Haverty v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-02447-NYW-NRN
RICHARD HAVERTY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS
(ECF No. 68)
N. Reid Neureiter
United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court pursuant to an Order, ECF No. 69, issued by
Judge Nina Y. Wang referring Defendant UnitedHealth Group, Inc.’s (“UnitedHealth”)
Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings (the “Motion”), ECF No. 68. The
Court has reviewed and carefully considered the motion, Plaintiff Richard Haverty’s
(“Plaintiff”) response and various “exhibits” thereto, ECF Nos. 70, 71–80, and
UnitedHealth’s Reply, ECF No. 86. The Court also heard oral argument at a hearing
held on February 6, 2026, see ECF No. 95, has taken judicial notice of the Court’s case
file, and considered the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, statutes, and case
law.
Now being fully informed, and for the reasons discussed below, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that the Motion be GRANTED.
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I. Background
According to his Fourth Amended Employment Discrimination Complaint
(“Amended Complaint”), ECF No. 47,1 Plaintiff, “an HIV-positive cancer survivor with
anxiety, depression, neuropathy, chronic migraines, and spondylolisthesis,” worked for
UnitedHealth as a sales agent beginning in 2021. He claims that UnitedHealth’s
termination of his employment in March 2023 was unlawful. He brings claims for: (1)
disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII; (2) retaliation for
protected activity; (3) hostile work environment; (4) FMLA interference and retaliation;
(5) interference with benefits protected by ERISA; (6) wrongful termination; (7) negligent
supervision and retention; (8) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (10) defamation; (11) civil conspiracy; and
(12) disability discrimination under Colorado law.
UnitedHealth moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. As a condition of his employment, Plaintiff signed an
Arbitration Agreement on June 2, 2021, which provides:
This Policy creates a contract between UnitedHealth Group and employee
requiring both parties to resolve employment-related disputes (except the
excluded disputes listed below) that are based on a legal claim through final
and binding arbitration. Arbitration is the exclusive forum for the resolution
of such disputes, and the parties mutually waive their right to a trial before
a judge or jury in federal or state court in favor of arbitration under the Policy.
UnitedHealth Group and employee mutually consent to the resolution by
arbitration of all claims and controversies, past, present, or future, that
employee may have against UnitedHealth Group or UnitedHealth Group
may have against employee, which arise out of or relate to employee’s
1 As is his habit, Plaintiff then filed numerous “exhibits” in support of the
Amended Complaint. See ECF Nos. 48–59. The Court has reviewed these filing and will
only reference them as necessary.
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employment, application and selection for employment, and/or termination
of employment.
ECF No. 68-1 at 2. The scope of the Arbitration Agreement is broad:
Subject to the specific exclusions below, the claims covered by the Policy
include, but are not limited to: claims for unfair competition and violation of
trade secrets; claims incidental to the employment relationship but arising
after that relationship ends (for example, claims arising out of or related to
post-termination defamation or job references and claims arising out of or
related to post-employment retaliation); claims derived from or that are
dependent on the employment relationship; claims that are derivative of or
inextricably intertwined with any claims of the employee; claims for wages
or other compensation due (including but not limited to, minimum wage,
overtime, meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, vacation pay and
pay on separation); claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express
or implied); tort claims; common law claims; equitable claims; claims for
discrimination and harassment; retaliation claims; and claims for violation
of any federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or
ordinance, except claims excluded below.
Id.
UnitedHealth contends that all of Plaintiff’s claims are covered by the Arbitration
Agreement. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is
unenforceable and that not all his claims are subject to arbitration.
II. Pro se Plaintiff
Plaintiff proceeds pro se. The Court, therefore, “review[s] his pleadings and other
papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys.” Trackwell v. U.S., 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
However, a pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff
can prove facts that have not been alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in
ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.
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State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); see also Whitney v. N.M., 113
F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997) (court may not “supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint”); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d
1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (the court may not “construct arguments or theories for the
plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”). A plaintiff’s pro se status
does not entitle him to an application of different rules. See Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d
952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
III. Standard of Review
As a threshold matter, the Court addresses its authority to rule on a motion to
compel arbitration under 28 U.S.C. § 636, which sets forth matters a U.S. Magistrate
Judge has the statutory authority to resolve by order versus in a report and
recommendation. Courts addressing this issue “are divided on whether motions to
compel arbitration are dispositive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).” Vernon v.
Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140 (D. Colo. 2012) (“Qwest I”). To
date the Tenth Circuit has not decided the issue. Santich v. VCG Holding Corp., No. 17-
cv-00631-RM-MEH, 2018 WL 3968879, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 20, 2018).
The difference determines the standard of review applied by the Article III District
Court Judge: if this Court views the motion to compel as non-dispositive, and thus rules
on it in a written order, that order is reviewed under a clearly erroneous or contrary to
law standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a); whereas, if it views the
motion as dispositive, a report and recommendation will be issued and, if any party
objects to it, it will result in de novo review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(b)(3).
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In Qwest I, after engaging in a very detailed analysis of whether a motion to
compel arbitration should be deemed dispositive versus non-dispositive, Magistrate
Judge Craig B. Shaffer concluded such motions are non-dispositive. 857 F. Supp. 2d at
1141. Judge R. Brooke Jackson nonetheless “elect[ed] to assume that the motion [to
compel arbitration] was dispositive,” and thus he reviewed Judge Shaffer’s order de
novo. Vernon v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189 (D. Colo.
2013) (“Qwest II”). Based on Judge Jackson’s assumption, and out of an abundance of
caution, this Court also elects to view the motion as dispositive, and therefore issues a
report and recommendation as opposed to an order.
Having resolved this threshold issue, the Court turns to the existence, validity,
and scope of the alleged arbitration agreement.
IV. Analysis
Under the FAA, agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9
U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has “long recognized and enforced a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” and under this policy, any “doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Nat’l Am. Ins.
Co. v. SCOR Reinsurance Co., 362 F.3d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynalds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) and Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d
1266, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2003)).
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The analysis required under the FAA is two-fold. First, the Court must determine
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.2 This “is a threshold issue which must be
established before the FAA can be invoked.” Avedon Eng’g, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d
1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 1997). When, as here, the parties dispute the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement, there is no presumption in favor of arbitration. Dumais v. Am.
Golf. Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor
Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 779 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Unlike the general
presumption that a particular issue is arbitrable when the existence of an arbitration
agreement is not in dispute, when the dispute is whether there is a valid and
enforceable arbitration agreement in the first place, the presumption of arbitrability falls
away.”) (internal citation omitted). As a result, “[a] court may compel arbitration of a
particular dispute . . . only when satisfied that the ‘making’ of the agreement to
arbitration is not at issue.” SCOR Reinsurance Co., 362 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Spahr,
330 F.3d at 1270).
Second, if a valid arbitration agreement exists, the Court then must determine
whether the specific dispute between the parties falls within the scope of that
agreement. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985); Pikes Peak Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Total Renal Case, Inc., No. 09-cv-
00928-CMA-MEH, 2010 WL 1348326, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2010). Once a court
2 Disputes concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement “are to be
resolved by the courts unless the parties have agreed, in ‘clear and unmistakable’
terms, to submit them to arbitration.” Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Avaya, Inc., 693 F.3d
1295, 1303 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Indeed, there is a “presumption that
questions about the arbitrability of an arbitration dispute will be resolved by the courts.”
Id.
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concludes a valid arbitration agreement exists, the FAA mandates a stay of a judicial
proceeding “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3; see also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. TAMKO Bldg.
Prods., 178 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1129 (D. Colo. 2016).
a. Whether a Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists
Concerning the first prong of the analysis, “[t]he existence of an agreement to
arbitrate ‘is simply a matter of contract between the parties; [arbitration] is a way to
resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit
to arbitration.’” Avedon Eng’g, Inc., 126 F.3d at 1283 (quoting First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–45 (1995)). ”[I]n deciding whether there is an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate, ‘courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.’” Qwest I, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1142
(quoting First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 944 (1995)).
