O'Connor, Trustee v. Cotrona et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
In re:
FRANK J. COTRONA, JR.,
Debtor
Case No.: 25-30539 (AMN)
Chapter 7
ANDREA O’CONNOR, CHAPTER 7
TRUSTEE,
Plaintiff
v.
SHERRY A. COTRONA, as Trustee of
the Sherry A. Cotrona Revocable Truste
Indenture;
SHERRY A. COTRONA, Individually;
FRANK J. COTRONA, as Trustee of the
Sherry A. Cotrona Revocable Trust
Indenture;
9 WEST MAIN PROPERTIES, LLC;
THE MARTONE GROUP, LLC;
MARTONE BUILDING GROUP, LLC;
MARTONE CUSTOM HOMES, LLC; and
NORTHSTAR ENTERPRISES BG, LLC,
Defendants
Adv. Pro. No. 25-03005 (AMN)
Re: AP-ECF Nos. 36, 391
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
This memorandum of decision and order addresses the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Counts IX-XXII of the Chapter 7 Trustee’s amended complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), made applicable to this proceeding by
1 “ECF No.” refers to the document number on the court’s electronic case filing docket for the
Chapter 7 case, Case No. 23-30539. “AP-ECF No.” refers to the document number on the court’s electronic
case filing docket for the adversary proceeding case, Adversary Proceeding No. 25-03005.
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Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012. 	See AP-ECF Nos. 36, 39. 	For the reasons explained below, the
Motion will be granted in part.
Background
Frank J. Cotrona, Jr. (the “Debtor”) commenced the underlying bankruptcy case
by filing a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code2 on July 26, 2023
(the “Petition Date”). 	Case No. 23-30539, ECF No. 1. Andrea O’Connor (the “Trustee”),
in her capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, initiated this
adversary proceeding by filing the initial complaint on July 1, 2025. 	See Case No. 25-
03005, AP-ECF No. 1 (the “Initial 	Complaint”). 	The Trustee brought 	claims against
multiple defendants, including Sherry A. Cotrona in her individual capacity and as trustee
and grantor of the Sherry A. Cotrona Revocable Trust Indenture (the “Trust”); Frank J.
Cotrona, Jr. as co-trustee of the Trust; 9 West Main Properties, LLC (“9 West”); The
Martone Group, LLC (“The Martone Group”); Martone Building Group, LLC (“Martone
Building”); 	Martone Custom Homes, LLC (“Martone 	Custom Homes”); and Northstar
Enterprises BG, LLC (“Northstar”) (collectively, the “Defendants.”)(The Martone Group,
Martone Building, and Martone Custom Homes are the “Martone Defendants.”).
The Court dismissed portions of the Initial Complaint and granted the Trustee leave
to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which she filed as AP-ECF
No. 36 (36 is the “Amended Complaint”). 	AP-ECF Nos. 9, 25, 30, 36. 	The Defendants
again seek to dismiss some of the Trustee’s claims in their new Motion to Dismiss,
requesting dismissal of Counts IX-XXII. AP-ECF No. 39 (the “Motion”).
2 Title 11 of the United States Code is the “Bankruptcy Code.”
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In both the Initial Complaint and Amended Complaint, the Trustee generally alleges
that the Debtor is the sole owner and manager of 9 West, a Vermont-based LLC, and
Martone Custom Homes, an entity the Debtor interchangeably referred to as Martone
Custom Homes, Martone Group, and Martone Buildings. 	The Trustee further states the
Debtor holds a 50% ownership interest in Northstar, with Sherry Cotrona possessing the
remaining interest. She argues the Debtor serves as co-trustee alongside Sherry Cotrona
of the Trust, which lists its place of business as 5 Laurelwood 	Drive, Wallingford,
Connecticut (the “Residence”) where the Debtor and Sherry Cotrona also both reside.
The Amended Complaint contains twenty-two (22) counts, as summarized in the following
chart:
Count 	Claims
Count I 	Seeks a declaratory judgment determining the extent that 9 West’s
assets constitute property of the bankruptcy estate.
Count II 	Seeks a declaratory judgment piercing the corporate veil and
determining 9 West is the Debtor’s alter ego.
