Lott v. Upgrade Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
LaConstance T. Lott,
Plaintiff,
v.
Upgrade Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-02299-PHX-DMF
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
(“Motion to Compel”) (Doc. 21). Plaintiff LaConstance T. Lott (“Plaintiff” and/or “Lott”)
is a self-represented, non-incarcerated litigant (see Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff and Defendant
Upgrade Incorporated (“Defendant” and/or “Upgrade”) are the only parties to this matter,
which was removed by Defendant from the Maricopa County Superior Court (Doc. 1). In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), all parties have voluntarily consented to have a United
States Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings in this case with direct review by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if an appeal is filed (Docs. 11, 12, 13).
Defendant’s Motion to Compel is brought pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (Doc. 21). In the Motion to Compel, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff signed a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement on January 30, 2023, and
thereby agreed to resolve any disputes concerning Plaintiff’s employment through neutral
and binding arbitration (Id. at 1). Defendant asks the Court to compel Plaintiff to
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arbitration and stay this matter until the conclusion of arbitration proceedings (Id. at 8).
Despite requesting and being granted an extension of time to respond to Defendant’s
Motion to Compel (Docs. 32, 24), Plaintiff did not respond in opposition to the Motion to
Compel and her time to do so has expired (Doc. 34). However, Plaintiff previously filed a
Motion to Vacate / Reconsider Order Compelling Arbitration, which asserted duress
regarding the arbitration agreement, was procedurally deficient, and was denied (see Doc.
26; Doc. 27; see also Doc. 29 at 9).
After Plaintiff failed to timely respond in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Compel, Defendant replied in support of its Motion to Compel (Doc. 35). Defendant’s
Motion to Compel (Doc. 21) is ripe for decision.
Upon careful review of the parties’ arguments, the record in this matter, and
applicable law, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Compel and stay these
proceedings.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND POSTURE
In May 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in the Maricopa County
Superior Court (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Defendant timely removed the action to this Court asserting
federal question jurisdiction regarding Plaintiff’s Title VII claims and supplemental
jurisdiction regarding Plaintiff’s state law claims (Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 4, 3 ¶ 6). Defendant
thereafter moved to dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 5). After response and reply (Docs. 16,
17), the Court granted in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 19). The Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII claims with prejudice and dismissed several state law claims
without prejudice; Plaintiffs remaining claims are for defamation and several claims under
the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”) (Id.). The Court noted that “Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims, which provide the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction on removal, will be dismissed
with prejudice” but allowed any party to file a motion opposing remand “seeking that this
Court exercise diversity jurisdiction or other jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims” (Id. at 6, 11). Defendant timely filed a Motion in Opposition to Remand (Doc. 23)
which the Court granted after response and reply, finding the Court sits in diversity
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jurisdiction (Doc. 29; see also Docs. 24, 25, 28).
On September 23, 2025, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Compel requesting
that the Court compel arbitration and stay these proceedings (Doc. 21). With the Motion
to Compel, Defendant attached a declaration by Upgrade’s Vice President of People
Operations, Erik Navarro (“Navarro Declaration”) (Doc. 21-1); the Mutual Arbitration
Agreement electronically signed by Plaintiff and Upgrade’s Chief Financial Officer, Jeff
Bogan (“Arbitration Agreement”) (Doc. 21-2); and a proposed form of order (Doc. 21-3).
Despite two extensions of time (Docs. 27, 32, 34), Plaintiff did not file a response.
However, Plaintiff previously filed a Motion to Vacate / Reconsider Order Compelling
Arbitration, which asserted duress regarding the arbitration agreement, was procedurally
deficient, and was denied (see Doc. 26; Doc. 27; see also Doc. 29 at 9). Attached exhibits
to the procedurally deficient and denied Motion to Vacate consisted of an undated instant
messaging conversation between Plaintiff and a supervisor (Doc. 26 at 4); an instant
messaging conversation between Plaintiff and a supervisor dated January 30th (Id. at 6);
an email Plaintiff sent to an Upgrade HR representative regarding alleged retaliation (Id.
at 8); and an email Plaintiff sent to an Upgrade HR representative asserting, among other
things, that Plaintiff was forced to sign the company handbook without sufficient time to
read and review it (Id. at 10).
After Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s Motion to Compel, Defendant
filed a reply in support of the Motion to Compel (Doc. 35). Defendant’s Motion to Compel
(Doc. 21) is ripe for decision.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Compelling Arbitration
Any party bound to an arbitration agreement that falls within the scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., may bring a motion to compel
arbitration and stay the proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
The FAA applies to “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
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contract or transaction[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (concluding that the FAA applies if the transaction “‘involve[s]’
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce
connection”). The party seeking to compel arbitration “must prove the existence of a valid
agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 944 F.3d 1212,
1219 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279,
1283 (9th Cir. 2017)). A court reviewing a motion to compel arbitration must consider two
issues: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and (2) whether the agreement to arbitrate
encompasses their present dispute(s). See Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207
F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th
Cir. 2015). “If the answer is yes to both questions, the court must enforce the agreement.”
Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130). In reviewing a motion to compel arbitration, the court
“consider[s] all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits.” Herrera v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd., 104 F.4th 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Barrows v. Brinker Rest. Corp., 36 F.4th 45, 50 (2d Cir. 2022)).
As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the FAA establishes “a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” and directs courts to “treat arbitration
agreements as ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S.
497, 505 (2018) (first quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2; then quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). “Any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.” Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922-23 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25). “Courts should thus ‘construe
ambiguities concerning the scope of arbitrability in favor of arbitration.’” Id. at 923
(quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 66 (1995)).
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“Notwithstanding the federal policy favoring it, ‘arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [the party] has
not agreed so to submit.’” Tracer Rsch. Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292,
1294 (1994) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); see French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d
902, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Where the arbitrability of a dispute is in question, a court must
look to the terms of the contract. See Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130.
In determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and the scope of
arbitration, federal district courts apply state contract law principles. Pokorny v. Quixtar,
Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944 (1995). Under Arizona law, “there must be an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and
sufficient specification of terms” for an enforceable contract to exist. Savoca Masonry Co.
v. Homes & Son Constr. Co., 112 Ariz. 392, 394, 542 P.2d 817, 819 (1975). “[W]hen
parties bind themselves by a lawful contract, the terms of which are clear and unambiguous,
a court must give effect to the contract as written.” VEREIT Real Est., LP v. Fitness Int’l,
LLC, 255 Ariz. 147, 152, 529 P.3d 83, 88 (Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Grubb & Ellis Mgmt.
Servs., Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 86, 138 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Ct. App. 2006)).
The purpose of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent and when such
intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous language the court need not resort to other
tools of construction or interpretation. Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz.
588, 594, 218 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Ct. App. 2009).
“Arizona courts have long held that contracts procured under duress are
unenforceable.” USLife Title Co. v. Gutkin, 152 Ariz. 349, 357, 732 P.2d 579, 586 (Ct.
App. 1986) (citations omitted). Cognizable duress occurs when a party is induced to sign
a contract by way of a wrongful act or threat of the other party. Inter-Tel, Inc. v. Bank of
Am., 195 Ariz. 111, 117, 985 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 1999) (following the Restatement
(First) of Contracts § 492); see Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 356, 429 P.2d 949, 953
(1967) (husband’s duress claim failed because wife had a right to leave the marriage and
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her threat to do so was not wrongful). “The test of what act or threat constitutes duress is
determined by considering whether the threat placed the party entering into the transaction
in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and judgment.” Dunbar, 102
Ariz. at 355-56, 429 P.2d at 952-53 (citing Restatement (First) of Contracts § 492 cmt. a
(1932)). Accordingly, a party’s voluntary and informed agreement does not constitute
duress. Rubenstein v. Sela, 137 Ariz. 563, 565, 672 P.2d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 1983).
B. Stay of Proceedings
The FAA provides that “[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts
of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of Section 3 as the district court’s
mandatory obligation to stay the proceedings if the lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute
and a party requests a stay. Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024). The Supreme
Court reasoned that Section 3 “ensures that the parties can return to federal court if
arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute. That return ticket is not available if
the court dismisses the suit rather than staying it.” Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, to protect the party’s procedural protections under the FAA, the district court
is compelled stay proceedings of an arbitrable dispute pending arbitration upon request of
a party. Id. at 478-89.
IV. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (Doc. 21-2 at 2-5)
On January 30, 2023, Plaintiff and Upgrade’s Chief Financial Officer, Jeff Bogan,
executed the Arbitration Agreement (Doc. 21-2 at 5). Among other things, the Arbitration
Agreement provides that “[a]ll disputes covered by this Agreement will be decided by a
single arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury
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trial.” (Id. at 2 (emphasis in original)). As to claims covered by the Arbitration Agreement,
it states the following:
[T]his Agreement applies, without limitation, to claims based upon or related
to discrimination, harassment, retaliation, defamation (including post-
employment defamation or retaliation), whistleblowing, breach of a contract
or covenant, fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, trade secrets, unfair
competition, wages, minimum wage and overtime or other compensation or
any monies claimed to be owed, meal breaks and rest periods, termination,
tort claims, common law claims, equitable claims, and claims arising under
the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Civil Rights Act of
1964, Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, Affordable Care Act, Genetic Information
Non-Discrimination Act, Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of 1990, Occupational Safety
and Health Act, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985,
False Claims Act, state statutes or regulations addressing the same or similar
subject matters, and any claims for violation of any federal, state or other
governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance.
