Day v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01557-PAB-SBP
THOMAS J. DAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
AMANDA FERGUSON,
HEATHER DEERE,
ALPINE MORTGAGE,
TRENT T. LAURIDSON, and
JASON S. BUCKLEY,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
This civil action is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11, the “Motion”
or “Motion to Dismiss”) filed by Defendants Alpine Mortgage (“Alpine”), Trent T. Lauridson
and Jason S. Buckley (collectively, the “Alpine Defendants”). The Alpine Defendants seek
dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted against them in Plaintiff Thomas J. Day’s
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
undersigned considers this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated
June 18, 2025 (ECF No. 7), and the Memorandum dated August 8, 2025 (ECF No. 12).
The court has carefully reviewed the Amended Complaint, the briefing on the Motion,
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including Plaintiff’s various oppositions and responses (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 23, 31),1 court records
subject to judicial notice, and the applicable law. The court concludes that oral argument would
not materially assist in the disposition of the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the court
respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that all claims
against the Alpine Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Procedural History
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on May 16, 2025. ECF No. 1. He filed
the operative Amended Complaint on June 6, 2025. ECF No. 4. The Amended Complaint names
as defendants Freedom Mortgage Corporation and its counsel (Ferguson and Deere), as well as
the Alpine Defendants. Id. Separate motions to dismiss have been filed by Freedom Mortgage
Corporation (ECF No. 20) and its counsel, Amanda Ferguson (ECF No. 13) and Heather Deere
(ECF No. 15), and will be addressed in separate recommendations.
This case is related to two state-court foreclosure proceedings involving the same real
property located at 106 Rachel Lane, Breckenridge, Colorado 80424 (the “Property”). First,
Freedom Mortgage Corporation initiated a foreclosure proceeding in Summit County District
Court, Case No. 2025CV30103, related to its deed of trust encumbering the Property. Second,
Alpine Bank (named in this action as “Alpine Mortgage”) filed a separate foreclosure action in
Summit County District Court, Case No. 2025CV30090 (the “Foreclosure Action”), based on
1 In preparing this recommendation on the Motion to Dismiss, the court has reviewed and
considered all of these papers. The court finds that the contents of those papers does not alter the
analysis here.
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Plaintiff’s default under a 2019 home-equity line of credit also secured by the Property. See ECF
No. 4 at 3–4; ECF No. 11, Exs. F–I.2
In the Foreclosure Action, Plaintiff asserted counterclaims mirroring several of the
federal claims he raises here.3 On July 9, 2025, the state court dismissed all counterclaims with
prejudice.4 On October 17, 2025, the state court entered partial summary judgment in Alpine’s
favor.5 On November 18, 2025, the court certified that ruling as final pursuant to Colorado Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b) and dismissed Alpine’s remaining claims without prejudice.6 Plaintiff
2 In evaluating the Motion to Dismiss, the court may consider documents incorporated by
reference in Plaintiff’s pleading, as well as other filings in the Foreclosure Action, which are
subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (on a
motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents the complaint incorporates by reference;
“documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim” and
there is no dispute concerning their authenticity; and matters subject to judicial notice) (citing
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)); see also St. Louis
Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (a court
may take judicial notice of filings in related cases, “both within and without the federal judicial
system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). Here, the Foreclosure
Action is expressly referenced in the Amended Complaint and forms part of the factual backdrop
for Plaintiff’s claims against the Alpine Defendants, which arise from the same loan default and
related enforcement proceedings.
3 See Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims filed May 29, 2025, Alpine Bank v. Day,
No. 2025CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.) (ECF No. 11, Ex. G).
4 See Orders dated July 9, 2025, dismissing all counterclaims with prejudice, Alpine Bank v. Day,
No. 2025CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.) (ECF No. 11, Exs. H & I).
5 See Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Oct. 17, 2025), Alpine Bank v. Day,
No. 2025CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.), as referenced and certified as final in the November
18, 2025 order; see also Register of Actions, Alpine Bank v. Day, No. 2025CV30090 (Summit
Cnty. Dist. Ct.) (docket entries reflecting entry of partial summary judgment).
6 See Order Granting Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice of Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims
and for C.R.C.P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment (Nov. 18, 2025), Alpine Bank v. Day, No.
2025CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.).
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has appealed (see Colorado Court of Appeals Case No. 2026CA72), and the appeal is ongoing.7
II. 	Facts
The Amended Complaint is lengthy and includes a mixture of factual allegations, legal
conclusions, citations to inapplicable authority, and non-justiciable rhetoric (including references
to Plaintiff as “a living man presenting myself pro se/sui juris”), demands for proof of
“consideration,” assertions of “God-given rights,” and challenges to the validity of the
underlying loan based on the creation of money through credit rather than legal tender. See, e.g.,
generally ECF No. 4; see also ECF No. 21, ECF No. 22-1, ECF No. 23, ECF No. 30, ECF No.
31 (consistent phrasing across Plaintiff’s filings). Courts within the Tenth Circuit have
recognized that similar rhetoric and theories—often associated with the so-called “sovereign
citizen” movement—do not supply a cognizable legal basis for relief and may be disregarded
when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. See Sipple v. Zevita, No. 5:23-cv-4038-HLT,
2023 WL 4706621, at *3-4 (D. Kan. July 24, 2023); id. at *3 (“Courts show no hesitation in
rejecting as frivolous arguments based on the theory of sovereign citizenship.”); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Sellors, 572 F. App’x 628, 632 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding arguments associated
with the “sovereign citizen” movement “patently frivolous”); United States v. Palmer, 699 F.
App’x 836, 838 (10th Cir. 2017) (“As for Palmer’s sovereign state citizen argument, reasonable
jurists could also not disagree that the claim is plainly frivolous.”). To the extent such allegations
constitute legal conclusions or rely on legally-unsupported theories, the court does not credit
them for purposes of the Motion. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.