Count III 	Seeks a declaratory judgment determining the extent that the Trust’s
assets are property of the bankruptcy estate.
Count IV 	Seeks a declaratory judgment piercing the corporate veil and
determining the Trust is the Debtor’s alter ego.
Count V 	Seeks a declaratory judgment determining the extent that the Martone
Defendants’ assets are property of the bankruptcy estate.
Count VI 	Seeks a declaratory judgment piercing the corporate veil and
determining the Martone Defendants are the Debtor’s alter ego.
Count VII 	Seeks a declaratory judgment determining the extent that assets of
Northstar are property of the bankruptcy estate.
Count VIII 	Seeks a declaratory judgment piercing the corporate veil and
determining Northstar is the Debtor’s alter ego.
Count IX 	Seeks a declaratory judgment substantively consolidating the Debtor, 9
West, the Trust, the Martone Defendants, and Northstar.
Count X 	Claim for fraudulent transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, 550 and
in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-552e(a)(1).
Count XI 	Claim against the Trust for actual fraudulent transfer pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-552b(3) and VT S. T. 9 § 2288(a)(1).
Count XII 	Claim against the Trust and 9 West for constructive fraudulent transfer
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(2) or VT. Stat. T. 9, §
2288(a)(2).
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Count 	Claims
Count XIII 	Claim against the Trust for constructive fraudulent transfer pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552h(a) and VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2291(a).
Count
XIV
Claim against the Martone Defendants for actual fraud pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552h(a), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2291(a), or Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code. § 24.008(a).
Count XV 	Claim against 9 West and Sherry Cotrona for constructive fraud
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-552e(a)(2), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2288(a)(2),
and Tex. Bus. & Com. Code. § 24.005(a)(2).
Count
XVI
Claim against the Martone Defendants for constructive fraud pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552f(a), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2289(a), or Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code. § 24.006(a).
Count
XVII
Claim against 9 West and Northstar for actual fraud pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(1), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2288(a)(1), or Fla. Sta. §
726.105(1)(a).
Count
XVIII
Claim against 9 West and NorthStar for constructive fraud pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(2), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2288(a)(2), Fla. Stat.
§ 726.105(1)(b).
Count
XIX
Claim against Northstar for constructive fraud pursuant to Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-552f(a), VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2289(a), Fla. Stat. § 726.106(1).
Count XX 	Claim against 9 West and Sherry Cotrona for actual fraud pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(1) or VT. Stat. T. 9, § 2288(a)(1).
Count
XXI
Claim against 9 West and Sherry Cotrona for constructive fraud
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(2) or VT Stat. T. 9, §
2288(a)(2).
Count
XXII
Claim against Sherry Cotrona for constructive fraud pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-552f(a) or VT Stat. T. 9, § 2289(a).
Jurisdiction and Venue
This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) and derives its authority to hear and determine this matter on reference from the
District Court for the District of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1), and
the District Court’s General 	Order of Reference 	dated 	September 	21, 1984. 	This
adversary proceeding 	is a core proceeding, 	and 	the parties 	have filed 	statements
consenting to the Court’s entry of a final judgment. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A)
(administration of the estate), (E) (turnover), (H) (determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
transfers); AP-ECF Nos. 24, 27. This adversary proceeding is governed by Federal Rules
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of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 7001, et seq. Venue of this proceeding is proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
Applicable Law
i. 	Motions to Dismiss
A complaint 	may 	survive a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(6),
incorporated to this proceeding by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b)(6), if it “contains sufficient
factual matter . . . to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,” and sufficiently
supports a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544,
570, 679 (2007). 	In this analysis, courts accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true—though legal conclusions or recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported
by mere conclusory statements need not be given such weight—and draw all inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 	A plausible claim must include factual
content adequate to support a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Pleadings raising nothing more than a
suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action or containing mere formulaic recitations
of the elements of a cause of action are inadequate. 	Lynch v. City of N.Y., 952 F.3d 67,
74 (2d Cir. 2020); Errato v. Am. Express Co., 646 F. Supp. 3d 402, 408 (D. Conn. 2022).
