Xtreme Landscaping & Grounds Maintenance, LLC

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
www.flmb.uscourts.gov
In re: 	Case No. 2:24-bk-00747-FMD
Chapter 11
Xtreme Landscaping &
Grounds Maintenance, LLC,
Debtor.
___________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PLAN ADMINISTRATOR’S
MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
AND TEE-OFF TEMPS, INC.’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1)(A) permits a bankruptcy
court, “for cause,” to enlarge the time for taking an act before the applicable deadline
expires. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Rule 9006(b) applies to
the statutory deadline for filing avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). Here, the
Court, over the objection of litigation targets, granted the Plan Administrator’s
motion for an extension of the § 546(a) deadline without an evidentiary hearing. This
ORDERED.
Dated: October 06, 2026
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memorandum 	opinion 	supplements 	the 	Court’s 	order 	granting 	the 	Plan
Administrator’s motion for an extension of time and addresses the motion for
reconsideration filed by one of the litigation targets.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Debtor previously operated a commercial landscaping business. In 2023 and
2024, Debtor experienced operating losses and was unable to service more than $20
million in debt it owed to its principal creditor, MSouth Capital (Doc. No. 22, ¶ 1).
In January 2024, Debtor entered into a forbearance agreement with MSouth
Capital. Under that agreement, Debtor engaged a financial consultant, Glen Devane,
as its interim controller (Doc. No. 22, ¶¶ 1 - 3; Doc. No. 165, ¶ 16). In April 2024,
Debtor sold substantially all its assets to an unrelated third party (Doc. No. 22, ¶¶ 1
- 3). Debtor has not operated since the sale closed.
A. 	Debtor files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
On May 25, 2024, Debtor filed this Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to liquidate its
remaining assets, including potential causes of action, for the benefit of its creditors
(Doc. Nos. 1, 22). In its bankruptcy schedules, Debtor listed approximately $3.6
million in unsecured debt (Doc. No. 24). Mr. Devane, acting as Debtor’s interim
controller, signed Debtor’s bankruptcy petition and schedules on Debtor’s behalf.
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B. 	Debtor discloses potentially avoidable transfers.
In its Statement of Financial Affairs, Debtor listed the creditors to whom it
made payments within 90 days before the date of the bankruptcy petition (Doc. No.
25). The list included the following creditors:
Creditor 	Amount
Big Shot Rides, LLC (“Big Shot”) 	$15,481.50
Tee-Off Temps, Inc. (“Tee-Off Temps”) 	$221,170.28
Palmdale Oil (“Palmdale”) 	$83,065.69
(Doc. No. 25 at 2, 15).
Debtor’s 	Statement 	of 	Financial 	Affairs 	also 	identified 	the 	recipients 	of
payments and transfers that Debtor made for the benefit of insiders in the year before
it filed for bankruptcy. The list included Debtor’s $1,202,000.00 transfer to Core
Property Capital (“Core Property”) (Doc. No. 25 at 2). For ease of reference, the Court
will sometimes refer to Big Shot, Tee-Off Temps, Palmdale, and Core Property as the
“Litigation Targets.”
Debtor’s transfers to the Litigation Targets may be subject to avoidance—in
other words, recoverable for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate—under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 547 and 548.
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C. 	Debtor’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan provides for a Plan
Administrator to pursue avoidance actions.
On December 20, 2024, Debtor filed its Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan of
Liquidation (the “Plan”) (Doc. No. 112). The Plan provided for the appointment of a
Plan Administrator, who was charged with (among other things) ensuring that
Debtor turned over its books and records and investigating and pursuing all Debtor’s
“causes of action.” The Plan defined “causes of action” to include any avoidance
actions (Doc. No. 112, §§ 9.01, 9.02, 9.03) and identified the potential targets of
avoidance actions, including the Litigation Targets.
Under the Plan, general unsecured creditors will share pro rata in the
recoveries from any avoidance actions (Doc. No. 112, § 5.04).
The Court confirmed Debtor’s Plan on January 27, 2025 (the “Confirmation
Order”) (Doc. No. 118).
