Sports Rehab Consulting LLC et al v. Vail Clinic Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 19-cv-2075-WJM-SBP
SPORTS REHAB CONSULTING LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, and
LINDSAY WINNINGER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VAIL CLINIC, INC., a Colorado nonprofit corporation, d/b/a Vail Health,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT VAIL CLINIC, INC.’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT
DETAILED TIME RECORDS EX PARTE FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW
_____________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Vail Clinic, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Submit
Detailed Time Records Ex Parte for In Camera Review (ECF No. 637) (“Motion”).
Plaintiffs Sports Rehab Consulting LLC and Lindsay Winninger (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) filed
a response, to which Vail Health filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 646, 649.) For the following
reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	ANALYSIS
In August 2025, the Court granted Vail Health’s motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 628.) That Order is currently on appeal before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. (ECF No. 241.)
In October 2025, Vail Health moved for $2,267,218.35 in attorneys’ fees as a
sanction for Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s alleged vexatious conduct pursuant to the
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Court’s inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 636.) It also filed a
contemporaneous motion asking the Court to review Vail Health’s counsel’s billing
entries in support of the fee motion in camera—i.e., outside the reach of Plaintiffs. (ECF
No. 637.) Vail Health insists that in camera review “is warranted due to the privileged
and confidential information contained in the time records and the risk of harm to Vail
Health from disclosure.” (Id. at 1.) It also asserts, in footnotes, that in camera review is
necessary based on its “joint-defense privilege” and to protect its counsel’s
“commercially sensitive pricing and financial information . . . .” (Id. at 4 n.3; 5 n.4.)
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion on several grounds. (ECF No. 646.) In their view,
Local Rule 54.3 forecloses the Motion because it demands that a moving party disclose
detailed descriptions of the services rendered, the time expended, and the hourly rate
charged for each person for whom the fees are claimed. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs also assert
that Vail Health waived its request for in camera review by disclosing in a declaration
the amount of fees it has incurred in this case (roughly $8 million) and revealing its
litigation strategies during settlement conference, mediation, and in its various motions
filed throughout the case. (Id. at 7.) Finally, Plaintiffs say that granting the Motion
would deprive them of due process. (Id. at 9.)
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that Local Rule 54.3 controls here. That
argument would have more purchase if Vail Health were moving for fees as a prevailing
party. But it’s not. Vail Health is moving for fees pursuant to the Court’s inherent
authority and section 1927. (See generally ECF No. 636.) Another Judge in this District
has explained why that distinction matters:
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Defendant contends Rule 54.3 is inapplicable to his motion,
because the motion is for section 1927 sanctions in the form
of attorney fees and is, thus, not a motion for attorney fees to
which the Local Rule applies. (Def.'s Fees and Sanctions
Reply at 5–6.) I agree. Local Rule 54.3 plainly states that it
applies to ‘motion[s] for attorney fees,’ rather than motions
for sanctions. D.C.Colo.LCivR 54.3 (2007). Moreover, I find
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) persuasive by
analogy. As discussed above, this rule lays out the
prerequisites to counsel receiving attorney fees, including
that the moving party must ‘state the amount or provide a fair
estimate of the amount sought.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B)
(2007). Subsection (d)(2)(E) of the rule, however, makes
clear that the prerequisites for receipt of fees ‘do not apply to
claims for fees and expenses as sanctions for violation of
these rules or under [section] 1927.’ Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(d)(2)(E) (2007); see Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440
F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant's
counsel's failure to specify the basis for the ultimate award in
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 [d] [2][B] was
irrelevant in the context of a motion for section 1927
sanctions).
Graymore, LLC v. Gray, 2007 WL 4062706, at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2007). Based on
this reasoning, the court found that the moving party’s “failure to support his request for
fees as a sanction with an affidavit and detailed description of the basis for the fees
does not render the motion unviable.” Id. And the court added that “[it] would require
such information to calculate any fees owed, but it does not need the information to
determine whether sanctions are due.” Id. In other words, the Graymore court made
clear that a court—not the non-moving party—must review detailed billing entries to
assess attorneys’ fees under section 1927. Id.
The Court is persuaded by this reasoning. Moreover, the Court observes that the
Tenth Circuit has affirmed a district court’s authority to review billing records in camera
where doing so would protect privileged or otherwise confidential information. See, e.g.,
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Team Sys. Int’l, LLC v. Haozous, 706 Fed. App’x. 463, 466 (10th Cir. 2017) (affirming
district court’s authority to review billing statements and time records in camera); United
States v. Anderson (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas), 906 F.2d 1485, 1492–93 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that fee contracts could reveal attorney-client privilege and noting that in
camera review of any of possibly privileged documents would be appropriate).
Still, the Court observes that it has some discretion in deciding whether to grant a
motion for in camera review in these circumstances. See Team Sys. Int’l, LLC, 706
Fed. App’x. at 466–67 (“Accordingly, we are not persuaded the district court abused its
discretion when it conducted its in camera review of the billing statements and time
records.”) (emphasis added). And here, given the extraordinary amount of fees Vail
Health seeks, as well as the fact that the Court would likely benefit from adversarial
input as to the reasonableness of Vail Health’s billing records, the Court will exercise its
discretion to give Plaintiffs access to some of Vail Health’s billing records on a redacted
basis. The extent of that access is outlined below.
II. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows;
2. 	Vail Health shall file unredacted copies of its counsel’s detailed time
records ex parte for the Court’s in camera review as to all fees it seeks—including the
categories listed below (ECF No. 636-1 at 27–34)—by no later than April 13, 2026.
This filing shall be filed under Restriction Level 3;
3. 	Vail Health shall file redacted copies of its counsel’s detailed billing
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records as to the following categories of fees it seeks:
a. 	Fees as to the Scheduling Order Dispute (ECF No. 636-1 at 27);
b. 	Fees as to the Text Messages and Motion to Compel No. 6 (id. at 29); and
c. 	Fees as to Sanctions Threats and Allegations of Criminal and Fraudulent
Conduct (id. at 31).
These redacted time records shall be filed under Restriction Level 1, as
stipulated by Plaintiffs, by no later than April 15, 2026. (See ECF No. 637 at 2 n.2
(“Plaintiffs do not oppose affording Vail Health’s detailed time records with Level 1
restrictions under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(b) . . . .”).) Vail Health is ORDERED to redact
from their time records ONLY that information which is CLEARLY subject to the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine;
4. 	Should Vail Health ultimately decide that it cannot, for whatever reason,
produce the required redacted documents to Plaintiffs, it shall withdraw its fees motion
by no later than April 15, 2026; and
5. 	Plaintiffs shall file a supplemental brief in opposition to Vail Health’s fee
motion (ECF No. 636) which addresses the issues raised by the billing records ordered
produced above by no later than April 30, 2026. Vail Health shall file a reply to this
supplemental opposition brief by no later than May 8, 2026.
Dated this 9th day of April, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
__________________________
William J. Martínez
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Senior United States District Judge
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