COLLEY v. STATE OF FLORIDA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
EMANUEL L. COLLEY,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 3:25-cv-2040-LC-MJF
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Emanuel L. Colley is a pre-trial detainee confined at the
Okaloosa County Jail. In a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
Colley seeks release from pre-trial detention and dismissal of criminal
charges pending in a Florida court. Doc. 12 at 2, 7. Because the abstention
doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) precludes
the District Court from interfering in Florida’s ongoing prosecution of
Colley, 	and 	because 	it 	appears 	that 	Colley 	has 	not 	exhausted 	his
available state remedies, the District Court should dismiss Colley’s
petition.
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BACKGROUND
The State of Florida has charged Colley with homicide in Okaloosa
County Case No. 2019CF002948. In his petition, Colley asserts four
grounds:
(1) violation of his Miranda rights during the police investigation;
(2) violation of his right to privacy during the police investigation;
(3) a denial of due process based on the length of Colley’s pre-trial
detention; and
(4) the investigator who provided a supporting affidavit for a search
warrant lied.
Colley seeks release from pre-trial detention and dismissal of the pending
criminal charges. Doc. 12 at 7.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Colley’s 	Petition 	is 	Barred 	by 	the 	Younger 	Abstention
Doctrine
“When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending
state criminal trial the petitioner must satisfy the ‘Younger abstention
hurdles’ before the federal courts can grant such relief.” Hughes v. Att’y
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Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kolski v.
Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977)).
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not
enjoin 	a 	pending 	state 	criminal 	proceeding 	unless 	an 	injunction 	is
necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury. 401 U.S. at
53–54. As the Supreme Court stated: “the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is
not to issue such injunctions.” Id. at 45. The Supreme Court’s Younger
decision 	was based on a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings. Id. at 44; Green v.
Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under Younger, a district court should abstain from interfering
with ongoing state proceedings when “(1) state proceedings, judicial in
nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state
interests; and (3) the state proceeding afford adequate opportunity to
raise constitutional issues.” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1099
(11th Cir. 2022); see Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). “There are three narrow exceptions to
the 	abstention 	doctrine: 	(1) 	there 	is 	evidence 	of 	state 	proceedings
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motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is
no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can
be raised.” Johnson, 32 F. 4th at 1099.
Generally, the Younger analysis is conducted in three steps. First,
federal courts consider whether a qualifying state-court proceeding is
pending. Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., 940 F.3d 1254, 1267–
68 (11th Cir. 2019). If so, federal courts then consider whether it is
appropriate to abstain under the factors set forth in Middlesex. Id. at
1268. If abstention appears to be appropriate, federal courts then must
determine whether any exception to Younger applies. Middlesex, 457 U.S.
at 435; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–25 (1975).
1. 	There is an Ongoing, Qualifying State Proceeding
Florida is currently prosecuting Colley for homicide in Okaloosa
County Case No. 2019CF002948. Accordingly, the first Younger criterion
is satisfied.
2. 	The Middlesex Factors Weigh in Favor of Abstention
At the second step of the Younger analysis, the District Court must
consider whether: (1) the federal action would interfere with ongoing
qualifying state judicial proceedings; (2) the state proceedings implicate
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important state interests; and (3) the underlying state proceedings afford
litigants 	an 	adequate 	opportunity 	to 	raise 	federal 	claims. 	Tokyo
Gwinnett, LLC, 940 F.3d at 1267–68.
(a). 	Interference with State Judicial Proceedings
“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere
with the state proceeding,” the court looks “to the relief requested and
the effect it would have on the state proceedings. The relief sought need
not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing
proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required.” 31 Foster
Children 	v. 	Bush, 	329 	F.3d 	1255, 	1276 	(11th 	Cir. 	2003) 	(citations
omitted).
Colley requests that this court dismiss the state criminal charges
against 	him 	and 	release 	him 	from 	pre-trial 	detention. 	This 	relief
necessarily would conflict with, and would obviate, Florida’s pending
court proceedings.
(b). 	Important State Interests
The State of Florida’s criminal prosecution of Colley implicates
important state interests. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41–44. The adjudication
of criminal cases—which is a facet of crime prevention—is an important
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state interest, particularly when there are victims involved. Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750 (1987). “[P]reventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government . . . .”