7 See Register of Actions, Alpine Bank v. Day, No. 2025CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.)
(listing Case Number 2026CA72 and showing that the appellate action is ongoing).
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2012) (“We will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining[ ]
factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.”).
Stripped of these extraneous contentions, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is
the record owner of the Property. ECF No. 4 at 6. On June 26, 2019, Plaintiff borrowed $300,000
from Alpine under a Credit Agreement and Disclosure, secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on
August 6, 2019, at Reception No. 1204373 in the Summit County real property records. Id. at 4;
ECF No. 11 Exs. A, B.
Plaintiff defaulted on the loan. See ECF No. 11, Ex. C. On February 11, 2025, the Alpine
Defendants sent Plaintiff a Notice of Loan Default demanding a cure amount of $9,719.19. ECF
No. 4 at 4; ECF No. 11, Ex. C. On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff responded with an “Affidavit of
Truth/Proof of Claim” disputing the debt and requesting verification. ECF No. 4 at 4; ECF No.
11, Ex. D. On March 17, 2025, the Alpine Defendants provided Plaintiff with a Verification of
Debt that included copies of the loan documents and a payment history. ECF No. 4 at 4; ECF
No. 11, Ex. E. Plaintiff did not cure the default. Id.
On April 30, 2025, Alpine filed the Foreclosure Action in Summit County District Court
seeking foreclosure and other relief related to the default. ECF No. 4 at 4; See also Complaint,
Alpine Bank v. Day, No. 25CV30090 (Summit Cnty. Dist. Ct.), ECF No. 11, Ex. F. On May 29,
2025, Plaintiff filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims asserting violations of
the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and the
Truth in Lending Act. Id. Ex. G. at 7-9. Alpine moved to dismiss the counterclaims on June 10,
2025. Id. Plaintiff did not respond, and on July 9, 2025, the state court granted the motion and
dismissed all counterclaims with prejudice. Id. & Exs. H, I.
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The Property is also encumbered by a separate mortgage loan serviced by Defendant
Freedom Mortgage Corporation, which initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2025.
ECF No. 4 at 3-4. Plaintiff’s claims against the Alpine Defendants, however, arise solely from
the 2019 Alpine loan, the default notices, the debt verification correspondence, and the
Foreclosure Action. See generally id.
Plaintiff raises four claims against the Alpine Defendants in the instant case: violation of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Claim Two);
deprivation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, actionable via 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Claim Four); violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”), Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 6-1-101 et seq. (Claim Five); and fraud, “supported by consideration under Colorado
common law” and the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) § 3-501(b)(2) (Claim Six). ECF
No. 4 at 3-6. These claims largely mirror the counterclaims dismissed with prejudice in the
Foreclosure Action and rest on allegations that the loan lacked consideration, that its funding
source was fraudulently concealed, and that the Alpine Defendants failed to properly verify the
debt or produce the original note. See generally id. As relief for each claim, Plaintiff requests
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 8-9.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
. . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri,
595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th
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Cir. 2009)). “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d
1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247
(explaining that plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint,” and that the
allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff’s claims “across the line from conceivable to
plausible”). The ultimate duty of the court is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently
alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the
legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
In applying these principles, this court is mindful that Plaintiff proceeds pro se and thus
affords his papers and filings a liberal construction. Smith v. Allbaugh, 921 F.3d 1261, 1268 (10th
Cir. 2019). But the court cannot and does not act as his advocate, United States v. Griffith, 928
F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019), and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to
Plaintiff as to a represented party. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018);
see also Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012) (“Pro se
status does not relieve Plaintiff of the duty to comply with various rules and procedures
governing litigants and counsel, or the requirements of the substantive law and, in these regards,
the Court will treat Plaintiff according to the same standard as counsel licensed to practice law
before the bar of this Court.”).
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ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Alpine Defendants contend that the court lacks jurisdiction over
two of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 11 at 10-14 (invoking the Younger abstention doctrine and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as grounds for dismissing Claims Five and Six). As explained in
greater detail below, no jurisdictional bar prevents the court from examining the substance of any
of Plaintiff’s claims and determining whether his allegations suffice to state a viable claim for
relief on any of the legal theories he posits. For the reasons that follow, the court respectfully
finds that Plaintiff has stated no legally cognizable claim.
I. 	Plaintiff’s claims rest on legally-unsupported theories concerning loan consideration
and debt extinguishment.
Plaintiff’s claims against the Alpine Defendants are premised on the contention that the
2019 mortgage loan is unenforceable because the lender allegedly provided no lawful
consideration. ECF No. 4 at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the loan was not funded through
the advancement of the lender’s own money or lawful tender, but instead was created through
credit, bookkeeping entries, or undisclosed funding mechanisms, rendering the indebtedness void
for lack of consideration. See id. at 3-9; ECF No. 11 at 4–7 & n.1. Plaintiff further alleges that,
because Alpine has not produced the “original note” or otherwise demonstrated the source of
loan funding, the note, deed of trust, and subsequent foreclosure efforts are void. See generally
ECF No. 4 at 3-9.
Although Plaintiff does not explicitly describe his theory using any particular label, the
substance of his allegations closely mirrors what courts commonly refer to as the
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“redemptionist” 8 or “vapor money” theory. Under that theory, borrowers contend that debts
arising from loans funded through credit—rather than physical currency or specie—are
unenforceable, lack consideration, or may be discharged through unilateral demands for proof of
funding or presentment of negotiable instruments:
The genesis of the vapor money theory is that the decision by the United States in
1933 to discard the gold standard resulted in the federal government’s bankruptcy,
after which lenders have been creating unenforceable debts because they are
lending credit rather than legal tender. Accordingly, under the vapor money theory,
a loan imposes no repayment obligation if the indebtedness was funded with credit
as opposed to hard currency.
