SIMMONS v. GEO CORPORATION et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
DEMETRIC SIMMONS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv1764-LC-HTC
GEO CORPORATION,
JOHN DOE,
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Demetric Simmons, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a
civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging two unknown guards at
Blackwater River Correctional Facility (“BRCF”) and GEO corporation, which runs
BRCF, violated the Eighth Amendment when they failed to protect Simmons from
two inmate-on-inmate attacks and subsequently failed to provide medical care. Doc.
1. After reviewing the initial complaint, the undersigned concluded it failed to state
a claim against any of the named Defendants and entered an Order explaining the
deficiencies to Simmons and giving him an opportunity to amend the complaint.
Doc. 9. However, Simmons’ amended complaint, while providing somewhat more
detail, continues to fall short of stating a claim. Doc. 15. Therefore, the undersigned
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respectfully recommends the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
I. 	Background
Simmons, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections currently
incarcerated at Dade Correctional Institution, sues three Defendants: (1) GEO
Corporation1 (“GEO”); (2) John Doe 1; and (3) John Doe 2, for events that occurred
while he was incarcerated at BRCF. Doc. 15 at 2-3. The following is a summary of
the facts taken from Simmons’s amended complaint, which are accepted as true for
purposes of this Report and Recommendation.
On August 2, 2023, Simmons was ordered to pack up all his personal property
because he was being transferred from C-1 dormitory to A-4 dormitory. Doc. 15 at
5. However, due to medical concerns, Simmons was rehoused and assigned to F-2
Dormitory. 	Subsequently, on August 3, 2023, he was attacked by two unknown
gang members while he was in his cell, “who had brandished weapons, knocked out
his teeth, and threatened to shank him if he didn’t give up his cell.” Id. 	He “brought
this problem to the Dorm Officer’s attention … and that he needed medical attention
1 “GEO Group is contracted with the State of Florida to run Blackwater River Correctional
Institution. Thus, GEO Group and (by extension) its employees are treated as ‘act[ing] under color
of state law within the meaning of § 1983.’” Farney v. GEO Grp., No. 3:24CV00189/MCR/ZCB,
2024 WL 5265054, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024
WL 5264421 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2024). In the Order requiring an amended complaint, the Court
instructed Simmons that the proper name of this defendant was “GEO Group, Inc.,” and that he
should use the proper name for this defendant in his amended complaint. 	Doc. 9. 	Despite this
instruction, Simmons simply listed this defendant as “GEO.” Doc. 15 at 1, 2 & 9.
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for his teeth being knocked out.” Id. Simmons was ordered (he does not specify by
whom) to pack all his personal property to be moved but never ended up being
rehoused. Id.
Thus, during the feeding of morning breakfast on August 8, 2023, while still
in F-2 dormitory, he got into another altercation over a breakfast tray with another
group of inmates “who are also affiliated.” 	He “brought this matter to the Dorm
Officer’s attention” and asked for medical assistance “due to temporary blindness
associated with being battered in the face and head, which had triggered his
symptoms of glaucoma.” 	Id. at 6. He was treated the next day, after he had been
rehoused back to C dormitory.
II. 	Legal Standard
Because Simmons is seeking relief from government employees and is
proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss his amended complaint, or
any portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying
same standard to cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis). 	To
state a claim, Plaintiff must plead factual content which allows the Court to draw the
reasonable inference the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s pro
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se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), but conclusory
allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986).
III. 	Discussion
The 	Eighth 	Amendment’s 	prohibition 	against 	“cruel 	and 	unusual
punishments” requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates,” including but not limited to “protect[ing] prisoners from
violence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); accord Cox v. Nobles,
15 F.4th 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2021). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by
one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for
prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see
also Tullis v. Dixon, 2025 WL 3181635, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2025) (“[T]he
duty to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates’ does not
make prison officials ‘the guarantor[s] of [inmates’] safety.’” (first quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832; and then quoting Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty.,
400 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005))).
