“Sharon”) to call the police because he
had been punched by Sloat. (Id. at 4 ¶ 19.) Jade was not present when Officers Ravelo,
Loper, and Figley of the Chandler Arizona Police Department arrived at the house. (Id.
at 4 ¶¶ 17, 19, 5 ¶ 28.) Sloat told the police that Jade had attacked him. (Id. at 3 ¶ 13.)
Sloat said he went onto Jade’s property to get his phone but tackled Jade after Jade called
Sloat “a name” and doused him with gasoline. (Id. at 3 ¶ 16, 5 ¶ 29.)
Officer Figley gave Sharon a report number and instructed her to have Jade contact
police “in order to get his side of the story.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 21.) However, Officer Ravelo
immediately put out an “attempt to locate” for Jade “to arrest him for probable cause for
aggravated assault.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
Later that night, an “Immediate Action Team” (“IAT”)1 “was formed in front of
Waichulaitis’ residence and another IAT was formed in the backyard of the rear of the
neighbor’s home in an attempt to arrest Jade.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 24.) Jade was arrested after he
“briefly ran from police.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Officer Stover “used his rifle to arrest Jade” and other
officers pointed guns at him with “night scopes/lights.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 26, 10 ¶ 51.)
Jade was charged with aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal damage.
(Id. at 3¶ 11; 7 ¶ 38.) After the arrest, Officer Ravelo submitted a “false or misleading
Form IV/release questionnaire” that did not include Jade’s version of events.2 (Id. at 3
¶ 13, 5 ¶ 10.) Additionally, it is alleged that Officer Pereira falsified his police report by
providing that Jade caused “substantial damage to the right rear patrol vehicle’s door” by
1 The FAC also alleges that a “SWAT team” was used to arrest Jade. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 11.)
It is unclear what the distinction—or relationship—is between the IAT and the SWAT
team.
2 A Form IV outlines details of an arrest, including “facts which establish probable cause
for the crime(s) for which the defendant is booked or is charged.” See Ariz. R. Crim P.
Form 4(a). A “Form IV” is a form completed by police and used by Arizona courts See
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 41
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kicking it despite there being “no significant damage to the police vehicle.” (Id. at 7
¶¶ 37–38.) Jade spent ten days in jail before the charges were dismissed. (Id. at 8 ¶ 42.)
Jade, Sharon, and Jade’s father, Bruce Waichulaitis (“Bruce”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) now bring a panoply of state and federal claims against Sloat, the City, and
Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, Pereira, and Stover. The present Motion only seeks
dismissal of the claims brought against the City and Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley,
Pereira, and Stover (collectively, the “City Defendants”). This Order collectively refers to
Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, Pereira, and Stover as the “Officer Defendants.”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2)
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets
forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a
cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual
matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal
“probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’”
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Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins
v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations
of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto
v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence
outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider
materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908.
III. DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ repeated insistence that dismissal is
inappropriate because discovery is necessary to substantiate their claims. (Doc. 34 at 1, 2,
8–9, 16–17.) Of course, the nature of some claims makes it difficult to provide sufficient
details at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126
(10th Cir. 1994) (noting that it is often impossible to provide details of a conspiracy claim
at the pleading stage, thus necessitating discovery). All the available evidence is not
always available at the pleading stage—that is the purpose of discovery. See Keith H. v.
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 655 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Generally, the
purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain
evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.”). However, this understanding
is baked into the pleading standard; claimants must only include enough factual detail to
make their claim plausible—not certain. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the nature of the
underlying claim might affect what constitutes sufficient factual detail, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are
never sufficient. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not exempted from Rule 8’s requirements
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merely because they want discovery.
The Court also cautions Plaintiffs against “shotgun pleading.” Shumlich v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., No. 2:24-CV-01681-MJP, 2025 WL 19871, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2025)
(“Pleadings that seek to overwhelm defendants with an unclear mass of allegations and
make it difficult to impossible for the defendants to make informed responses to the
plaintiff’s allegations are considered shotgun pleadings.” (citation modified)). Complaints
may be considered impermissible shotgun pleadings if they merely set forth “everyone did
everything” allegations or “simply incorporat[e] every antecedent allegation by reference.”
Id. (citation modified); see Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). Shotgun
pleadings risk dismissal under Rule 8(a)(2). See A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc,
484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 943 (D. Or. 2020). Here, Plaintiffs assert blanket claims against
groups of defendants, rarely attributing particular actions to particular Defendants. This
pleading “strategy” makes it difficult for the Court to properly assess the adequacy of
Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court now turns to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ eleven causes
of action.
A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution
The FAC includes a claim for false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Jade
against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 17.) The FAC also includes state law claims
for false imprisonment and malicious prosecutions by Jade against the City Defendants.
(Id. at 14–15.) The Court analyzes these claims together because there was probable cause
to arrest and prosecute Jade—a complete defense to these claims.3
1. False Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
The Court begins by analyzing Jade’s § 1983 false arrest claim. Section 1983
provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
3 Plaintiffs insist that “probable cause is a factual issue” which requires discovery. (Doc.
34 at 7.) They are mistaken. “[T]he question of whether a reasonable officer could have
believed probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) existed to justify an arrest is an
essentially legal question that should be determined by the district court at the earliest
possible point in the litigation.” Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir.
1993) (citation modified).
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United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” “The ultimate
issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question
posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of
federal rights fairly attributable to the government?” Pasadena Republican Club v. W.
Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). To state a § 1983 claim,
“a plaintiff must ‘plead that (1) the defendants acted under color of state law and
(2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.’” WMX
Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Gibson v.
United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)). It is undisputed that the Officer
Defendants were acting under the color of state law.
“A claim for [false] arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.”
Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus,
Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that Jade was arrested without probable cause. See
Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs fail to
do so.
“Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” United States v.
Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). Importantly, “[w]hether probable cause exists
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting
officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (emphasis
added). Additionally, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the
criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Id. at 153. The
FAC establishes that there was probable cause to arrest Jade for any number of crimes.
Prior to the arrest, Sloat informed police that Jade attacked him with a rock and
doused him with gasoline. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 13, 4 ¶ 16, 5 ¶ 27.) By the time police became
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involved, Sloat was visibly injured and Jade was not present. (Id. at 4 ¶ 17, 5 ¶ 28, 7 ¶ 40.)
Furthermore, Jade ran from police when they attempted to arrest him. (Id. at 5 ¶ 26.) These
facts are sufficient to establish that there was probable cause to arrest Jade.
Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. At bottom, Plaintiffs contend
that further investigation disproved many of the facts that gave rise to probable cause.
(Doc. 34 at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Jade was arrested for assault with a deadly
weapon “yet further investigation revealed that no rocks were found.” (Id.) Additionally,
Plaintiffs argue that the Form IV and police report “show numerous inconsistencies and
blatantly false claims.” (Id.) These arguments errantly rely on information made available
after the arrest, not “at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152.
Disproving facts used to form probable cause after an arrest does not make the
probable cause determination unreasonable in the first instance. See District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018) (“To determine whether an officer had probable cause
for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to probable cause.” (emphasis added) (citation modified)). This conclusion is in
harmony with the understanding that probable cause demands objective reasonableness,
not perfection. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (noting that the
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness” and that “[t]o be reasonable is
not to be perfect” (citation modified)). As the Supreme Court noted, “probable cause does
not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.”
Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61. Much less are officers required to do so when a suspect’s first
encounter with the police is evading arrest. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000) (noting that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion”). The Wesby Court went on to note that “innocent
explanations—even uncontradicted ones—do not have any automatic,
probable-cause-vitiating effect.” 583 U.S. at 68. This accords with the understanding that
probable cause is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
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factual contexts.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s § 1983 false arrest claim
against the Officer Defendants.
2. False Imprisonment
The foregoing analysis also demands dismissal of Jade’s false imprisonment claim
under state law. To establish false imprisonment under Arizona law, a plaintiff must show
that they were unlawfully detained “without his consent and without lawful authority.”
Cullison v. City of Peoria, 584 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Ariz. 1978). However, “a detention which
occurs pursuant to legal authority . . . is not an unlawful detention.” Id. Accordingly,
“[p]robable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest or false imprisonment.”
Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2009); see Hansen v. Garcia, 713
P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that a summary judgment should be granted
on false imprisonment claims where an arrest was legal and made with probable cause).
Plaintiffs argue that Jade was falsely imprisoned because “police did not conduct an
investigation and instead of waiting for Jade to contact them, they initiated a nighttime
arrest with rifles, flashlights and frightening police action.” (Doc. 17 at 14 ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs
further contend that “Jade was not only arrested but he was kept in jail for a week.” (Id.)
These arguments fail to establish that police did not have probable cause “at the time
of the arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. Plaintiffs do not point to any authority that
required police to “wait[] for Jade to contact them.” Indeed, there are no facts indicating
that it was unreasonable for police to accept Sloat’s version of events at the time of the
arrest. Again, “probable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent
explanation for suspicious facts.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61; Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541
P.2d 550, 553 (Ariz. 1975) (“Police depend upon the information furnished by citizens,
and, unless the contrary appears, they should be able to depend upon the presumption that
men speak the truth.”). Broadly, Plaintiffs fail to allege that police lacked lawful authority
to arrest Jade.
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Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s false imprisonment claim
against the City Defendants.
3. Malicious Prosecution
Finally, the Court turns to Jade’s state law claim of malicious prosecution. “[T]he
essential elements of an action for malicious prosecution are 1) a criminal prosecution,
2) that terminates in favor of plaintiff, 3) with defendants as prosecutors, 4) actuated by
malice, 5) without probable cause and 6) causing damages.” Cullison, 584 P.2d at 1160.
“The key element of malicious prosecution is malice, which can be inferred from a lack of
probable cause.” Id. Thus, “the existence of probable cause to institute an action is a
complete defense to malicious prosecution.” Id.
“In the context of malicious prosecution, probable cause is defined as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent
man in believing the accused is guilty of the offense.” Gonzales v. City of Phoenix, 52
P.3d 184, 187 (Ariz. 2002) (citation modified). “The test generally applied is: upon the
appearances presented to the defendant, would a reasonably prudent man have instituted
or continued the proceeding?” Id. (quoting McClinton v. Rice, 265 P.2d 425, 431 (Ariz.
1953)). Here, Jade was charged with aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal
damage. (Doc. 17 at 3¶ 11, 7 ¶ 38.) The FAC and incorporated documents establish that
there was probable cause to prosecute Jade for each crime.4
a. Aggravated Assault
There was probable cause to prosecute Jade for aggravated assault. Under Arizona
law, a person commits criminal assault by: (1) “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causing any physical injury to another person”; (2) “[i]ntentionally placing another person
in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury”; or (3) “[k]nowingly touching
another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
4 As noted, “[a] court may, however, consider materials—documents attached to the
complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial
notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. The FAC relies heavily on the Form IV, Officer Pereira’s police
report, and other documents relating to Jade’s prosecution.
