Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Thompson

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Regina M. Rodriguez
Civil Action No. 24-cv-02558-RMR-KAS
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL THOMPSON, an individual,
Defendant.
ORDER
This 	matter is 	before the Court 	on 	the Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Kathryn A. Starnella, ECF No. 196, entered February 27, 2026,
addressing Defendant Abbott Laboratories’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(B)(2) and 12(B)(6) (“Abbott’s Motion”), ECF No. 112, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
Thompson’s 	Counterclaims 	(“Plaintiffs' 	Motion”), 	ECF 	No. 	138. 	Magistrate 	Judge
Starnella recommends that Abbott’s Motion be granted in part and denied in part and that
Plaintiffs’ motion be granted. Defendants Thompson and Abbott jointly filed a timely
Objection. ECF No. 197. Plaintiffs also filed a timely Objection. ECF No. 198. Both sides
filed responses to the respective objections. ECF Nos. 199, 200. For the reasons stated
below, the Court overrules the parties’ objections and adopts the Recommendation.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This is a trade secret misappropriation case. Plaintiffs Edward Sciences, LLC and
Edward Sciences Corporation (collectively “Edwards” or “Plaintiffs”) sued and moved the
Court for a Preliminary Injunction (“PI”), ECF No. 10, to stop its former employee,
Defendant Michael Thompson (“Thompson”) from working or performing services for his
new employer, Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”). On June 18, 2025, this Court granted
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 107, which is pending appeal with
the Tenth Circuit, ECF No. 116.
The parties do not object to the factual or procedural background outlined in the
Recommendation. Accordingly, the Court adopts and incorporates the factual and
procedural background included within the Recommendation as if set forth therein.
Plaintiffs assert claims against both Abbott and Thompson under the Defend Trade
Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1832, et seq., and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (“CUTSA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-101, et seq. ECF No. 102 ¶¶ 80-94. Solely against
Thompson, Plaintiffs assert state law claims for breach of contract and breach of duty of
loyalty. Id. ¶¶ 95-107. Solely against Abbott, Plaintiffs assert state law claims of tortious
interference 	with 	Thompson’s 	contract 	and 	tortious 	interference 	with 	prospective
business advantage regarding Plaintiffs’ customers. Id. ¶¶ 108-120.
Thompson asserts two state-law counterclaims against Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 49–63.
First, he asserts a claim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113, alleging that Plaintiffs’ attempt
to enforce non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in his Employment Agreement is
unlawful. Id. ¶¶ 49-53. Second, he asserts a claim for tortious interference with an
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employment relationship, alleging that Plaintiffs’ efforts to enforce the non-compete and
non-solicitation provisions effectively prevent him from working for Abbott. Id. ¶¶ 54–63.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
This Court is required to make a de novo determination of the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to which a specific objection has been made, and it may accept, reject,
or modify any or all of the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of
the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). “[A] party’s
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and
specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate
review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.
1996).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Defendants 	Abbott 	and 	Thompson 	raise 	two 	objections, 	one 	each, 	to 	the
Recommendation. ECF No. 197. Plaintiffs raised one objection to the Recommendation.
The Court will address Abbott’s objection first, then Thompson’s, and finally Plaintiffs’
objection.
A. 	Abbott’s Objection
Abbott objects to Magistrate Judge Starnella’s findings that this Court may exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over Abbott. ECF No. 197 at 2. Specifically, Abbott objects
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to a finding that it purposefully availed itself to Colorado, or in other words, that it
“deliberately . . . engaged in significant activities within’ the forum State [Colorado] or
deliberately directed its activities at the forum State [Colorado], so that it has ‘manifestly
availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting business there” or that “[Plaintiffs’] claims
arise out of or relate to [Abbott’s] forum conduct.” XMission, L.C. v. PureHealth Rsch.,
105 F.4th 1300, 1308, 1312 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotation and citations omitted).
Abbott argues that Magistrate Judge Starnella’s reliance on an out-of-Circuit case,
Vessel Medical, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 6:15-cv-00330-MGL, 2015 WL 5437170, at *5-6
(S.D.S.C. Sept 15, 2015), was erroneous. Specifically, Abbott argues that “Thompson
cannot have been ‘acting as [Abbott’s] agent when he act[ed] outside the scope of
employment.” ECF No. 197 at 3 (quoting United States v. Smith, 810 F.2d 996, 997 (10th
Cir. 1987)).1 Abbott has not provided any case law to suggest that Magistrate Judge
Starnella cannot find an out-of-Circuit case with analogous facts persuasive. The Court
would not go so far as to say Magistrate Judge Starnella found that Thompson was
working as Abbott’s agent in Colorado before he started working for Abbott. See ECF No.