(Id.). Additionally, the Arbitration Agreement advises:
This Mutual Arbitration Agreement is a contract and covers important issues
relating to your rights. It is your sole responsibility to read it and understand
it. You are free to seek assistance from independent advisors of your choice
outside the Company or to refrain from doing so if that is your choice.
(Id.).
In her procedurally deficient and denied Motion to Vacate / Reconsider Order
Compelling Arbitration, it appears Plaintiff conceded that she signed the Arbitration
Agreement, but Plaintiff asserts she was coerced into signing the Arbitration Agreement
(Doc. 26 at 1-2). Plaintiff argued that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because
Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement under duress (Id. at 1-2). In support of her
duress argument, Plaintiff relied primarily on two purported instant messaging
conversations between Plaintiff and her supervisors. Plaintiff characterized the
conversations as demands to sign the Arbitration Agreement even though Plaintiff lacked
“ample time to review and consult counsel” (Id.). In the first undated conversation,
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Plaintiff and her supervisor, Milagros Jorge, had the following exchange:
Jorge: [Plaintiff] can you please go into workday and sign off on the
handbook
Thank you
Plaintiff: yes of course. I was on a call sorry for the late reply..
Plaintiff: I have reviewed and signed esigned . . . .
Jorge: sure
you reviewed the document for 45 minutes
?
Plaintiff: I did.
(Id. at 4). In the second conversation, dated January 30, Plaintiff and her supervisor, Chris
Heck, further discuss signing the handbook:
Heck: Hello, can you please go into workday and complete signing
the company handbook.
ASAP
. . .
Plaintiff: I have reviewed and signed esigned . . . .
Heck: nice thank you
(Id. at 6). Indeed, the Arbitration Agreement reflects that Plaintiff signed it on January 30,
2023 (Doc. 21-2 at 5). Approximately one week later, Plaintiff emailed an Upgrade HR
representative regarding alleged retaliation (Doc. 26 at 8) and two days after that sent
another email asserting, among other things, that Plaintiff’s supervisors “forced [her] to
sign [the] 2023 Handbook without time to read the 70+ pages” (Id. at 10).
V. DISCUSSION
Defendant is correct in its reply that “[d]espite the Court’s generosity in granting
Plaintiff two extensions to file her Response, she has failed to act.” (Doc. 35 at 2).
Ordinarily, when a motion is filed and the other party fails to file the required answering
memoranda, the Court may consider such failure as consent to the granting of the motion.
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See LRCiv. 7.2(i) (“[I]f the unrepresented party or counsel does not serve and file the
required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the
denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily);
United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming district court’s
dismissal of an action where party failed to respond in accordance with local rules thereby
consenting to dismissal). Nevertheless, because the Court previously stated that it was
inclined to construe Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate as Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 29 at 9), the
Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments in her Motion to Vacate as set forth herein.
A. Compelling Arbitration
Defendant argues that the Court should compel the parties to arbitration because the
Arbitration Agreement falls within the scope of the FAA, the Arbitration Agreement is
valid and enforceable, and the Arbitration Agreement covers the claims in these
proceedings (Doc. 21). Defendant reasons that the FAA applies because Defendant sells
its products and services in all fifty states and Washington, D.C., satisfying the commerce
requirement (Id. at 4-5). Defendant argues that the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable
under Arizona law and Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which arise out of her employment
with and separation from Defendant, are claims covered by the Arbitration Agreement (Id.
at 6-9). Thus, Defendant concludes that the FAA requires the claims in this matter to be
referred to arbitration (Id. at 5-6, 8). Plaintiff does not contest that she signed the
Arbitration Agreement but argued in her previous filing that the Arbitration Agreement is
unenforceable because she claims she signed such under duress (Doc. 26).
First, the Court agrees with Defendant’s contention that the FAA applies to the
Arbitration Agreement. In the Navarro Declaration, an Upgrade Vice President describes
Defendant as a “privately held financial technology company that operates an online
marketplace, through which consumers can apply for and obtain various financial
products” (Doc. 21-1 at 2 ¶ 3). He further states that Defendant “does business in all fifty
states and Washington, DC” (Id. at 2 ¶ 4). Thus, because Defendant conducts interstate
business and Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant—including the
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Arbitration Agreement—involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies.
