A.H. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District et al

3:22-cv-03233Cand20 de fev. de 2026

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
A. H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-cv-03233-AMO
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS
SUMMER SIGLER & WEST CONTRA
COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Re: Dkt. No. 104
This is a tort and discrimination case arising from a high school teacher’s sexual assault of
a minor student. Defendants Summer Sigler and West Contra Costa Unified School District (“the
District” or “WCCUSD”) move for summary judgment as to all remaining causes of action
asserted against them. The motion for summary judgment was heard before this Court on
December 18, 2025. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments
therein and those made at the hearing, as well as the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ motion in part, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law causes of action, and DISMISSES the remainder of the claims without prejudice to re-filing in
state court, for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff A.H. alleges she was sexually abused by one of her teachers, Jane Shetterly, while
a student at De Anza High School within the West Contra Costa Unified School District during
the 2020-2021 school year. See Third Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 60). A.H. started attending De Anza
High School as a freshman in August 2019, when she was 14 years old. A.H. was a student with
special needs and was identified as having a Specific Learning Disability which required an
Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). Sigler Dep. at 24:3-9. During A.H.’s time at De Anza
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High School, Sigler was the principal. Sigler Dep. at 19:14-18. In September 2019, Assistant
Principal Kim Jordan was appointed the “admin point person” for issues involving A.H. and
would give Principal Sigler regular updates. Sigler Dep. at 29:9-25, 44:13-18.
Upon starting at De Anza, A.H. began spending increasing amounts of time with Shetterly
before, during, and after school. A.H. Dep. at 117:5-14. Shetterly immediately took an interest in
A.H., asking questions about her personal life and private matters. A.H. Dep. at 118:16-119:10,
120:8-14, 125:2-9. Shetterly provided A.H. with her cell phone number and the two began
communicating regularly on their cell phones. A.H. Dep. at 125:20-126:7, 131:16-20. Shetterly
would also take A.H. into the teacher’s lounge and faculty restroom. A.H. Dep. at 127:17-128:9,
128:15-18. Principal Sigler noticed A.H. spending time in Shetterly’s room during the 2019/2020
school year before the pandemic. Sigler Dep. at 59:23-60:24.
De Anza High School’s in-person instruction ceased in March 2020 when the COVID
pandemic hit. Sigler Dep. at 36:20-22. During the summer following her first year at De Anza,
A.H. emailed Assistant Principal Jordan and told her “of course me and Shetterly, we talk on the
daily.” Jordan Dep. Ex. 7; Jordan Dep. at 52:17-53:7. Principal Sigler admitted this conduct
would be “unusual” and “outside the norm” and was something she would want to look into
further. Sigler Dep. at 53:9-12, 53:23-25. By September 30, 2020, Principal Sigler knew
Shetterly and A.H. were “very close” and spending time together. Sigler Dep. at 59:10-22, 51:25-
52:7.
As A.H. entered her second year at De Anza, Shetterly became increasingly involved in
her life. By fall 2020, Shetterly and A.H. spent almost every weekday together. Shetterly Dep. at
30:16-23. Shetterly first sexually assaulted A.H. around September 2020, following months of
grooming. A.H. Dep. at 79:4-10, 155:1-16; Shetterly Dep. at 31:18-22. The sexual assault
continued consistently from September 2020 up to the date of Shetterly’s arrest on May 30, 2021.
Shetterly Dep. at 31:23-32:5.
Between September 2020 and May 2021, Shetterly sexually assaulted A.H. on numerous
occasions and exchanged and requested explicit images. Shetterly Dep. at 111:4-112:16.
Shetterly also provided A.H. with drugs and alcohol and lied to A.H.’s mother in furtherance of
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her sexual assault of A.H. A.H. Dep. at 165:5-18; Shetterly Dep. at 121:4-9. At some point
during the 2020/2021 school year, Shetterly began to teach from A.H.’s house and continued to do
so until in-person instruction resumed. A.H. Dep. at 134:9-18, 151:8-152:5.
