Chand v. Regan

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SHARON S. CHAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEE M. ZELDIN,
Defendant.
Case No. 21-cv-07773-RS
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Sharon Chand (Plaintiff), proceeding pro se, moves for relief from a partial grant of
summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6). Plaintiff
contends she has uncovered new evidence of fraud by officials at the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), her former employer. Because she has failed to demonstrate that this new evidence
would have impacted the partial grant of summary judgment, the motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural history of this case has been extensively documented and need
not be recounted here. See, e.g., Dkt. 27, at 2–3; Dkt. 46, at 2. In brief, Plaintiff was formerly a
probationary employee at the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights. She suffers from several medical
conditions—including deep vein thrombosis, inflammation, and major depressive disorder—
which necessitated certain accommodations at work. After filing a formal complaint against her
manager and taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, her employment was
terminated. She brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.,
and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, against the Administrator of the EPA (Defendant),
Case 3:21-cv-07773-RS Document 135 Filed 02/23/26 Page 1 of 5

ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION
CASE NO. 21-cv-07773-RS
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
asserting five claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination based on disparate treatment, (2)
retaliation, (3) hostile work environment, (4) disability discrimination based on failure to provide
reasonable accommodations, and (5) ADA interference.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The motion was granted as to the
disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether
Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. See
Dkt. 94, at 6–8. The motion was granted as to the retaliation claim because she could not
demonstrate that certain actions constituted adverse employment actions under the law and
because she could not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether certain other adverse employment
actions were caused by her employer’s desire to retaliate against her. See id., at 8–11. The motion
was also granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA interference claim because she failed to oppose
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. See id. at 17–18.
Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim yielded mixed results. She averred she was denied
a reasonable accommodation on four occasions, and summary judgment was granted for
Defendant as to only one of those occasions. As to the others, Plaintiff successfully raised a triable
question over whether Defendant satisfied its obligation to engage in the interactive process to
accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. See Dkt. 94, at 12–13. Finally, Plaintiff’s hostile workplace
claim survived summary judgment because Plaintiff produced enough evidence from which a
factfinder could conclude that she was harassed on account of her disability. See id., at 13–17.
Plaintiff now moves for relief from the partial grant of summary judgment. She claims to
have uncovered two new pieces of evidence which she asserts demonstrate fraud. The first piece
of evidence is an office-wide email provided to her by a former EPA employee in which someone
at EPA solicited annual leave donations for Plaintiff because she “[was] experiencing a medical
emergency and . . . exhausted all other paid leave.” Dkt. 126 (Mot.), Ex. B. Plaintiff argues that
this evidence would have helped her retaliation claim survive summary judgment because it
showed that Strauss, the EPA official who decided to terminate her employment, knew about her
leave at the time he terminated her.
Case 3:21-cv-07773-RS Document 135 Filed 02/23/26 Page 2 of 5

ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION
CASE NO. 21-cv-07773-RS
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
The second piece of evidence comes from an anonymous EPA employee Plaintiff calls
“Jane Doe.” This employee gave Plaintiff her “reasonable accommodation paperwork,” which
Plaintiff claims made her aware of how the interactive process worked in her EPA region and how
it was “corrupted by the actions of Edwards and Wong,” two EPA officials. Mot., at 5. Plaintiff
specifically seems to take issue with the fact that Wong, who served as agency counsel, was
involved in her accommodation process but was not involved in Jane Doe’s. She also complains
that she was not offered the same accommodation paperwork as Jane Doe and that one of the
accommodations she received, a flexible start time, was not an accommodation at all but rather a
benefit available to all employees.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) permits relief from a judgment or order for “fraud
. . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” “To prevail, the moving party must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party
from fully and fairly presenting the defense.” De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206
F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir.2000). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) require[s] that fraud ...
not be discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceedings.” Pac. & Arctic Ry. and
Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.1991).
Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that permits relief from a judgment or order for “any
other reason that justifies relief.” “A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show
‘extraordinary circumstances . . .’” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)); see Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d
1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Rule is ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent
manifest injustice’ and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party
from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” (quoting United States v.
Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005))).
Case 3:21-cv-07773-RS Document 135 Filed 02/23/26 Page 3 of 5

ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION
CASE NO. 21-cv-07773-RS
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
III. DISCUSSION
Neither piece of evidence warrants setting aside the partial grant of summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues that the office-wide email demonstrates that Strauss knew about her leave at the
time she made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, but the grant of summary
judgment on the retaliation claim did not turn on whether Strauss knew about Plaintiff’s leave.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. Under that framework, Defendant bore the burden of offering a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. Because Defendant successfully offered such a
reason—that Plaintiff was terminated because of her job performance—the burden shifted to
Plaintiff to raise a triable question as to whether that proffered reason was pretextual. See Curley v.
City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff could not do so. She argued that she was “fully successful” in her role, but that
assessment did not entitle her to continued employment under the regulations which governed
Plaintiff’s employment. See Dkt. 94, at 6; 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u)(6). Plaintiff also failed to offer
any direct or circumstantial evidence that the EPA officials, including Strauss, did not genuinely
believe that Plaintiff’s performance did not merit continued employment, even if that genuine
belief was wrong. See id. at 7. This failure doomed her retaliation claim. Evidence that Strauss
knew about her leave would have made no difference.
Plaintiff’s reliance on new evidence regarding the way EPA conducted the interactive
accommodation process with another former employee is equally confounding. As Defendant
points out, Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation and EPA’s response to that request are
directly relevant to only the failure to accommodate claim1—a claim which largely survived
1 Evidence about the interactive process could theoretically be relevant to the ADA interference
claim as well. However, summary judgment on that claim was granted to Defendant because
Plaintiff “failed to present any evidence in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.” Dkt. 94, at 18. Plaintiff does not specifically address the ADA interference claim in the
present motion. There is, therefore, no basis on which to upset the grant of summary judgment on
that claim.
Case 3:21-cv-07773-RS Document 135 Filed 02/23/26 Page 4 of 5

ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION
CASE NO. 21-cv-07773-RS
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
summary judgment. Summary judgment was only granted insofar as the claim related to an
incident in which Plaintiff’s supervisor requested that she turn up for work at 7:45AM even
though she was approved to start work at 8:30AM. See Dkt. 94, at 12. However, that portion of the
claim was not deficient because Plaintiff failed adequately to demonstrate that EPA did not engage
in an interactive accommodation process; it failed because Plaintiff never requested the
accommodation. See id. Thus, more information about how EPA engaged in the interactive
accommodation process with other employees could not have changed the result.
It is similarly unclear what the import is of Plaintiff’s assertion that a flexible schedule was
a benefit provided to all employees, not a disability accommodation. Plaintiff averred three
instances in which she requested some change to her schedule or working conditions to
accommodate her disability. Summary judgment to Defendant was denied as to two of those
instances, and—to reiterate—it was granted as to the other only because there was no evidence
that Plaintiff actually made the request.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the partial grant of summary
judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
______________________________________
RICHARD SEEBORG
Chief United States District Judge
Case 3:21-cv-07773-RS Document 135 Filed 02/23/26 Page 5 of 5