As to the question of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate, the Court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid and
enforceable arbitration agreement under Arizona law.1 Here, offer and acceptance of the
Arbitration Agreement2 are shown by the electronic signatures of Plaintiff and Defendant’s
CFO (see Doc. 21-2 at 5). Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement states that “[t]he mutual
obligations by [Defendant] and [Plaintiff] to arbitrate provide consideration for this
Agreement” and the terms of such obligations are clearly specified (Id. at 4; see generally
id.). Therefore, the Arbitration Agreement is an enforceable contract and the Court must
give effect to its provisions. See Savoca Masonry, 112 Ariz. at 394, 542 P.2d at 819.
Moreover, the materials Plaintiff proffers to show duress do not support her
argument. Rather than showing a wrongful act or threat by Defendant, the asserted instant
messaging conversations reflected that Plaintiff’s supervisors merely asked her to sign the
company handbook (Doc. 26 at 4, 6). Both supervisors asked Plaintiff to “please go into
workday and sign off on the handbook” and, although one requested Plaintiff to sign
“ASAP,” Plaintiff spent at least 45 minutes reviewing the documents before signing (Id.).
Moreover, the Navarro Declaration relates that “Plaintiff was also advised and encouraged
to review the Arbitration Agreement with legal counsel of her choice” (Doc. 21-1 at 2 ¶ 8)
and the Arbitration Agreement further advised Plaintiff that “[i]t is your sole responsibility
to read it and understand it. You are free to seek assistance from independent advisors of
your choice outside the Company or to refrain from doing so if that is your choice.” (Doc.
21-2 at 2). Upon review of the parties’ submissions and the record in this matter, the Court
discerns no wrongful threat or act by Defendant to induce Plaintiff into signing the
Arbitration Agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff was free to accept or
reject the Arbitration Agreement and did not sign under duress.
1 Plaintiff did not contest that Arizona law governs (see Doc. 26).
2 The Navarro Declaration relates that the agreement attached to Defendant’s motion (Doc.
21-2) is a true and correct copy of the Arbitration Agreement electronically signed by
Plaintiff on January 30, 2023 (Doc. 21-1 at 2 ¶ 6).
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As to the question of whether the claims in these proceedings are covered by the
Arbitration Agreement, the Court concludes that the parties’ agreement encompasses all of
the parties’ present disputes in these proceedings. After the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Arizona Employment
Protection Act, and respondeat superior, Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant are
defamation and several claims under ACRA, namely harassment, sexual harassment, and
retaliation (Doc. 19 at 10-11; see Doc. 1-1 at 11). Each claim relates to conduct by
Defendant’s employees and to events that occurred while Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant (Doc. 1-1 at 6-9, 11). Thus, Plaintiffs remaining claims in these proceedings
fall squarely within the Arbitration Agreement’s provision requiring the parties to arbitrate
claims relating to “harassment, retaliation, [and] defamation (including post-employment
defamation or retaliation)” (Doc. 21-2 at 2). Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement applies
to “claims based upon or related to . . . [the] Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . [and] state statutes
or regulations addressing the same or similar subject matters” (Id.). Accordingly, the
Arbitration Agreement applies to ACRA claims because, as stated by the Arizona Supreme
Court, “[t]he Arizona Civil Rights Act is modeled after and generally identical to the
federal statute in the area (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e, et seq.).” Higdon v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 138 Ariz. 163, 165, 673 P. 2d
907, 909 n.3 (1983). The Court will thus give effect to the parties’ clear agreement that
the remaining claims in this matter be arbitrated.
In short, the parties agreed to arbitrate, the Arbitration Agreement encompasses the
remaining claims in this matter, and the Court will compel arbitration.
B. Stay of Proceedings
Defendant argues that a court must stay proceedings when arbitration is compelled
and a party requests a stay (Doc. 21 at 8). Plaintiff has not addressed the issue of a stay
(see Doc. 26). In any event, Defendant is correct that if a lawsuit involves an arbitrable
dispute and a party requests a stay, the court must grant the stay. Smith, 601 U.S. at 475-
76. Accordingly, the Court will stay the litigation in this Court pending arbitration of
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Plaintiff’s remaining claims in these proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement
that encompasses all the remaining claims in this matter, which are Plaintiff’s defamation
claims and ACRA claims (see Doc. 19). Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant’s
Motion to Compel (Doc. 21), will order the parties to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration
Agreement (Doc. 21-2 at 2-5), and will stay these proceedings pending arbitration.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Doc. 21).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED compelling Plaintiff and Defendant to arbitration
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement (Doc. 21-2 at 2-5) on all Plaintiff’s remaining claims
in this matter, which are Plaintiff’s defamation claims and ACRA claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED staying these proceedings pending arbitration
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement (Doc. 21-2 at 2-5).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, after seeking the input of Plaintiff,
shall file with this Court a joint status report setting forth the progress of the arbitration
within 90 days of the date this Order is filed and then every 90 days thereafter through
conclusion of arbitration.
Dated this 18th day of December, 2025.
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