196 at 18 (“[T]hrough Thompson, Abbott engaged in intentional acts in Colorado with the
aim of cutting into Plaintiffs’ market share” (emphasis added)).
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Abbott 	Vice 	President 	Chris 	Waddell 	(“Waddell”), 	not
Thompson, was acting as Abbott's agent in Colorado. The focus should be on Waddell's
conduct directed at the form state. In November 2023, Waddell contacted Thompson, a
Colorado resident, regarding a potential sales position for TAVI, Abbott’s version of
1 Smith is a criminal drug case and has no bearing on personal jurisdiction.
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Plaintiffs' product, TAVR. ECF No. 102 ¶ 45. Waddell knew that Thompson worked for
Plaintiffs and likely had contractual obligations with Plaintiffs. Waddell also knew that
Thompson worked in multiple states, including Colorado, and that he had access to
Plaintiffs’ trade secrets that would be of value to Abbott. In May 2024, Waddell informed
Thompson that Abbott might have a Regional Sales Director (“RSD”) position available.
Id. ¶ 26. On July 3, 2024, Thompson and Waddell discussed a strategy for Abbott to
expand into the Kansas and Nebraska markets, including Thompson providing site
recommendations, contact information, and follow-up calls. Id. ¶¶ 47-50. On July 9, 2024,
after a phone call with Waddell, Thompson texted him “Sites to consider:” and listed
several Colorado hospitals and key implanters at those facilities. ECF No. 132-10 at 2.
On July 11, 2024, Waddell texted Thompson that Abbott’s legal counsel “knows all about
you and your situation.” Id. ¶ 61. The Court does not find the “2017 TAVR business plan”
that Thompson sent to an Abbott employee in August 2023, very persuasive. Id. ¶ 44. But
it does find Waddell’s solicitation of Thompson and Plaintiffs’ clients, including those in
Colorado, persuasive.
Next, Abbott argues that Plaintiffs did not argue, nor can Plaintiffs meet the
“harmful effects” test utilized by Magistrate Judge Starnella in her Recommendation. ECF
No. 194 at 4. The Tenth Circuit held that “[t]o demonstrate purposeful availment in the
harmful-effects 	context, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	allege 	the 	defendant 	committed “(a) 	an
intentional action that was (b) expressly aimed at the forum state with (c) knowledge that
the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state.” XMission, 105 F.4th at 1309. For
the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the elements of the test are met based on
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Waddell’s conduct. Defendants argue that “it is ‘well-established’ under controlling Tenth
Circuit [law] that these isolated texts and single phone call are insufficient to establish
purposeful availment.” ECF No. 197 at 5 (citing Far W. Cap. Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071,
1077 (10 th Cir. 1995); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299
(10th Cir. 1999)). But the cases cited by Abbott are distinguishable. Far W. Cap. is a thirty-
year-old case involving a dispute over land in Nevada. 46 F.3d at 1073. The federal district
court in Utah held that contacts of the lessor and sublessee with Utah were insufficient to
render them subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah. Id. at 1080. There, the contacts were
fewer and less important than Waddell’s contacts here. And the communications in Soma
Med. Int’l were passive in the sense that they were routine communications from a British
bank to its customer in Utah. 196 F.3d at 1298-99. Here, as described above, Abbott
expressly aimed its conduct at Colorado through Waddell. Waddell knew that Thompson
was a Colorado resident who had access to information that would help Abbott be more
successful in Colorado.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ “merely hiring Thompson cannot give rise to
specific jurisdiction.” ECF No. 197 at 5 (citing Paul Transp., Inc. v. Gambe, No. 23-cv-
00241-WPJ-SH, 2024 WL 1143516, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2024)). The Court agrees.