D. 	The Plan Administrator appears in Debtor’s bankruptcy case.
On February 7, 2025, Amy Mayer, at that time a partner at the Stichter, Riedel,
Blain & Postler, P.A. law firm, filed her Notice of Appearance as Plan Administrator (Doc.
No. 122).
On August 4, 2025, Ms. Mayer (the “Plan Administrator”), after practicing law
with the Stichter Riedel law firm for 22 years, moved to the Berger Singerman LLP
law firm. She took more than 100 active matters with her to Berger Singerman (Doc.
No. 165, ¶ 10). As described by the Plan Administrator in more detail below, Berger
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Singerman’s process of conducting conflicts checks was labor-intensive and time-
consuming.
On October 20, 2025, after Berger Singerman had completed its conflicts
checks, the Plan Administrator filed an application to employ Berger Singerman as
her counsel (Doc. No. 143). No objections were filed, and on November 12, 2025, the
Court 	entered 	an 	order 	approving 	Berger 	Singerman’s 	retention 	as 	the 	Plan
Administrator’s counsel (Doc. No. 151).
E. 	The Plan Administrator moves to extend the deadline for
filing avoidance actions.
Under Bankruptcy Code § 546(a)(1), the Plan Administrator’s deadline to file
actions to avoid transfers by Debtor as preferential payments under § 547 or as
fraudulent transfers under § 548 was two years after the filing of Debtor’s bankruptcy
petition. 	On 	May 	25, 	2026, 	one 	day 	before 	the 	deadline 	lapsed, 	the 	Plan
Administrator filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Avoidance Actions (the “Initial
Extension Motion”) (Doc. No. 156), seeking an extension of 90 days.
The Plan Administrator asserted three grounds for the requested extension:
(1) she had identified avoidance claims in excess of $1 million; (2) she needed
additional time to properly serve several demand letters and any subsequent service
of process; and (3) failing to extend the deadline would prejudice the bankruptcy
estate and creditors (Doc. No. 156, ¶¶ 6, 19). The Initial Extension Motion was not
supported by an affidavit or declaration.
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One day after the deadline for filing avoidance actions, the Plan Administrator
served demand letters on 18 potential targets of avoidance actions, including three
of the Litigation Targets (Doc. No. 169, ¶ 14; Doc. No. 170, ¶ 15).
Core Property and Tee-Off Temps filed written objections to the Initial
Extension 	Motion 	(Doc. 	Nos. 	158, 	159). 	Both 	conceded 	that 	Eleventh 	Circuit
precedent authorizes bankruptcy courts to extend the § 546(a) deadline for cause
under Rule 9006(b). However, they argued there was no evidence in the record to
support the showing of “cause” required by Rule 9006(b). They also argued that
because Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules listed the amounts of its payments to
creditors 	and 	transfers 	to 	insiders 	within 	the 	avoidance 	period, 	the 	Plan
Administrator—who they have asserted had sufficient information to serve demand
letters 	on 	potential 	litigation 	targets—also 	had 	sufficient 	information 	to 	file
avoidance actions before the § 546(a) deadline.
On June 10, 2026, the Court conducted a hearing on the Initial Extension
Motion 	and 	Core 	Property’s 	and 	Tee-Off 	Temps’ 	written 	objections. 	At 	the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court (1) directed the Plan Administrator to file an
amended motion supported by an affidavit or declaration to establish cause; and
(2) set a date for parties to file objections. The Court rescheduled the hearing for
July 22 (Doc. No. 162).
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F. 	The Plan Administrator files an amended motion to extend
the deadline for filing avoidance actions.
On June 30, 2026, the Plan Administrator filed her Amended Motion for Extension
of Time to File Avoidance Actions (the “Amended Extension Motion”) (Doc. No. 165).
The Amended Extension Motion included the Plan Administrator’s declaration
stating that she had personal knowledge of the factual matters set forth in the
Amended Extension Motion and declaring under penalty of perjury that those
matters are true and correct (Doc. No. 165, Ex. 2).
