Bratt v. Carlsbad Police Department et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BRYAN BRATT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARLSBAD POLICE DEPARTMENT,
et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-CV-1295 JLS (BLM)
ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND AND (2)
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO RE-TAX COSTS
(ECF Nos. 46, 50)
Presently before the Court is Bryan Bratt’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 46),
Carlsbad Community Theater and the City of Carlsbad’s Responses in Opposition (ECF
Nos. 47, 48), and Bratt’s Reply (ECF No. 51). Also before the Court is Bratt’s Motion to
Re-Tax Costs (ECF No. 50), the City of Carlsbad’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 54),
and Bratt’s Reply (ECF No. 55).
MOTION TO REMAND
Bratt initially filed this case in California Superior Court. 	ECF No. 46 at 4. 	The
Defendants then removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. Id.
at 5. After several rounds of Motions to Dismiss, the Court dismissed Bratt’s federal-law
claims with prejudice. See ECF No. 30. The Court then exercised its discretion under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declined to maintain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims,
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and dismissed those claims too. Id. Bratt brought the instant Motion, arguing that the state
law claims should be remanded back to state court. See generally ECF No. 46.
The issue with Bratt’s Motion is that there are no claims left to remand. The Court
dismissed all of Bratt’s claims and the case has since been closed. 	See ECF No. 30. The
Court was under no obligation to remand the state law claims and was well within its power
to dismiss them instead. See Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 2002)
(“The court does have jurisdiction to entertain the supplemental claims, and normally the
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction, which will result in a dismissal without
prejudice.”).
Accordingly, Bratt’s Motion to Remand is DENIED (ECF No. 46).
MOTION TO RE-TAX COSTS
Under Rule 54(d)(1), “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). “By its terms, the rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding
costs to a prevailing party, but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.”
Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Ninth Circuit has approved of a few reasons for refusing to award costs, including the
losing party’s limited financial resources, misconduct on the part of the prevailing party,
and the chilling effect of imposing high costs on future litigants. Champion Produce, Inc.
v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). 	After the Clerk orders that
costs be taxed, a party can move for the Court to re-tax those costs. See S.D. Cal. CivLR
54.1(h).
Here, the Clerk taxed costs in the amount of $439.47. 	ECF No. 49. 	Bratt makes
four arguments for why costs should not have been taxed. Each of them fails.
I. 	Carlsbad is a Prevailing Party Under Rule 54(d)(1)
First, Bratt argues that Carlsbad is not a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1). ECF
No. 50 at 6–7. 	Not so. A prevailing party “is one who has been awarded some relief by
the court.” 	Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Hum.
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Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001). In other words, courts look at whether “there has been a
‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.’” 	Miles v. State of California,
320 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Buchannon, 532 U.S. at 603).
Applying this rule, costs may not be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1) where an
underlying claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the dismissed
party is not a prevailing party. Id. at 988. But here, the case was not dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice under
Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed the state claims by declining to exercise jurisdiction over
them. Even though Bratt can still pursue his state claims in state court, such a dismissal
certainly alters the parties’ legal relationship. 	See Miles, 320 F.3d 986 (finding that a
defendant was a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) when the case was dismissed without
prejudice to plaintiff’s right to seek relief in state court because the disposition was a
material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties); see also Zenith Ins. Co. v.
Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause a dismissal with prejudice is
tantamount to a judgment on the merits, the defendant in this case ... is clearly the prevailing
party on the dismissed claims.”); S.D. Cal. CivLR 54.1(f) (“The defendant is the prevailing
party upon any termination of the case without judgment for the plaintiff except a voluntary
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).”).
II. 	Bratt’s Good Faith is Insufficient
Bratt next argues that the Court should deny costs because his claims were
nonfrivolous and brought in good faith. 	ECF No. 50 at 7–8. 	But this is just the bare
minimum—all parties have an obligation to pursue their claims in good faith. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11. Doing so does not rebut the presumption that Carlsbad is entitled to costs. Nat'l
Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) overruled on other
grounds by Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d 572.
III. 	Awarding Costs Would Not Have a Chilling Effect
Third, Bratt claims that granting costs here would have a chilling effect on future
litigants. ECF No. 50 at 8. The Ninth Circuit has expressly ratified this reason for denying
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costs; but only when costs are high. Champion Produce, 342 F.3d at 1022. Here, the Court
finds that an award of less than $500 is unlikely to have such an effect on future litigants.
IV. 	Costs are Proper and Sufficiently Supported
Bratt lastly contends that the costs awarded are either improper or insufficiently
supported. ECF No. 50 at 9. Specifically, he argues that (1) removal costs are not properly
taxable and (2) proof of copying costs was inadequate. Both assertions are incorrect.
As to removal costs, the Civil Local Rules set out several categories of costs that a
prevailing party is entitled to and explicitly include costs for removed cases. 	S.D. Cal.
CivLR 54.1(b)(10) (“In a case removed from the State Court, costs incurred in the State
Court prior to removal must be recovered by the prevailing party in federal court.”).
As to copying costs, the Local Rules require a “specific showing” of costs. Despite
Bratt’s argument to the contrary, the Court finds that Carlsbad has satisfied this standard.
Its Memorandum of Costs provides a detailed explanation of what copies were made, how
many were made, and why they were made. See ECF No. 32.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Bratt’s Motion to Remand (ECF No.
46) and DENIES Bratt’s Motion to Re-Tax Costs (ECF No. 50).
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 9, 2026
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