MUHAMMED v. PATHWARD NA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
ABDULLAH MUHAMMED,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No.: 3:25cv1765/MCR/ZCB
PATHWARD, N.A.,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed an
amended complaint. (Doc. 8). On November 18, 2025, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to show cause, within fourteen days, why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff has
responded to the show cause order. (Doc. 12). Dismissal is warranted for
the reasons explained below.
“Federal courts . . . are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 	Wu v. Liu,
131 F.4th 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). 	If a federal court
“determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal subject
matter jurisdiction is based upon either federal question or diversity
jurisdiction, or jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant. 	See 28
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U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; Wilson v. Hearos, LLC, 128 F.4th 1254, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2025).
Federal question jurisdiction exists when an action arises under
federal law. 	28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	Actions arise under federal law “when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.” 	Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC, 121 F.4th 149,
155-56 (11th Cir. 2024). This “well-pleaded complaint rule means that a
federal question is ‘presented’ when the complaint—on its face—invokes
federal law as the basis for relief.” Id. at 156. Claims based on state law
generally do not confer federal question jurisdiction. See Dunlap v. G&L
Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004).
A 	second 	way 	to 	invoke 	federal 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is
through diversity jurisdiction. 	Diversity jurisdiction exists when the
parties are residents of different states and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. 	28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 	“[T]he plaintiff’s amount-in-
controversy allegation is accepted if made in good faith.” 	Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014). 	“Diversity
jurisdiction requires complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse
from every defendant.” Hensley v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 113 F.4th 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2024).
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The burden to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction rests on
the party asserting it. Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1207
(11th Cir. 2007). 	Before dismissing a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court should provide the plaintiff with notice and an
opportunity to respond. 	Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d
1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint provides no basis for federal subject
matter 	jurisdiction. 	Regarding 	jurisdiction, 	Plaintiff 	states 	that
Defendant “is a federally chartered financial institution with operations
in Florida and corporate headquarters in South Dakota, subject to federal
jurisdiction and venue” in the Northern District of Florida. (Doc. 8 at 1).
As to federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s amended complaint
provides no basis to conclude that this action arises under federal law as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	The only federal law referenced in
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is “Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act.”
(Doc. 8 at 1, 2). 	But “Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act does not
provide [Plaintiff] with a cause of action.” 	White v. Lake Union Ga
Partners LLC, No. 1:23-CV-02852-VMC, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. July 14, 2023) (collecting cases and dismissing for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). 	And Plaintiff’s vague references to “breach of
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fiduciary duty” and “commercial dishonor” similarly do not implicate
federal question jurisdiction. 	See Bracciale v. Valdez, No. 8:17-CV-2040-
T-36AEP, 2017 WL 4117806, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2017) (“[T]he
elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty [in Florida] are: the
existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that it is
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. 	It does not appear that
[this] claim[] requires the application of federal law. 	A federal issue is
therefore not ‘necessarily raised’ by the Complaint.”); see also Dickerson
v. Nahra, No. 809-CV-963-T-17TGW, 2010 WL 746707, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 2, 2010) (“While the violation of federal regulations may be evidence
of the breach of fiduciary duty under substantive principles of state law,
the breach of fiduciary duty claim remains a state law claim.”).
Although not invoked in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Plaintiff
cited to 28 U.S.C. § 1348 in his initial complaint as a basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1). Section 1348 provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any
officer thereof, against any national banking association, any
civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and
any action by a banking association established in the district
for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to
enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting
under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
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As originally written, § 1348 provided federal jurisdiction based solely on
the fact that a national bank was a party to a case. 	See Wachovia Bank
v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 309-10 (2006) (“When Congress first authorized
national 	banks 	in 	1863, 	it 	specified 	that 	any 	‘suits, 	actions, 	and
proceedings by and against them could be had in federal court. National
banks thus could sue and be sued in the federal . . . courts solely because
they 	were 	national 	banks, 	without 	regard 	to 	diversity, 	amount 	in
controversy or the existence of a federal question in the usual sense.”)
(cleaned 	up). 	But 	importantly, 	“Congress 	ended 	national 	banks’
automatic qualification for federal jurisdiction in 1882.” 	Id. at 310.
Since the late 1800s, Congress has limited “the access of national
banks to, and their suitability in, the federal courts to the same extent to
which non-national banks were so limited.” 	Id. at 311 (cleaned up).
