C. et al v. Jacobs Solutions Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC
Al.C., A.P., An.A., An.D., Ari.R., Arn.R., A.V.,
C.V., E.M., Ed.T., E.D.L., E.L., Er.T., F.S., F.T.,
F.B., G.D.L., G.O., H.V., J.N.B., J.F., J.A., J.C.,
J.P., L.G., P.C., Ra.L., Ra.V., R.B., R.B.E.,
Re.C., Ri.C., R.F., Rog.B., Rom.B., R.E., R.N.,
R.T., T.L., and V.M.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACOBS SOLUTIONS INC.;
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC.;
CH2M HILL COMPANIES, LTD.;
CH2M HILL INTERNATIONAL, LTD.; and
CH2M HILL INTERNATIONAL B.V.;
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
______________________________________________________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung, United States Magistrate Judge.
In F.C. v. Jacobs Solutions Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (D. Colo. 2025), this Court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. In this case, a new set of plaintiffs
brings nearly identical allegations. Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–146 with First Amended Complaint
¶¶ 1–146, F.C. v. Jacobs Sols. Inc., No. 23-cv-02660-RMR-CYC (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2024) (the
“F.C. Complaint”), ECF No. 52. They differ only when specifying the new plaintiffs’
circumstances, which are alleged to be nearly identical to those in F.C.: construction of World
Cup stadia and related infrastructure under forced-labor conditions. Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 147–
187 with F.C. Complaint ¶¶ 147–200; see ECF No. 36 at 8.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 9

2
The same counsel from F.C. represent the parties here. Like in F.C., 790 F. Supp. 3d at
1171, the plaintiffs here also assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1595, each a
section of the Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), and one for
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1593. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 188–203. The defendants here moved to
dismiss this case, ECF No. 27, repeating many of their arguments from F.C. The plaintiffs rehash
similar counterarguments. The district judge referred the motion to the undersigned, ECF No. 33,
who authored F.C. There is little reason, then, to repastinate the ground that F.C. already plowed,
and the Court assumes familiarity with its previous opinion.
Instead, the Court addresses each party’s specific arguments aiming to remove this case
from F.C.’s ambit. None of them compel a different result.
The defendants begin by attacking F.C.’s synthesis of nationwide TVPRA case law
showing that “a plaintiff can allege that the defendant associated itself with the venture by
performing particularized services for it.” 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1189. The idea has since been
endorsed elsewhere. See Doe (J.R.L.) v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co., --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
2025 WL 3215615, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2025) (citing F.C., 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1188–89).
Nevertheless, the defendants insist that such participation must assist or facilitate the underlying
TVPRA violation to ground such a claim. ECF No. 27 at 21, 39–40. But “‘participation’ does not
require getting your hands dirty.” G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 561 (7th Cir. 2023).
In all events, even accepting the defendants’ proposition does not compel dismissal. “In
evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must . . . view all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and liberally construe the pleadings.” McNellis v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
116 F.4th 1122, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). And one such inference is
that the defendants’ participation could be viewed as facilitating the underlying TVPRA
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 9

3
violation by papering over those violations to allow venture participants to continue engaging in
cheap delivery of construction work through forced labor. See ECF No. 36 at 26.
Next, the defendants fault F.C.’s holding that the TVPRA’s private right of action applies
extraterritorially, contending that “several” subsequent decisions confirm their view. ECF No. 39
at 7. They cite one. See id. at 12. But Xu Lun v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, No. 24-
cv-0803-bhl, 2025 WL 3443536, at *13–14 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2025), in rejecting the opinion of
two circuits in favor of one from a district court, relied heavily on the use of “offense” in the
TVPRA to hold that it applied extraterritorially only in criminal prosecutions. In doing so, it did
not engage with the order of amendment in the TVPRA, the design of the statute’s 2008
amendments, or the use of “offense” in civil portions of the TVPRA, all of which point to that
word lacking the talismanic value Xu Lun ascribes to it. See F.C., 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1182–83. It
provides little reason, then, to chart a different course here.
The defendants continue their foray by labeling F.C.’s requirement that the primary
TVPRA offender in the venture be present in, a national of, or a permanent resident in the United
States to ground extraterritorial jurisdiction, 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1183–84, as “atextual” and
“distort[ing] the statute beyond recognition.” ECF No. 27 at 27. The assertion is quizzical. This
is the portion of the TVPRA that provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction:
(a) In general.--In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction
otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial
jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense)
under section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 if--
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence (as those terms are defined in section 101
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or
(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the
nationality of the alleged offender.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 9

