WHARTON v. MARTIN et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
JASON T. WHARTON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv2625-AW-HTC
J. MARTIN, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jason T. Wharton, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, has filed an amended civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging the Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they threw away
certain photographs that were part of his personal property. Doc. 7. After reviewing
the amended complaint, the undersigned finds it fails to state a claim, and because
Plaintiff has already had one opportunity to amend his complaint, this case should
be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural Background
Wharton initiated this action on or about December 16, 2025. Doc. 1. After
reviewing the initial complaint, the undersigned recommended the action be
dismissed for Wharton’s failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history. Doc. 5.
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However, prior to receiving the Report and Recommendation, Wharton realized he
had omitted certain litigation from the initial complaint form and moved to amend
the complaint to identify those non-disclosed cases. Doc. 6. The Court granted the
motion to amend, accepted the amended complaint (Doc. 7) as the operative
pleading, and vacated the Report and Recommendation. Doc. 10 (January 13, 2026
Order).
However, shortly after filing the motion to amend and before getting the Order
vacating the Report and Recommendation, Wharton filed a Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal (Doc. 11) indicating he wanted to file a new case (presumably because he
assumed his motion to amend would be denied and the Report and Recommendation
accepted). Despite filing the notice of voluntary dismissal, and presumably because
he had received the Court’s January 13, 2026 Order, Wharton filed a motion to
appoint counsel. 	Doc. 12. 	Because it appeared Wharton wanted to continue with
this action, the Court struck the notice of dismissal.1 Doc. 13.
Having resolved the issue with the failure to disclose and the notice of
voluntary dismissal, the undersigned proceeded to screen the amended complaint on
1 Prior to receiving the order striking the notice of dismissal, Wharton submitted a new complaint,
which was initially docketed, in error, as a service copy of the amended complaint in this action.
Realizing Wharton wanted to file a new action, the clerk opened a new case, which was assigned
case number 3:26cv739/MW/ZCB. That case, however, was closed after Wharton filed a notice
of dismissal of that action. Wharton’s dismissal of the second action confirms that Wharton wants
to proceed with this action.
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the merits. 	Having done so, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
recommends the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. 	Factual Background
In the amended complaint, Wharton sues three (3) defendants: (1) Sergeant J.
Martin at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (“SRCI”); (2) R. Quinn, Warden at
SRCI; and (3) Ricky Dixon, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections.
Doc. 7 at 2-3. 	The following factual allegations taken from Wharton’s amended
complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this Report and Recommendation.
Wharton arrived at SRCI from Apalachee Correctional Institution on October
27, 2025. Per protocol, inmate property should be searched and inventoried in the
presence of the inmate, “but wasn’t because property was not inventoried until Oct.
29, 2025 out of the control of [Wharton].” On October 29, 2025, “in violation of its
own FAC,” Sergeant Martin inventoried Wharton’s property out of Wharton’s
presence and “disposed of items on its own will,” resulting in a due process violation.
Martin did not follow FAC Chap. 33-602.204. Martin “denied [Wharton] to choose
what photos to dispose of.” 	There were 36 photos of sentimental value “of
[Wharton’s] ex-wife and daughter, that passed away together in 2015.”
Wharton contends the disposal of these photos denied him “intellectual
property rights,” that the photos cannot be replaced, and that had he been present
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when the property was being inventoried, he would have asked that they be sent
home.
Wharton submitted two grievances, one on October 30, 2025, and one on
November 6, 2025, complaining that the property was inventoried out of his
presence in violation of the FAC and his due process rights.
Wharton alleges Defendant Warden Quinn violated FAC Ch. 33-208.002,
which states that each warden will be responsible for ensuring that employees under
his supervision are familiar with the department’s regulations.
Wharton claims all defendants violated his constitutional due process rights.
As relief, Wharton asks for money damages of $36,000 ($1,000 per photograph lost).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Because Wharton is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking
relief from government employees, the Court must dismiss his complaint, or any
portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 	To state a
claim, Wharton must plead factual content that allows the Court to draw the
reasonable inference the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The Court must liberally construe pro se
allegations, 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory
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allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Due Process Claim2
Wharton alleges Defendant Martin violated his constitutional rights by
throwing out Wharton’s personal property, namely, the thirty-six family photos, and
appears to allege Defendants Quinn and Dixon are liable for Martin’s actions in a
supervisory capacity. 	The Fourteenth Amendment demands that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST . amend. XIV, § 1. 	However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of
property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 	Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
2 Wharton also alleges the Defendants violated his “intellectual property” rights. 	Intellectual
property is a “category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the
human intellect,” such as trademarks and patents. 	Intellectual Property, BLACK’ S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Wharton’s photographs are not intellectual property, but tangible
personal property, defined as “property that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, touched, or in
any other way perceived by the senses … .” 	Tangible Personal Property, BLACK’ S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Therefore, Wharton does not have an intellectual property claim.
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Florida offers such a remedy, as it has waived its sovereign immunity in tort
actions for the negligent or wrongful acts of employees causing injury or loss of
property. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1); see also Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App’x 697, 698
(11th Cir. 2014) (concluding Florida provided adequate postdeprivation remedy
because individuals can sue state officials for the conversion of their personal
property); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law
of Florida, law enforcement officers may be liable for conversion for the seizure or
retention of personal property.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore,
the availability of an adequate postdeprivation remedy under Florida law prevents
Wharton from pursuing a constitutional claim against Defendant Martin (or his
supervisors) for throwing out his personal property.
B. 	Violation of the Florida Administrative Code
Wharton also contends that Defendants violated various sections of the
Florida Administrative Code when Martin conducted an inventory search outside of
Wharton’s presence. Even if true, “[v]iolations of departmental rules or regulations
do 	not, 	standing 	alone, 	infringe 	on 	an 	inmate’s 	federal 	constitutional
rights.” 	Newton v. Wheeler, 2015 WL 6746511, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2015),
report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 6756134 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015);
see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (prison regulations are not
intended to confer rights or benefits on inmates but are merely designed to guide
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correctional officials in the administration of prisons); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d
1269, 	1279 	n.7 	(11th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(“procedural 	requirements 	set 	out 	in 	[an
administrative] regulation are not themselves constitutional mandates”); Caruth v.
Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1052 (7th Cir. 1982) (“By itself, however, the failure to
comply with the regulation does not amount to a violation of constitutional
magnitude.”).
Thus, Wharton cannot state a claim against Defendants under § 1983 for
violating any portion of the Florida Administrative Rules and those claims must be
dismissed.
C. 	Official Capacity Claims Against Defendants Quinn and Dixon
Even if Wharton could state a claim for relief, Defendants Quinn and Dixon
are immune from suits in their official capacities. 	A suit for monetary damages
against these Defendants in their official capacities is effectively a suit against their
employer, which, here, is the State of Florida. 	See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25
(1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity … should be treated as
suits against the State.”). However, Florida is immune from suits for damages under
§ 1983, and therefore Wharton cannot recover damages from the Defendants in their
official capacities. 	See Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“Under the Eleventh Amendment, state officials sued for damages in
their official capacity are immune from suit in federal court.”).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	This case be DISMISSED for Wharton’s failure to state a claim under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
2. 	The clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 9 th day of February, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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