Mercado v. Transp. Funding, LLC, No. 2:23-CV-02052-HLT, 2025 WL 388661, at *3 (D. Kan.
Feb. 4, 2025) (quoting Thomas v. All In Credit Union, No. 23-00215-TFM-B, 2023 WL
9197752, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
312682 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2024)). In essence, proponents of the theory believe that borrowers
may “essentially convert a payment demand into legal tender and magically extinguish [their]
debts” through unilateral action. Thomas, 2023 WL 9197752, at *8.
Courts within the Tenth Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected such arguments
as legally baseless. Mercado, 2025 WL 388661, at *3 (describing the theory as one that has been
“summarily, universally, and rightly rejected”) (collecting cases); Baldwin v. Glob. Lending
8 The “redemptionist” theory “propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a
fictional person called the ‘strawman. The ‘strawman’ purportedly came into being when the
United States went off the gold standard in 1993, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its
citizens as collateral for the country’s national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has
power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can
free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their
strawman.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiff here labels
himself “a living man presenting Sui Juris.” See ECF No. 1 at 1.
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Servs., LLC, No. CIV-25-121-D, 2025 WL 1426564, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. May 16, 2025); Sipple,
2023 WL 4706621, at *1, *3–4.9 As one court has aptly described the essence of the matter,
redemptionist arguments are “frivolous legal arguments made in an attempt to avoid paying for
the car,” Podgorny v. Ally Fin., No. CV-21-00288-PHX-DJH, 2022 WL 672676, at *2 (D. Ariz.
2022)—or, as is the case here, to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars owed to a lender.
This court likewise rejects this wholly-discredited theory that finds no support in the law.
Here, Plaintiff contends that Alpine was obligated to demonstrate that lawful money was
advanced at the origination of the loan (that is, that the lender placed its own funds at risk), to
verify the source of loan funds upon demand, or to produce original loan instruments as a
prerequisite to enforcing the debt. See ECF No. 4 at 3-9; see also ECF No. 11 at 4–7 & n.1. No
such obligations exist under federal law, Colorado law, or the Uniform Commercial Code, and as
discussed above, courts have uniformly rejected the theory that loans funded through credit,
accounting entries, or similar banking mechanisms lack consideration or are unenforceable. See,
e.g., Mercado, 2025 WL 388661, at *3. It is beyond cavil that loans funded through bank credit
are a routine and lawful feature of modern banking and create valid, enforceable repayment
obligations—which Plaintiff here obviously seeks to avoid.
9 Accord, e.g., Adams v. Partners, No. 24-CV-943-PP, 2025 WL 101615, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Jan.
15, 2025); Farina v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:24-cv-287-TKW-HTC, 2024 WL 3333270,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3330586 (N.D.
Fla. July 8, 2024); Marshall v. Mechanics Bank Auto Fin., No. 2:22-CV-06973-MCS-KS, 2023
WL 2628674 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2023); Price v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-
655-FtM-29MRM, 2021 WL 1610097, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-11806,
2022 WL 896816 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022); Swain v. Dir. of Corr., No. 19-CV-03882-EMC,
2019 WL 7020322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019); McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F.
Supp. 2d 201, 213-14 (D. Conn. 2010).
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Nor does a borrower’s unilateral demand for proof of consideration, verification of
funding sources, or production of original documents operate to discharge a debt or nullify a
security interest. Courts confronting materially identical arguments have rejected them as a
matter of law. See Brown v. Selene Fin. LP, No. 1:22-CV-04690-LMM, 2023 WL 4996552
(N.D. Ga. June 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3335060 (N.D. Ga.
May 9, 2023) (rejecting borrower’s contention that mortgage debt was unenforceable because it
was allegedly not funded with “actual money,” and characterizing the argument as a variant of
the discredited “vapor money” theory).
Because each of Plaintiff’s claims brought in this lawsuit (couched in whatever legal garb)
rests on the premise that the loan was void or unenforceable due to the alleged absence of lawful
consideration or failure of proof of consideration—that is, the “vapor money” or similarly
unsupported theory—that alone is “sufficient to grant [the] Motion to Dismiss, as . . . these
theories have been universally and emphatically rejected by numerous federal courts for at least
the last 25 years.” See Baldwin, 2025 WL 1426564, at *3 n.4 (citing McLaughlin, 726 F. Supp.
2d at 214). Accordingly, dismissal with prejudice of all claims against the Alpine Defendants is
warranted on this basis alone. See, e.g., Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.”); Viegas v. Kane, No.
23-cv-03291-PAB-MDB (D. Colo. 2023) (ECF No. 38 at 16 n.6 ), report and recommendation
adopted, ECF No. 42 (dismissing with prejudice a due process claim alleging that a foreclosure
action was premised on “unjust cause” and that the defendants colluded in effectuating the
foreclosure “with a fraudulent security instrument,” and observing that “Plaintiffs have caused
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Defendants and the court [to expend] significant time and resources on what appear to be entirely
meritless claims about a foreclosure action that has long been resolved in state court”) (citing
Avery v. Wade, No. 22-4093, 2022 WL 17544077, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 2022) (finding that the
district court “didn’t abuse its discretion in dismissing [the plaintiff’s] claims with prejudice”
because he raised “indisputably meritless legal theories”) (cleaned up)).
II. 	The Amended Complaint suffers from additional pleading defects.
Even if the vapor money theory were viable (which it decidedly is not), the Amended
Complaint fails to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief on any of
the four claims brought against the Alpine Defendants. In the interest of providing a complete
recommendation for review by Chief Judge Brimmer, the court addresses the additional pleading
defects compelling dismissal of each claim.