4
18 U.S.C. § 1596(a). F.C.’s conditions for extraterritorial jurisdiction are lifted directly from the
text of subsections 1 and 2 of that statute. It is difficult to comprehend how such an exercise can
be atextual. This therefore also provides no reason to depart from F.C.
Turning to the plaintiffs’ claim for restitution, the defendants criticize F.C.’s refusal to
dismiss the analogous claim there because it did not mention 18 U.S.C. § 3664, to which the
restitution statute refers. ECF No. 27 at 45. Other courts have confronted the argument about
section 3664, though, and have held that restitution is available in civil TVPRA cases. See, e.g.,
Dinsay v. RN Staff Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00907-TWP-DML, 2021 WL 2643639, at *2–3. (S.D. Ind.
June 28, 2021)
Finally, in their reply, the defendants argue for the first time that the Court ought to
examine a Programme Management Consultant Contract that is not attached to the plaintiffs’
complaint, determine from the contract that they had a role that is at odds with the complaint,
and then conclude that the entire venture as proposed in the complaint is not viable. ECF No. 39
at 20–22 & n.8. But a court does “not consider . . . arguments raised for the first time on reply.”
Colo. Conservation All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 23-cv-03294-RMR, 2024 WL
6990972, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2024). To ignore that rule here would present additional
difficulty. Generally, a court does not consider documents outside a complaint on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and, while the defendants invoke the exception that a court “may
also consider ‘documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the
plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity,’” Doe through Doe v.
Rocky Mountain Classical Acad., 99 F.4th 1256, 1259 n.1 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Jacobsen v.
Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002)), by submitting the contract with their
reply brief, the defendants have left no opportunity for the plaintiffs to dispute the document’s
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 9

5
authenticity or offer their position on it. The Court therefore declines to examine the contract or
to address the arguments’ merits.
For their part, the plaintiffs, pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1 (2025), urge a different result from F.C. regarding personal
jurisdiction over CH2M Hill International B.V (“CH2M B.V.”). Though the plaintiffs’ argument
has some superficial appeal, ultimately Fuld does not change the analysis.
In F.C., the plaintiffs argued that CH2M B.V. had sufficient minimum contacts with
Colorado for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over it. Pltfs.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
Pltfs.’ Am. Compl., F.C. v. Jacobs Sols. Inc., No. 23-cv-02660-RMR-CYC (D. Colo. May 28,
2024), ECF No. 54 at 42–47. F.C. accordingly analyzed the issue of personal jurisdiction under
the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that CH2M B.V. lacked minimum contacts with Colorado to
support such jurisdiction. 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–76, 1178–79.
Here, the plaintiffs take a new tack. The question of personal jurisdiction over CH2M
B.V., they say, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Because their claims
arise under the TVPRA, the plaintiffs say that they “arise[] under federal law”; CH2M B.V.,
being a foreign corporation, “is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction”; and “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and
laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The last of those requirements, the only one that is contested, asks
“whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction satisfies Fifth Amendment due process standards.”
GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v. Coleridge Fine Arts, 700 F. App’x 865, 868 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing
Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 9