The Plan Administrator has attested to the following:
• 	In 	March 	2025 	(before 	she 	transitioned 	to 	the 	Berger
Singerman 	firm), 	the 	Plan 	Administrator 	had 	requested
business and accounting records from Debtor and its former
accountants (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 8). Although Debtor did not
produce 	any 	records, 	on 	May 	2, 	2025, 	the 	accountants
produced nearly 8,000 documents (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 9).
• 	Between 	May 	and 	July 	2025, 	the 	Plan 	Administrator
reviewed the nearly 8,000 documents she had received from
the 	accountants. 	However, 	neither 	Debtor 	nor 	the
accountants produced any bank statements, canceled checks,
invoices, or other records supporting the alleged transfers
identified in the Plan or otherwise (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 9).
• 	In August 2025, the Plan Administrator transitioned her law
practice from the Stichter Riedel firm to Berger Singerman.
The transition, which involved more than 100 active matters,
was 	extraordinarily 	labor-intensive 	and 	time-consuming.
During the transition, which took months to complete, the
Plan Administrator worked, on average, 70 hours per week
(Doc. No. 165, ¶ 10).
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• 	The 	transition 	required 	the 	Plan 	Administrator 	to 	run
comprehensive conflicts checks across every client, affiliate,
and adverse party (which, in a bankruptcy case, may involve
hundreds of parties for one matter) (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 10).
• 	In 	the 	process 	of 	conducting 	conflicts 	checks, 	the 	Plan
Administrator 	discovered 	that 	Berger 	Singerman 	had
previously 	represented 	Debtor 	in 	unrelated 	matters,
requiring 	the 	Plan 	Administrator 	to 	make 	supplemental
disclosures to the Court and parties in interest (Doc. No. 165,
¶ 11).
• 	Once Berger Singerman was formally retained on November
12, 2025, the Plan Administrator asked her counsel, Berger
Singerman 	attorney 	Erin 	Hoskins, 	to 	search 	Berger
Singerman’s files for all information relating to potential
avoidance 	actions, 	including 	the 	records 	from 	the
accountants 	that 	the 	Plan 	Administrator 	had 	previously
reviewed. However, Ms. Hoskins was unable to locate any
information. The Plan Administrator also asked Ms. Hoskins
to reach out to Debtor’s counsel for information regarding
potential avoidance actions, but Ms. Hoskins did not receive
a response by the statutory deadline (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 15).
• 	Debtor is defunct and has no ongoing business, custodian of
records, or internal source of information. And Debtor’s
counsel informed the Plan Administrator that Mr. Devane,
Debtor’s former officer and interim controller, did not have
any of Debtor’s records (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 16).
• 	As of the June 10 hearing on the Initial Extension Motion, the
Plan Administrator believed that Stichter Riedel had not
successfully transferred to Berger Singerman the records that
the accountants had produced (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 21).
• 	After the June 10 hearing, the Plan Administrator asked
Stichter Riedel to transfer all files relating to this bankruptcy
case, 	including 	the 	records 	previously 	produced 	by 	the
accountants. 	Stichter 	Riedel 	believed 	it 	had 	already
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transferred all the requested documents, and eventually,
Berger Singerman’s IT department was able to retrieve the
transferred files, 	including 	the records 	produced by the
accountants (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 22).
The Court infers that Debtor’s accountants had electronically transferred 8,000
documents to the Plan Administrator while she was at Stichter Riedel, that Stichter
Riedel transferred those documents electronically to Berger Singerman, and that
Berger Singerman had some difficulty in retrieving the documents on its computer
system.
The Plan Administrator further attested that, despite her prior review of the
accountants’ records, she lacked sufficient information and documentary support to
commence avoidance actions, or any other estate causes of action, consistent with
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 23). She also attested
that the estate holds roughly $2.2 million in potential avoidance claims, and that,
absent meaningful recoveries on the avoidance actions, general unsecured creditors
will receive little or no distribution (Doc. No. 165, ¶ 24).