Rule 8(a) requires pleadings to contain “a short and plan statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” sufficient to “give the adverse party a fair
notice of the claim asserted so as to enable [them] to prepare for trial.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), (3); Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7008. 	Pleadings containing “formulaic recitation[s] of the
elements of a cause of action,” or lacking facts sufficient to permit the court to infer more
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than the mere possibility of misconduct or a speculative right to relief do not meet this
standard. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 679.
Claims alleging 	fraud trigger heightened 	pleading 	requirements 	under Rule 9,
which requires they “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” though
the particularity requirement is “relaxed” for bankruptcy trustees, who, as outsiders to the
transactions, necessarily plead fraud from second-hand knowledge. 	Despins v. Apple (In
re Kwok), 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 1801, at 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025); In re Extended Stay,
Inc., 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2128, at 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020). Allegations of fraud must
be accompanied by the facts upon which they are based. DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive
Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987). 	Though the defendant’s intent, if a
required element, need not be alleged with great specificity, the complaint must include
sufficient detail on the property that was conveyed, the timing or frequency of the transfer,
and the consideration paid for the transfers, so as to, in part, enable defendants to identify
and prepare a defense for the allegedly fraudulent behavior. Gordon v. I.M.V. 1290 (In re
Mina), 	2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1887, 2022 WL 2657481, 	at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2022)
(quoting Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC, 454 B.R. 317, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011));
Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1996). 	Complaints alleging fraudulent
conduct by multiple defendants should include specific and separate allegations against
each defendant 	sufficient to “inform each defendant 	of the nature of [their] 	alleged
participation.” 	Conn. Gen. Life Ins. v. BioHealth Labs, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 3d 671, 686 (D.
Conn. 2021).
So-called 	“shotgun” 	pleadings, 	wherein 	it 	is 	impossible 	to 	determine 	which
allegations of fact support which claims to relief, may be subject to dismissal under Rules
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8(a) and 9(b). Harrington v. Racki (In re Bishop), 578 B.R. 158, 167-68 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
2017); see also Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1288-90 (9th Cir. 2026)
(generally describing the incompatibility between shotgun pleadings and Rule 8); Decker
v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 113-15 (2d Cir. 1982) (dismissing a shotgun
pleading under Rule 9(b)). 	Shotgun pleadings typically assert multiple counts, each of
which incorporates by reference all preceding factual allegations and every prior count,
and recites the elements of the claim without tying those elements to specific factual
allegations, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine which facts relate to
each claim. Digilytic Int’l FZE v. Alchemy Fin., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. 57765, at 13 (S.D.N.Y.
2022); McArter & English v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155704, at 11-
12 (D. Conn. 2020) (internal citations omitted); Croons v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health, 18 F. Supp. 3d 193, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).
ii. 	Fraudulent Transfers
Bankruptcy Code Section 548 permits trustees to avoid actual and constructive
fraudulent transfers. 	11 U.S.C. § 548. 	Trustees may similarly avoid fraudulent transfers
under applicable state law pursuant to § 544(b)(1). 	“[T]he fraudulent transfer analysis in
most states shares substantially similar legal requirements to those set forth in § 548.”
Dundon v. TPG Capital, L.P. (In re Endo Int’l PLC), 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 1337, 2026 WL
1534328, at 17, n.8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2026) (explaining that, absent allegations of bad
faith, “regardless of which state’s laws are treated as the ‘applicable state law,’ the legal
inquiry . . . is substantially similar”); see e.g., Katz v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 651 B.R.
82, 92 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023) (finding the standards under § 548 and the Connecticut
Uniform Financial Transfer Act (“CUFTA”) are not “materially different”).
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To adequately 	plead 	a 	constructive fraudulent 	transfer 	claim, 	plaintiffs 	must
plausibly allege that the transferor made the transfer within two years of the petition date
without receiving “reasonably equivalent value,” and that the debtor was: (i) insolvent at
the time of the transfer, (ii) became insolvent as a result of the transfer, (iii) was engaged
in business with unreasonably small capital, or (iv) intended to incur debts beyond their
ability to pay. 	11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). 	Proof of fraudulent intent is not required. 	The
Code defines insolvency as a “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts
is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(32).