A failure-to-protect deliberate-indifference claim has three elements. 	See
Cox, 15 F.4th at 1357–58. First, the plaintiff must allege that he was “incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Id. at 1358 (quoting
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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Second, he must demonstrate “that the prison official had
a sufficiently culpable state of mind amounting to deliberate indifference.” 	Id.
(cleaned up). 	Third, the plaintiff must show causation (i.e., that the alleged
constitutional violation caused his injuries). Id.
“The first element of a failure-to-protect claim—whether a substantial risk of
serious harm existed—is an objective determination. To show a substantial risk of
serious harm, a prisoner must provide evidence that there was a ‘strong likelihood’
of his injury occurring, because the mere possibility of injury is not enough.” Rhiner
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 817 F. App’x 769, 775 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted). The second element of a failure-to-protect claim—deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of harm—has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a
risk of serious harm, (2) disregard of that risk, and (3) conduct that amounts to
subjective recklessness under criminal law. Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283
(11th Cir. 2024).
Thus, to state a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must make two
showings. 	He must allege facts sufficient to show he is “incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). 	He must also show the
defendant prison official had a “culpable state of mind,” which the Eleventh Circuit
has defined as “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” 	Wade v.
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McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (a defendant “must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference”).
Here, Simmons has failed to allege facts sufficient to meet either the objective
or subjective elements of his failure to protect claim. 	Simmons alleges, in
conclusory fashion, that “violent endeavors [go] on inside F-Dormitory,” that F-
Dormitory is “a closed custody setting” with inmates “that govern themselves; where
weapons, and inmate violence is at a[n] all time high.” Doc. 15 at 8. These factual
allegations do not establish that the conditions at BRCF “were extreme and posed
an unreasonable risk of serious injury to [Simmons]’s future health or safety.”
Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d at 1233 (internal quotation omitted); Purcell, 400 F.3d
at 1320 (explaining general confinement is actionable under the Eighth Amendment
only where plaintiff is confined “in a prison where violence and terror reign”).
Simmons fails to point to anything specific about BRCF or its population that makes
it a particularly violent place. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235; Doe v. Ga. Dep’t of
Corr., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2024), appeal dismissed as moot, 2025
WL 1206229 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2025) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Phillips
is unconstitutionally dangerous—without more—is not enough for her to show that
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inmates there are ‘exposed to something even approaching the constant threat of
violence.’”).
Simmons’s generalized, conclusory, and vague allegations regarding the
conditions at BRFC do not show he was under a substantial risk of serious harm.
See Fuqua v. Dunn, 2020 WL 3273235, at *8 (M.D. Ala. May 22, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3273028 (M.D. Ala. June 17, 2020) (“The
plaintiff presents no direct facts to support her general and conclusory allegations
that Tutwiler was overcrowded and understaffed when the attack at issue occurred
nor does she show that these conditions constituted a contributing factor to the
March 6, 2017 assault.”); Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1321 (Plaintiff must allege “that
serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something close to it”).
Moreover, even assuming Simmons plausibly alleged that he was incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, he has not alleged facts
sufficient to show either of the John Doe Defendants “had a sufficiently culpable
state of mind amounting to deliberate indifference.” Cox, 15 F.4th at 1358 (cleaned
up). 	As with the initial complaint, the amended complaint does not make clear
whether the John Doe Defendants are the Dorm Officers or distinguish between the
two Dorm Officers. Regardless, like the initial complaint, the amended complaint
fails to allege facts sufficient to show that either Dorm Officer (assuming they were
different) knew there was a risk Simmons would be assaulted before the assault
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occurred. To the contrary, Simmons merely alleges that he advised the Dorm Officer
of the assaults after they occurred. 	“Absent a particularized focus on a prison
official’s subjective awareness of the risk created by h[er] own conduct, there is a
danger that [s]he could be held liable for conduct that does not remotely resemble
the ‘inflict[ion]’ of ‘punishment[.]’” 	Wade, 106 F.4th at 1259 (alterations in
original). 	Therefore, Simmons’ amended complaint fails to state a claim for
deliberate indifference to a risk of prisoner-on-prisoner violence. 	See Wade, 106
F.4th at 1258; see also Beaubrun v. Dodge State Prison, 2025 WL 2490396, at *4
(11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of an
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim where “[the plaintiff] didn’t allege that
the defendant had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm”).