“Contract formation in Colorado requires evidence ‘that the parties agreed upon
all essential terms.’” Ragab v. Howard, 841 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting
I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 888 (Colo. 1986))); see also
PayoutOne v. Coral Mortg. Bankers, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1224 (D. Colo. 2009)
(“Contract formation requires mutual assent to an exchange between competent
parties—where an offer is made and accepted—regarding a subject matter which is
certain, and for which there is legal consideration.”). “A meeting of the minds is
essential.” Ragab, 841 F.3d at 1137 (citing Agritrack, Inc. v. DeJohn Housemoving, Inc.,
25 P.3d 1187, 1192 (Colo. 2001)). Indeed, the touchstone of any “agreement” is a
“manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons as to the substance
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of a contract.” Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (citing Restatement,
Second, Contracts § 3). “This can be demonstrated by the parties’ ‘conduct, their oral
statements and their writings, and other evidence illuminating the circumstances
surrounding the making of an agreement.’” Ragab, 841 F.3d at 1137 (quoting I.M.A.,
713 P.2d at 888)). “Courts cannot create or enforce contracts between parties when the
contract itself does not clearly demonstrate the parties’ intent.” Id. (citing Newton Oil Co.
v. Bockhold, 115 Colo. 510, 176 P.2d 904, 908 (1946)).
Because UnitedHealth is the party claiming an obligation to arbitrate, it has the
burden of “present[ing] evidence sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable arbitration
agreement.” Stein v. Burt-Kuni One, LLC, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1213 (D. Colo. 2005).
The appropriate standard is “similar to that governing motions for summary judgment.”
Id. Thus, once UnitedHealth makes this showing, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a
genuine issue of material fact concerning the making of the agreement using evidence
comparable to that required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. If Plaintiff fails to
do so, arbitration is appropriate for all disputes covered by the arbitration agreement. If,
on the other hand, Plaintiff demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact, a trial must be
held concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Avedon, 126 F.3d
at 1283 (“When parties dispute the making of an agreement to arbitrate, a jury trial on
the existence of the agreement is warranted unless there are no genuine issues of
material fact regarding the parties’ agreement.”)3
3 The Court’s interpretation of the relevant case law indicates that if either party
presents sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate, a trial on this issue is warranted.
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Here, UnitedHealth has presented clear evidence that Plaintiff entered into the
Arbitration Agreement. The document is signed and dated, with a time stamp indicating
the specific date and time that Plaintiff read, signed, and assented to it, as well as the IP
address of Plaintiff’s computer. See ECF No. 68-1 at 8. Moreover, the Arbitration
Agreement provides that “[a]cceptance of employment or continuation of employment
with UnitedHealth Group is deemed to be acceptance of this Policy,” and it is
undisputed that Plaintiff was employed until March 2023. This, by itself, would likely be
sufficient to make the Arbitration Agreement enforceable. See Morris v. Milgard Mfg.
Inc., No. 12-cv-01623-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 6217387, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2012)
(“The Handbook instructed employees where to get further information about the
[dispute resolution procedures], and thus plaintiff’s purported ignorance of the policy,
whether willful or otherwise, does not absolve him from being bound by the agreement,
which he accepted with his actions.”); Elsken v. Network Multi–Family Security Corp.,
49 F.3d 1470, 1473–74 (10th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff bound by contract terms even though
she did not read the contract). In any event, Plaintiff does not contest that he was
presented with and signed the Arbitration Agreement.
Instead, Plaintiff claims that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. The Court cannot agree.
As Judge R. Brooke Jackson explained,
Under Colorado law, one of the legal grounds for revoking a contract is
unconscionability. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.3d 985, 991
(Colo. 1986); Univ. Hills Beauty Acad., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 38 Colo. App. 194, 554 P.2d 723, 726 (1976). Colorado courts consider
a number of factors in deciding whether a contractual provision is
unconscionable, including:
(1) the use of a standardized agreement executed by parties
of unequal bargaining power; (2) the lack of an opportunity for
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the customer to read or become familiar with the document
before signing it; (3) the use of fine print in the portion of the
contract containing the provision in question; (4) the absence
of evidence that the provision was commercially reasonable
or should reasonably have been anticipated; (5) the terms of
the contract, including substantive fairness; (6) the
relationship of the parties, including factors of assent, unfair
surprise, and notice; and (7) the circumstances surrounding
the formation of the contract, including setting, purpose, and
effect.