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§ 13-1203(A)(1)–(3). Criminal assault becomes aggravated assault “[i]f the person uses a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(2). Jade was
charged with using a rock as a deadly weapon.5 (Doc. 29-5 at 3.)
The Court already relayed those facts in the FAC which supported the existence of
probable cause to arrest Jade. Based on these facts, a reasonable person would institute an
aggravated assault proceeding against Jade. Again, Sloat, who was visibly injured,
informed police that Jade attacked him with a rock, doused him with gasoline, and
attempted to evade arrest. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 13, 4 ¶ 16, 5 ¶¶ 26–27, 7 ¶ 40.) This information
was also relayed by Officer Ravelo in the Form IV, which states Sloat had “injuries from
the gasoline on skin.”. (Doc. 29-2 at 2–3.) The Form IV was completed after the arrest.
(Doc. 29-2 at 2.)
Plaintiffs argue that the Form IV cannot establish probable cause to prosecute Jade
for aggravated assault because it contains false information. (Doc. 34 at 7.) Plaintiffs
primarily contend that Officer Ravelo was aware of Jade’s version of events when she filed
out the Form IV but failed to include those details. (Doc. 17 at 5.) However, Plaintiffs do
not cite any authority suggesting that a suspect having a different version of events is
sufficient to eliminate a finding of probable cause. Of course, such a rule would be utterly
impracticable. Nor do Plaintiffs point to any facts suggesting that it was patently
unreasonable for police to rely on Sloat’s version of events.
Of course, “an officer may not ignore exculpatory evidence that would negate a
finding of probable cause.” Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir.
2015) (citation modified). However, Jade’s protestations do not negate a finding of
probable cause because “[t]he mere existence of some evidence that could suggest
self-defense does not negate probable cause.” Id. Ultimately, Plaintiffs fail to plead any
facts that demonstrate that the officers’ first-hand observations and Sloat’s recapitulation
of events was objectively unreasonable. And while the Form IV might not contain Jade’s
version of events, the police report does include Jade’s version of events. (Doc. 29-2 at 6.)
5 Arizona courts have recognized that rocks can be dangerous instruments. See, e.g., In re
A.E., No. 2 CA-JV 2023-0117, 2024 WL 471654, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024).
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Although Plaintiffs repeatedly bemoan the Form IV for being “false,” they seem to
exclusively focus on the Form IV “[s]tating there was a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument,” which, in Plaintiff’s view, “is directly contradicted by the police report.”
(Doc. 34 at 8.) Plaintiffs state that “further investigation revealed that no rocks were
found.” (Doc. 17 at 7 ¶ 40.)
The Form IV provides that at approximately 1 PM Jade twice “threw a rock at
[Sloat’s] face.” (Doc. 29-2 at 2.) The police report provides that “further investigation
revealed that no rocks were found” but that a “single rock was found” on a nearby house.
(Doc. 29-3 at 5.) However, this is not the inconsistency Plaintiffs make it out to be. The
Form IV pertains to the 1 PM altercation between Jade and Sloat. (Doc. 29-2 at 1.)
However, the police report pertains to an 11 PM “Disorderly Conduct call” placed
regarding a “suspect . . . throwing rocks at a neighbor’s house.” (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) It is
unclear that the Form IV is “blatantly false” based on police not finding a rock on the
ground more than 10 hours after the alleged altercation.
b. Disorderly Conduct
There was probable cause to prosecute Jade for disorderly conduct. Under Arizona
law, “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of
a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such
person . . . [e]ngages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-2904(A)(1). The above facts and analysis are sufficient to establish probable cause
to prosecute Jade for disorderly conduct.
c. Criminal Damage
Finally, there was probable cause to prosecute Jade for criminal damage. “A person
commits criminal damage by . . . [r]ecklessly defacing or damaging property of another
person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1602(A)(1). Jade was charged with “causing damage in an
amount of $250 or less” under § 13-1602(B)(6). (Doc. 29-5 at 3.) In the police report,
Officer Pereira wrote:
During the process of placing [Jade] in the rear cab of the patrol vehicle[,]
[Jade]was uncooperative and refused to enter the patrol vehicle, placing his
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right foot at the patrol vehicle’s door. After brief resistance, [Jade] was
placed in the rear cab of the patrol vehicle. While inside the patrol vehicle,
[Jade] became aggressive and began kicking the patrol vehicle from inside,
causing substantial damage to the right rear patrol vehicle’s door. I secured
[Jade’s] legs with a strap using restraint technique to prevent kicking, in an
attempt to prevent more damage to the patrol vehicle and to prevent [Jade]
from injuring himself.
(Doc. 29-3 at 5.) Plaintiffs contend that the criminal damage prosecution was malicious
because it was “dismissed after prosecutors found out the claims were false and misleading
about . . . the damage to the vehicle.” (Doc. 17 at 15 ¶ 80.) Plaintiffs allege that the
prosecutor stated: “The State has been notified by the Police Department there was no
significant damage to the police vehicle as a result of this incident and therefore no
restitution sought.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 38.) Accepting as true that there was no “significant
damage” to the police vehicle, there still was probable cause to prosecute Jade for criminal
damage.