A. 	Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Claim Two)
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that Alpine and its counsel violated the FDCPA by
sending an allegedly defective default notice on February 11, 2025, and proceeding with
foreclosure after Plaintiff disputed the debt and demanded validation, including documentation
concerning consideration and the promissory note, and by providing only “partial documents” in
response. See ECF No. 4 at 4; see also ECF No. 31 at 3–4 (asserting that Plaintiff requested
“proof of consideration,” a “wet ink promissory note,” and “certified wire transfer records,” and
contending that Defendants failed to validate before pursuing foreclosure). This claim does not
survive scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6).
To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) he is a
“consumer,” under § 1692a(3); (2) the obligation at issue is a “debt” arising from a transaction
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primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (3) the defendant is a “debt collector” as
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and (4) the defendant violated a specific provision of the
FDCPA. Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 43 F.4th 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 2022).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against the Alpine Defendants arise from (i) Alpine’s role as the
originating lender on a 2019 loan secured by a deed of trust on the Property and (ii) Alpine’s
subsequent efforts, through counsel, to enforce that security interest after Plaintiff defaulted. See
ECF No. 4 at 4. The specific conduct Plaintiff challenges includes the February 11, 2025 notice
of default, Defendants’ March 17, 2025 response providing loan documents and account
information, and the filing of the Foreclosure Action in Summit County District Court. See ECF
No. 11, Exs. C (Notice of Default), E (Verification materials), F (state-court complaint).
Entities whose principal purpose is not debt collection—including creditors collecting
debts owed to themselves—are generally excluded from the FDCPA’s primary definition of
“debt collector.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (excluding from the definition of “debt collector”
“any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a
bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person;
(iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or
(iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit
transaction involving the creditor”); see also Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S.
466, 477 (2019) (recognizing that “those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act”). In the foreclosure context, “the vast
majority of courts, especially in this District, have found that foreclosure activities are outside
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the scope of the FDCPA.” Schwitzer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-01367-RBJ-MJW,
2013 WL 607832, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2013) (citing Wessler v. Colonial Nat’l Mortg., No.
11-cv-02683-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 5949730 (Bankr. D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5949581 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 28, 2012)).
Here, Alpine is the original creditor on the 2019 loan secured by the Property, ECF No.
11, Exs. A (promissory note executed in favor of Alpine) & B (deed of trust naming Alpine as
lender, recorded Aug. 6, 2019, Reception No. 1204373, Summit County records), and its
counsel’s actions—sending the February 11, 2025 Notice of Default (id., Ex. C), providing
verification materials on March 17, 2025 (id., Ex. E), and filing the foreclosure complaint on
April 30, 2025, in the Foreclosure Action (id., Ex. F)—are squarely within the scope of the
procedures established for enforcing a security interest under Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 38-38-101 et seq. Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that Alpine or its counsel used a name
other than their own, regularly collect debts owed to another, or engaged in general debt-
collection activity beyond enforcing Alpine’s deed of trust. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Claim
Two therefore fails because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Alpine Defendants are
“debt collectors” subject to the FDCPA.
Even if the FDCPA applied, the claim would still fail for failure to state a plausible claim
for relief. First, the record here demonstrates that the materials provided on March 17, 2025,
satisfied the verification requirement of § 1692g(b). Verification under that provision requires
the debt collector to obtain and mail either verification of the debt (or a copy of a judgment) or
the name and address of the original creditor; it does not entitle the borrower to a detailed
accounting or to proof of the loan’s internal funding mechanics or acceptance of the borrower’s
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legal theories. As the Tenth Circuit has made clear, § 1692g(b) “is not intended to give a debtor a
detailed accounting of debt to be collected. Instead, ‘[c]onsistent with the legislative history,
verification is only intended to eliminate the problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong
person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.’” Maynard v.
Cannon, 401 F. App’x 389, 396 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394,
406 (4th Cir. 1999)). The verification sent to Plaintiff included true and accurate copies of the
note, deed of trust, and payment history—more than adequate under the statute.
Second, Plaintiff’s allegations do not identify any specific false, deceptive, or misleading
representation prohibited by § 1692e, nor do they plausibly demonstrate the existence of any
unfair or unconscionable practice under § 1692f. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegation that the Alpine
Defendants’ collection efforts were “misleading” rests entirely on his assertion that the
underlying debt is invalid for lack of consideration. That conclusory allegation—premised on a
rejected legal theory, rather than on concrete misstatements regarding the amount, status, or
ownership of the debt—does not plausibly state a claim under the FDCPA.
Accordingly, Claim Two fails as a matter of law for this independent reason. Because no
alteration of the pleading could repair the fundamental defects in the claim, it should be
dismissed with prejudice. See Brereton, 434 F.3d at 1219.
B. 	Section 1983 Due Process Claim (Claim Four)
In Claim Four, Plaintiff alleges that the Alpine Defendants deprived him of property
without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, by pursuing
foreclosure in the face of his demands for loan validation and proof of consideration and
disputation of the debt in March 2025. See ECF No. 4 at 5–6. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
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plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Claim Four fails at the threshold because
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Alpine Defendants—Alpine (the original private
lender) and its private counsel (Lauridson and Buckley)—acted under color of state law.
“Section 1983 was enacted ‘to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.’” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 161 (1992)). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the
defendant in a § 1983 action exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. (quoting Haines, 82
F.3d at 1508) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Silva v. US Bank, Nat’l Assoc., 294 F. Supp. 3d
1117, 1130 (D. Colo. 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Silva v. US Bank,
Nat’l Assoc. as Tr. under Pooling & Serv. Agreement dated as of Feb. 1, 2007, No. 17-cv-01529-
WJM-KLM, 2018 WL 10561514 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2018) (“Section 1983 establishes liability
based on the actions of the government and its agents.”) (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young
Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1995).