Core Property, Big Shot, and Palmdale filed written objections to the Amended
Extension Motion (Doc. Nos. 169, 170, 171). 1 All three objections concede (or assume)
that Rule 9006(b)’s “for cause” standard governs, but they argue that the Plan
1 Tee-Off Temps, which had filed a written objection to the Initial Extension Motion (Doc.
No. 158), did not file a separate objection to the Amended Extension Motion.
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Administrator failed to establish cause sufficient to warrant an extension of the
§ 546(a) deadline. Palmdale also argues that, to the extent the Court was willing to
entertain the Plan Administrator’s sworn allegations as constituting “cause,” the
Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 171 at 3).
G. 	The Court extends the deadline for filing avoidance actions.
On July 22, 2026, the Court conducted a hearing on the Plan Administrator’s
Amended Extension Motion. At the hearing, the Litigation Targets again agreed that
Rule 9006(b) authorizes this Court to extend the § 546(a) deadline, and that the
relevant standard under Rule 9006(b)(1)(A) is “cause.” However, they argued that
the Plan Administrator failed to satisfy Rule 9006(b)’s “cause” standard because, they
contend, the requesting party must satisfy two requirements: a diligent investigation
and an inability to complete the investigation despite the investigating party’s
diligence (Doc. No. 170, ¶ 12).
In particular, the Litigation Targets argued that because Debtor had identified
the recipients of potentially avoidable transfers in its Statement of Financial Affairs
and the Plan and the Plan Administrator had sufficient information to send demand
letters to the Litigation Targets before the § 546(a) deadline, she therefore had
sufficient information to file avoidance actions before the § 546(a) deadline.
The Plan Administrator responded that it is one thing to send a demand
letter—which is not subject to Rule 9011—but a very different thing to file a
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complaint to avoid a preferential transfer in a manner consistent with the obligations
of Rule 9011. The Plan Administrator contended that without bank records, canceled
checks, or wire transfers, she could not certify under Rule 9011 that she had
evidentiary support for the potential avoidance actions.
Although the Litigation Targets did not identify any disputes with the Plan
Administrator’s factual recitations, they contended that the Court should not grant
the Amended Extension Motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court denied the
Litigation Targets’ request for an evidentiary hearing because they had not identified
any disputed facts. The Court then found that the Plan Administrator’s sworn
allegations established the cause required by Rule 9006(b) and granted the Amended
Extension Motion, extending the § 546(a) deadline to September 20, 2026.
On July 30, 2026, the Court entered the Extension Order (Doc. No. 173),
reserving jurisdiction to issue a memorandum opinion setting forth its reasoning.
H. 	The Litigation Targets appeal and seek reconsideration of the
Extension Order.
Tee-Off Temps timely filed the Reconsideration Motion (Doc. No. 175), asking
the Court to reconsider its denial of the request for an evidentiary hearing on the
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Amended Extension Motion. And Core Property and Palmdale timely filed notices
of appeal and motions for leave to appeal (Doc. Nos. 177, 178, 180, 181). 2
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Court must decide (A) whether it properly exercised its discretion to
extend the § 546(a) deadline for cause; and (B) whether to grant Tee-Off Temps’
motion for reconsideration of the denial of its request for an evidentiary hearing.
A. 	THE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
EXTEND THE § 546(A) DEADLINE FOR CAUSE.
Under Rule 9006(b)(1)(A), if a party moves for an extension of time before the
applicable deadline expires, the Court may—with or without a motion or notice—
extend the time “for cause.” 3 If the request is made after the deadline has expired,
Rule 9006(b)(1)(B) requires the moving party to demonstrate that its failure to act
“resulted from excusable neglect.” 4
Here, the Plan Administrator moved for an extension of time before the
§ 546(a) deadline expired. As set forth below, the Court finds that Rule 9006(b)
applies to the § 546(a) deadline, and the Plan Administrator demonstrated cause for
the requested extension.
2 The District Court denied the motions for leave to appeal. Core Property Capital v. Mayer,
2:26-cv-02392-KCD, Doc. No. 7; Palmdale Oil Co. v. Mayer, 2:26-cv-02398-KCD, Doc. No. 8.
3 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(A).
4 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(B).