Trustees bear the burden of proof in demonstrating lack of reasonably equivalent value
by a preponderance of the evidence. 	AYH Wind Down LLC v. Silberstein (In re All Year
Holdings Ltd.), 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 367, 2025 WL 559695, at *48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025).
Because constructive fraud 	claims are 	subject to 	Rule 	8, rather 	than 	Rule 	9(b)’s
heightened standards, movants may make “allegations aggregating transfers into lump
sums over several years without identifying the number of transfers, the dates of the
transfers, or the amount of any specific transfer,” though the transfers to be avoided
should be identified with enough specificity to give the defendant fair notice of the facts
the complaint rests on. 	See In re Endo Int’l PLC, 674 B.R. at 406-07; In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Securities, LLC, 458 B.R. 87, 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Actual 	fraudulent 	transfer 	claims 	are 	subject 	to 	Rule 	9(b)’s 	heightened
requirements and must plead with specificity facts showing the circumstances of the
fraud, and the transferor’s fraudulent 	intent. 	11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 	Loreley Fin.
(Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015). 	Such
claims should identify the property subject to the transfer, the timing or frequency of the
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transfer, and the consideration paid with respect thereto, though allegations of fraudulent
intent may be pled more generally. 	Loreley Fin., 797 F.3d at 171; Madoff, 458 B.R. at
106.
iii. 	Substantive Consolidation
Complaints seeking substantive consolidation must allege facts showing: (i) the
operational and financial affairs of the applicable entities are so entangled that accurate
identification 	and allocation 	of assets and liabilities 	cannot be achieved; or (ii) that
creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit. 	Gordon v. I.M.V. 1290 (In re
Mina), 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1887, 2022 WL 2657481, at *7 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y., July 8, 2022).
When appropriate, courts may “substantively consolidate debtor and non-debtor entities.”
Official Comm. of (In re Verestar), 343 B.R.444, 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Discussion
i. 	Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9
The Defendants contend that Counts X, XI, XIV, XVII, and XX of the Amended
Complaint, each alleging actual fraudulent transfer, fail to satisfy Rule 9’s heightened
pleading requirements and thus should be dismissed. The Court agrees.
With respect to “[a]llegations 	of the transferor’s mental state, i.e., intent, may be
pleaded generally, but a plaintiff must nonetheless allege facts that give rise to a strong
inference of fraudulent intent.” 	Katz v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 623 B.R. 199, 213
Bankr. 	D. Conn. 	2020). 	Here, 	while 	the Amended 	Complaint 	makes generalized
allegations that the Debtor was subject to various lawsuits and conclusorily asserts he
was concealing assets, it fails to set forth specific facts supporting that the Debtor and/or
any of the defendants acted with the specific fraudulent intent needed to support a count
of actual fraud. 	Particularly, the Amended Complaint fails to inform each Defendant of
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the nature of the specific acts they took in participation to the alleged fraud and does not
make specific and separate allegations against each Defendant. 	While these allegations
may be sufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, they are not under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9.
ii. 	Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8
a. 	Count IX
The Defendants also argue that Count IX, which requests a declaratory judgment
substantive consolidating 	the Defendants, be dismissed for failure to meet Rule 8’s
pleading standards. Again, the Court agrees. Count IX consists of only two paragraphs:
the first incorporates en masse all allegations 	in the preceding paragraphs, and the
second 	simply 	requests 	a 	declaratory 	judgment 	substantively 	consolidating 	the
Defendants. 	AP-ECF No. 36, p. 30. 	Beyond this, Count IX gives no indication as to the
basis upon which this relief is sought or any explanation as to how the facts alleged
elsewhere in the Amended Complaint satisfy the governing legal standard.
Though the Trustee is correct that a movant may establish either that creditors
dealt with the relevant entities as a single economic unit, or that the entities’ affairs are so
entangled that consolidation would benefit all creditors, neither theory is alleged here.
AP-ECF No. 47, p. 7. The Trustee contends that the numerous transfers identified in the
Amended Complaint, together with the Debtor's testimony that "9 West is me," satisfy this
standard. 	The Court disagrees.