Put another way, when a § 1983 claim is “based on the conduct of a private individual,
that conduct constitutes state action if it is fairly attributable to the state.” Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d
897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). And the conduct of a private actor is “fairly attributable
to the state” only if two conditions are met:
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First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the state is responsible. Second, the private party must have acted together
with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials or engaged in conduct
otherwise chargeable to the State.
Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161). It is
impossible for the court to reasonably infer the existence of either condition from Plaintiff’s
pleading.
It has long been established that financial institutions and their legal counsel engaged in
foreclosure proceedings do not operate under color of state law pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g.,
Elliott v. May, 122 F. App’x 944, 946 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding dismissal of a § 1983 claim
brought against private mortgage lenders who failed to refinance the plaintiff’s home loan
because the “private entities” were not “acting under ‘color of state law’” in making that
refinancing decision); Ramsey v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-cv-02653-WYD-CBS, 2011 WL
4485922, at *10 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL
4485918 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2011), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
plaintiff’s challenge to a bank’s utilization of eviction and foreclosure proceedings under
Colorado law did not “transform Citibank N.A. or CitiMortgage, Inc. into agents of the state”).
And private actors “do not engage in state action simply by availing [themselves] of a state
procedure,” Scott, 216 F.3d at 906, including by “instituting a routine civil suit”—which is
insufficient to “transform a litigant’s actions into those taken under color of state law.” Hirsch v.
Copenhaver, 839 F. Supp. 1524, 1531 (D. Wyo. 1993) (quotation omitted). “Similarly, relief
under § 1983 cannot be premised solely on an argument that a private actor misused available
state procedures, particularly in the absence of overt and significant assistance from state
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officials.” Ramsey, 2011 WL 4485922, at *10 (citing Cobb v. Saturn Land Company, Inc., 966
F.2d 1334, 1336–37 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff fails to offer any supporting allegations or details tending to suggest that “state
officials and [the Alpine Defendants] have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation
of constitutional rights.” Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 777 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1453); see also Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“[W]hen a plaintiff attempts to assert the state action required for a § 1983 claim against private
actors based on a conspiracy with government actors, mere conclusory allegations with no
supporting factual averments are insufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts
tending to show agreement and concerted action.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
Stated otherwise, Plaintiff’s allegations permit no inference that any state official had any
involvement whatsoever in this matter. The well-pleaded facts—construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff—merely allege that the Alpine Defendants utilized the legal processes
available to them to carry out a foreclosure proceeding when Plaintiff defaulted on the loan.
For these reasons, Claim Four fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed with
prejudice. See, e.g., Brereton, 434 F.3d at 1219.
C. 	Colorado Consumer Protection Act (Claim Five)
In Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that the Alpine Defendants violated the CCPA by
misrepresenting the validity of the loan, concealing its “loan funding mechanisms,” and pursuing
a “defective” foreclosure. See ECF No. 4 at 6. The Alpine Defendants seek dismissal of the
claim for a host of reasons, both jurisdictional and substantive. They assert that the court should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
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(1971); that the claim is jurisdictionally-barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; that the
claim is also barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; and that the claim fails as a matter of
law. See ECF No. 11 at 10-14. While the court rejects the Alpine Defendants’ jurisdictional
arguments, it concludes that the claim is marked by fatal pleading defects—in addition to the
baseline frivolity of the “vapor money” theory that compels dismissal of all claims in the first
instance—and warrants dismissal on this basis as well.
1. 	Younger Abstention and the Sprint Categories
The Alpine Defendants first argue that Claim Five “must be dismissed under the Younger
abstention doctrine.” Id. at 10. Younger is a “jurisdictional limit[],” Woodham v. Hireright, LLC,
No. 25-4119, 2026 WL 412582, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026), and so the court must address its
claimed application before taking any other action with respect to Claim Five. See Citizens
Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1301
(10th Cir. 1980) (“A federal court must in every case, and at every stage of the proceeding,
satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, and the court is not bound by the acts or pleadings of the
parties.”).
“The Younger abstention doctrine generally requires federal courts to abstain from
interfering with ongoing state legal proceedings.” Covington v. Humphries, No. 24-1158, 2025
WL 1448661, at *3 (10th Cir. May 19, 2025) (citing Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Pro.
Licensing of Dep’t of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 874-75 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Younger)). “Younger
provides that a federal court must abstain from deciding a case otherwise within the scope of its
jurisdiction in ‘certain instances in which the prospect of undue interference with state
proceedings counsels against federal relief.’” Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC,
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953 F.3d 660, 669-70 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the “[c]ircumstances fitting within the Younger
doctrine . . . are ‘exceptional[.]’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
For Younger abstention to be triggered, the state proceeding must fall into one of three
categories: “(1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings [that take on a
quasi-criminal shape], and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.” Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted); see also Sprint, 571
U.S. at 78 (recognizing that these three “‘exceptional categories’ . . . define Younger’s scope”).
“If and only if the state court proceeding falls within one of the enumerated ‘exceptional’ types
of cases, may courts analyze the propriety of abstention under the so-called Middlesex
conditions. Those conditions ask whether there exists ‘(1) an ongoing state judicial . . .
proceeding, (2) the presence of an important state interest, and (3) an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto
Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. N.M. Admin.
Off. of Cts., 53 F.4th 1245, 1256 (10th Cir. 2022)); see also Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). “Middlesex conditions are ‘additional factors
appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger,” but do not control its
application in a particular case. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., 98 F.4th at 1317 (quoting Sprint, 571
U.S. at 81). Instead, “the sine qua non of Younger abstention is the presence of an ‘exceptional’
state court proceeding, and Younger extends ‘no further.’” Id. (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 82).
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Only if the state court actions falls into one of the “exceptional” cases will the court be obliged to
address the Middlesex factors. See id.
This court therefore must grapple with the threshold question of whether the Foreclosure
Action qualifies as one of the “exceptional” cases that may fall within the scope of Younger
abstention.10 The record here precludes a finding that the Foreclosure Action qualifies as one of
the “exceptional” cases to which Younger might apply.