However, in the case cited by Defendants, “the only connection between Plaintiff
Company and Defendant Jordan [was] the former employee, who ended up working for
Defendant Jordan.” Paul Transportation, 2024 WL 1143516, at *2. That is not the case
here. Thompson is not the only connection between Plaintiffs and Abbott. Abbott, through
Waddell, recruited one of the Plaintiffs’ employees to allegedly take advantage of his
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access to trade secrets. Finally, Defendants argue “there is no allegation that Abbott
expressly aimed intentional actions towards Colorado specifically. Nor is there any
allegation that Abbott knew the brunt of injury caused by its actions would be felt in
Colorado by Plaintiffs, which are Delaware and California companies, not Colorado
companies.” ECF No. 197 at 5-6. The Court does not agree. There is evidence that
Waddell sought information about Plaintiffs’ Colorado clients from Thompson. Waddell
knew that Thompson worked in Colorado and had access to Plaintiffs’ trade secrets
regarding Colorado customers, even if Abbott also hired Thompson for Abbott’s Nebraska
and Kansas markets. It does not matter if Plaintiffs are Delaware and California
companies. Plaintiffs do business in Colorado and have clients in Colorado that Abbott
arguably would be interested in.
When personal jurisdiction is contested, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish
personal jurisdiction as to each defendant. Dental Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly Dental Group,
LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2020). But, in this preliminary stage of litigation, that
burden is light, and if the court considers such a motion without an evidentiary hearing,
“the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the
motion.” AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 (10th
Cir. 2008). The Court believes that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction. The Court finds that Waddell, acting as an agent of Abbot, targeted the
Plaintiffs doing business in Colorado and caused economic and reputation injury to the
Plaintiffs in Colorado, purposely availing Abbott to the personal jurisdiction of Colorado.
Thus, Abbott’s objection is OVERRULED.
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B. 	Thompson’s Objection
Thompson objects to Magistrate Judge Starnella’s recommendation that Plaintiffs’
Motion be granted as to Thompson’s counterclaim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113. ECF
No. 197 at 6. Colo. R. Stat. § 8-2-113(8) provides:
(a) An employer shall not enter into, present to a worker or prospective
worker as a term of employment, or attempt to enforce any covenant that
is void under this section.
(b) An employer that violates subsection (8)(a) of this section is liable for
actual damages and a penalty of five thousand dollars per worker or
prospective worker harmed by the conduct. The attorney general and any
worker or prospective worker harmed by an employer's conduct may bring
an action for injunctive relief and to recover penalties. In addition to injunctive
relief 	and 	the 	penalty 	allowed 	in 	this 	subsection 	(8)(b), 	a 	worker 	or
prospective worker may recover actual damages, reasonable costs, and
attorney fees in any private action brought under this section.
(c) In any action brought under this subsection (8), if the employer shows
that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that
the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the employer's act
or omission was not a violation of this section, the court may, in its sound
discretion, award the worker or workers no penalty or award a penalty of any
amount not to exceed the amount specified in subsection (8)(b) of this
section.
“Section 8-2-113(8) was added to Colorado's Non-Compete Statute as part of the August
2022 Amendments. Colo. Leg. Serv. Ch. 441 (H.B. 22-1317). The pre-2022 version of the
Non-Compete Statute did not include a subsection 8 or entitle a former employee to
recover fees, costs, or damages.” Huset v. EIS Ultimate Holding, LP, No. 2023CV30661,
2025 WL 2491568, at *33 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 18, 2025) (emphasis in the original). The
effective date of the new subsection is August 10, 2022. Thompson executed the
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Employment Agreement at issue on June 9, 2022, before the statute's effective date. ECF
No. 102-1 at 9.
This Court, in this case, and other courts in this district, have applied the Colorado
Statute in effect at the time the Employment Agreement was signed. See, e.g., Edwards
Lifesciences LLC v. Thompson, No. 24-CV-02558-RMR-KAS, 2025 WL 2045423, at *12,
*12 n. 4 (D. Colo. June 18, 2025). Using that, and the plain language of the statute,
Magistrate Judge Starnella found that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(8) did not apply to
Thompson’s claim because it was added in the 2022 Amendments to the statute, after
the Employment Agreement took effect. ECF No. 196 at 33. In Huset, a Colorado state
court held “[s]ubsection (8)(a) of the statute may apply prospectively to [an employers]
‘attempt to enforce any covenant that is void under this section’” 2025 WL 2491568, at
*34. Magistrate Judge Starnella addressed Huset in her Recommendation, ultimately
finding it unpersuasive. ECF No. 196 at 32.