Bernal [v. Burnett], 793 F. Supp. 2d [1280, 1286 (D. Colo. 2011)] (citing
Davis, 712 P.3d at 991) [hereinafter “the Davis factors”]. The Davis factors
encompass both procedural and substantive unconscionability, both of
which must be shown in Colorado. See Vernon v. Qwest Commc’ns Intern.,
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1194–95 (D. Colo. 2013); Davis, 712 P.2d at
991. The burden of proof is on the party opposing arbitration. See Weller v.
HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1080 (D. Colo. 2013).
Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1371 (D. Colo. 2014), aff’d, 811 F.3d 371
(10th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff claims that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable because it “is
forced, non-negotiable, of adhesive character, incorporates rules never provided, and
grants [UnitedHealth] the right to unilaterally modify the agreement without notice to
Plaintiff. Onboarding was a digital click-through buried amongst dozens of other
employment documents; Plaintiff lacked any meaningful choice or chance for review.”
ECF No. 70 at 6. This is all conclusory. Plaintiff does not explain how he was denied a
meaningful chance to review the agreement, or how a six-page document—
conspicuously titled “Employment Arbitration Agreement” and containing his signature—
could be considered “buried,” even if it was one of several employment papers he was
presented with. See Axis Venture Grp., LLC v. 1111 Tower, LLC, No. 09-cv-01636-
PAB-KMT, 2010 WL 1278306, at *4–5 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s
attempt to imply that he was “affirmatively instructed to sign the documents without
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reading them” where that the record showed that he was provided access to the
agreement, was not prevented from reading the agreement, was not compelled or
defrauded, did not ask for additional time to read, and he “did not concern himself” with
the specific terms of the agreement). And it is settled that mere fact that the Arbitration
Agreement is a standardized agreement between parties with unequal bargaining power
is not sufficient for a finding of unconscionability. See Levine v. Vitamin Cottage Nat.
Food Markets, Inc., No. 20-cv-00261-STV, 2021 WL 4439800, at *14 (D. Colo. Sept. 27,
2021) (“A contract of adhesion, on its own, however, is not sufficient for a finding of
unconscionability . . . .”); Nesbitt, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1371 (unequal bargaining power
alone does not create unconscionability); Laurich v. Red Lobster Rest., LLC, 295 F.
Supp. 3d 1186, 1218 (D. N.M. 2017) (“[W]hile it may have been in an adhesion contract
in the sense that it was a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the terms are not so patently unfair
that the agreement is unconscionable.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s contention that
UnitedHealth retained the right to unilaterally modify the Arbitration Agreement does not
appear to be supported by the language of the agreement itself. In short, Plaintiff could
have sought and obtained employment elsewhere if he had chosen not to sign the
Arbitration Agreement. He did sign it, however, and is now bound to it.
b. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Arbitration
Agreement
Plaintiff’s other main argument is that the Arbitration Agreement does not cover
all the claims asserted in this suit. Questions “concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Encore Prod., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1109 (D. Colo. 1999) (citation omitted). The Arbitration Agreement
requires “resolution by arbitration of all claims and controversies, past, present, or
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future, that employee may have against UnitedHealth Group or UnitedHealth Group
may have against employee, which arise out of or relate to employee’s employment,
application and selection for employment, and/or termination of employment.” ECF No.
68-1 at 2. Plaintiff argues that his ERISA claim is specifically exempted from arbitration.4
However, the Arbitration Agreement excludes claims for benefits under UnitedHealth’s
ERISA and short-term disability plans. Id. at 3. As UnitedHealth points out, Plaintiff does
not allege he is entitled to benefits under an ERISA plan; he claims that UnitedHealth
interfered with his rights under the plan pursuant to § 510, which “protects plan
participants from termination motivated by an employer’s desire to prevent a pension
from vesting.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990). Recognizing
that “all doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Harrison v. Envision Mgmt.