While the transfers certainly indicate a close financial relationship between the
various entities, as currently pled the Amended Complaint does not indicate that the
Defendants’ affairs were so intertwined 	as to make separating them impossible. 	In
support of their position, the Trustee cited, among other authorities, Bank of Am., N.A. v.
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CD-04, Inc. (In re Owner Mgmt. Serv., LLC), 530 B.R. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015).
However, in that decision the Court held that such a degree of entanglement 	may be
shown “only where the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them
is so substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the creditors,” or is
otherwise impossible. 	In re Owner Mgmt. Serv., LLC, 530 B.R. at 723 (citing In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988)). 	The Amended Complaint
provided no information supporting that this is the case here, and, in fact, the Trustee’s
own classification of transfers by party in the Amended Complaint appears to indicate the
opposite. 	There 	is 	also 	no 	identified 	support 	showing 	that 	creditors 	treated 	the
Defendants as a single entity or that equitable concerns would otherwise necessitate
consolidation beyond repeating the bare assertion that “consolidation would benefit all
creditors.” See e.g., AP-ECF No. 36, p. 17.
b. 	Counts XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXI, and XXII
The Motion requests dismissal of Counts XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXI, and
XXII, all alleging constructive fraud, pursuant to Rule 8 for similar reasons. However, the
Court finds the complaint is sufficiently specific as to the transactions at issue. 	The
Amended Complaint lays out – with sufficient specificity – the date, amount, transferor,
and transferee for each of the subject transactions and alleges the Debtor and/or his
(alleged) alter ego were insolvent and/or received no consideration for said transfers.
Accordingly, the Amended Motion to Dismiss is Denied as to these counts.
iii. 	Dismissal with Prejudice
The Court now considers the final remaining question of whether dismissal of these
counts with prejudice is warranted. As the Trustee acknowledged in her response to the
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Motion, the Court previously identified substantially similar deficiencies in its ruling on the
First Motion to Dismiss and afforded the Trustee both an opportunity and a deadline
extension to cure them. 	AP-ECF Nos. 30; 44; 47, p. 2. 	Despite this, the Amended
Complaint perpetuates many of the same defects.
There is significant 	case law in the Second Circuit supporting 	dismissal with
prejudice 	in instances when, despite being 	previously granted 	leave to amend, 	an
amended complaint fails to correct already-identified shortcomings. 	See e.g., Chunn v.
Amtrak, 916 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2019)(“Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed
amendment would be futile. 	Amendment is futile if it fails to cure prior deficiencies.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Catania v. United Fed’n of Tchrs., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76866, 2025 WL 1195917, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal quotations omitted) (“[F]ailure to
fix deficiencies in [a] previous pleading, after being provided notice of them, is alone
sufficient ground to deny leave to amend”); Tow v. Bulmahn, No. 15-3141, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57396, at 94-96 (E.D. La. 2016), aff’d, 711 Fed. Appx. 216 (5th Cir. 2017) (denying
a trustee leave to amend after failing to cure deficiencies despite a prior amendment,
which the court found “particularly striking given that . . . Trustee has ample access to [the
Defendant’s] books and records”).
Because the Amended 	Complaint 	failed 	to adequately 	remedy 	the 	pleading
deficiencies previously identified despite receiving an extended period of time to do so,
the Court concludes that any further amendment to be futile. 	The Court is aware that
leave to amend should be given freely when justice so requires pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
15, under these circumstances, requiring 	the Defendants 	to respond to yet another
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complaint would impose unnecessary expense and delay. Therefore, the aforementioned
counts are dismissed with prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 39 is
GRANTE IN PART, as set forth above, and it is hereby
ORDERED: Count IX is dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), appliable to this
proceeding by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7008; and, it is further
ORDERED: 	Counts 	X, 	XI, 	XIV, 	XVII, 	and 	XX 	are 	dismissed 	pursuant 	to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), made applicable here by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7009; and, it is further
ORDERED: Because the Trustee has already been afforded an opportunity to
amend the Initial Complaint, and because the Amended Complaint contains substantially
similar pleading deficiencies, dismissal of the above counts is with prejudice.
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