SANDTON CREDIT SOLUTIONS MASTER FUND IV, LP v. Sloan et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRESNO DIVISION
In re
STEPHEN WILLIAM SLOAN,
Debtor.
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Case No. 	20-10809-B-11
SANDTON CREDIT SOLUTIONS
MASTER FUND IV, LP,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN WILLIAM SLOAN, an
individual; and WILLIAM BRETT
SLOAN, as Trustee of the Brett
Sloan Irrevocable Trust dated
February 4, 2020 and as
Trustee of the Grace Sloan
Irrevocable Trust dated
February 4, 2020,
Defendants.
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Adv. Proc. No. 	21-01039
MEMORANDUM
INTRODUCTION
Debtor Stephen Sloan (“Sloan”) guaranteed a loan of about
$33 million dollars made in 2017 by Sandton Credit Solutions
Master Fund IV, LP (“Sandton”) to 4-S Ranch Partners, LLC
(“4-S”) Sloan was the principal of 4-S. 	The loan was to
refinance an acquisition loan by which 4-S purchased real
properties. 	The properties secured Sandton’s loan. 	The loan
(and guaranty) was also secured by a large pistachio ranch Sloan
owned.
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Unable to perform under the loan’s terms, Sloan entered
into Forbearance Agreements with Sandton, the last of which was
to terminate in mid-February 2020. 	Sandton had started
foreclosure proceedings but suspended them during the
forbearance period. 	Sloan could not perform under the
Forbearance Agreements.
Meanwhile Sloan’s parents transferred three parcels of
property to Sloan which, Sloan claims, were to be held by Sloan
until Sloan’s son, Brett, had established two irrevocable trusts
for Sloan’s children. 	After the trusts were established, Sloan
transferred the three parcels to Brett as Trustee, less than
three weeks before Sloan filed chapter 11.
Its standing established by stipulation and through Sloan’s
confirmed plan, Sandton sued Sloan and Brett, as Trustee, to set
aside the conveyances as avoidable. 	Following trial, the court
finds the transfers were made with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud the creditors of the bankruptcy estate and
holds that the transfers should be avoided.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Pertinent Pre-Petition Events.
Sandton loaned 4-S over $33 million. Pre-Trial Order Doc.
#218 “PTO.” 	The loan was guaranteed by Sloan. 	The 4-S loan was
secured by deeds of trust over property located in Merced County
known as the Hamburg Ranch owned by Sloan as well as property
owned by 4-S.
Less than a year later, 4-S defaulted and Sandton started
foreclosure.
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Forbearance Agreements were entered into between 4-S, Sloan
and Sandton between May 2019 and December 2019. PTO. 	The final
forbearance was entered into in December 2019. 	Sandton agreed
to forbear exercising its rights provided Sloan made a payment
of $1 million dollars and otherwise performed the terms of the
agreement. 	The forbearance period would terminate on February
18, 2020. PTO.
Sloan’s only sibling, Elizabeth “Beth” Johnson and Sloan
testified both by alternate direct testimony and by live
testimony at trial.
Beth Johnson testified that sometime in the fall of 2019
she had a conversation with Sloan’s parents, William H. Sloan
Jr. and June Elizabeth Sloan, concerning William’s wishes about
his estate plan. 	Their father, William H. Sloan, Jr., was
seriously ill at the time. 	He passed away in July 2020. Trial
Transcript (“TT”) 45:15-18. 	Sloan testified that his father
planned to balance the properties left to his children. Beth’s
Alternate Direct Testimony (“ADT Beth”) 4:13-18. Sloan Alternate
Direct Testimony (“ADT Sloan”) 3:9-13.
One of the properties their father was concerned about is
known as the Sunset property. 	This was formerly the family’s
ancestral home (APN 083-200-020). 	There were two adjoining
parcels known as the Pioneer property (APN 083-190-025 and 083-
190-026). 	According to Beth and Sloan, these three parcels
(Pioneer and Sunset properties) were to be transferred to the
grandchildren, Brett and Grace Sloan, however the irrevocable
trusts that were eventually set up for Brett and Grace were not
yet finalized. (ADT Beth 6:4-10; ADT Sloan 4:19-20, 5:20-6:2.)
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Sloan testified that his father wanted to transfer the properties
to Sloan to transfer to Sloan’s children’s irrevocable trusts
when those trusts were completed. TT 50:9-17. 	The value of the
properties when transferred were approximately $900,000.00.