Holding, Inc. Bd. of Dirs., 59 F.4th 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted), and
that “that ERISA claims are generally arbitrable,” id. at 1108 (quoting Smith v. Bd. of
Directors of Triad Mfg., Inc., 13 F.4th 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2021)), the Court concludes the
interference claim brought by Plaintiff is not a claim for benefits, but rather “arises out of
or relates to” Plaintiff’s employment and is therefore covered by the Arbitration
Agreement.
4 Plaintiff states that “Congress also precludes waiver of FMLA, ADA statutory
rights by private exclusionary agreement.” Both types of claims are arbitrable. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., LP, No. 15-cv-711 MCA/GJF, 2016 WL 9818324,
at *4 (D.N.M. Nov. 30, 2016) (“The ‘Agreement to Arbitrate’ clearly requires all disputes,
including Plaintiff’s FMLA dispute, to be submitted to arbitration.”); Morrison v. Equity
Residential Props. Woodridge Apts., No. 05-cv-01787-PSF-MJW, 2006 WL 1517734, at
*4 (D. Colo. May 31, 2006) (requiring arbitration where the “policy expressly provides for
arbitration of a variety of employment claims, including termination and post-
employment conduct, and expressly includes claims arising under Title VII and the ADA,
which are the claims plaintiff asserts in his Amended Complaint”).
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c. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments
The Court will briefly address the numerous other arguments Plaintiff raises.
Plaintiff’s claim that the Arbitration Agreement is ambiguous is perfunctory and
unsupported by factual citation or legal authority. His assertion that United Health
somehow waived its right to arbitration by removing this lawsuit to federal court is
likewise facially devoid of substance.
Plaintiff’s invocation of the effective-vindication doctrine, which exists to “prevent
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 36 (2013), is unavailing because under this doctrine,
the Court should still enforce an arbitration agreement “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum,” id. at 235 (quotation omitted). Plaintiff offers no argument as to why he cannot
vindicate his statutory rights in an arbitration proceeding. Cf. Harrison, 59 F.4th at
1104–09 (holding that an arbitration provision that prevented an ERISA plan participant
from seeking or receiving any remedy which provided additional benefits to anyone
other than participant was unenforceable because it directly conflicted with participant’s
statutory right to pursue plan-wide remedies for ERISA violations).
The fact that UnitedHealth did not execute the Arbitration Agreement does not
invalidate it: “[c]ourt decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, have held
that no signature is required to satisfy the Act’s requirements for a binding arbitration
agreement.” E-21 Eng’g, Inc. v. Steve Stock & Assocs., Inc., 252 P.3d 36, 39 (Colo.
App. 2010) (citing cases). Nor does the agreement fail for lack of consideration: under
Colorado law, “continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for entering
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into an arbitration agreement.” Zynex Med., Inc. v. Frabotta, No. 21-cv-1076-RNR-KLM,
2022 WL 1211876, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2022). “Courts applying Colorado law have
also found that ‘the mutual promise to arbitrate also constitutes sufficient consideration
for entering into Arbitration Agreements.’” Id. (quoting Hickerson v. Pool Corp., No. 19-
cv-02229-CMA-STV, 2020 WL 5016938, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2020)) (brackets
omitted).
Finally, compelling arbitration in this case does not violate public policy. Indeed,
as noted above, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the FAA reflects “a ‘liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration’ and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)
(citations omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983), then quoting Rent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67,
130 (2010)). Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement and public policy mandates that
the Court enforce it.
V. Conclusion
The Court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable, and
that the scope of the Arbitration Agreement encompasses all of Plaintiff’s claims for
relief. Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that UnitedHealth’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings, ECF No. 68, be GRANTED.
NOTICE: Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties shall have fourteen (14)
days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written
objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this
case is assigned. A party’s failure to serve and file specific, written objections
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waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate
review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d
1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996).
A party’s objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to
preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review.
United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).
Dated at Denver, Colorado this 27th Day of February, 2026.
________________________
N. Reid Neureiter
United State Magistrate Judge
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