As to the first two Sprint categories, the Foreclosure Action obviously is not a state
criminal prosecution, nor is it a civil enforcement proceeding “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in
‘important respects.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604
(1975)). In cases falling into the second Sprint category, “a state actor is routinely a party to the
state proceeding and often initiates the action,” and the “enforcement actions are
characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state
action, for some wrongful act.” Id. (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1979)).11 This
court has no reason to conclude, based on the record, that any of these characteristics are present
in the Foreclosure Action. It thus remains for the court to consider whether the Foreclosure
Action falls into the third Sprint category, which has been construed to encompass state
proceedings “involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quotation omitted); see also, e.g.,
10 The Alpine Defendants do not address this question at all and, indeed, do not even mention
Sprint in their briefing.
11 In Moore, for example, Younger abstention applied because the state was a party to the
proceeding in a case that involved “the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context,”
which is “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.’” See 442 U.S. at 423 (quoting
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
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Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977) (applying Younger abstention to a state court
contempt proceeding between private parties because contempt enforcement “stands in aid of the
authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory”);
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987) (holding that Younger applies when the
federal suit “challenge[d] . . . the processes by which the State compels compliance with the
judgments of its courts”); Clark v. Colo. Div. of Sec., No. 23-cv-02170-SKC-JPO, 2024 WL
1836917, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2024) (holding that a state “administrative proceeding to
revoke Plaintiff’s securities licenses . . . is the type of action to which the Younger abstention
doctrine applies,” because “the state initiated a coercive civil enforcement proceeding to revoke
Plaintiff’s securities licenses as a sanction for his alleged violations of state securities licensing
requirements”).
The Alpine Defendants have not attempted to explain how the Foreclosure Action, a
dispute between private parties about a failure to pay a debt, is in the nature of a “civil
proceeding implicating a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts such
as state court contempt proceedings.” Courthouse News Serv., 53 F.4th at 1257 (cleaned up)
(quoting Catanach v. Thomson, 718 F. App’x 595, 597 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017)). Neither can this
court discern any such correlation between the state dispute and the interest of the state of
Colorado in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. Indeed, based on the record in the
instant matter, the court is obliged to find that the Foreclosure Action is demonstrably not of that
type and accordingly does not fall into the third Sprint category.
Because this case does not fall into a Sprint category, Younger does not apply and
accordingly poses no barrier to the adjudication of Claim Five.
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2. 	The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Alpine Defendant argue, in the alternative, that Claim Five must be dismissed under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.12 ECF No. 11 at 11-12. Like Younger, Rooker-Feldman does not
deprive this court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
“The ‘Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] prevents federal courts, with the notable exception of
the United States Supreme Court, from exercising jurisdiction over ‘cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
Marshall v. Bacon, No. 24-2076, 2025 WL 369436, at *6 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (quoting
Graff, 65 F.4th at 517) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005)). “The doctrine’s jurisdictional bar applies when (1) the plaintiff lost in state court,
(2) the state court judgment caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (3) the state court rendered judgment
before the plaintiff filed the federal claim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the district court to
review and reject the state court judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). Put simply, “Rooker-Feldman is
limited to cases where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit after the state proceedings
ended.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291) (emphasis added). And a state
proceeding has not “ended” until any appeals have concluded. See D.A. Osguthorpe Family
P’ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that proceedings are
final for purposes of Rooker-Feldman after the state-court proceedings, including appeals, have
ended).
12 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983).
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Here, Plaintiff has appealed the judgment against him in the Foreclosure Action. Indeed,
just a few days ago, the Colorado Court of Appeals entered an order denying Alpine’s motion to
dismiss the appeal. See February 19, 2026 Order of Court, Day v. Alpine Bank, No. 2026CA72
(denying motion to dismiss appeal and ordering that Plaintiff’s notice of appeal be accepted as
filed). Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman does not create a jurisdictional bar to the court’s evaluation
of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
3. 	Claim Preclusion
The Alpine Defendants next assert that the doctrine of claim preclusion prohibits the
court from considering Plaintiff’s CCPA claim. See ECF No. 11 at 12-13. “Three elements must
be established for claim preclusion to attach: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior action;
(2) the identity (i.e., sameness) of parties or their privies in the prior and instant suits; and (3) the
‘identity of the cause of action in both suits.’” Watkins v. Genesh, Inc., 135 F.4th 1224, 1229
(10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221,
1239 (10th Cir. 2017)).
The court appreciates that the Motion to Dismiss was filed before the appeal of the
Foreclosure Action, but the Alpine Defendants have not sought to explain in any request for
supplemental briefing whether the pendency of the appeal negates a finding that the judgment in
the Foreclosure Action is “final” for purposes of triggering claim preclusion. In order to satisfy
the final judgment requirement, “a judgment must be ‘sufficiently firm’ in the sense that it was
not tentative, the parties had an opportunity to be heard, and there was an opportunity for
review.” Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561, 568 (Colo. 1989); see also Rantz v. Kaufman, 109
P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005) (“[p]ronouncing a judgment to be final while it is still pending on
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appeal would negate” the requirement that the parties have an opportunity for review); 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4433 (3d Ed.) (“Substantial
difficulties result from the rule that a final trial-court judgment operates as res judicata while an
appeal is pending. The major problem is that a second judgment based upon the preclusive
effects of the first judgment should not stand if the first judgment is reversed.”).
It is the Alpine Defendants’ burden to establish claim preclusion. See, e.g., Nwosun v.
General Mills Restaurants, Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997). Given the pending appeal
of the judgment in the Foreclosure Action, and the absence of any meaningful argument on this
critical point from the Alpine Defendants, the court cannot conclude that they have met their
burden at this juncture.