On September 19, 2019, Sloan’s parents conveyed, by grant
deed to Sloan, the Pioneer and Sunset properties. 	These gift
deeds were recorded on September 16, 2019. PTO. 	Two months
later, Sloan conveyed the parcels to himself as trustee of the
2012 Stephen Sloan Inter Vivos Trust. PTO.
The Sunset and Pioneer parcels were never part of Sandton’s
collateral nor were they part of Sloan’s assets when Sandton
underwrote the loan to 4-S that was guaranteed by Sloan. TT
22:19-23:9.
Sloan held the Pioneer and Sunset properties individually
or as trustee of his inter vivos trust for almost five months
until February 4, 2020, when Sloan’s 2012 Trust conveyed by gift
deed the three parcels to his son, Brett Sloan, as trustee of
the William Brett Sloan Irrevocable Trust dated February 4,
2020, and as trustee of the Grace Sloan Irrevocable Trust dated
February 4, 2020. 	The transfers were recorded February 13,
2020. PTO.
Sloan received no consideration for the transfers. 	Sloan
filed a Claim for Reassessment Exclusion for Transfer Between
Parent and Child with the County of Merced on February 4, 2020,
listing values totaling approximately $900,000.00 for the three
parcels. Plaintiff Exhibit (“PX”)-10; TT 54:17-55:3.
On February 13 and February 14, 2020, Sloan transferred
thirteen other properties in three counties to his son, Brett
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Sloan. (PTO.) 	These properties later were returned by Brett to
the Sloan bankruptcy estate. 	These properties were collectively
valued at $4.1 million.
B. 	Pertinent Post-Petition Events.
Eighteen days after recording the transfers of the Sunset
and Pioneer parcels to his son Brett as trustee of two trusts,
on March 2, 2020, Sloan filed Chapter 11.
Sloan’s schedules (PX-11) revealed his 2012 trust and that
it holds title to about $7 million dollars of property and that
some of the property “may have been moved” to an irrevocable
trust in favor of Sloan’s heirs. Id. 	Sloan also states in his
schedules that he had been working to convert the 2012 trust to
an irrevocable trust. Id.
Part 9 of the Statement of Financial Affairs asks Sloan to
identify property he holds or controls for another person,
including “any property you borrowed from, are storing for, or
hold in trust for someone.” PX-11. 	In response, Sloan checked
the box “No.”
During the case and before confirmation of the
reorganization plan, Sandton filed a stay relief motion. Main
Case Doc. 22 WJH-2. 	The motion was resolved in part by Sloan
agreeing Sandton would have standing to bring an Adversary
Proceeding to set aside avoidable transfers. Main Case Doc.
#302.
Sloan’s fourth amended plan was confirmed on February 22,
2022. Main Case Doc. #483. 	It provides for liquidation of
assets. 	Sloan was given a period to liquidate certain specified
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assets. 	Thereafter, assets would be administered and sold by a
plan administrator. 	That administrator is presently in place.
On the date of filing bankruptcy, Sloan owed Sandton over
$57 million dollars. 	During the case, Sandton foreclosed on its
collateral reducing its claim to an unsecured claim of $27
million dollars at the time of plan confirmation. Main Case Doc.
#483. 	Sandton’s original complaint was filed on September 3,
2021 (Doc. #1). 	On October 27, 2022, Sandton’s first amended
complaint was filed. 	That is the operative complaint in this
adversary proceeding.
Sandton alleged the transfer of the Sunset and Pioneer
parcels to Brett as trustee of two irrevocable trusts were
actually fraudulent transfers with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors and constructively fraudulent transfers made
for no consideration while Sloan was insolvent under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 548(a)(1)(A) and (b)(i), (ii)(I). 	Sandton also alleged the
same claims under California’s Uniform Voidable Transfers Act
under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and Cal. Civ. Code § 3439 et seq.
Sandton also alleged the transfers should be recovered for the
benefit of the estate from Brett Sloan as trustee.
In November 2024, Sandton and Brett Sloan as trustee
entered into a settlement. 	Under the settlement, Brett would
remain in the adversary proceeding as a nominal defendant only
and would not contest any judgment entered in this proceeding.
Doc. #763, 4:24-5:9. 	The court approved that settlement on
November 19, 2024. Docs. #763, #794.