Assuming the “Dorm Officer(s)” are John Doe Officers #1 and #2, Simmons
also fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need by either
defendant. To state such a claim, Simmons must show: “(1) a serious medical need;
(2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between
that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]he medical need must be one that, if left unattended,
poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1307 (quoting Farrow v. West, 320
F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)). To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
prove: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
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(3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.” 	Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718
F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d
1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010)). Finally, Plaintiff must show his injury was caused by
Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct. See Cooper v. Rogers, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1131 (M.D. Ala. 2013).
Here, Simmons’s allegations fall woefully short. Simmons alleges he told the
Dorm Officer about the August 3, 2023 assault and requested medical attention for
his teeth, but “was denied requested medical treatment.” Simmons does not allege
any facts showing why he needed medical attention or what was wrong with his
teeth. He has failed to allege facts sufficient to show he had a serious medical need.
“[N]ot all claims regarding improper dental care will be constitutionally cognizable.
Dental conditions, like other medical conditions, may be of varying severity.”
Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 276 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)); Smith v. Crews, 4:12-cv-590-
RH/GRJ, 2014 WL 12650573, at *6 (N.D. Fla. June 2, 2014) (broken tooth without
other specific evidence about its severity was not necessarily a serious medical
need).
Simmons’ allegations regarding the August 8, 2023 incident fare no better.
Although Simmons alleges he told the Dorm Officer he needed medical treatment
and did not get it that day, Simmons admits that he received treatment the next day.
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Finally, Simmons was warned in the December 5 Order that his allegations
against GEO failed to state a claim because he did not allege: (1) that GEO had a
custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to a constitutional right; or
(2) that the policy or custom caused the violation. Doc. 9 at 11 (citing Grochowski
v. Clayton Cnty., 961 F.3d 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2020) and McDowell v. Brown, 392
F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). Simmons has not cured this deficiency. Instead,
Simmons alleges in conclusory and vague fashion that GEO failed to train
“Defendants toward inmates welfare and safety” concerning attacks by other
inmates. 	Doc. 15 at 9. 	Simmons, however, does not allege what training was
required or how any such training would have prevented the assault.
Regardless, a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation premised on a failure
to train must demonstrate that the supervisor had “actual or constructive notice that
a particular omission in their training program causes [his or her] employees to
violate citizens’ constitutional rights,” and that armed with that knowledge the
supervisor chose to retain that training program. 	Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749
F.3d 1034, 1052–53 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350,
1360 (2011)). 	To establish that supervisor was on actual or constructive notice of
the deficiency in training, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees is ordinarily necessary.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Here,
Simmons does not allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
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employees that was known to GEO. Therefore, his allegations against GEO fail to
state a claim.
IV. 	Conclusion
After Simmons filed his original complaint (Doc. 1), the Court issued an order
which described the applicable legal standards, advised Simmons of the elements
for each of his claims, and warned him of the deficiencies in his allegations. Despite
being given an opportunity to more carefully craft his complaint, the amended
complaint continues to suffer from the same deficiencies. 	Because Plaintiff has
failed to state a viable claim against the Defendants and failed to cure the
deficiencies identified in the original complaint through amendment, this case
should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Brennan v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 626 F. App’x 939,
945-46 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A pro se litigant must be given at least one opportunity to
amend his complaint before the court dismisses the action with prejudice if it appears
that a more carefully drafted pleading would state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.”).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That this case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
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2. 	That the clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 24 th day of March 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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