MIDGETT v. TRUMP et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
MICHAEL D. MIDGETT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv2450-MCR-HTC
DONALD J. TRUMP,
ELON MUSK,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Michael D. Midgett, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing
a complaint against Donald J. Trump and Elon Musk.1 Doc. 1. 	Midgett claims
Defendants conspired to commit a conspiracy against the United States, that
President Trump took bribes from Boeing and Musk, and those actions caused him
severe harm. 	He brings claims of “life, liberty, freedom, due process, pursuit of
happyness [sic], bear arms, equal application of law and all others.” Id. at 6.
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends this case be
dismissed 	sua sponte, as Midgett’s allegations are illogical, nonsensical, and
frivolous. 	Indeed, Midgett has a history of filing nonsensical suits, including the
1 Midgett also filed an “Emergency Motion for Protective Order” for “repeat false imprisonments,
medical kidnapping, and recent attempt to order a passenger in [his] vehicle to shoot [him] on the
way here,” (Doc. 4) which will be terminated as moot by separate order.
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following: 	Midgett v. United States Fed. Bureau of Investigations, Case No.
3:2020cv404/RV/EMT at Doc. 1 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2020) (alleging he was
“terrorised and kidnaped [sic] by the FBI” and that they had “hacked [his] electronics
so [he] cannot look up laws to cite”); Midgett v. Northrop Grumman Corp. et al.,
Case No. 8:2019cv2970 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020) (granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim where plaintiff listed several allegations, including
accusing all defendants of “conspired and premeditated murder or attempt thereof,
defamation, civil rights violations, physical [and] emotional damages, loss of
income, taking of free will, false imprisonment, torture, and many other travesties”)
(internal 	punctuation 	omitted); 	and 	Midgett 	v. 	Florida, 	Case 	No.
3:2022cv10378/TKW/ZCB, Doc. 16 at 12 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023) (alleging the
State of Florida “medically kidnapped” and hypnotized him several times since 2019
and that he “was held against his will without due process, beaten, tortured, and
framed for crimes he did not commit.”).3
I. 	Legal Standard
“[A] district court has the inherent power to dismiss an action that is ‘so
patently lacking in merit as to be frivolous.’” 	Guthrie v. U.S. Gov’t, 618 F. App’x
2 Between filing the complaint and the Clerk closing this case, Midgett filed eight (8) motions—
some containing several combined motions—including multiple motions to appoint counsel,
multiple motions for emergency injunctions, and a motion to certify a class, among others. See
3:2022cv10378/TKW/ZCB at Docs. 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 19. If the Court allowed this case
to proceed, it is not unlikely Midgett would litigate in a similar way.
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612, 617 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de
Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 & n.3 (11th Cir.1983)); see also Davis v.
Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 234-35 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming district courts’
inherent authority to dismiss frivolous claims sua sponte). “A claim is frivolous if
it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” 	Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting “a case is frivolous for section 1915(d) [now 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)] when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
II. 	The Complaint Does Not Contain a Cause of Action
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be “concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(e)(1). 	Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does
demand 	“more 	than 	an 	unadorned, 	the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The Supreme Court has explained that a claim
for relief must contain sufficient factual allegations to cross ‘the line between
possibility and plausibility.’” 	Guthrie v. U.S. Gov’t, 618 F. App’x 612, 617 (11th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
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The Court must liberally construe pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched
as factual allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). While “pro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard ... and [are] liberally construed,” Boxer X v. Harris, 437
F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), “a pro se litigant is expected to follow the
procedural rules.” 	Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 111575, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2016).
Midgett’s complaint falls woefully short of meeting the pleading standard set
forth in Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint is completely devoid of
factual allegations supporting any cause of action. 	Instead, it contains over ten
handwritten pages of nonsensical ramblings. 	Even reading Midgett’s allegations
liberally and in his favor, there is no cognizable cause of action. Rather, Midgett’s
complaint appears to contain only demands and allegations that are fanciful or border
on delusional.
For example, Midgett repeatedly requests that the Court remove President
Trump from office “immediately due to personal and public safety.” 	Doc. 1 at 6;
12. 	However, the Court is powerless to remove a President from office. 	See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution explicitly provides
for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon impeachment by
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the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate.”). 	He contends “the
defense contractor and unknowing others …[are] commit[ting] further crimes
against me, my family and the public,” (id.) but does not identify the contractor or
the harm.
Reading Midgett’s complaint extremely liberally, Midgett may be trying to
state a claim as a whistleblower under the Federal Claims Act (“FCA”). 	Even so,
Midgett makes only vague allegations of bribery. 	Midgett’s allegations fall well
short of supporting an FCA claim. See Vargas v. Lincare, Inc., 134 F.4th 1150, 1157
(11th Cir. 2025) (noting: (1) an “FCA complaint must spell out the fraud in detail—
what happened, who did it, when and where it occurred, and how it amounted to
fraud” and (2) the “FCA targets false claims—not regulatory violations, not internal
misconduct, and not abstract theories untethered from government payment”).
Midgett also asks for the immediate arrest of Elon Musk. 	Doc. 1 at 9-10.
However, it is well-settled that no private citizen holds “a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” 	Linda R. v. Richard V.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 	And this Court is not a prosecutorial body and cannot
refer a case for prosecution. See U.S. ex rel. Stolls v. Martin, 2006 WL 1883439, at
*3 (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2006) (noting the “authority to investigate and initiate criminal
complaints rests exclusively with federal prosecutors”).