In Arizona, criminal damage does not require “significant damage.” Instead,
§ 13-1602(A)(1) only requires reckless damage of another’s property. For purposes of
§ 13-1602(A)(1), “damage” is defined broadly as it “means any physical or visual
impairment of any surface.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1701(1) (emphasis added); see Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 13-1601(1) (adopting § 13-1701’s definition of “damage” to § 13-1602).
Accordingly, the amount of damage caused does not influence whether someone
commits criminal damage in the first instance. Instead, the amount of damage affects the
punishment for criminal damage. See § 13-1601(B). Although the alleged damage Jade
caused might have been dubbed “substantial” and “significant” by police officers and
prosecutors, Jade was ultimately charged with causing less than $250 worth of
damage—the lowest form of criminal damage. See § 13-1602(B)(6).
Taking as true Plaintiffs’ allegations that Jade did not cause “substantial damage,”
the police report would still establish probable cause. Jade kicking the inside of the police
car to a point necessitating restraint would be “sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent
man in believing the accused is guilty of” causing criminal damage. Gonzales, 52 P.3d
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at 187 (citation modified). Again, criminal damage only requires “any physical or visual
impairment of any surface.” § 13-1701(1) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s malicious prosecution claim
against the City Defendants.
B. Assault and Battery
The FAC includes state law claims for assault and battery against the City
Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 9). Under Arizona law, “[a]n actor is subject to liability to another
for battery if the actor intentionally engages in an act that results in harmful or offensive
contact with the person of another.” Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d
435, 438 (Ariz. 2003). “Similarly, to succeed on an assault claim a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant acted with intent to cause another harmful or offensive contact or
apprehension thereof, and the other person apprehended imminent contact.” Lewis v. Dirt
Sports LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1044 (D. Ariz. 2017) (citation modified). “The two
claims are the same except that assault does not require the offensive touching or contact.”
Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 809 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiffs allege that the Officer Defendants “intentionally attacked . . . and harmed”
Jade. (Doc. 17 at 9 ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs go on to allege that “[t]hese actions included the
offensive contact having countless officers enter the neighbor’s home, pointing guns with
night scopes/lights at Jade at night at his own house, and the use of a rifle to arrest Jade
despite there being no indication weapons were needed to be drawn.” (Id. at 9–10 ¶ 51).
The assault and battery claims are easily dismissed as to Officers Ravelo, Loper,
Figley, and Pereira. The FAC fails to allege that that these officers participated in the
above conduct or were even present at Jade’s arrest.6 The only named defendant alleged
to participate in the foregoing conduct is Officer Stover. The FAC provides that Officer
Stover “used his rifle to arrest Jade despite there being no indication weapons were needed
to be drawn.” (Doc. 17 at 5 ¶ 25.) This is insufficient to give rise to a battery claim because
6 Based on the police report, it appears that Officer Pereira was present at Jade’s arrest.
But it is unclear what role Officer Pereira played in Jade’s arrest beyond strapping Jade’s
legs to keep him from kicking the inside of the police vehicle. (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) The FAC
does not cite this incident as giving rise to an assault or battery claim.
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Plaintiffs fail to allege that Officer Stover touched or contacted Jade.
This leaves the assault claim against Officer Stover. The Court finds that Plaintiffs
have plausibly pleaded that Officer Stover caused Jade to apprehend imminent harm or
offensive contact by pointing a rifle at him.
The City Defendants correctly point out that, under Arizona law, police are
“justified in threatening or using physical force against another if in making or assisting in
making an arrest.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-409; see Oakry v. City of Tempe, 629 F. Supp. 3d
974, 987 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“Arizona law provides that a person cannot be civilly liable for
justified conduct . . . .”). However, an officer is only justified in using physical force under
§ 13-409 if: (1) “[a] reasonable person would believe that such force is immediately
necessary to effect the arrest or detention or prevent the escape; (2) “[s]uch person makes
known the purpose of the arrest . . . or believes that it is otherwise known or cannot
reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested or detained; (3) “[a] reasonable
person would believe the arrest or detention to be lawful.” § 13-409(1)–(3). While these
factors might be met in this case, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the assault claim
against Officer Stover at this juncture. Ultimately, the City Defendants bear “the burden
of proving a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil case.” Ryan
v. Napier, 425 P.3d 230, 241 (Ariz. 2018).
Accordingly, apart from the assault claim against Officer Stover, the Court
dismisses without prejudice Jade’s assault and battery claims against the City Defendants.
C. Gross Negligence
The FAC includes a gross negligence claim by Jade against the City Defendants.
(Doc. 17 at 11). Under Arizona law, gross negligence “involves the creation of an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to another (simple negligence) together with a high
degree of probability that substantial harm will result (wantonness).” Roebuck v. Mayo
Clinic, 575 P.3d 375, 383 (Ariz. 2025) (citation modified). Thus, gross negligence requires
negligence paired with a “choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious
danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger
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to any reasonable man.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Wise, 476 P.2d 145, 151 (Ariz. 1970));
see Noriega v. Town of Miami, 407 P.3d 92, 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). Plaintiffs fail to
plead a gross negligence claim.
Plaintiffs allege that the City Defendants acted outrageously by “respon[ding] to
this matter at 11:00 at night and going to neighbors and presenting Jade as a dangerous
criminal.” (Doc. 17 at 11 ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs further allege that the false statements in the
Form IV and police report “can support a claim of gross negligence.” (Id. ¶ 60.) These
conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the City Defendants were
grossly negligent. At bottom, Plaintiffs do not specifically identify any particular action
by any particular defendant that rises to the level of gross negligence.
First, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts demonstrating that the City Defendants had
reason to know “facts that would lead a reasonable person to recognize their conduct
created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and involved a high probability of substantial
harm.” Garibay v. Johnson, 565 P.3d 236, 246 (Ariz. 2025). Plaintiffs essentially allege
that police conducted a late-night arrest that became known to Jade’s neighbors. It is
unclear what risk of substantial harm Jade was exposed to. This hardly rises to the level
of gross negligence.7
Second, Plaintiffs allege—without any supporting authority—that the City
Defendants were grossly negligent because they knowingly gave false testimony. (Doc.
17 at 11 ¶ 60.) It is unclear how giving false testimony, by itself, can support a claim of
7 Plaintiffs do not specifically state that Officer Stover was grossly negligent in pointing a
rifle at Jade. However, it is unclear whether Officer Stover’s act of pointing a rife at Jade
could plausibly support both an assault claim and a gross negligence claim. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. County of Santa Cruz, No. CV-24-00353-TUC-SHR, 2025 WL 2495065,
at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2025) (dismissing a gross negligence claim where the underlying
conduct was an intentional use of force). In Ryan, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized
that negligence and intentional torts are “mutually exclusive grounds for liability.” 425
P.3d at 236. While claimants can assert both claims as alternate theories of liability,
claimants must demonstrate that a set of facts plausibly gives rise to both a negligence
claim and an intentional tort claim. See id. at 238. However, an intentional use of force
cannot support a gross negligence claim. See id. A negligence claim can only tenably
accompany an intentional use of force claim where: (1) the negligence claim is based on
“conduct that is independent of the intentional use of force”; or (2) an action can reasonably
be construed as either intentional or negligent. See id. For example, in Ryan, an officer’s
intentional release of a K-9 did not support a negligence claim. Id.
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gross negligence. Plaintiffs fail to link the alleged false testimony to an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm. As other courts in the District have noted, “[while] a plaintiff need not
show that actual bodily harm occurred, it is not true that this ‘risk of bodily harm’
requirement is dispensable when making a claim for gross negligence.” Daurio v. Arizona,
No. CV-25-00001-PHX-SPL, 2025 WL 1745106, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2025)I. While
false testimony could hypothetically expose someone to bodily harm, that is not this case.
As noted, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate any patent falsehood in either the Form IV or the
police report. However, even if Plaintiffs did so, these documents were completed after
Jade was arrested. Plaintiffs do not identify what risk of bodily harm Jade faced after the
Form IV and police report were completed or how that risk was at all related to the Form
IV or the police report.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s gross negligence claim
against the City Defendants.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The FAC claims intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) by each Plaintiff
against the City Defendants.8 (Doc. 17 at 12.) Under Arizona law, “one who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.” Godbehere v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781,
785 (Ariz. 1989) (citation modified). IIED has three elements: (1) “the conduct by the
defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’”; (2) “the defendant must either intend to
cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will
result from his conduct”; and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result
of defendant’s conduct.” Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005)
(quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)).
Plaintiffs allege that Jade, Bruce, and Sharon each suffered from emotional distress
due to “Jade’s wrongful arrest, court proceedings and incarceration.” (Doc. 17 at 14 ¶ 73.)
8 Count Four also includes an IIED claim by Jade against Sloat. (Doc. 17 at 12). The
Court does not address this claim.
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Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fail because they fail to allege that the City Defendants’ conduct
was extreme or outrageous. Plaintiffs also make blanket assertions that apparently apply
to each of the City Defendants without attributing specific conduct to specific defendants.
IIED claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim where the claim is predicated
on a lawful arrest. See Malnes v. City of Flagstaff, 710 F. App’x 764, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)
(citing Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 909 P.2d
486, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)). Lawful arrests cannot “constitute the ‘extreme or
outrageous’ behavior required to establish [IIED].” Id. (citing Wallace, 909 P.2d at 496).
As discussed, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Jade’s arrest or prosecution was unlawful.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fails because those claims are predicated on a lawful
arrest and prosecution.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff’s IIED claim against the
City Defendants.
E. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The FAC includes claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) by
Bruce and Sharon against the City Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 16.) Under Arizona law, “the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires” that the plaintiff: (1) “witnessed
an injury to a closely related person”; (2) “suffered mental anguish manifested as physical
injury”; and (3) “was within the zone of danger so as to be subjected to an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm created by the defendant.” Doe I ex rel. Fleming & Curti PLC v. Warr,
566 P.3d 342, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) (citation modified).
Plaintiffs allege that Bruce and Share “were in the zone of danger” “by seeing their
son taken into custody” (Doc. 17 at 16–17 ¶¶ 87, 90.) As a result, Plaintiffs allege that
Bruce and Sharon experienced “emotional distress that resulted in physical harm including
loss of sleep, headaches, stomach aches and loss of appetite.” (Doc. 17 at 16 ¶ 87.)
Plaintiffs’ claim fails for a myriad of reasons.
It is unclear what injury Bruce and Sharon witnessed as Plaintiffs never specify what
harm befell Jade. Plaintiffs allege that Bruce and Sharon saw “their son harmed” and “were
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damaged by seeing their son taken into custody by this conduct.” (Id. at 16–17 ¶¶ 87, 89.)
Plaintiffs also repeatedly allege that Jade incurred physical injuries. (Id. at 10 ¶ 52.)
However, Plaintiffs never specify what those injuries are or how they were incurred.