By October 2020, Assistant Principal Jordan had reported to Principal Sigler concerning
behavior between Shetterly and A.H., and Principal Sigler acknowledged that Shetterly
overstepped boundaries. Sigler Dep. at 70:5-9, 70:17-23. Principal Sigler herself also noticed that
Shetterly was acting “inappropriately” in October 2020. Sigler Dep. at 62:10-63:1.
As a special needs student with an IEP, A.H. had a case manager during her time at De
Anza High School, Marlene Trempy. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 88:19-21. As A.H.’s case manager,
Trempy would write the IEP, work with the family, help determine academic goals, and remain
closely involved with A.H. during her time at De Anza. Sigler Dep. at 64:24-65:17. Trempy
testified that she started to observe Shetterly overstep boundaries in the beginning of October 2020
and went to Principal Sigler to report her concerns. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 126:2-4, Sigler Dep. at
56:22-57:6.
On October 20, 2020, Trempy observed Shetterly on A.H.’s Zoom camera in A.H.’s
bedroom. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 134:24-135:22. Trempy raised the issue with Principal Sigler
“right away.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 50:18-21; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 136:1-3. Principal Sigler
recalled Trempy advising her that Shetterly was in A.H.’s Zoom classroom but denied being told
Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom at the time. Sigler Dep. at 63:8-14, 77:1-15, 77:25-78:9, 79:1-5,
94:9-14, 172:7-9, 213:22-25. Assistant Principal Jordan also denied being told by Trempy that
Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom. Jordan Dep. at 218:4-8. Principal Sigler testified that if it was
reported to her that Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom during school hours it would have triggered a
call to human resources (“HR”), and it could be a serious offense. Sigler Dep. at 79:6-15, 84:8-15.
However, Principal Sigler admitted that she was aware that Shetterly was spending time at A.H.’s
home and teaching classes from A.H.’s home. Sigler Dep. at 102:19-23, 213:11-21. Jordan
similarly knew Shetterly was spending time at A.H.’s home in October 2020, including during
school and teacher work hours. Jordan Vol. II at Dep. 226:10-13.
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WCCUSD administrators held a meeting with Shetterly to discuss her conduct on October
23, 2020. Assistant Principal Jordan prepared a conference summary of the meeting, which
Principal Sigler reviewed. Jordan Dep., Ex. 20; Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9; Sigler Dep. at
93:5-93:12. The conference summary outlines some of Shetterly’s “inappropriate conduct” in
October 2020, including spending time at a student’s home during school hours. Jordan Dep., Ex.
20; Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9. Shetterly received several directives, including, “stop
spending time alone with this student at her home or in any other location.” Jordan Dep., Ex. 20;
Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9; Sigler Dep. at 101:20-102:1. Principal Sigler did not go to HR
and never spoke with A.H.’s parents about Shetterly being in A.H.’s bedroom. Sigler Dep. at
80:19-81:9, 86:17-22. Shetterly was not disciplined as a result of her conduct and Principal Sigler
described the conference as a warning that she was at risk of discipline. Sigler Dep. at 105:14-
106:8.
Shetterly attended A.H.’s 16th birthday party at a rental home despite Assistant Principal
Jordan warning that an in-person meeting for A.H.’s 16th birthday would be problematic and a
“boundary thing.” Jordan Dep. Ex. 25; Jordan Dep. at 95:13-23. Shetterly used her work email to
send rental reservation information to A.H. Shetterly Dep. Ex. 16; Shetterly Dep. at 101:8-14.
A.H. thereafter told Jordan about Shetterly attending her 16th birthday party. A.H. Dep. at
182:10-15. Shetterly posted social media photos, some of which Principal Sigler admitted she saw
and which “gave [her] pause.” Sigler Dep., Ex. 33; Sigler Dep. at 195:5-197:13, 198:12-18;
Shetterly Dep. at 56:1-57:10.
By spring of 2021, WCCUSD began to transition away from remote classes. De Anza
reopened for in person instruction to certain students in April 2021, including A.H. Sigler Dep. at
38:10-39:16. After the October 23, 2020 instruction to “stop spending time with [A.H.] at her
home or any other location,” Trempy observed A.H. getting out of Shetterly’s car at school.
Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 142:25-143:2. Trempy immediately reported what she observed to
Principal Sigler and Assistant Principal Jordan. Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 52:12-19.
A.H. testified that Principal Sigler observed Shetterly and A.H. alone together walking out
of a storage closet in Shetterly’s classroom with her arm around A.H.’s waist. A.H. Dep. at
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200:22-202:19. Sigler testified that she never saw A.H. and Shetterly alone in a classroom
together and never saw them coming out of a storage closet. Sigler Dep. at 154:11-19.
In March 2021, A.H. and Shetterly visited the home of District art teacher Ruth Paesch.
A.H. Dep. at 159:1-20. Shetterly called A.H. “baby” during the visit, which prompted a question
from Paesch. A.H. Dep. at 160:7-12; 161:1-25. A.H. testified that the two shared a look, and she
acknowledged the nickname was “a little strange.” Id. at 161:1-25. Paesch testified that she first
became aware of the romantic relationship between A.H. and Shetterly only after Shetterly’s arrest
in May 2021. Paesch Dep. at 102:4-6; 139:21-140:13. She had no prior knowledge, suspicions, or
concerns that A.H. and Shetterly were engaged in an inappropriate relationship. Id. at 88:8-14;
100:12-22; 103:3-13; 103:25-104:9; 109:6-9; 110:11-111:19; 132:20-133:23. The only other
individual A.H. told about the relationship was a friend. A.H. Dep. at 162:17-25. A.H. told no
one else she was in a sexual relationship with Shetterly prior to Shetterly’s arrest. Id. at 163:6-14.
In April 2021, Trempy observed A.H. and Shetterly “come in the building holding hands.
And when they saw me, they dropped their hands, but they were acting in a way that, as I said, my
mom tingling senses went off. It didn’t seem appropriate. It was too intimate. It was too
chummy. I saw no boundaries physically between those two.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 37:11-22.
It was clear to Trempy that there was an “inherent intimacy to their action” and it “was not just
teacher/student.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 73:18-21, 73:22-74:3; Trempy Dep Ex. 37; Trempy Vol.
II Dep at 176:3-12. After seeing A.H. and Shetterly holding hands, she immediately reported it to
Principal Sigler. Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 40:22-24.
On April 27, 2021, Trempy sent an email outlining some of her concerns, including the
lack of boundaries between Shetterly and A.H. and their ongoing relationship. Trempy Dep., Ex.
31; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 158:20-161:17. Trempy expressed that “admin needs to step in” and
felt the “ongoing relationship” “needs to be addressed.” Id. Trempy filed a CPS report on April
30, 2021. Trempy Dep., Ex. 2; Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 46:11-47:7; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 166:1-
9, 172:23-173:4. Principal Sigler knew Trempy filed a CPS Report. Sigler Dep. at 216:5-7.
On May 26, 2021, school psychologist Beth Frieswyk-Masters observed A.H. and
Shetterly “Eskimo kiss” (affectionately rub their noses together) and Shetterly rub A.H.’s arm in
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an off-campus restaurant. Frieswyk-Masters Dep. Ex 24; Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 25:1-7, 96:16-
25; Sigler Dep. at 182:16-18. Frieswyk-Masters testified she reported what she observed to
Assistant Principal Jordan that same day, May 26, 2021. Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 25:16-26:17.
Jordan testified that Frieswyk-Masters reported what she saw to her on May 27, 2021. Jordan
Dep. Vol. II at 210:24-211:5. Jordan testified she instructed Frieswyk-Masters to file a CPS
report. Jordan Vol. II Dep. at 211:6-8. On or about May 27, 2021, Jordan reported to Principal
Sigler and relayed the information regarding the public, affectionate nose rubbing and arm
rubbing. Jordan Vol. II Dep. at 211:11-16, 214:25-215:16. Principal Sigler denies talking to
Frieswyk-Masters or learning information about this incident prior to Shetterly’s arrest. Sigler
Dep. at 168:8-169:12, 181:4-11. Principal Sigler testified that, if she knew the information
Frieswyk-Masters reported, she would have gone to HR. Sigler Dep. at 193:22-25.