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Finally, Midgett claims, “The attacks have left me with severe dissabilities
[sic]…as well as…medical kidnappings to discredit me and several unconscionable
acts to prevent me from participating fully in these proceedings and restrienining
[sic] me for prolonged periods with torture to silence me….” Doc. 1 at 13 (quoted
as is). However, he does not set forth any facts to support those allegations or state
how the Defendants’ actions or inactions resulted in those purported injuries.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (Although Rule 8 does not require
detailed factual allegations, it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). 	“The Supreme Court has explained that a
claim for relief must contain sufficient factual allegations to cross ‘the line between
possibility and plausibility.’” Guthrie v. U.S. Gov’t, 618 F. App’x 612, 617 (11th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
Midgett’s allegations do not cross that line.
III. 	Lack of Jurisdiction
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction must set forth the basis of
the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 	“[F]or a federal district court to have
jurisdiction over a claim, a plaintiff must show, on the face of the complaint, either
complete diversity of citizenship or that a ‘substantial’ issue of federal law is raised
by the claim.” 	See Selensky v. Mobile Infirmary, 221 F. App’x 814, 815 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Dunlap v. G & L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.
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2004)). 	Here, however, Midgett’s complaint fails to provide “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” as required by Rule 8. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
Although Midgett contends he is bringing a Bivens action against Defendants,
he also states he is suing Defendants in their “official capacity.” Bivens claims apply
to federal employees “only in their individual capacities.” 	Williams v. Cheatham,
548 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1177-78 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2021) (stating a Bivens claim
“cannot be brought against a federal employee in his or her official capacity”) (citing
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 140-41 (2017)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009) (explaining that in a Bivens suit, “a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”). 	And a claim against Defendants in their official
capacity is the equivalent of a claim against the United States, which is barred by
sovereign immunity. 	Ishler v. Comm’r, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1203 (N.D. Ala.
2006) (“The protection of sovereign immunity generally extends to claims against
the United States, agencies of the United States government, and employees of those
agencies sued in their official capacities.”), aff’d sub nom. Ishler v. Internal Revenue,
237 F. App’x 394 (11th Cir. 2007).
Midgett also references several federal statutes. 	Those references, alone,
however, are not sufficient to establish this Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, it is required
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that the complaint clearly set out the basic facts necessary to support the conclusion
that 	there 	is 	federal 	jurisdiction. 	Pearson 	v. 	U.S. 	Postal 	Serv., 	No.
3:06CV190MCR/EMT, 2007 WL 624536, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2007) (quoting
Fountain v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. La.
1967)); see also Gilbeaux v. University of Texas Medical Branch, 42 F. Supp. 2d
637, 641 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (concluding that a mere citation to a federal statute in the
heading of a complaint form is insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction).
Midgett also has not established diversity jurisdiction. 	Even assuming the
parties are citizens of different states, the has not alleged any facts supporting an
amount in controversy greater than $75,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
IV. 	Improper Venue
Finally, although Plaintiff does not have to allege venue in his complaint, it
appears that even if Plaintiff could state a cause of action and show this Court has
jurisdiction, venue would still not be proper in this district. The venue for civil
actions against government agencies or employees is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e). 	Under that provision, venue is proper (1) in any district in which any
federal defendant resides, § 1391(e)(1)(A); Rogers v. Civ. Air Patrol, 129 F. Supp.
2d 1334, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2001); (2) in any district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, § 1391(e)(1)(B); or (3) where
the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved, § 1391(e)(1)(C).
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Venue is not proper under any of those subsections. Midgett has alleged no
facts showing any substantial events or omissions occurred in this district. 	He
alleges a Texas address for Musk and does not allege a full and complete address for
President Trump. Regardless, there are no allegations showing that President Trump
resides in the Northern District of Florida.
V. 	Conclusion
Generally, “a district court must grant a plaintiff at least one opportunity to
amend their claims before dismissing them if it appears a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Silva v. Bieluch,
351 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2003). However, an opportunity to amend is not
necessary when the defects in the complaint are incurable and an amendment would
be futile. Rance v. Winn, 287 F. App’x 840, 841 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts
need not permit amendment where it would be futile to do so.”). Instead, a district
court may sua sponte “dismiss an action that is ‘so patently lacking in merit as to be
frivolous.’” Guthrie, 618 F. App’x. at 617 (quoting Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v.
Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983)).
District courts have “‘unquestionable’ authority to control their own dockets.
This authority includes ‘broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases
before them.’” Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted). Thus, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a pro se litigant’s
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complaint when the plaintiff either cannot cure the defects by amending his
complaint or an amendment would be futile. 	See Horn v. Estate of Camacho, 817
F. App’x 872, 874 (11th Cir. 2020); Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 885 F.3d
1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). Indeed, while a court should read a pro se complaint
liberally, “early evaluation of the potential merits of a pro se litigant’s claim is very
important because initial screening by the court can eliminate patently frivolous
actions.” 	See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Citicorp Credit Srvcs., Inc., 2015 WL 13776794
(S.D. 	Fla. 	May 	18, 	2015), 	adopting 	report 	and 	recommendation, 2015 	WL
13776795 (June 22, 2015). Thus, because Midgett’s complaint is frivolous, it should
be dismissed sua sponte.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	This case be DISMISSED as frivolous.
2. 	All pending motions be TERMINATED as MOOT.
3. 	The clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida this 29 th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations may be filed within 14
days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different deadline that
may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not
control. A copy of objections shall be served upon the magistrate judge and all other
parties. A party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11 th Cir. R. 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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