“State 	banks, 	however, 	like 	other 	state-incorporated 	entities, 	could
initiate actions in federal court only on the basis of diversity of citizenship
or the existence of a federal question.” 	Id. at 310. 	Today, therefore,
jurisdiction may only be invoked under § 1348 in the enumerated types
of cases therein or if there is a separate independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. See S. Elec. Steel Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, 515
F.2d 1216, 1217 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Moreover, 28 U.S.C. s 1348, which does
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confer jurisdiction on the federal courts with regard to certain suits
involving national banks, clearly was intended to forbid the entertaining
of this type of action merely because the bank is federally chartered; to
maintain a claim in federal court the plaintiff must plead diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. s 1332, federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. s
1331, or some other independent jurisdictional base . . . .”).1
Here, 	there 	is 	nothing 	indicating 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	was
“commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 1348. 	Nor is this a “civil action to wind up the affairs of”
Defendant. 	Id. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action does not fall within the
specific grants of jurisdiction set forth in § 1348, and he must provide an
independent basis of jurisdiction. See S. Elec. Steel Co., 515 F.2d at 1217.
As shown above, Plaintiff has not provided a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. Thus, the Court turns to diversity jurisdiction.
As to diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of
Pensacola, Florida. 	(Doc. 8 at 1). 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a
“federally chartered financial institution with operations in Florida and
1 	“Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to the close of
business 	on 	September 	30, 	1981, 	are 	‘binding 	as 	precedent 	in 	the
Eleventh Circuit.’” 	United States v. Carter, 158 F.4th 1319, 1335 n.1
(11th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
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corporate headquarters in South Dakota.” 	(Id.). 	National banks like
Defendant 	are 	“deemed 	citizens 	of 	the 	States 	in 	which 	they 	are
respectively located.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1348. 	The Supreme Court has stated
that “a national bank, for § 1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in
which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located.”
Wachovia 	Bank, 	546 	U.S. 	at 	307. 	Since 	Defendant’s 	corporate
headquarters are in South Dakota (Doc. 8 at 1),2 it is a citizen of South
Dakota and is diverse from Plaintiff who is a citizen of Florida. To invoke
jurisdiction under § 1332, however, a Plaintiff must also show an amount
in controversy in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Though 	not 	entirely 	clear, 	Plaintiff 	appears 	to 	allege 	that
Defendant failed to complete a “transfer of intangible property and
credits” belonging to Plaintiff to a different bank account. 	(Doc. 8 at 1).
Plaintiff also appears to want to “close the account” and receive a “new
access device” so he can access “the intangible property held in trust.”
2 See also https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-
suite/bankfind/details/30776 (showing Defendant’s corporate
headquarters in Sioux Falls, South Dakota); see also Am. Senior Servs.
of CA, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:15-CV-1804-T-35AEP, 2015
WL 12915729, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2015) (stating that the
defendant’s “main office is located in South Dakota” and thus the
defendant “is a citizen of South Dakota for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction”).
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(Id. at 1, 2). For relief, Plaintiff seeks equitable relief including a transfer
of property and a new “access device,” unspecified “damages for delay
harm, and breach of fiduciary duty,” and $50,000 in “emergency fiduciary
funding” to “mitigate ongoing hardship and facilitate lawful remedy.”
(Id. at 2). 	Plaintiff also states that is “willing to accept” $1 million “per
day” as “compensation for continued dishonor and delay.” (Id. at 1).
A district court does not have to “suspend reality or shelve common
sense in determining whether the face of the complaint . . . establishes
the jurisdictional amount.” 	Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d
744, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). This means a court “cannot ignore the facts of
the case or its own insight and experience in determining whether it is
‘facially apparent’ from the pleading itself that the amount in controversy
exceeds 	the 	jurisdictional 	minimum.” 	Drummond 	Co., 	Inc. 	v.
Collingsworth, No. 2:11-CV-3695-RDP, 2025 WL 2967093, at *2 (N.D.
Ala. Oct. 20, 2025) (cleaned up). Thus, a court “may find, as a matter of
fact, that the amount of claimed damages has been projected beyond the
amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery” so long as “such a finding
. . . rest[s] on facts in the record.” 	Jordan v. Closet Factory Franchise
Corp., No. 24-12229, 2025 WL 1100911, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025).
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Here, it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s amended complaint that
the amount in controversy is less than the $75,000 jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiff specifically seeks “emergency fiduciary funding” of $50,000 and
indeterminate damages for “delay, harm, and breach of fiduciary duty.”
(Doc. 8 at 2). 	The $50,000 request clearly does not exceed the $75,000
jurisdictional threshold. And Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations
do not show that his indeterminate damages are sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional threshold.3 	See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon
Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that where
jurisdiction is based on a claim for indeterminate damages, “the party
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claim on which it is basing
jurisdiction meets the jurisdictional minimum”).