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). The “State has a strong
sovereign interest in ensuring public safety and criminal justice within
its territory, and in protecting all crime victims. . . . The State also has a
strong interest in ensuring that criminal offenders . . . are appropriately
punished and do not harm others in the State.” Oklahoma v. Castro-
Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 651 (2022). Thus, there is a “strong judicial policy
against 	interference 	with 	state 	criminal 	proceedings.” 	Arizona 	v.
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 (1981). Accordingly, the second Middlesex
factor also weighs in favor of abstention.
(c). 	Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims
Finally, Colley will have an adequate opportunity to raise any
arguments based on federal law in state courts. In order for Colley to
show that he lacks an adequate opportunity to raise his claims, he must
assert that he is procedurally prevented from raising the claims pretrial,
during trial, or at a subsequent stage of the criminal proceedings. See
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Johnson, 32 F.4th at 1101. Colley has not alleged that Florida law
prevents him from raising any of the claims he seeks to assert. Indeed,
the underlying state criminal case affords Colley adequate opportunities
to raise the claims he seeks to assert in his petition. See, e.g., Johnson,
32 F.4th at 1100 (noting that Florida law permits a defendant to file a
writ of prohibition and a direct appeal to challenge an alleged violation
of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial). Accordingly,
the third Middlesex factor also weighs in favor of abstention.
3. 	Petitioner Identifies No Applicable Exceptions
Colley 	has 	not 	alleged 	bad 	faith, 	harassment, 	or 	any 	other
extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate.
“[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single prosecution alone do not constitute ‘irreparable injury’ that would
warrant federal interference in a state criminal proceeding.” Kugler, 421
U.S. at 124. Accordingly, the District Court should dismiss Colley’s
petition.
B. 	Colley Has Failed to Exhaust Available State Remedies
There is a second reason the District Court should dismiss Colley’s
petition: Colley has failed to exhaust available state remedies.
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A “district court may not grant a § 2241 petition ‘unless the
petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’” Johnson, 32 F.4th
at 1095–96; see Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). Requiring state pretrial detainees to
exhaust all means of state relief prevents “interference by federal courts
in the normal functioning of state criminal processes.” Moore v. DeYoung,
515 F.2d 437, 441–42 (3d Cir. 1975); see Johnson, 32 F.4th at 1096.
To exhaust his state remedies, a state pre-trial detainee must: (1)
fairly present his federal claim to the state courts; and (2) take his claim
“to the state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral
review.” 	Johnson, 	32 	F.4th 	at 	1096. 	To 	overcome 	the 	exhaustion
requirement, a pretrial detainee must show “an absence of available
State corrective process” or that “circumstances exist that render such
process ineffective to protect [his] rights.” Combs v. Coats, 2011 WL
3290386, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	Aug. 	1, 	2011) 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)); see Johnson, 32 F.4th at 1097.
Colley could have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
release from pre-trial detention in the relevant Florida District Court of
Appeals and, if the court denied the petition, he could have sought review
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in the Supreme Court of Florida. Magbanua v. McNeil, 310 So. 3d 138,
141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). Colley, however, does not indicate that he
has exhausted these avenues of State relief. Instead, under the “Your
Earlier Challenges of the Decision or Action” section of his petition,
Colley indicates that he has not filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
and release from pre-trial detention in the pertinent Florida District
Court of Appeals, or in any other court. Doc. 12 at 2–4. 	Colley has also
not shown that Florida lacks a “corrective process” or that “circumstances
exist that render such process ineffective to protect [his] rights.” Combs,
2011 WL 3290386, at *2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)). As
such, he is not entitled to waive the exhaustion requirement.
Because Colley failed to exhaust his state remedies, and because
Colley has failed to show that he is entitled to a waiver of the exhaustion
requirement, the District Court should dismiss Colley’s petition
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS
that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS without prejudice Petitioner’s petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
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2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 9th day of February 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). Objections to this report and recommendation
(“R&R”) must be filed within fourteen days of the date
of 	the 	R&R. 	A 	party 	who 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the
magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	recommendations
contained in this R&R waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;
28 U.S.C. § 636. If Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of any
facts taken from judicially-noticed documents, or if
they otherwise wish to be heard on the propriety of the
District Court taking judicial notice of those facts, they
must raise this issue in an objection to this R&R.
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