The matter was tried on June 23, 2026. 	Robert Rice, one of
Sandton’s principals, Stephen Sloan and Beth Sloan each
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testified by alternate direct testimony and live testimony. 	The
matter was submitted to the court on August 14, 2026, and taken
under advisement after post-trial submissions.
JURISDICTION
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California has jurisdiction of this proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) as it is a civil proceeding arising under and in a
case under Title 11 of the United States Code. 	The district
court referred this matter to this court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(a). 	This is a matter that this court may hear and finally
determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Transfers Can be Avoided as Actually Intended to
Hinder, Delay, or Defraud Creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) permits a trustee to avoid a
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property within two
years before the date of the petition if the debtor voluntarily
or involuntarily made such transfer with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became
indebted, on or after the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred.
Under Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(i)(1), a creditor may seek
to avoid a debtor’s transfer with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.
Under both statutes, the claimant seeking to avoid the
transfer has the burden of proof on each element. 	O’Gorman v.
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Hoffman (In Re O’Gorman), 115 F.4th 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2024);
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(c). 	Both statutes require that the
debtor have an interest in the property transferred. 	11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1); Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.01(a) – defining “asset”
meaning property of the debtor except to the extent it is
encumbered by a lien or generally exempt under non-bankruptcy
law and “transfer” meaning every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing
of or parting with an asset or interest in an asset.
Intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be
inferred from circumstances such as: (1) actual or threatened
litigation against the debtor; (2) a purported transfer of all
or substantially all of the debtor's property; (3) insolvency or
other unmanageable indebtedness on the part of the debtor; (4) a
special or close relationship between the debtor and the
transferee; (5) the debtor’s continued possession and use of the
property after the putative transfer. Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton
(In Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 805-806 (9th Cir. 1994). 	The
court, however, is not limited to those circumstances when
determining the debtor’s intent in making the transfer. 	In Re
Kinnerson, 16-22163-A-7; Adv. No. 16-02134; 2017 WL 6021318
(Bankr. E.D. Cal., December 4, 2017).
In the same vein, Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b) lists factors
from which a court may infer an intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud. 	Those include: (1) whether the transfer or obligation
was to an insider; (2) whether the debtor retained possession or
control of the property transferred after the transfer; (3)
whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
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(4) whether before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (5)
whether the transfer was substantially all of the debtor's
assets; (6) whether the debtor absconded; (7) whether the debtor
removed or concealed assets; (8) whether the value of the
consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred; (9) whether the debtor was insolvent or
became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred; (10) whether the transfer occurred
shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;
(11) whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor that transferred the assets to an insider
of the debtor. 	These so called “badges of fraud” are relevant
when a court considers whether a transfer is avoidable under 11
U.S.C. § 548 even though implication or construction of that
section is a matter of federal law. See, O’Gorman, 115 F.4th at
1059 fn. 5. 	Sandton here points to several “badges of fraud”
that it asserts establishes a basis to avoid the transfer of the
Pioneer and Sunset properties by debtor Stephen Sloan to Brett
Sloan. 	The court generally agrees.
First, the transfer of the property was to the debtor’s
son, Brett Sloan as trustee. 	Brett is an insider and certainly
has a close relationship with Sloan.
Second, at least as to Sandton, there was unmanageable
indebtedness on the part of Sloan at the time of the transfers.
The parties in this case have stipulated that Sloan owed Sandton
over $57 million dollars when the petition was filed. PTO.
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Sandton had already initiated non-judicial foreclosure of the
real property owned by 4-S and that Sloan individually pledged
as collateral when the transfers were made.
Third, the transfers of the Sunset and Pioneer properties
were at the same time as numerous other transfers of real
property were made to Brett Sloan. 	True enough, many of those
properties were retransferred by Brett to the estate prior to
the filing of the first amended complaint here.
Fourth, the transfers were not revealed on the debtor’s
schedules. 	In fact, in response to the pertinent question on
the Statement of Affairs the debtor answered that he did not
hold any property for the benefit of another person. 	It is well
settled that the debtor has a duty to prepare bankruptcy
schedules and statements carefully, completely, and accurately
and bears the risk of non-disclosure. Diamond Z Trailer, Inc. v.
JZ, LLC, 371 B.R. 412, 417 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007 quoting Cusano
v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 946-49 (9th Cir. 2001).
Though there are no bright line rules for how much
itemization and specificity is required in a bankruptcy
schedule, the schedules must be as particular as reasonable
under the circumstances. 	Cusano, 264 Fd. at 946 quoting In re
Mohring, 142 B.R. 389, 395 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992).
