Cash v. Gilead Sciences Inc. et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ADRIAN HOLLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.,
Defendant.
This order relates to:
Cash v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.,
Case No. 4:22-cv-08970-JST
Case No. 18-cv-06972-JST
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS AS TO PLAINTIFF
DIANA CASH; ORDER DENYING AS
MOOT MOTION TO SUSPEND CASE
DEADLINES
Re: ECF Nos. 1833, 1845
Before the Court is Defendant Gilead Sciences, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Diana
Cash’s claims. ECF No. 1833.1 The Court finds Gilead’s motion to be suitable for resolution
without oral argument, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b), and will now grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court previously summarized the history of this case as follows:
Cash’s claims were originally brought through counsel in a multi-
plaintiff complaint in Mosely v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Case
No. 19-cv-5816. On March 5, 2021, counsel moved to withdraw
from representing Cash, citing Rule 1.16(b)(1) of the California
Rules of Professional Conduct. ECF No. 591; ECF No. 591-1 at 2.
That rule allows counsel to withdraw from representation if “the
client insists upon presenting a claim or defense in litigation . . . that
is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.” Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(1). The motion to withdraw
was granted on April 7, 2021, ECF No. 645, and Cash proceeded to
represent herself. On November 22, 2021, Gilead moved to dismiss
Cash’s claims without prejudice because she failed to submit a
1 Unless otherwise noted, ECF citations refer to the docket in Case No. 18-cv-6972.
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Plaintiff Fact Sheet as required by the Court’s orders. ECF No. 838.
The Court granted the motion on December 28, 2021. ECF No. 866.
On November 24, 2021, Cash, representing herself without a lawyer,
filed a complaint in New York state court. Cash v. Gilead Scis.,
Inc., No. 23-cv-1266 (“Cash II”), ECF No. 1-4 at 2. In its entirety,
the complaint states: “Personal Injuries for $15,000.00 with interest
from 01/01/2010; Failure to provide proper services for $9,000.00
with interest from 01/01/2010; Return of Security for $500.00 with
interest from 01/01/2010; Unpaid Wages for $500.00 with interest
from 01/01/2010.” Id. Gilead removed the case to the Eastern
District of New York, which transferred the case to this district on
March 17, 2023. Cash II, ECF Nos. 1, 8.
On December 13, 2022, Cash, again representing herself without a
lawyer, filed another complaint in the Eastern District of New York.
Cash v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 22-cv-8970 (“Cash I”), ECF No. 1.
In that complaint, she alleged that she suffered various side effects
from taking one of Gilead’s medications. Id. The case was
transferred to this district on December 16, 2022. Cash I, ECF
No. 4.
The Court consolidated both Cash I and Cash II with Holley v.
Gilead Sciences Inc., Case No. 18-cv-6972, on May 24, 2023. ECF
No. 1293.
ECF No. 1798 at 1–2.
On May 22, 2026, the Court granted Gilead’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
Cash’s claims and granted her leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at 4. It also directed the
Clerk to close Cash II “[b]ecause there is no need for Cash to have two open cases based on the
same set of claims.” Id.
On June 2, 2026, Cash filed a document that was labeled as a “declaration.” ECF
No. 1807. The Court construed that document as Cash’s amended complaint and set a responsive
briefing schedule. ECF No. 1827. Gilead now seeks dismissal of Cash’s claims with prejudice.
ECF No. 1833. Cash’s opposition was filed in her individual case. Cash I, ECF No. 48.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate
only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.