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1. 	Under Rule 9006(b)(1)(A), the Court has discretion to extend
the § 546(a) deadline “for cause.”
The Eleventh Circuit appears to be the only circuit court of appeals to have
ruled on the issue of whether Rule 9006(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy courts to extend
the statutory deadline under Bankruptcy Code § 546(a). 5
In In re International Administrative Services, Inc. (“IAS”), 6 the bankruptcy court
granted the trustee’s motion to extend the § 546(a) deadline through a hearing
scheduled to be conducted before a special master on discovery issues on July 29,
1998; however, that hearing was not conducted until September 3. At the September
3 hearing, the bankruptcy court orally granted a second extension of the deadline,
but the court did not enter a written order until September 17. Before the second
extended 	deadline 	expired, 	the 	trustee 	filed 	a 	fraudulent 	transfer 	adversary
proceeding against two defendants. The defendants lost at trial and appealed.
The threshold issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the § 546(a)
deadline had expired before the trustee filed his adversary proceeding. 7 At the outset,
the Eleventh Circuit found “no merit” to the defendants’ argument that bankruptcy
5 Kokoszka v. Naguib (In re Naguib), 675 B.R. 22, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2025) (observing that IAS
is “the only circuit level opinion on the issue” of whether the § 546(a) deadline may be
extended under Rule 9006(b)).
6 IBT Int’l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005).
7 Id. at 698.
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courts 	cannot 	extend 	the 	§ 	546(a) 	deadline 	under 	Rule 	9006(b). 8 	The 	court
acknowledged 	that 	Rule 	9006(b)(1) 	“does 	not 	explicitly 	encompass 	statutory
timeframes.” 9 But the court explained that Rule 9006 applies to “these rules,” and
“bring[s] all of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure under its umbrella,”
including 	Rule 	7001, 	which 	defines 	an 	adversary 	proceeding 	as 	including
a proceeding “to recover money or property.” 10
However, due to the gaps between the orders that extended the deadline and
the issue of whether the operative date of the first extension was July 29 or the
“hearing set before the special master,” the Eleventh Circuit went on to provide an
alternative basis for its ruling. But rather than looking to the “excusable neglect”
standard of Rule 9006(b)(1)(B)—which authorizes the bankruptcy court to grant an
extension requested after a deadline has expired—the Eleventh Circuit considered
the appropriateness of the extension under the more demanding “equitable tolling”
analysis. The court concluded that the trustee satisfied the requirements for equitable
tolling because he demonstrated that he acted with due diligence to discover the
8 Id. at 699.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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negligently concealed fraud or that one of the parties involved in the alleged fraud
took positive steps to conceal the transfers.11
Notwithstanding 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit’s 	equitable 	tolling 	analysis, 	IAS’s
primary holding is that bankruptcy courts have discretion to extend the § 546(a)
deadline under Rule 9006(b). 12 The issue before the Court, then, is whether the Plan
Administrator has established cause to extend the § 546(a) deadline under Rule
9006(b)(1)(A).
2. 	The Plan Administrator has demonstrated “cause.”
In a different context, the bankruptcy court in In re Wooten observed that
although the term “cause” is used repeatedly in the Bankruptcy Code and the
Bankruptcy Rules, 13 neither the Code nor the Rules define “cause.” 14 The Wooten
court cited Collier on Bankruptcy’s discussion of the cause required to extend a
deadline under Rule 9006. Collier’s discussion explains that a bankruptcy court’s
decision 	to 	grant 	an 	extension 	for 	cause 	is 	within 	its 	discretion; 	that 	“some
11 Id. at 702.
12 Id. at 695 – 99. The Court notes that at least one bankruptcy court has held that the § 546(a)
deadline cannot be extended “for cause” under Rule 9006. See, e.g., In re Walnut Hill, Inc.,
2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). The Litigation Targets did not raise
this issue in their written objections or at the June 10 or July 22 hearings.
13 See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), 503(a), 707(a), and 1112(b)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(3)
and 9006(b)(1).