Instead, Plaintiffs lodge cursory allegations such as “Defendants intentionally attacked
[Jade] and harmed him.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 51.) While it is unclear what “attack” and “harm”
means in this context, it appears that Plaintiffs are labeling Jade’s arrest as the attack.
Regardless, even if the Court were to accept that Jade incurred the requisite injury,
Plaintiffs fail to establish that Bruce and Sharon were in the danger zone. “A person is not
within the zone of danger unless he witnesses the injury of a closely related person from a
position in which ‘the negligent defendant created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm’ to
him as well.” Marquez v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-08-1132-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL
11338817, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2008) (quoting Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 670
(Ariz. 1979)). Plaintiffs fail to allege that Bruce and Sharon faced an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm.
Finally, Plaintiffs fail to plead that they “suffered mental anguish manifested as
physical injury.” Warr, 566 P.3d at 352. As noted, Plaintiffs complain they experienced
“emotional distress that resulted in physical harm including loss of sleep, headaches,
stomach aches and loss of appetite.” (Doc. 17 at 16 ¶ 87.) In Arizona, “physical injury, as
well as a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance, constitutes sufficient bodily
harm to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Monaco v.
HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 995 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). However,
“[t]ransitory physical phenomena, such as crying, nightmares, insomnia, and headaches,
that are themselves inconsequential and do not result in substantial bodily harm, cannot
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Borunda v. Rico, No. 1
CA-CV 12-0859, 2013 WL 6327652, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013). Plaintiffs fail to
establish that their alleged injuries “result[ed] in substantial bodily harm” or otherwise
“persist[ed] so as to result in a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance.” Id.
(emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Bruce and Sharon’s NIED
claim against the City Defendants.
F. Defamation
The FAC includes claims of defamation by Plaintiffs against the City Defendants.
(Doc. 17 at 15.) “To prevail on a defamation claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must
show (1) the defendant published a false and defamatory statement, and (2) the defendant
either (a) knew the statement to be false and defamatory, (b) acted in reckless disregard to
these matters, or (c) acted negligently in failing to ascertain them.” Burton v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety, No. CV-20-00920-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 2806760, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2,
2025) (citing Peagler v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Ariz. 1977)).
Plaintiffs allege they were defamed because police “[p]resent[ed] Jade or his family
as criminals or harboring criminals by going into neighbors’ homes to obtain access to the
Waichulaitis home to arrest Jade.” (Id. at 16 ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs further allege that “body
cameras will show the published statements about the intended arrest.” (Id.) Plaintiff fails
to adequately plead a defamation claim.
At bottom, Plaintiffs do not identify a false or defamatory statement. Instead,
Plaintiffs appear to argue that Jade’s arrest was defamatory because it presented Jade and
his family as criminals. Courts have expressly rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., Pistor
v. Garcia, No. CV-12-0786-PHX-FJM, 2014 WL 116391, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2014)
(“Plaintiffs contend that their arrests in public communicated to those present that plaintiffs
were criminals. But the law of defamation in Arizona requires ‘a false and defamatory
statement concerning another.’” (quoting Fendler v. Phx. Newspapers Inc., 636 P.2d 1257,
1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981))). The Court is unwilling to consider a lawful arrest a “false
statement.”
Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiffs’ defamation claims
against the City Defendants.
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G. Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
The FAC includes claims of excessive force by Plaintiffs in violation of § 19839
against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 17.) As noted, a § 1983 claim is predicated on
a state actor depriving an individual of a constitutional right. See WMX Techs., 197 F.3d
at 372. “The use of excessive force by police officers in the course of an arrest can violate
the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Oakry, 629
F. Supp. 3d at 984. Whether a seizure is unreasonable is an objective inquiry; “the question
is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). As the Supreme Court has noted:
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight. . . . Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 396 (citation modified). “Whether a particular use of force was ‘objectively
reasonable’ depends on several factors, including the severity of the crime that prompted
the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and whether the
suspect was resisting arrest.” Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090,
1095 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiffs allege that excessive force was used because a “SWAT team” was
employed to arrest Jade, which was “excessive in relation to the purpose for which it was
used.” (Doc. 17 at 20 ¶ 101.) Plaintiffs further allege that Jade’s arrest was “objectively
unreasonable given that Plaintiff was not a threat and there was no reason to bring an
extraordinary amount of officers with guns and night scopes at night and involve neighbors
to arrest him.” (Id. ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs also note that Jade was “forcibly arrested and
9 The FAC provides: “Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1982, excessive force and false arrest
occurred here.” (Doc. 17 at 17 ¶ 92.) The Court assumes the FAC mistakenly cites to
these statutes because both pertain to racial discrimination, which is not implicated here.
The only other instance in which these statutes are cited is in Plaintiffs’ Response which
provides: “Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1982, excessive force and false arrest occurred
here.” (Doc. 34 at 15.) The Court presumes that Plaintiffs reemployed this language by
mistake.
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detained.” (Id. at 19 ¶ 99.)
City Defendants do not seek dismissal of the excessive force claim against Officer
Stover. (Doc. 29 at 23.) This leaves Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, and Pereira. But as
noted, the FAC fails to allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, and Figley were even present at
the arrest. Neither does the FAC allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, and Figley employed
excessive force. While the police report establishes that Officer Pereira was present at
Jade’s arrest, it is unclear what role Officer Pereira played in Jade’s arrest beyond strapping
Jade’s legs to keep him from kicking the inside of the police vehicle. (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) The
FAC does not cite this incident as constituting excessive force.