On May 28, 2021, A.H.’s mother, Jamie Danberg, discovered cards from Shetterly and
found pictures and text messages showing A.H. had been sexually assaulted. Danberg Dep. at
115:12-118:13. Danberg contacted the Richmond Police Department to report what she
discovered. Id. Shetterly was arrested and WCCUSD was notified of the arrest on or about May
30, 2021. Sigler Dep. at 183:20-184:22. Shetterly was placed on paid administrative leave on
June 1, 2021. Sigler Dep. at 186:1-5.
A.H. never told Frieswyk-Masters, Assistant Principal Jordan, or Principal Sigler that
Shetterly was sexually assaulting her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep.
at 192:18-23, 196:5-11, 197:1-8.
II. DISCUSSION
Both Defendants, the District and Sigler, move for summary judgment in their favor on all
claims asserted against them by A.H., including claims for (1) negligence (against the District and
Principal Sigler); (2) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention (against the District and Sigler);
(3) violation of Title IX (against the District); (4) discrimination in violation of California
Education Code section 200 (against the District); and (5) discrimination in violation of the Bane
Act, California Civil Code section 52.1 (against the District and individuals). After setting forth
the relevant legal standard, the Court addresses the sole remaining federal cause of action for
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violation of Title IX. The Court then considers its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law causes of action.
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment
on a “claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court
of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery
responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is
“genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Id.
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively
demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun
v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving
party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may carry its initial burden of
production by submitting admissible “evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case,” or by showing, “after suitable discovery,” that the “nonmoving party does not have
enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-
06 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25 (noting a moving party can prevail merely
by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case).
When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must respond with
specific facts, supported by admissible evidence, showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c), (e). The asserted disputed facts must be material – the existence of only “some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
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summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. “[M]ere allegation and speculation do not
create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.” Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d
1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants where there
was “no evidence in the record from which a trier of fact could have” found for plaintiff).
When deciding a summary judgment motion, courts must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in their favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).
However, when a non-moving party fails to produce evidence rebutting the moving party’s
showing, then summary adjudication is proper. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103 (“If the nonmoving
party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party
wins the motion for summary judgment.”). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion
is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed
material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th
Cir. 1987).
B. Violation of Title IX (against WCCUSD)
Defendants aver that A.H.’s cause of action for gender discrimination under Title IX fails
on the basis that the District did not have actual knowledge of the discrimination. Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
A “damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails
adequately to respond.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290
(1998). Actual notice on the part of the federal funding recipient is critical because it is the
deliberate failure to curtail known harassment, rather than the harassment itself, that constitutes
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the Title IX violation. Lopez v. Regents of University of California, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1122
(2013) (citing Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Moreover, to prove actionable, “Title IX plaintiffs asserting a sexual harassment theory must
demonstrate that the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it caused
a deprivation of educational opportunities or benefits.” Lopez, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (citing Porto
v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D.
v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gebser set forth the standard for a plaintiff who seeks
damages based on a claim of discrimination under Title IX. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-78. There,
like here, the plaintiff brought a claim for discrimination under Title IX against a school district on
a theory of sexual harassment arising from a high school teacher’s grooming and sexual assault of
a minor plaintiff. Parents had separately complained to the school administration about the same
teacher’s sexually inappropriate comments to students during class, but the administration did not
learn of the teacher’s sexual assault of the student until after police caught him in the act. Gebser,
524 U.S. at 277-78. Following a lengthy discussion distinguishing a judicially-implied cause of
action for discrimination in education under Title IX from the congressionally-authorized cause of
action for discrimination in employment under Title VII, the Court held that a school district
receiving federal funds can be subject to a Title IX claim for damages as a result of sexual
harassment by one of its teachers only if an appropriate official had actual notice of the harassment
and the school responded with deliberate indifference. Id. at 290-91.