3 	Plaintiff’s 	vague 	requests 	to 	compel 	Defendant 	to 	“transfer 	the
Principal’s intangible property and credits to the designated account and
access device” along with his other requests for equitable relief 	(Doc. 8
at 2) are also not adequate to satisfy the amount in controversy. 	Reilly
v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“While
absolute 	certainty 	is 	neither 	attainable 	nor 	required, 	the 	value 	of
declaratory and injunctive relief must be ‘sufficiently measurable and
certain’ 	to 	satisfy 	the 	amount-in-controversy 	requirement. 	That
requirement is not satisfied if the value of the equitable relief is ‘too
speculative and immeasurable.’”) (citations omitted).
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Plaintiff fails to identify or explain what the “intangible property”
is that he claims has not been transferred. 	(Doc. 8 at 1). 	Plaintiff does
not explain what “credits” are being withheld by Defendant. 	(Id. at 2).
Instead, a document Plaintiff filed alongside his amended complaint
references Plaintiff having a “Wisely Pay Account” with balances ranging
from $0.00 to $80.56 in 2024. 	(Doc. 8 at 12). 	And Plaintiff provides no
basis or explanation for his willingness to accept $1 million per day “as
compensation for continued dishonor or delay.” 	(Id. at 1). 	See Burks v.
Texas Co., 211 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1954) (“In a tort action . . . the
amount in controversy is that which the plaintiff in good faith, and upon
a reasonable factual basis, seeks to make the defendant pay . . . .”)
(emphasis added). 	Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to have met the
jurisdictional requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Before 	recommending 	dismissal 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, the Court provided Plaintiff with notice and an opportunity
to respond by way of the show cause order. In response to the show cause
order, Plaintiff asserts that federal question jurisdiction exists under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 504 (Federal Reserve Act § 29), and “the
Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS)” which “implicates
federal tax administration and fiduciary oversight.” 	(Doc. 12 at 1).
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Plaintiff also states that diversity jurisdiction exists since the parties are
completely 	diverse 	and 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy 	exceeds 	$75,000
because Plaintiff is seeking damages of “$1,000,000 per day for breach of
fiduciary duty and obstruction of due process” under “Section 29 of the
Federal Reserve Act.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff, therefore, claims $556,000,000 is
at issue for 556 days of Defendant allegedly acting unlawfully. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s 	response 	to 	the 	show 	cause 	order 	does 	nothing 	to
ameliorate the Court’s jurisdictional concerns. 	As to federal question
jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s response to the show cause order provides the
Court with no basis to conclude that this case arises under federal law as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	First, Plaintiff’s mere reference to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not establish federal question jurisdiction because
there is no plausible allegation that Defendant—a private bank—acted
under color of state law. See Yeh Ho v. Sabocik, 775 F. App’x 551, 554-55
(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction where complaint provided no basis to conclude that
defendants were state actors).
Second, as Plaintiff was told in the show cause order (Doc. 11 at 3-
4), “Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act does not provide [Plaintiff] with
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a cause of action.” 	White, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2 (collecting cases and
dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Lastly, Plaintiff’s vague reference to the “Electronic Federal Tax
Payment System” and “federal tax administration” is insufficient to raise
a federal question. These references do not cite any specific statutes, nor
do they appear to otherwise implicate federal question jurisdiction.4 See
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred and defined by statute. 	It
cannot be created by the consent of the parties . . . nor supplanted by
considerations of convenience and efficiency.”) (emphasis added).
Turning to diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s response to the show
cause order provides the Court with no reasonable basis to conclude that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1332. As discussed above, it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint that the amount in controversy here is less than $75,000. 	In
4 See also O’Neal v. Allstate Indem. Ins. Co. Inc., No. 20-14712, 2021 WL
4852222, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (“[T]he mere reference to federal
law 	is 	insufficient 	to 	establish 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction—the
implicated federal issue must be substantial.”) (cleaned up and emphasis
in original); Mitchell v. Parham, 357 F.2d 723, 725 (10th Cir. 1966)
(stating that a “mere allegation . . . that the cause arises under the
Constitution or [federal law] without specific facts is not enough under
any standard to pass the jurisdictional hurdle”).
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response 	to 	the 	show 	cause 	order, 	Plaintiff 	claims 	damages 	of
$556,000,000 “[p]ursuant to Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act” for
“breach of fiduciary duty and obstruction of due process” (Doc. 12 at 1).
Again, however, “Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act does not provide
[Plaintiff] with a cause of action” and thus he cannot recover anything
under that statute. 	White, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2.
Additionally, 	Plaintiff’s 	response 	still 	does 	not 	identify 	what
“intangible property and credits” Defendant has failed to transfer or how
this alleged inaction plausibly involves damages in excess of $75,000.
(Doc. 12 at 1). 	Thus, Plaintiff has provided no reasonable factual basis
in his response or amended complaint to support potential damages
exceeding $75,000.
Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that this
Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal is warranted.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	This case be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
2. 	All pending motions be DENIED as moot.
3. 	The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
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At Pensacola, Florida, this 5th day of December 2025.
/s/
Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice To The Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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