Furnas v. Tierra Luna and Sol Enterprises LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Nicole Furnas,
Plaintiff,
v.
Tierra Luna and Sol Enterprises, LLC; et al.,
Defendants.
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CV 23-00529-TUC-RM (MAA)
ORDER
Pending before the court is a motion for protective order filed by the corporate
defendants (“the defendants”) on November 25, 2025. Doc. 90. The plaintiff filed a response
on December 10, 2025. Doc. 94. The defendants filed a reply on January 14, 2026. Doc. 103.
Background
The plaintiff in this action, Nicole Furnas, lived in one of the defendants’ apartments.
Complaint, Doc. 1, p. 1. “As the lease term neared its end without a renewal offer, Furnas
became afraid that [the defendants] would not renew her lease . . . .” Doc. 1, pp 1-2. One of
the defendants’ maintenance workers, the individual defendant since identified as Jesus Santos
Caceres, “said he would have her lease renewed if she performed oral sex on him.” Doc. 1, p.
2; Doc. 93, p. 3. “Feeling she had no other way to avoid losing her home, Furnas did so.” Doc.
1, p. 2.
On November 20, 2023, Furnas filed a Complaint in this court claiming (1) sexual
harassment in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, (2) discriminatory housing practices
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in violation of the Arizona Fair Housing Act, (3) negligence for failing to train and supervise,
(4) assault, and (5) battery. Complaint, Doc. 1.
In the pending motion, the corporate defendants seek a protective order to “limit the
discovery requests and deposition questions by Plaintiff to topics and information that are
relevant to what is asserted in this case.” Doc. 90, p. 2.
“Rule 26(c) [of the Fed.R.Civ.P.] authorizes the district court to issue any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211–12
(9th Cir. 2002) (punctuation modified). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as
conferring broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate
and what degree of protection is required.” Id.
Discussion
In general, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery
in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The defendants assert first that “[a]t each deposition, Plaintiff has dedicated a sizeable
portion of the deposition to questions regarding the decision to renew a lease, who makes the
decision, how a tenant would be notified of that lease.” Doc. 90, p. 4. They argue this
information is irrelevant.
In her response, Furnas argues that “[t]he circumstances leading up to and surrounding
Plaintiff’s non-renewal, as well as her subsequent attempts to get her lease renewed are critical
to understanding Plaintiff’s frame of mind when she accepted Caceres’ quid pro quo.” Doc. 94,
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p. 5. Moreover, “[t]he details of her non-renewal also provide insight into why she reasonably
believed that Caceres, a maintenance worker, could help her get her lease renewed.” Id.
The court agrees that “Plaintiff’s frame of mind when she accepted Caceres’ quid pro
quo” is important. Doc. 94, p. 5. If she subjectively believed that Caceres could help her, her
version of events becomes more likely. The fact that Furnas received a non-renewal notice is
relevant. What she believed about the renewal process and Caceres’s ability to influence that
process is relevant. The defendants’ actual lease renewal policies and procedures, however, are
irrelevant unless Furnas was aware of them. The true reason for the Furnas’s non-renewal is
irrelevant unless she knew what it was.
Furnas argues that the defendants’ inability to give a straight answer about how leases
are renewed is evidence relevant to her negligence claim. The court is not convinced. The
defendants’ alleged failure to articulate a clear policy about how leases are renewed is not
particularly strong evidence that they breached the standard of care related to the supervision
and training of their maintenance workers.
The defendants further argue that Furnas “seeks irrelevant information regarding
property conditions.” Doc. 90, p. 4. They maintain that code violations and complaints about
the maintenance of property are irrelevant. They assert that “[w]hether or not Nicole Furnas’s
air conditioner unit was fixed in a timely manner is not a claim in this case.” Doc. 90, p. 5. The
court finds that under some circumstances, the maintenance of the property could be relevant.
Furnas claims, among other things, that Caceres performed air conditioning repair and
the defendants’ supervision of him was negligent. Evidence that the defendants did not timely
respond to their tenant’s air conditioning complaints could be evidence that the defendants did
not properly supervise their air conditioning maintenance workers and ensure they were
working faithfully. On the other hand, it could be evidence that the defendants were strapped
for cash and were unable to hire enough workers to timely respond to their tenants’ complaints.
Air conditioning complaints could be relevant, but the court cannot say for sure at this point.
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The defendants further argue that Furnas “seeks irrelevant information related to her
security deposit and rent amount.” Doc. 90, p. 5. They assert that “Plaintiff takes lines and
lines [of] questioning in depositions to ask who decides how much a deposit should be, who
decides if it is returned, who does the walkthrough of the unit upon move-out, how a security
deposit is paid, and who decides how much rent should be for a unit.” Id. The defendants
further argue that Furnas has spent an unreasonable amount of time establishing that Furnas
does not appear in the rent rolls and tenant listings and is not listed in the defendants’ online
system. Doc. 90, p. 6. The court cannot see how any of those issues would be relevant to
Furnas’s claims.
The defendants also seek their costs and fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Doc.
90, p. 9.
When a party files a motion to compel, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) instructs the court to make the
party “whose conduct necessitated the motion” pay the movant’s reasonable expenses if the
motion is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. Here, however, the court grants the motion in part. If that
happens, Rule 37(a)(5)(C) explains that the court “may . . . apportion the reasonable expenses
for the motion.” The court finds that each party should pay their own costs and fees for the
motion.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for protective order filed by the corporate defendants
on November 25, 2025 is Granted-in-Part. Doc. 90. The parties should continue to conduct
their discovery in accordance with this order.
DATED this 14 day of January, 2026.th
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