Here, Plaintiff has put forward no evidence that any DeAnza official had actual knowledge
of the sexual harassment of A.H. by Shetterly. A.H. testified that she never told Frieswyk-Masters
that Shetterly was sexually harassing her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H.
Dep. at 192:18-23. A.H. testified that she did not tell Assistant Principal Jordan that Shetterly was
sexually harassing her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep. at 196:5-11.
A.H. testified that she did not tell Principal Sigler about Shetterly’s actions or that they had any
type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep. at 197:1-8. And staff testified that they did not know of
Shetterly’s conduct until after the arrest – Trempy testified that she found out about the “sexual
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relationship” between A.H. and Shetterly only upon Shetterly’s arrest. Trempy Dep. at 61:22-
62:6. A.H. presents no countervailing evidence that any of the District’s staff learned of the
sexual harassment prior to Shetterly’s arrest, much less that they responded with deliberate
indifference. Instead, A.H. advances evidence that stops short of actual knowledge, and which
instead suggests that, based on the instances of boundary-crossing conduct by Shetterly,
Defendants had constructive knowledge about Shetterly’s sexual harassment of A.H. –
constructive knowledge that falls short under Title IX. See Dkt. No. 105 at 20-22.
Sigler and Jordan were aware of some disturbing conduct, including a relationship between
A.H. and Shetterly that clearly exceeded expected and appropriate student-teacher dynamics.
Principal Sigler had actual knowledge of multiple instances of physical contact, including
Shetterly’s arm around A.H.’s waist, Shetterly holding hands with A.H., Trempy Dep. at 73:11-15,
and “Eskimo kissing,” Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 119:14-19. Though the principal’s observation
of the pair coming out of a storage closet together would be significant, it does not establish Sigler
actually knew Shetterly was engaged in the severe and pervasive sexual harassment of a student,
particularly where no one knew the nature of A.H. and Shetterly’s relationship.1 Overall, these
incidents do not establish actual notice that Shetterly was subjecting A.H. to severe, pervasive, or
objectively offensive sexual harassment. Cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 279 (holding that a school
principal’s knowledge of inappropriate teacher comments within educational setting did not
establish actual notice that the same teacher engaged in sexual abuse of student). A.H. does not
cite any authority suggesting that the complained-of conduct rises to the level of severe, pervasive,
or objectively offensive, and the Court cannot conclude otherwise.
Ultimately, Principal Sigler, Assistant Principal Jordan, and the other staff at De Anza
failed to protect A.H. from being groomed and sexually assaulted, but those failures do not
establish liability for discrimination under Title IX because A.H. cannot show that they had actual
1 The parties dispute whether Principal Sigler observed Shetterly and A.H. alone together walking
out of a storage closet in Shetterly’s classroom with her arm around A.H.’s waist. Compare A.H.
Dep. at 200:22-202:19 with Sigler Dep. at 154:11-19. However, because this incident does not
rise to the level of “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” necessary to constitute sexual
harassment, any factual dispute is immaterial to the Court’s conclusion and does not preclude
summary judgment. Lopez, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1121; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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knowledge and responded with deliberate indifference. Thus, the District is entitled to judgment
on the Title IX discrimination claim.
C. Declination of Supplemental Jurisdiction
“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[A] federal court should consider and weigh in each
case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court
involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[i]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000
(9th Cir. 1997).
Having disposed of the sole remaining federal claim in this matter, there is no longer a
persuasive reason for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over A.H.’s state law claims.
The Court finds that the balance of factors does not weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Most
importantly, the Court finds “that principles of comity will be well-served by allowing the state
courts to resolve claims solely of state law” because of the potential application of statutory
immunities. Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 524 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Cal. Educ. Code
§ 44808. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to deny supplemental jurisdiction over
A.H.’s remaining state law causes of action and dismisses those claims without prejudice to re-
filing in state court.
//
//
//
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part as MOOT. The Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction over A.H.’s
remaining state law claims and DISMISSES the remaining claims without prejudice to re-filing in
state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 20, 2026
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN
United States District Judge
Case 3:22-cv-03233-AMO Document 118 Filed 02/20/26 Page 12 of 12

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