6
Ordinarily, that change would occasion no different analysis. In this Circuit, such
standards have required not only “minimum contacts with the United States as a whole,” but
“something more.” Peay, 205 F.3d at 1211. And the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations all focus
on CH2M B.V.’s contacts with Colorado. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29–33. On such a record, a
conclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment that CH2M B.V. had constitutionally insufficient
contacts with Colorado would compel the same conclusion about the sufficiency of its contacts
with the United States as a whole. Nor do the plaintiffs contend otherwise.
Instead, they focus on the statement in Fuld, released six days before F.C., “that the Fifth
Amendment does not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Fourteenth.” 606 U.S. at
18. “Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily permits a more flexible
jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the Federal Government’s broader sovereign
authority.” Id. at 16. Given that Rule 4(k)(2)’s limits come from the Fifth Amendment, the
plaintiffs say, this more “flexible” inquiry requires a finding that the Court can exercise
jurisdiction over CH2M B.V. despite its lack of purposeful direction at Colorado and the United
States more broadly.
If Fuld overruled Peay, it gave little guidance about what new test to employ. It explicitly
did “not purport to delineate the outer bounds of the Federal Government’s power, consistent
with due process, to hale foreign defendants into U.S. courts.” Id. at 18. But there are at least
three reasons to believe that its holding is not so broad as to disturb the Court’s previous
personal-jurisdiction analysis.
First, Fuld repeatedly emphasized its deference to the political branches’ exercise of
judgment on matters of foreign affairs in extending the reach of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause beyond that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s. Id. at 19–20, 22 That judgment was
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 9

7
exercised when “Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism
Act [the “PSJVTA”] in 2019” which “deem[ed] the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority—if they engage in specified conduct—to have consented to personal
jurisdiction in civil suits brought in the United States under the Antiterrorism Act [ATA].” Id. at
5–6. There is no analogous statute specifically addressing personal jurisdiction here. F.C., 790 F.
Supp. 3d at 1175.
Second, Fuld relied heavily on the limited nature of the jurisdictional grant of the
PSJVTA in finding that it did not transgress the Fifth Amendment’s bounds. That grant did “not
put respondents at broad risk of being haled into U.S. courts for myriad civil liability actions,”
instead “appl[ying] only to ATA cases, a narrow category of claims that provide civil remedies
only for Americans injured by acts of international terrorism.” Id. at 20. Its “jurisdiction
triggering predicates [were] likewise narrow.” Id. at 21. And it “limit[ed] jurisdiction to only two
enumerated nonsovereign foreign entities, both of which have been subject to a series of
congressional enactments aimed at deterring terrorism and accomplishing other foreign relations
objectives.” Id. Here, though, adopting the plaintiffs’ interpretation could result in the very
outcomes against which Fuld cautioned: “haling just any run-of-the-mill private defendant into
American courts,” such as CH2M B.V., that lack “decades of ‘meaningful contacts, ties, and
relations’ with the United States” so long as they meet the requirements of Rule 4(k)(2). Id. at 22
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
And third, Fuld urged caution in expanding the international reach of American personal
jurisdiction for fear of upsetting international relations in a way the political branches did not
intend. See id. at 18–19 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 9

8
(1987)). To adopt an interpretation of Fuld that totally casts aside Peay’s safeguards would
throw that caution to the wind.
Absent more clear guidance, then, it seems that a district court in this Circuit presented
with the situation at hand ought to adhere to Peay’s advice — definitively binding in Fuld’s
absence — that at least minimum contacts with the United States are required for jurisdiction
under Rule 4(k)(2). Following that path means that there is no deviation from F.C. required here.
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in F.C., the Court RECOMMENDS1 that
the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 27, be GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
The Court further RECOMMENDS that defendants Jacobs Solutions Inc. and CH2M
Hill International B.V. be DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
1 Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen days after service hereof to serve and file any
written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is
assigned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings
or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not
consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file such written
objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and
recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676–83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations within fourteen days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved
party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are
accepted or adopted by the District Court. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). Finally, all parties
must consult and comply with the District Judge’s practice standards for any specific
requirements concerning the filing and briefing of objections.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 9

9
The Court further RECOMMENDS that Count 1 be DISMISSED without prejudice
insofar as it is predicated upon a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590.
Dated this 17th day of February, 2025 at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung
United States Magistrate Judge
Case No. 1:25-cv-00274-RMR-CYC Document 52 filed 02/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 9