Still, Plaintiffs contend that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, and Pereira “may be
held liable under the ‘integral participant’ standard.” (Doc. 17 at 8 ¶ 46.) “[A]n official
whose individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation
may be held liable under section 1983 only if the official is an integral participant in the
unlawful act.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). An
official may be considered an integral participant in two situations:
(1) the defendant knows about and acquiesces in the constitutionally
defective conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct
constitutes the violation or (2) the defendant sets in motion a series of acts
by others which the defendant knows or reasonably should know would
cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.
Id. (citation modified). Even if Jade was subject to excessive force, the FAC fails to allege
that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira were integral participants in applying said
force.
The FAC fails to implicate the first integral participant situation as it does not allege
that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira knew about or acquiesced to any behavior
that might be construed as constituting excessive force. This “category of liability is fairly
narrow.” Id. An officer knows about or acquiesces to unconstitutional behavior where he
participates in either the planning or execution of such behavior. See id. As noted, the
FAC does not establish that the foregoing officers participated in the execution of the arrest.
Neither does the FAC establish that the foregoing officers played any meaningful part in
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planning Jade’s arrest—or at least those details of the arrest which could arguably give rise
to an excessive force claim.
Similarly, the FAC fails to implicate the second integral participant situation. The
FAC does not allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira set in motion events
that were reasonably known to result in the use of excessive force.
At bottom, the FAC attempts to employ the integral participant doctrine as a catchall
to broadly impose liability on any officer that was remotely involved in Jade’s arrest.
However, integral participant “liability may not be imposed based on a ‘team effort’ theory
that would allow the jury to lump all the defendants together, rather than require it to base
each individual’s liability on his own conduct.” Id. at 890 (citation modified).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s excessive force claim
under § 1983 against Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira.
H. Conspiracy to Interfere With Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985)
The FAC includes a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 by Jade against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 20.) The “first
clause” of § 1985(3)— commonly known as the “equal protection clause”—“prohibits two
or more persons from conspiring to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the law.” 10 Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).
The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance
10 The Court assumes Plaintiff does not bring a claim under either § 1985(1) or (2) because
neither is remotely implicated. Section 1985(1) “extend[s] exclusively to the benefit of
federal officers.” Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th
Cir. 1981). Section 1985(2) “proscribes conspiracies ‘to deter, by force, intimidation, or
threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or
from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such
party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified.’”
Head v. Wilkie, 936 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting § 1985(2)). Additionally,
the Court assumes that Plaintiff does not bring a claim under the “second clause” of
§ 1985(3) which is known as the “support-or-advocacy clause.” See Gaetz v. City of
Riverside, 722 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2024). “A plaintiff asserting a claim
under this subsection must . . . establish that the conspiracy’s purpose was to force,
intimidate, or threaten an individual legally entitled to vote who is engaging in lawful
activity related to voting in federal elections.” Id.
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of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in their person or
property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Gaetz, 722 F. Supp. 3d at 1068–69 (citing Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536
(9th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff claims that “video evidence shows that two or more of the Defendants
conspired to ignore the typical procedure of obtaining and then resenting [sic] clearly
exculpatory evidence as to Jade’s rights to defend himself on his property.” (Doc. 17 at 21
¶ 108.) Plaintiff further claims that the following facts “illustrates a conspiracy”: “arresting
Jade at night, involving the neighbors, falsifying the Form IV and related police reports,
setting forth false facts to try and justify a $250,000 bond . . . [,] not doing any investigation
despite setting in motion a business card to have Jade contact police,” and the “ police
report alleging substantial damage to a vehicle then the City’s own prosecution admitting
there was none.” (Id. ¶¶ 109–10.) These allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege
that any particular Officer Defendant conspired to injure Jade.
To meet the first element, “the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the
existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.
1989). “[A] civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to
commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element
of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon
another, and an overt act that results in that damage.” Page v. Clark Cnty. Fire Dist. 6, 733
F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (citation modified). Such an agreement “may
be inferred from conduct and need not be proved by evidence of an express agreement.”
Ward v. E.E.O.C., 719 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1983). Still, claimants must provide
“plausible allegations—with specific facts—that there was a ‘meeting of the minds’ or an
‘agreement.’” Gaetz, 722 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.
Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the Officer Defendants expressly conspired
against Jade. Neither do Plaintiffs establish that any of the Officer Defendants tacitly
agreed to injure Jade. Plaintiffs merely allege that discrete events precipitated by discrete
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individuals, in the aggregate, demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. “Although a
conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, to establish violation of
Section 1985(3), plaintiff will have to do more than show independent parallel behavior on
the part of the defendants.” Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Plaintiffs only identify discrete events without plausibly alleging that these events were a
part of a coordinated effort to injure Jade.
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to allege what role each Officer Defendant played in the
alleged conspiracy. Again, Plaintiffs assert that each Officer Defendant conspired against
Jade. However, Plaintiffs fail to allege, even generally, what role each Officer Defendant
had in the broader agreement to injure Jade. Plaintiffs’ generic allegation that each Officer
Defendant engaged in a conspiracy is “not enough to give fair notice and to enable the
opposing party to defend itself effectively.” I.H. ex rel. Hunter v. Oakland Sch. for Arts,
234 F. Supp. 3d 987, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citation modified).
Finally, claims under § 1985(3) require “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); see also Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale,
227 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A cause of action under the first clause of § 1985(3)
cannot survive a motion to dismiss absent an allegation of class-based animus.”). Even if
the Officer Defendants conspired against Jade, Plaintiffs fail to allege that said conspiracy
was motivated by any discriminatory animus. Although courts are divided as to what
“categories” of animus are sufficient to give rise to a § 1985(3) claim, Plaintiffs fail to
claim that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by any commonly recognized animus such
as race, religion, or political affiliation. See Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr.,
424 F. Supp. 3d 861, 878 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 985 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing
cases). Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy, what role each
Officer Defendant played in the alleged conspiracy, or that the alleged conspiracy was
motivated by discriminatory animus.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s § 1985(3) claim against
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the Officer Defendants.