14 620 B.R. 351, 357 – 58 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2020); see also 10A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.06[2]
(16th ed. 2026) (explaining that “[w]hat constitutes cause is not set out in the rule.”).
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justification” for the requested enlargement of time must be shown; and that an
extension should 	not be granted when the 	moving party has been guilty 	of
negligence or bad faith or has abused the privilege of extensions. 15 But Collier
cautions that courts should be wary of granting motions for extensions of time as a
matter of course, that the requirement of cause should be taken seriously, and that
proceedings should not be delayed without reason. 16
Core Property cites the IAS opinion in support of its argument that a finding
of cause requires the requesting party to satisfy two requirements: 	a diligent
investigation and an inability to complete the investigation despite the investigating
party’s diligence. But Core Property’s reliance on IAS is misplaced: 	the Eleventh
Circuit’s discussion of diligence in IAS arises only in the context of its alternative
equitable tolling analysis, and the court itself stated that it addressed the issue of
equitable tolling only in “an abundance of caution.” 17 In making their argument, the
Litigation Targets have incorrectly conflated the Eleventh Circuit’s equitable tolling
analysis with IAS’s primary holding: Rule 9006(b)(1) applies to the § 546(a) deadline.
15 10A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.06[2] (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 IBT Int’l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc.), 408 F.3d 689, 700 (11th Cir. 2005).
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The Litigation Targets also cite the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re
American Purchasing Services, LLC18 to support their argument. But in American
Purchasing, the bankruptcy court denied the Chapter 7 trustee’s motion to extend the
§ 546(a) deadline on facts very different from those presented in this case.
In American Purchasing, the trustee filed a motion to extend the § 546(a)
deadline months before the deadline expired on the grounds that he had not yet
negotiated a “carve out” for the estate with the creditor who held a security interest
in any litigation proceeds. In other words, the trustee wanted to ensure that the estate
would benefit from any avoidance-claim recoveries before he embarked on what
could be costly litigation. But the trustee did not claim that he was otherwise unable
to file the avoidance actions before the deadline, and the timing of the trustee’s
requested extension and the bankruptcy court’s ruling left the trustee with ample
time to file avoidance actions. 19 Although the court ruled that the trustee had not
satisfied the requirements of equitable tolling, the court could just as easily have
found that the trustee had not established cause for the requested extension.
Here, the Court finds that the Plan Administrator has provided sufficient
justification for the requested extension for the following reasons:
18 2022 WL 17096649, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022).
19 The bankruptcy court’s docket in American Purchasing, Case No. 20-23495-SMG, reflects
that the trustee filed eleven avoidance actions before the § 546(a) deadline expired.
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a. 	The Plan Administrator’s investigation into potential
avoidance claims was delayed.
The Plan Administrator has demonstrated that her investigation was delayed
in large part by (i) Debtor’s lack of a principal with actual knowledge of Debtor’s
financial affairs; (ii) her transition to Berger Singerman, including the conflicts checks
that had to be completed before she could continue serving as Plan Administrator
and retain the law firm as her attorney in this case; and (iii) the difficulties
encountered in locating Debtor’s records after their transfer to Berger Singerman.
b. 	The Plan Administrator is required to comply with Rule 9011
and § 547(b).
Rule 9011 requires that an attorney presenting a pleading to the court certify—
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances—that “the allegations and
factual contentions have evidentiary support.” 20 In 2019, § 547(b) was amended to
require plaintiffs to conduct reasonable due diligence before suing to avoid a
preferential transfer; § 547(b) specifically requires the plaintiff to “tak[e] into account
a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses.”
According to Collier, “[t]he most plausible explanation [for the amendment to
§ 547] is that it seems to have been the practice for chapter 11 liquidating trusts to
20 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9001(b)(3).
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employ what are called, in the vernacular, ‘preference mills.’” 21 Collier succinctly
described this “business model”:
Their business model is simple: they take the list from the debtor’s
statement of affairs of all payments the debtor made in the 90 days
before bankruptcy and file preference actions against all the recipients
without undertaking any investigation of the merits of the causes of
action, such as whether the transfer was ordinary course, whether it was
COD or otherwise a contemporaneous exchange, or any other defense.22
Ironically, the Litigation Targets appear to argue that the Plan Administrator,
rather than seeking an extension of the § 546(a) deadline, should have followed the
criticized “business model” that gave rise to the 2019 amendment to § 547(b).
c. 	The Plan Administrator is not guilty of negligence or bad faith.