4. 	Failure to State a Plausible Claim for Relief
Even if the CCPA claim were not subject to dismissal on grounds that it rests on the
frivolous “vapor money” theory, the Amended Complaint otherwise fails to state a plausible
cause of action under the CCPA.
Under the CCPA, “[a] person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
the person’s business, the person knowingly or recklessly makes a false representation as to the
characteristics, ingredients, uses, [or] benefits of goods[.]” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(1)(e) (in
relevant part, cleaned up). To successfully press a private cause of action under this statute, a
plaintiff must show:
(1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice; (2) that the
challenged practice occurred in the course of defendant’s business, vocation or
occupation; (3) that it significantly impacts the public as actual or potential
consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property; (4) that the plaintiff
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suffered the injury in fact to a legally protected interest; and (5) that the challenged
practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.
HealthONE of Denver, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (D. Colo.
2011) (quoting Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 146-
47 (Colo. 2003)); see also Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998) (same). “All elements
of a CCPA claim must be met; otherwise, the claim fails as a matter of law.” HealthONE, 805 F.
Supp. 2d at 1120. In addition, because Plaintiff’s CCPA theory sounds in fraud and deception, he
must meet the heightened pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b). HealthONE, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s pleading fails to allege any of the elements of a CCPA claim. To begin with,
his factual allegations center on a single, private dispute over the terms, validity, and
enforcement of his personal 2019 home‑equity loan with Alpine and the resulting foreclosure on
his property at 106 Rachel Lane in Breckenridge, Colorado. Colorado courts routinely hold that
essentially private disputes of this sort—even where one party is a business—do not
“significantly impact the public” as actual or potential consumers, and thus fall outside the
CCPA’s reach. See Hall, 969 P.2d at 235; Rhino Linings, 62 P.3d at 149-50. The facts alleged
here permit of no reasonable inference that Alpine engaged in a broader pattern of similar
conduct toward other borrowers, that the challenged practices were part of a systematic scheme,
or that any member of the public beyond Plaintiff himself was affected. Plaintiff’s conclusory
assertion that “other Colorado homeowners” were impacted, ECF No. 4 at 6, is wholly lacking in
supporting factual averments. On the face of the Amended Complaint, then, Claim Five concerns
only a one‑off lender-borrower dispute and thus fails the public‑impact element as a matter of
law.
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Neither does the Amended Complaint plausibly allege that the Alpine Defendants
engaged in any deceptive trade practice at all, let alone one pled with the particularity that Rule
9(b) requires. Plaintiff contends the loan “lacked consideration,” that Alpine and its counsel
“fraudulently concealed” the loan’s funding source by not producing internal bank records and
balance sheets, and that any attempt to foreclose while Plaintiff disputes those issues is
necessarily deceptive. But these contentions sound in the vapor money theory, which courts have
uniformly rejected as legally frivolous. Plaintiff identifies no specific false statement about the
interest rate, principal balance, fees, or legal status of the loan; no misleading advertising or
consumer‑facing representation; and no omission of information that Colorado law requires
Alpine to have disclosed in the circumstances alleged. Instead, he proclaims the debt “invalid”
because Alpine has not adopted his view of “consideration” or produced the internal
documentation he demands. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that a loan is “fraudulent” or that
verification was “inadequate,” without concrete facts plausibly establishing an actionable
misrepresentation, are insufficient to satisfy his pleading burden. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In sum, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Alpine Defendants’ actions with respect
to the loan violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. In addition to its patent defect as
grounded in the frivolous vapor money theory, Claim Five should be dismissed with prejudice
for this reason.
D. 	Common-Law Fraud/U.C.C. Violation (Claim Six)
In Claim Six, Plaintiff asserts “Fraud and Lack of Consideration,” alleging that the
Alpine Defendants concealed the mortgage’s “funding mechanisms” (including alleged “Federal
Reserve involvement” or “note monetization”), thereby committing fraud and negating
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consideration, and further contending that the Alpine Defendants failed to present the original
promissory note despite Plaintiff’s demands, purportedly in violation of U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(2).
ECF No. 4 at 6. The court has determined that Claim Six, like all of Plaintiff’s claims, must be
dismissed because it is grounded on a wholly discredited and frivolous legal theory. However,
even if this defect could be overlooked—and it cannot—the claim should not proceed because
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief.13
Under Colorado law, a plaintiff must plead fraud with particularity, setting forth well-
pleaded facts plausibly demonstrating the following elements: “(1) that the defendant made a
false representation of a material fact; (2) that the one making the representation knew it was
false; (3) that the person to whom the representation was made was ignorant of the falsity;
(4) that the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon; and (5) that the
reliance resulted in damage to the plaintiff.” Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack, 312 P.3d 1155,
1160 (Colo. 2013). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) further requires that, “[i]n alleging fraud
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lawrence
Nat’l Bank v. Edmonds (In re Edmonds ), 924 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1991)). Measured against
these standards, Plaintiff’s allegations state no plausible claim for relief.
First, Claim Six rests on the same fallacious vapor money premise that underlies
Plaintiff’s other claims: that the loan was “fraudulent” or “unsupported by consideration”
13 The Alpine Defendants also seek dismissal of Claim Six under Younger and Rooker-Feldman
and on a claim-preclusion theory. See ECF No. 11 at 14. For the reasons discussed in connection
with Claim Five, the court finds that dismissal is not warranted on those grounds.