2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Factual
allegations need not be detailed, but they must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. In determining whether a plaintiff has met the plausibility
standard, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the
pleadings in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072
(9th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
When the Court granted Gilead’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, it explained the
deficiencies in Cash’s first two complaints:
In Cash I, Cash alleges that she suffered multiple side effects from
taking Atripla, one of Gilead’s medications. As Gilead correctly
observes, however, the complaint does not “articulate[] any theory,
based on warnings, design, or otherwise, that would entitle her to
damages for her alleged harm.” ECF No. 1776 at 6. Her opposition
to Gilead’s motion similarly asserts vague allegations of harm
without presenting any basis on which Cash seeks to hold Gilead
liable. For example, she states, “Plaintiff has all the rights to
continue in this law suit against[] Defendant; Gilead medication
Atripla violated Plaintiff[’s] Rights. . . . The Defendant Gilead[’s
medication has] various side effects [and] damages [that Plaintiff]
experienced.” ECF No. 1786 at 7–8. She further states, “Gilead
Sciences Inc. have . . . had clients die[] from liver and kidney
failure.” Id. at 10. Her opposition contains a list of side effects and
attaches medical records, but this only provides more detail to the
harm that Cash alleges she suffered. Neither the complaint nor the
opposition indicate what causes of action Cash seeks to bring.
Instead, like the complaint, Cash’s opposition presents “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,”
which is insufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court therefore grants
Gilead’s motion as to Cash I.
The complaint in Cash II is even more deficient because it alleges
no facts at all and, instead, asserts only that Cash is entitled to
$25,000 plus interest based on unspecified “Personal Injuries,”
“Failure to provide proper services, “Return of Security,” and
“Unpaid Wages.” Cash II, ECF No. 1-4 at 2. Cash does not, for
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example, indicate how she has been injured or why Gilead should be
held liable for causing any of those injuries. Nor does she allege
what services she believes Gilead was obligated to provide, what
security was allegedly not returned, or whether she has any basis to
assert a claim for unpaid wages. Accordingly, the Court also grants
Gilead’s motion as to Cash II.
ECF No. 1798 at 3–4.
Neither the document the Court construed as Cash’s amended complaint nor her opposition
to Gilead’s motion to dismiss corrects these deficiencies. She does assert “that Gilead
intentionally delayed the release of a safer [TAF]-based alternative to maximize profits from their
existing TDF drug monopoly, exposing . . . Cash to unnecessary risks of bone density damage,
pain and suffering mentally, TDF side effects.” ECF No. 1807 at 2. But she continues to fail to
indicate what claims she seeks to bring or the legal theory or theories under which she believes
Gilead should be held liable for the side effects she alleges she experienced. The document that
the Court construed as an amended complaint also contains a request for the Court “to simply
grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment of the Defendant.” Id. at 10.
Her opposition to the motion similarly states that she “seeks dismissal of this case pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Cash I, ECF No. 48 at 5. In arguing for “dismissal,” she
appears to believe that Gilead must “comply with threshold pleading standards” and “state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 6; see also id. at 14 (“Dismissal is warranted under
Federal Rules of Civil [Procedure]. Defendant has fail[ed] to meet the threshold pleading
standards and has not articulated a claim that entitles to the Defendant. The Court should dismiss
this case with prejudice.”). But those are requirements that Cash, as the plaintiff, must satisfy with
her complaint, not obligations Gilead must meet at this stage of the proceedings. She states that
she is “clarify[ing] how I know and believe that I’m . . . entitled to relief” by explaining that her
“theory is liable being in position in undesirable outcome and evidence shows to Defendant
medicine.” Id. at 34. But simply suffering “undesirable outcomes” is not sufficient to state a
claim for relief. The Court continues to find that Cash presents only “an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” which is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Dismissal is without leave to amend for the following reasons: After her claims were
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dismissed without prejudice from a prior complaint filed by counsel, Cash filed two complaints
representing herself. The Court granted judgment on the pleadings as to both complaints with
leave to amend. The Court construed one of the documents Cash filed as her amended complaint.
Cash has now had two opportunities to oppose Gilead’s motions to resolve this case on the
pleadings. None of the documents Cash has filed indicates that she will be able to state a plausible
claim for relief in compliance with Rule 8, and the Court therefore finds good cause to dismiss this
case without leave to amend. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by
amendment. A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the
plaintiff has previously amended.” (citation modified)).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court grants Gilead’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Diana Cash’s
claims with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file in Cash I, Case
No. 22-cv-8970.
Gilead’s motion to suspend case-specific deadlines as to Cash, ECF No. 1845, is denied
as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 14, 2026
______________________________________
JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge
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