The Court finds that (i) the Plan Administrator is not guilty of negligence or
bad faith, and (ii) in requesting a single extension, the Plan Administrator has not
abused the privilege of extensions.
The 	Court 	understands 	the 	Litigation 	Targets’ 	contention 	that 	the 	Plan
Administrator could have been “more diligent,” but even assuming that to be the
21 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.02A (16th ed. 2026).
22 Id.
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case, the absence of “more” diligence does not rise to the level of negligence, much
less bad faith. 23
d. 	The Litigation Targets are not prejudiced by a brief extension
of the § 546(a) deadline.
Core Property argues that “[t]he primary purpose of statutes of limitations
[such as § 546(a)] is to protect defendants from having to defend against stale claims
at a time when ‘evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared’” (Doc. No. 170, ¶ 10) (quoting In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 460 B.R. 222,
232 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011)). But Core Property does not explain how evidence will be
lost, memories will fade, or witnesses will disappear if the Plan Administrator files
an avoidance action 27 months—rather than 24 months—after Debtor filed its
bankruptcy case. And none of the Litigation Targets has shown any prejudice from
the short extension of the deadline.
23 See, e.g., Ianuale v. Borough of Keyport, 2017 WL 3503332, *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2017) (in finding
that good cause existed to vacate default judgment, court observed that “[a]dministrative
delay by Defendants’ insurance carrier and a five-day delay by Defendant Kerm’s counsel
due to a family vacation may indicate a certain lack of diligence, particularly on the part of
the insurance carrier, in timely responding to Plaintiffs’ pro se pleadings, but clearly do not
rise above the threshold of mere negligence necessary to show willfulness or bad faith on the
part of Defendants here.”).
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Curiously, it appears that the Litigation Targets would have preferred the Plan
Administrator to have sued them before taking the time to investigate further, assess
their defenses, and engage in pre-suit negotiations. 24
e. 	Debtor’s unsecured creditors will be prejudiced if the Court
does not extend the § 546(a) deadline.
Debtor and its insiders will not benefit from any recoveries in the avoidance
actions. Rather, the recoveries will be the primary—apparently, the only—source of
distributions to Debtor’s unsecured creditors. In other words, Debtor’s unsecured
creditors would be harmed if the Court denied the Amended Extension Motion,
while the Litigation Targets would receive a “windfall” by retaining potentially
avoidable preferential transfers.
B. 	THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE COURT TO RECONSIDER
THE EXTENSION ORDER.
As set forth below, the Court finds, first, that notwithstanding the pending
appeals, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the Reconsideration Motion; and
second, that Tee-Off Temps fails to demonstrate grounds for reconsideration.
24 The Court also notes that Core Property is not a Litigation Target because it is an
unfortunate creditor who received a payment within § 547’s 90-day preference period.
Rather, Debtor identified Core Property as an insider of Debtor who received $1,202,000.00
from Debtor in December 2023.
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1. 	The Court has jurisdiction to deny the Reconsideration
Motion.
Under Rule 8008(a), if a party timely files a motion that the bankruptcy court
lacks jurisdiction to grant because an appeal has been docketed and is pending, the
court may (a) defer considering the motion; (b) deny the motion; (c) state that it
would grant the motion if the appellate court remands for that purpose; or (d) state
that the motion raises a substantial issue.
Therefore, notwithstanding the pending appeals, this Court has jurisdiction to
deny the Reconsideration Motion.
2. 	Tee-Off Temps has failed to demonstrate that the Extension
Order constitutes clear error or will result in a manifest
injustice.
Reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy that should only be
granted sparingly. 25 Reconsideration is warranted only when (a) there has been an
intervening change in controlling law; (b) newly discovered evidence would merit a
different result; or (c) reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or
fact or to prevent a manifest injustice. 26
Here, Tee-Off Temps does not allege there has been an intervening change in
controlling law or that newly discovered evidence would merit a different result.
25 United States v. Thompson, 2024 WL 4471414, at *2 n.2 (11th Cir. Oct.. 11, 2024).
26 Hood v. Perdue, 300 F. App’x 699, 700 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Instead, Tee-Off Temps alleges that the Court’s denial of its request for an evidentiary
hearing constituted clear error or, alternatively, resulted in manifest injustice (Doc.
No. 175, ¶ 16).
In 	its 	Reconsideration 	Motion, 	Tee-Off 	Temps 	alleges 	that 	the 	Plan
Administrator’s 	Amended 	Extension 	Motion 	“relied 	upon 	numerous 	factual
assertions concerning her diligence in investigating avoidance actions, the effect of
her law firm transition, the alleged inability to obtain records, efforts undertaken to
investigate potential claims, the necessity of additional time, the inability to comply
with Rule 9011 without an extension, and the alleged benefit to the estate” (Doc. No.
175, ¶ 5).
Tee-Off Temps alleges that it disputed the Plan Administrator’s factual
allegations and that “[b]ecause those factual assertions were disputed, the Court
necessarily resolved questions of fact in determining that ‘cause’ existed under Rule
9006(b)” (Doc. No. 175, ¶¶ 6, 7). According to Tee-Off Temps, “where disputed
adjudicative facts determine whether a party has satisfied its burden of proof, those
facts ordinarily should be established through competent evidence” (Doc. No. 175,
¶ 10).
The Court concludes the Reconsideration Motion should be denied for two
reasons.
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First, Tee-Off Temps’ argument contradicts the plain language of Rule 9006(b),
which grants courts discretion to extend deadlines for cause “with or without a
motion or notice.” 27 Unlike many other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules, Rule 9006(b) does not condition an extension on “notice and a
hearing.” 28
And even in cases where the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Rules require
“notice and a hearing,” “a bankruptcy judge ‘does not abuse her discretion in reaching
a decision without holding an evidentiary hearing where the record provide[s] ample
evidence on which the court could make such a decision.’” 29 “[I]t is unnecessary to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on a contested matter unless there are disputed
issues of material fact that a Bankruptcy Court cannot decide based on the record.”30
Second, 	contrary 	to 	Tee-Off 	Temps’ 	allegations, 	the 	Court 	did 	receive
competent evidence in the form of the Plan Administrator’s sworn testimony
regarding her investigation of potential avoidance actions, the effect of her law firm
transition, her inability to obtain records, the need for additional time, her inability
27 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(A).
28 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 363(b)(1), 364(b), 502(b), 503(b), 543(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
1009(a)(2), 3002.1(e), 3012(a), 3018(a)(3).
29 Estate of Townsend v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP (In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.),
2021 WL 222779, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021) (quoting In re Garcia, 532 B.R. 173, 182 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2015)).
30 Id. (quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 490 B.R. 470, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
2013)).
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to comply with Rule 9011 without an extension, and the benefit of the potential
avoidance actions to the bankruptcy estate.
Tee-Off Temps did not file a written objection to the specific facts asserted in
the Amended Extension Motion, and it did not identify any disputed facts at the July
22 hearing. And despite having moved for reconsideration, Tee-Off Temps has yet to
identify a single disputed fact; it has provided only a blanket statement that it
disputes the Plan Administrator’s factual assertions.
Here, given the Plan Administrator’s sworn statement and Tee-Off Temps’
failure to identify a single fact in dispute, the Court finds it had ample evidence to
find that “cause” exists to extend the § 546(a) deadline without the need for an
evidentiary hearing.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes it had discretion to extend
the § 546(a) deadline “for cause” under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) and that there was
no need for an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes it appropriately
exercised its discretion to extend the § 546(a) deadline to September 20, 2026.
The Court will enter a separate order denying the Reconsideration Motion.
The Clerk’s office is directed to serve a copy of this order on interested parties via
CM/ECF.
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