I. Monell Claim
Finally, the FAC includes the following Monell claims under § 1983 by Jade against
the City: unconstitutional policy and custom; failure to supervise and discipline; failure to
train; and negligent hiring. (Doc. 17 at 21.) As noted, § 1983 provides a cause of action
against state actors who deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. See WMX Techs.,
197 F.3d at 372. A city can be a “state actor” amenable to suit under § 1983. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–94 (1978). However, § 1983 does not “impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). “Instead, in Monell and
subsequent cases, [the Supreme Court] required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a
municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the
plaintiff’s injury.” Id. Such claims are commonly known as “Monell claim[s].” E.g.,
Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2020).
To assert a Monell claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a
constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy;
(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right;
and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau
v. Sch. Dist. No 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). Ultimately,
“there must be ‘a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.’” Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
Plaintiffs allege that the City “either failed to properly hire, supervise, discipline,
monitor, terminate and/or train its employees and/or failed to establish policies and
procedures that would prevent individuals that were not fit for duty from being hired,
employed, employed without supervision and retained as detention or peace officers.”
(Doc. 17 at 22 ¶ 113.) Plaintiffs specifically point out that Officer Ravelo “instructed
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Sharon to have Jade call the Police Department in order to get his side of the story” but that
the Officer Defendants “did not wait” and instead “set in motion the hunting down of Jade.”
(Id. ¶¶ 115–16.) Plaintiffs allege this resulted in “an outrageous nighttime SWAT assault”
and “Defendant Periera falsif[ying] his police report.” (Id ¶¶ 116–17.) It is unclear what
constitutional right Plaintiffs are attempting to vindicate through their Monell claim.
Nonetheless, the only remaining constitutional law claim is the alleged use of excessive
force by Officer Stover against Jade. Accepting the excessive force claim as true, Plaintiffs
fail to establish that the City was “the moving force behind” the alleged use of excessive
force.
Plaintiffs fail to point to a City “policy or custom” that bears a “direct causal link”
with the alleged use of excessive force. See Villegas, 541 F.3d at 957 (quoting City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Instead, Plaintiff recites that the City “either
failed to properly hire, supervise, discipline, monitor, terminate and/or train its employees
and/or failed to establish policies and procedures that would prevent individuals that were
not fit for duty from being hired.” (Doc. 17 at 22 ¶ 113.) However, these bare allegations
fail to identify a discrete City policy or action that was the “moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” Plumeau, 130 F.3d at 438 (quoting Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v.
Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs’ allegation that the City
negligently hired certain employees fails for similar reasons. However, Plaintiffs fail to
provide any meaningful detail beyond blanket assertions that the City negligently hired
each employee that was involved in Jade’s arrest.
Additionally, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the City’s failure to train its
employees resulted in excessive force against Jade. Typically, “[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
62 (2011) (citation modified). “Only when a city is on actual or constructive notice that a
particular omission in its training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights can the city be deemed deliberately indifferent.” Hayes v. Riley, 525
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F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S.
at 61). Plaintiffs only point to one instance in which excessive force might have been used.
This is insufficient to plausibly demonstrate the City failed to train its employees. As the
court in Hayes noted:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim of deliberate indifference based on a
city’s failure to train requires more information about prior instances of
officer misconduct, what those incidents entailed, what the city knew (or
should have known) about the incidents, and what training protocols could
have been implemented to prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.
525 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the City failed to discipline its
employees. “[A]llegations that a city repeatedly refused, or failed to take appropriate
corrective action against one officer when that officer has numerous incidents of
misconduct may form the basis for liability against the city employing that officer.” Hayes,
525 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (citation modified). Even assuming Plaintiffs intended to allege
that the City failed to discipline any of the named officers, Plaintiffs fail to establish any
particular officer engaged in “numerous incidents of misconduct.” See id. Plaintiff’s bald
assertion that the City failed to discipline its officers is insufficient to plead a failure to
discipline claim.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s Monell claim against the
City.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED dismissing the following counts with prejudice:
(1) Count Four: the IIED claims; (2) Count Five: the false imprisonment claims; (3) Count
Six: the malicious prosecution claims; (4) Count Seven: the defamation claims;; (5) Count
Nine: the false arrest claim under § 1983 (Doc. 17).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the following counts without prejudice:
(1) Count One: the assault and battery claims except for the assault claim as to Officer
Stover; (2) Count Three: the gross negligence claims (3) Count Nine: the excessive force
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claims under § 1983; (4) Count Eight: the NEID claims; (5) Count Ten: the conspiracy
claims under § 1985; and (6) Count Eleven: the Monell claims under § 1983 (Doc. 17).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff leave to amend the claims
dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiffs so choose, they must file a Second Amended
Complaint no later than thirty (30) days after the date this Order is issued.
Dated this 18th day of November, 2025.
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