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because it was allegedly funded with “credit” instead of “lawful money,” and because Alpine did
not produce internal wire records, balance‑sheet entries, or Federal Reserve documentation. See
generally ECF No. 4 (including allegations demanding “proof of consideration” and asserting
loan invalidity for lack of lawful funding); see also ECF Nos. 21, 23, 31 (repeated demands
across Plaintiff’s opposition papers for proof of “lawful consideration” and identification of the
funding source). But the Amended Complaint does not identify any concrete misrepresentation
by Alpine or its counsel about the amount, terms, or legal status of the loan, nor does it articulate
any specific omission of a fact Alpine was legally required to disclose at the origination of the
loan or during attempts to collect on it. Instead, Plaintiff simply dubs the loan invalid and
fraudulent, and asserts that the communications about it are premised on concealment and
misrepresentation, see ECF No. 4 at 6, because the Alpine Defendants have not endorsed his
sovereign‑citizen views on consideration and negotiable instruments. Such naked legal
conclusions, unmoored from well‑pleaded facts, do not satisfy Rule 9(b). See Tal v. Hogan, 453
F.3d 1244, 1263 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that “[f]ailure to adequately allege any one of the nine
elements [of a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] is fatal to
the fraud claim,” and affirming the trial court’s dismissal of that claim under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Second, the record affirmatively contradicts Plaintiff’s assertion that Alpine concealed
the existence or funding of the loan. The documents the court can consider here show that on
June 26, 2019, Plaintiff executed a written Credit Agreement and Deed of Trust in favor of
Alpine, which were recorded against the Property and that set forth the principal amount, interest
rate, and repayment terms. ECF No. 11, Exs. A (promissory note/Credit Agreement executed
June 26, 2019) & B (Deed of Trust recorded Aug. 6, 2019, Reception No. 1204373). Alpine’s
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March 17, 2025 Verification of Debt letter further explained that Alpine advanced $247,823.29
to pay off Plaintiff’s prior loan, made additional advances at his request until he fully drew the
$300,000 line of credit, and attached both the governing loan documents and a detailed payment
history reflecting those disbursements and Plaintiff’s subsequent payments and defaults. ECF
No. 11, Ex. E (March 17, 2025 Verification of Debt with attached note, deed of trust, and
payment history documenting advances and disbursements).
On these facts, no reasonable inference may be drawn that Alpine falsely represented that
a loan existed or that it failed to disclose that it had, in fact, advanced funds on Plaintiff’s behalf.
While Plaintiff disputes the legal sufficiency of “credit” as consideration, that is not a
misrepresentation of fact but a discredited legal theory courts have repeatedly deemed frivolous.
Because Plaintiff does not plead any particular false statement, any justifiable reliance, or any
distinct fraud damages apart from the ordinary consequences of his default and foreclosure, his
common‑law fraud claim fails as a matter of law.
Third, Plaintiff’s reliance on U.C.C. § 3‑501(b)(2) (as adopted in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4‑3-
501(b)(2)) is misplaced. That section addresses presentment and notice of dishonor in the context
of negotiable instruments; it governs what must be done when a person “entitled to enforce” an
instrument demands payment and the obligor questions the presentment, and it sets forth certain
rights to inspect the instrument and to receive notice upon dishonor. It does not: (a) create a
freestanding cause of action for borrowers against lenders; (b) require a lender, on pain of fraud
liability, to produce original promissory notes, wire confirmations, internal ledgers, or “proof of
consideration” whenever a borrower demands them; or (c) allow a debtor to discharge a
mortgage loan by sending pseudo‑legal documents and declaring the instrument “dishonored.”
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ECF No. 11, Ex. D (Plaintiff’s self-styled “Affidavit of Truth/Proof of Claim” attempting to
invoke U.C.C.-style dishonor to discharge the debt).
Courts confronting similar attempts to weaponize U.C.C. provisions to advance vapor
money or “bill of exchange” schemes have uniformly rejected them as patently meritless. See,
e.g., McGee v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 619 F. App’x 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2015)
(dismissing as frivolous the claim that a lender’s refusal to accept the borrower’s “bill of
exchange” canceled the underlying debt under the U.C.C.); Zickafoose v. Upstart Network, Inc,
No. 8:25-CV-1280-AAS, 2025 WL 2879548, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2025) (“Mr. Zickafoose’s
claims are an iteration of the vapor money theory. In attempting to discharge liability through
various UCC provisions, Mr. Zickafoose’s argument is the functional equivalent of attempting to
create money by signing ‘W/O Recourse’ to pay off the loan. Thus, Mr. Zickafoose’s breach of
contract claim lacks legal merit because it is an iteration of the rejected vapor money theory.”)
(internal citations omitted); Aalaam v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 5:24-CV-00209-KDB-
DCK, 2025 WL 492010, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2025) (observing, in granting defendants’
motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff “erroneously believes that he does not have to pay valid
mortgage and other debts based on the widely discredited ‘vapor money” theory and/or his
contention that Article 3 of the UCC permits him to simply declare his debts discharged based on
his ‘tender’ of so-called ‘negotiable instruments,’” and stating that “[t]his case is the third
installment in his trilogy of wasteful litigation”). Claim Six merely re‑labels this same
discredited theory as “fraud” and “U.C.C. 3‑501.”
Claim Six thus fails to state a legally cognizable claim and should be dismissed with
prejudice.
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* 	* 	*
In summary, all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they rest on patently
frivolous legal theories that have been universally and emphatically rejected by federal courts for
decades. That alone warrants dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims against the Alpine
Defendants. But even if that fundamental defect is overlooked, and the substance of the
allegations examined, Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible claim for relief under the
operative legal standards. Dismissal with prejudice of the claims against the Alpine Defendants
is justified for this additional reason.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS14 that the
Alpine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) be GRANTED and that all claims against
Defendants Alpine Mortgage, Trent T. Lauridson, and Jason S. Buckley be dismissed with
prejudice.
14 Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that within fourteen (14) days after
service of a Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation, any party may serve and file written
objections with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A), (B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b). Failure to make any such objection
will result in a waiver of the right to appeal the Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation. See
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (firm waiver
rule applies to non-dispositive orders); but see Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119,
1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require
review, including when a “pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting
and the consequences of failing to object”).
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DATED: February 23, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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