The debtor here did not conspicuously reveal the transfers.
Subjectively, Sloan may have thought it was unnecessary since he
believed the property was eventually to be in his children’s
trusts. 	However, he had sufficient opportunity in his chapter
11 case to be more forthright.
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Fifth, it is uncontested that Sloan received no
consideration for the transfers to Brett.
Sloan argues otherwise. 	Primarily he contends that he held
the properties in a resulting trust for the benefit of his
children following the wishes of his father and mother. 	Sloan
argues that his sister confirmed the intention of his parents
and his sister’s testimony to that effect should be given great
weight since she was not going to benefit from the transfer of
the properties to Brett Sloan as trustee.
Under California law, a resulting trust arises under
circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to
take the beneficial interest. 	Siegel v. Barton, 220 B.R. 660,
664 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 	Sloan asserts that while he had
title to the properties, it was bare legal title since the
beneficial interest was always intended to be for his children.
It is true that the transfer of the interest of the debtor in
property refers to property that would have been part of the
estate had it not been transferred before bankruptcy. 	In re
Beverly, 374 B.R. 221, 233 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) citations
omitted. 	In other words, the focus is on the interest of the
debtor that was transferred. 	Id. 	Specific evidence may negate
an inference of fraud notwithstanding the presence of a number
of “badges of fraud.” 	Id. at page 236 citing Filip v.
Bucurenciu, 129 Cal.App. 4th 825; 28 Cal.Rptr. 3d 884, 890
(2005); Annod Corp. v. Hamilton & Samuels, 100 Cal.App 4th 1286;
123 Cal.Rptr. 2d 924, 932-33 (2002) (“a court must consider all
relevant circumstances”). 	See also, Lloyds Bank of California
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 187 Cal.App 3d 1038, 1042 (1986) (No
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resulting trust when there is a lack of evidence the grantor
intended to transfer other than as set forth in the deed.)
One significant problem with Sloan’s position is that it is
well settled that an exception to the general rule concerning
resulting trusts are transactions between a parent and a child.
These transactions are presumed to be in the nature of gifts,
advancements, or bounties. 	In short, the existence of the
relationship of parent and child is a circumstance which prima
facie establishes the presumption of an advancement and thereby
rebuts the presumption of a resulting trust. 	Id. at page 1044
quoting Estate of Schechtman, 162 Cal.App 2d 365, 370 (1958).
It is a presumption affecting the burden of proof. 	See,
Ceguerra v. Secretary of HHS, 933 F.2d 735, 739-40 fn. 4 (9th
Cir. 1991).
In addition to the common law presumption, Cal. Evidence
Code § 662 provides:
The 	owner 	of 	the 	legal 	title 	to 	property 	is
presumed 	to 	be 	the 	owner 	of 	the 	full
beneficial 	title. 	This 	presumption 	may 	be
rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.
So, Sloan’s proof of a resulting trust must be clear and
convincing. 	It is not.
First, after Sloan received the properties from his parents
he did not immediately transfer them. 	He held the properties
for over five months. 	His control over the properties was
demonstrated by his unilateral decision to put the properties
into an inter vivos trust which had been established by Sloan
since 2012. 	Sloan’s response is that he could not transfer the
properties to Brett as trustee because the irrevocable trusts
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for Brett Sloan and Grace Sloan, his children, were not
completed. 	That may be true, 	However, there was no evidence as
to why they were not completed. 	No evidence was presented by
Sloan’s estate planning attorneys. 	Sloan had control of any
attorney client privilege since his father had passed away. 	His
mother, according to Beth Sloan’s testimony, had dementia that
may have meant Sloan’s mother could not realistically waive her
privilege. 	But Sloan could waive his.
Second, as mentioned above, Sloan’s representations in his
bankruptcy schedules were inconsistent with him taking the
position that he was a “mere conduit” of the properties.
Third, there were alternatives available to Sloan’s father
and mother. 	For example, they could have transferred the Sunset
and Pioneer properties to Beth Sloan to hold for the benefit of
Brett Sloan as trustee. 	No evidence was presented explaining
why that option was not pursued. 	There was no evidence as to
why the transfer could not have been made directly to Brett
Sloan bypassing the debtor here given the debtor’s mounting and
seemingly unmanageable debt problems leading up to his
bankruptcy filing in March 2020.