Thompson asks this Court to apply Huset, or if it declines to do so, certify the
question for the Colorado Supreme Court. ECF No. 197 a 10. But as Thompson
acknowledges, Huset, is on appeal. The Colorado Court of Appeals is likely to issue an
opinion on the issue before this Court receives an answer from the Colorado Supreme
Court. Though not binding on this Court, the Court would likely find persuasive a ruling
from the Colorado Court of Appeals opinion applying Colorado law. Until such time, the
Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Starnella’s analysis that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(8)
does not apply to Thompson’s claim. Thus, Thompson’s objection is OVERRULED.
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C. 	Plaintiffs’ Objection
Plaintiffs object to Magistrate Judge Starnella’s recommendation that the Court
dismiss their claim against Abbott for tortious interference with Thompson’s Employment
Agreement for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 198. Magistrate Judge Starnella used the
correct legal standard. To state a claim for tortious interference with contract under
Colorado law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) it had a valid contract with a third party, (2)
the defendant induced or otherwise caused the third party to breach the contract, and (3)
the defendant acted intentionally and through improper means. Insight Glob. LLC v.
McDonald, No. 17-cv-1915-MSK-MJW, 2018 WL 2092486, at *4 (D. Colo. May 3, 2018)
(citing Harris Grp. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1195-96 (Colo. App. 2009)). Magistrate
Judge Starnella found that the Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege that Abbott
induced or otherwise caused Thompson to breach his Employment Agreement. Instead,
she found Thompson did it on his own. The Court agrees.
In their objection, Plaintiffs list seven bullets of citation from the Amended
Complaint that they argue “show Abbott caused Thompson to breach his employment
agreement.” However, the Court finds that at least three actions are ones that Thompson
chose to take on his own:
• 	¶ 43, alleging that Thompson sent Plaintiffs’ confidential and trade secret
information to Abbott while he was still employed by Plaintiffs
• 	¶ 44, alleging that Thompson sent a business plan for Plaintiffs’ TAVR
business to an Abbott employee
• 	¶ 46, alleging that Thompson continued to disclose Plaintiffs’ confidential
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and trade secret information to Abbott to assist its TAVI business strategy;
ECF No. 198 at 4. One bullet point is not an action:
• 	¶ 61, alleging that Abbott was aware of Thompson’s contractual obligations to
Plaintiffs
Id. 4-5. Another action occurred after Thompson’s employment with Plaintiffs ended:
• 	¶ 75, alleging that, in response to a letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel,
Thompson’s counsel stated that Abbott would not restrict Thompson from
Plaintiffs’ accounts.
The two remaining bullets are not sufficient to plausibly allege a claim against Abbott for
tortiously interfering with Thompson’s Employment Agreement. Plaintiffs’ objection is
OVERRULED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and in the Recommendation, it is ORDERED as
follows:
1. 	Defendants’ Partial Objections to Recommendations of the United States
Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 197, is OVERRULED;
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Objection to the Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge, ECF No. 198, is OVERRULED;
3. 	The Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 196, is
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED;
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4. 	Defendant Abbott Laboratories’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(B)(2) and 12(B)(6), ECF No. 112, is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in
PART;
5. 	Abbott’s 	Motion 	is 	granted 	as 	to 	Claim 	Five, 	tortious 	interference 	with
Thompson’s contract, and that claim is DISMISSED without PREJUDICE;
6. 	Plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage
regarding Plaintiffs’ customers remains;
7. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Thompson’s Counterclaims, ECF No. 138, is
GRANTED;
8. 	Thompson’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113 is
DISMISSED without PREJUDICE; and
9. 	Thompson’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs for tortious interference with an
employment relationship is DISMISSED without PREJUDICE.
DATED: March 31, 2026
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
REGINA M. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
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