Whyte v. Robinson et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PHILIP DOUGLAS WHYTE,
Plaintiff,
v.
M. ROBINSON, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-08148-JD
ORDER RE SERVICE
Re: Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15
Pro se plaintiff Whyte, a state prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The Court will identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must
be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed
factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face”
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standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
LEGAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to properly treat his severe pain. Deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin
v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX
Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of
“deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the
prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin,
974 F.2d at 1059.
A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle,
429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that
significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain
are examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-
60 (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to
abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff underwent two stomach surgeries, two spine surgeries, and two knee surgeries.
The surgeries did not correct or minimize his constant pain. The defendant doctors failed to
properly treat the severe pain and stopped prescribing Gabapentin, which is the appropriate
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United States District Court
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medication, without an alternative care plan. He continues to suffer from severe pain and his
requests for medical care have been ignored. Liberally construed, this states a claim against Dr.
Bright, Dr. Kumar, and Dr. Robinson. Plaintiff names the warden as defendant but provides no
specific allegations; therefore, this defendant is dismissed.
Plaintiff also requests that counsel be appointed. The Ninth Circuit has held that a district
court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant only in “exceptional circumstances,” the
determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits,
and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the
legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff says this case is complex, and that he will have difficulty prosecuting the action
due to his confinement. These circumstances are not sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant
appointment of counsel at this time. This action does not present complex legal issues, and
plaintiff has ably litigated this case and the drafting of his complaints. It is too early for the Court
to determine the likelihood of success on the merits. The motion is denied without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
1. The motion for an extension (Dkt. No. 12) is granted and the filing fee was
properly paid. The proposed order for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 13) is denied without
prejudice because plaintiff failed to file a motion presenting any arguments. The motion to
appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 14) is denied without prejudice and the motion to compel (Dkt. No. 15)
is denied as moot. Once counsel for defendants appears, plaintiff may seek discovery.
2. The Court orders that Dr. Darrin Bright, Dr. Kumar, and Dr. M. Robinson be
electronically served at Salinas Valley State Prison. Warden Santoro is dismissed.
Service on the listed defendants will be effected via the CDCR e-service program for civil
rights cases from prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is
directed to serve on CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint (Dkt. Noa.
1, 7), this order of service, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form and a summons. The Clerk
is also requested to serve a copy of this order on the plaintiff.
No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR will provide
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the Court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which defendant
listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by the United
States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant declines to waive service or could not be
reached. CDCR also will provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver to the
California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, will file with the Court a waiver of
service of process for the defendant if he is waiving service.
Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk is requested to prepare
for each defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service
Waiver a USM-285 Form. The Clerk will provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 forms
and copies of this order, the summons and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant
who has not waived service. The Clerk will also provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR
Report of E-Service Waiver.
3. To expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders:
a. No later than sixty days from the date of service, defendants will file a
motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion will be supported by
adequate factual documentation and will conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, and will include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the
events at issue. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary
judgment, they will so inform the Court prior to the date his summary judgment motion is due.
All papers filed with the Court will be promptly served on the plaintiff.
b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants will also serve, on a
separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-
954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).
See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be
given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed,
not earlier); Rand at 960 (separate paper requirement).
c. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, will be filed with the
Court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion was served
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upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING,” which is
provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc),
and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).
If defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should take
note of the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which is provided
to him as required by Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).
d. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they will do so no later than fifteen
days after the opposition is served upon them.
e. The motion will be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due.
No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.
4. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants, or
defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to
defendants or defendants’ counsel.
5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
No further Court order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are required before the parties may
conduct discovery.
6. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court
informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of
Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to
do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15, 2026
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge
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United States District Court
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NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT)
If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed.
A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if
granted, end your case.
Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment.
Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--
that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party
who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your
case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly
supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your
complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts
shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment,
if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be
dismissed and there will be no trial.
NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION)
If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking
to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case.
You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did
exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations
(statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents
accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other
sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. If defendants file a motion for
summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there
will be no trial.
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