Though somewhat cumbersome, there was also the option of
Sloan’s parents transferring the properties to an escrow holder
with instructions that the escrow holder would transfer the
properties to the Brett Sloan and Grace Sloan trusts when
appropriate.
In the face of these facts, the testimony of Sloan and his
sister does not amount to clear and convincing proof. 	Though
testimony concerning their father’s plan or intentions was not
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hearsay. 	Fed. R. Evid. 803(d). 	That simply means it was not
excluded. 	It was not entitled to significant weight. 	Beth
could not recall specifics as to when she had any conversations
with her father concerning his estate plan when asked on cross-
examination. 	Sloan was equally vague on the timeline and
ultimately it was speculative as to how and why this estate plan
was going to be accomplished.
The court also heard testimony that the elder Mr. Sloan was
one who wished to act quickly once he made up his mind. 	That
does not explain why the transfer of the Sunset and Pioneer
properties went to Sloan in the first place. 	That just explains
the speed with which the elder Mr. Sloan wanted the estate plan
to be accomplished.
On balance then, Sloan does not by clear and convincing
evidence overcome the presumption that he held beneficial title
at the time he transferred the Sunset and Pioneer properties to
his son Brett Sloan as Trustee of the Brett Sloan irrevocable
trust and Grace Sloan irrevocable trust.
II. 	Plaintiff did not Meet its Burden of Proof on
Constructive Fraud Claims.
Sandton urges that the transfers of the Sunset and Pioneer
properties can be voided under both bankruptcy and California
law because they were “constructively fraudulent.” 	Specifically,
Sandton claims that Sloan received no consideration for the
transfers and was insolvent at the time of the transfers, 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii)(I); Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05(a).
///
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The court is unconvinced. 	Sandton has not proved insolvency by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, insolvency as applicable in this
case means a financial condition “such that the sum of [Sloan’s]
debts is greater than all of [Sloan’s] property, at a fair
evaluation, exclusive of (i) property transferred, concealed, or
removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity’s
creditors; and (ii) property that may be exempted.” 	11 U.S.C.
§ 101(32)(A).
True enough, Sloan’s bankruptcy schedules as well as
admitted facts in this adversary proceeding show Sloan had
assets totaling slightly over $36 million dollars and debts of
over $57 million dollars. 	Based on a “balance sheet” test,
Sloan appeared insolvent on the date of filing the bankruptcy
case.
However, Sandton provided no evidence of Sloan’s solvency
other than relying upon Sloan’s testimony at trial and
bankruptcy schedules. 	Sloan’s testimony was that he did not
believe he was insolvent until he filed the bankruptcy case.
Debtor was the principal of 4-S. 	(See In re 4-S Ranch Partners,
LLC, Case #20-10809.) 	4-S scheduled the value of the real
property assets as $500 million dollars with total real and
personal property assets totaling $703 million dollars.
(Summary of Assets and Liabilities and Schedule A/B at page 1-9
of Doc. #18 in the 4-S case.) 	Sandton encumbered the real
property in the 4-S case.1 	In the debtor’s amended schedules,
1 The substantial value attributed by the debtor to 4-S is likely based on the
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the 4-S Ranch Partners property had an estimated value of $300
million or more with approximately $55 million of debt against
the property. 	Main Case Doc. #19. 	Debtor scheduled the
interest in 4-S Ranch Partners as having “unknown value” not
“zero value.” 	Yet Sandton provided no evidence to contradict
Sloan’s estimates.
California’s version of the UVTA contains virtually the
same definition of insolvency. 	Civil Code § 3439.02(a).
Sandton argues that Sloan was not generally paying the debtor’s
debts as they became due and therefore Sloan should be presumed
to be insolvent. 	Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02(b). 	Sandton
correctly notes that the presumption imposes on the party
against which the presumption is directed (here, Sloan) the
burden of proving the non-existence of insolvency is more
probable than its existence.
Sloan did prove the non-existence of insolvency was more
probable at the time of the transfers. 	Sloan’s own schedules
show that he valued his interest in 4-S substantially more than
what was owed Sandton. 	True enough, Sandton is correct that
Sloan was not paying the debts owed Sandton under the terms of
the original loan agreement or forbearance agreements. 	But
Sandton had no counter evidence as to the value of the debtor’s
other assets.
debtor’s use of the property as a source of water to be sold before the
passage of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”). 	After the
enactment of SGMA, Debtor made efforts to sell water from the 4-S property.
