Abramian et al v. Bondi et al

2:25-cv-04256Azd17 de nov. de 2025

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Eleonora Abramian, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Pam Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-04256-PHX-SHD (ASB)
ORDER
Petitioners are natives and citizens of Georgia who filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 action
seeking “mandamus, APA [Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)], and constitutional
relief to prevent the unlawful and premature removal . . . while their motion to reopen is
pending before the Board of Immigration appeals.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) Late in the afternoon on
November 16, 2025, Petitioners also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
through the Court’s “After-Hours Emergency Injunctive Relief Procedure” alleging
Eleonora Abramian’s removal was scheduled to take place that day at 6:00 p.m. The Court
will dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
Petitioners allege their orders of removal were issued in 1995 and, since that time,
they have been released on Orders of Supervision requiring them to check in twice per
year. (Doc. 1 at 5.) They argue that removal at this juncture would violate their
constitutional rights because they suffer from medical vulnerabilities and removal is
“medically dangerous” and will result in irreparable harm. Petitioners also argue they
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received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout their removal proceedings and are
entitled to withholding of removal, CAT protection, and other relief. On November 14,
2025, Petitioners filed a motion to reopen their immigrations proceedings with the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and seek a stay of removal until that motion is
adjudicated. Petitioners also filed with the BIA a motion to stay their removal, but that
motion was summarily denied.
Specifically, Petitioners raise eight counts for relief under the All Writs Act and 28
U.S.C. § 2241. They seek equitable and declaratory relief arguing the BIA’s denial of their
motion to stay their removal violated the APA, they seek mandamus relief to compel the
BIA to issue a reasoned decision, and contend their removal before adjudication of their
motion to reopen would violate their due process rights.
II. Legal Standards
In the Ninth Circuit, “Petitioners seeking a stay of removal must show that
irreparable harm is probable and either: (a) a strong likelihood of success on the merits and
that the public interest does not weigh heavily against a stay; or (b) a substantial case on
the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the Petitioners’ favor.” Leiva-
Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing application of Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 444 (2009)); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Where a party “can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the
merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary
injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the [party]’ s favor,’
and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.,
709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this Ninth Circuit “serious questions” test, “[t]he
elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a
weaker showing of another.” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).
A federal district court is authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under
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28 U.S.C. § 2241 where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1), (3). District courts are directed to screen habeas corpus petitions
before requiring the government to file a response. A district court may summarily dismiss
a habeas corpus petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, foll. 28 U.S.C. §
2254.1 See also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Federal courts are
authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its
face”); Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (“District courts adjudicating
habeas petitions . . . . are instructed to summarily dismiss claims that are clearly not
cognizable.”); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rule 4 “explicitly
allows a district court to dismiss summarily the petition on the merits when no claim for
relief is stated”).
Habeas corpus review in federal district court is not available, however, for claims
“arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), “arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9),2 or “challeng[ing]
a ‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney
General has made regarding [an alien’s] detention or release,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 516 (2003) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(precluding review of other discretionary decisions and actions specified by statute).
III. Discussion
Here, Petitioners fail to state a claim for habeas corpus relief. While Petitioners
allege they “do not challenge the underlying 1995 removal orders in this action” they are
challenging Respondents’ discretion in executing their final orders of removal. (Doc. 1 at
1 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts apply
to habeas corpus proceedings under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
2 See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (the court of appeals “shall be the sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal”).
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2.) Petitioners also argue they are challenging the “BIA’s unexplained denial of a stay and
ICE’s attempt to execute removal while a motion to reopen is pending.” (Doc. 1 at 4.)
This Court lacks jurisdiction over such a challenge because Petitioners’ request to halt the
execution of a final removal order “arise[s] from” an “action” or a “proceeding” brought
in connection with Petitioners’ removal (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)), or from “the decision or
action” to “execute removal orders against” Petitioners (8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). See
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (interpreting
Section 1252(g) to foreclose judicial review over the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders);
see also Ma v. Holder, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that the
district court lacked jurisdiction under Section 1252(g) to stay a removal pending the BIA’s
decision on a motion to reopen); Lopez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV 10-7929 AG
(JC), 2010 WL 4279314, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) (finding that the district court did
not have jurisdiction over a habeas claim challenging the IJ’s denial of a motion to stay);
Mejia-Espinoza v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-7884 FMC (PLA), 2009 WL 235625, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a request to stay
removal during the pendency of a motion to reopen before the BIA).
Petitioners also challenge the BIA’s summary denial of their motion to stay removal
as violating the APA for which they seek mandamus relief. The APA authorizes “[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency decision, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” to seek judicial review of the agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
A court may set aside final agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2), and where
an agency has failed to act within the meaning of the APA, a court may compel the “agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
Petitioners fail to state a colorable claim for review under the APA. Petitioners do
not present any final determination that is subject to review, nor do they seek a
determination by an agency that has been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.
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See Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“a claim under
§ 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete
agency action that it is required to take”); Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 941-42 (9th
Cir. 2013). Insofar as Petitioners seek review of the BIA’s decision to deny their motion
to stay, such claim is barred from review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Patchak v.
Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (finding the jurisdiction-stripping provision which
“applie[d] ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,’” included “the general grant of
federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331”); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (the APA does not
apply “to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”).
Finally, the remaining grounds cited by Petitioners do not give rise to a cognizable
claim for relief. The Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, are not independent sources
of jurisdiction, and serve only to enlarge the range of remedies available in cases where
jurisdiction otherwise exists. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571
U.S. 191, 197 (2014); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2005) (“the Declaratory Judgment Act does not by itself confer federal subject-matter
jurisdiction”); Lights of Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 130 F.3d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir.
1997) (“the All Writs Act is not itself a source of jurisdiction”); Starbuck v. City and
County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 459 n.18 (9th Cir. 1977) (the Mandamus Act “does
not provide an independent ground for jurisdiction”). And, even if they were independent
sources of jurisdiction, as described above, relief would be barred by § 1252. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), including . . . sections 1361 and 1651 . . .”).
Petitioners have therefore failed to present cognizable grounds for relief.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Petition and this action.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Petitioners’ Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus
By A Person In Federal Custody (Doc. 1) and this action are dismissed.
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(2) Petitioners’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 2) is denied.
(3) The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.
Dated this 17th day of November, 2025.
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