However, those efforts did not coincide with the forbearance periods agreed
upon by Sandton pre-petition. 	Main Case Doc. #440 pages 6-8. 	Sandton
provided no evidence concerning the value of the 4-S interest or other
property owned by Sloan at the time of the transfers. 	Sandton solely relied
on the debtor’s valuations.
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Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05(b) plainly provides that Sandton
has the burden of proving the elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. 	Sandton did not prove the value of Sloan’s assets at
fair valuation at the time of the transfers. 	Rather, Sandton,
using the debtor’s schedules, speculated that when the transfers
were made, Sloan’s assets did not exceed his debts. 	Given
Sloan’s testimony and statements in his schedules, Sandton
needed to provide more evidence than presented.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, Sloan had the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption. 	However, Sandton
still had the burden of persuasion as to the insolvency issue.
Fed. R. Evid. 301, 302. 	Sloan presented evidence that he was
not insolvent at the time of the transfers. 	Sandton had the
burden of proof to establish a constructively fraudulent
transfer. 	For the reasons indicated, they did not meet that
burden of proof for the constructively fraudulent transfer on
the issue of insolvency.
III. No Relief can be Awarded Against Sloan, Individually.
Case law is fairly clear that the transferor is not a
necessary party in an action to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance. 	Koeberer v. California Bank of Commerce, et al. (In
re Koeberer), 632 B.R. 680, 688, fn.3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021).
However, if the transferor retained an interest in the
fraudulently transferred asset, the transferor is a properly
named party. 	Scoggins v. Fredrick, 629 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1980); Takiguchi v. MRI International, Inc., 2:13-cv-01183-JAD-
VCF; 2015 WL 13677808*2 (D.Nev. January 23, 2015). 	There was no
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evidence presented that Sloan retained any interest when he
transferred the Sunset and Pioneer parcels to Brett Sloan as
trustee.
The transferee here, Brett Sloan as Trustee of the Brett
Sloan Irrevocable Trust and as Trustee of the Grace Sloan
Irrevocable Trust has agreed to bound by the judgment in this
matter even though he did not participate or present any defense
to the transfers.
Since Sloan retained no interest, he, in his individual
capacity, will be dismissed.
IV. 	Attorneys’ Fees.
Sandton seeks its attorneys’ fees and argues that it is
entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. 	It is
unclear if Sandton will be seeking an award of attorneys’ on a
contract basis or as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(3), (4) or both.
Nevertheless, Sandton’s right to attorneys’ fees or
expenses on either basis may be sought under Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
54(d)(2) as applicable under Fed. R. Banky. Proc. 7054. 	Any
request for attorneys’ fees will need to be served upon all
necessary parties.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment shall be entered
against Defendant Brett Sloan as Trustee of the Brett Sloan
Irrevocable Trust and Brett Sloan as Trustee of the Grace Sloan
Irrevocable Trust avoiding the transfers of Merced County APN
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083-190-025; Merced County APN 083-190-026; and Merced County
APN 083-200-020. 	Those properties shall be transferred to
Stephen Sloan within twenty-one (21) days of entry of judgment
to be administered by the plan administrator in Sloan’s main
bankruptcy case. 	Any claim of Sandton for attorneys’ fees shall
be in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(c) as applicable to
bankruptcy adversary proceedings under Fed. R. Banky. Proc.
7054. 	Judgment to be prepared by counsel for Sandton and
approved as to form only by counsel for Stephen Sloan. 	Form of
judgment to be submitted to the court within fourteen (14) days
of the date of this memorandum.2
Dated: 	By the Court
René Lastreto II, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
2 The forgoing are the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52 as made applicable to bankruptcy adversary
proceedings by Fed. R. Banky. Proc. 7052. 	Any finding of fact which is
deemed a conclusion of law is adopted as such. 	Any conclusion of law which
is deemed a finding of fact is adopted as such.
Aug 27, 2026
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Instructions to Clerk of Court
Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment
The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment
or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the
parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the
BNC or, if checked 	, via the U.S. mail.
Kurt F. Vote
Steven K. Vote
265 E. River Park Circle, Suite 310
Fresno CA 93720
Peter A. Sauer
7650 North Palm Avenue, Suite 101
Fresno CA 93711
Peter L. Fear
7650 North Palm Avenue, Suite 101
Fresno CA 93711
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