ROMAGNANO v. DESANTIS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
CHASE ANDERSON ROMAGNANO,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 3:25cv2650/MCR/ZCB
RONALD DION DESANTIS,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this
case by filing a civil complaint. 	(Docs. 1, 4). 	Because Plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis (Doc. 4), the Court is statutorily required
to review the complaint to determine whether this action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Having reviewed the complaint, the Court believes
dismissal is warranted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and because it seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).1
I. 	Background
Plaintiff, a frequent litigator in this Court,2 initiated this lawsuit
by filing a civil rights complaint against Florida Governor Ron DeSantis.
(Doc. 1). 	Plaintiff alleges that Florida law requires a candidate for the
County Clerk and Comptroller for Escambia County to have a minimum
number of valid signatures. 	(Id. at 4). 	He alleges Pam Childers did not
have 	the 	required 	number 	of 	minimum 	signatures 	to 	qualify 	as 	a
candidate in the 2020 County Clerk election in Escambia County. 	(Id.).
Plaintiff argues that Pam Childers should have been disqualified, and
that he—as the “sole qualified candidate for Circuit Clerk”—should have
been the County Clerk of Escambia County from 2021-2025. 	(Id.). 	He
complains that the state courts did not “permit [him] to litigate” this
1 Given the deficiencies in the complaint, the Court further believes that
providing an opportunity to amend would be futile.
2 	See 	Romagnano 	v. 	Childers, 	Case 	No. 	3:19cv3557/MCR/EMT;
Romagnano v. ECAT, Case No. 3:29cv3558/RV/HTC; Romagnano v. CSL
Plasma, Case No. 3:19cv3559/RV/EMT; Romagnano v. Pensacola News
Journal, Case No. 3:22cv21803/TKW/ZCB; Romagnano v. Byrd, Case No.
3:23cv8294/TKW/HTC; 	Romagnano 	v. 	Childers, 	Case 	No.
3:23cv24643/MCR/HTC.
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issue. 	(Id. at 12). 	This is Plaintiff’s second time attempting to litigate
these 	issues in this Court. 	See 	Romagnano v. Childers, Case 	No.
3:23cv24643/MCR/HTC (case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
Plaintiff claims Defendant violated the following: (1) the “guarantee
clause” under Article IV § 4 of the Constitution, which “guarantees” that
a state has a republican government; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to enforce Florida law; and (3) various federal statutes, including
42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 595, and 52 U.S.C. § 10307. For
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensation for the salary and retirement benefits
he believes was entitled to as the rightful County Clerk from 2021-2025.
(Id. at 5).
II. 	Statutory Screening Standard
To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The plausibility standard is
met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id.
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Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility 	and 	plausibility 	of 	entitlement 	to 	relief.” 	Id. 	(internal
quotation marks omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” 	Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And “bare assertions” that “amount to nothing more than a formulaic
recitation of the elements” of a claim “are conclusory and not entitled to
be assumed true.” Id. at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted). “While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Thus, “assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement” fail to satisfy the pleading standard under
Rule 8. 	Id. at 678.
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III. 	Discussion
A. 	The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff admits he already litigated the issues in this case in state
court.3 	Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff is mounting a federal court
challenge to a state court judgment. 	This is problematic because of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which places “limits on the subject matter
jurisdiction” of federal courts. 	Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259
F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). 	Under that doctrine, “federal district
courts have no authority to review final judgments of a state court.”
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir. 2013).
The 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine applies where “state court losers” are
“complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” 	Id. “The doctrine extends not
3 	Plaintiff 	states 	in 	his 	complaint, 	“I 	want 	the 	court 	to 	order 	my
compensation for my term as Circuit Clerk of Escambia County from
2021-2025 as was sought in 2025 CA 1076 in The Second Circuit of
Florida, County of Leon[.]” (Doc. 1 at 5); see also (id. at 15-17). Plaintiff
also admits he attempted to challenge Pam Childers’s election in the
First Circuit of Florida. 	(Id. at 12-13); see also Romagnano v. Childers,
392 So. 3d 112 (1st DCA 2024). 	Both cases were dismissed and ended
before Plaintiff filed his complaint in this case.
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only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court,
but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment.” 	Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1332 (cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff was the loser in prior state court proceedings.
Plaintiff is complaining about injuries he has allegedly suffered because
of those state court proceedings. He asks this Court to review and reject
the state court judgments. 	And the arguments he makes in this Court
are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgments. This case,
therefore, is covered by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 	As a result, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to provide Plaintiff the relief he
seeks. 4 	See, e.g., Bedasee v. Fremont Inv. & Loan Co., 741 F. App’x 642
(11th Cir. 2018) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where “Plaintiffs
lost in state court and they now seek a do-over in federal court with the
goal of having the district court review and reject the state [] judgment”).
4 While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if a party did not
have 	a 	“reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	raise 	his 	federal 	claim 	in 	state
proceedings,” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009),
there is no indication Plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to
bring his federal claims in state court.
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B. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Even if this Court could entertain Plaintiff’s claims, they would be
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff purports to bring
a claim under (1) Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution, (2) the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (3) various federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 595, and 52 U.S.C. § 10307. None of those claims
have merit.
Article IV, § 4 guarantees that all states will have a right to a
republican form of government. 	Art. IV, § 4 (cl. 1); Herbert ex rel. E. v.
United States, No. 3:07cv776, 2007 WL 2827682, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
27, 2007). 	But § 4 of Article IV of the Constitution does not provide a
right of action to an individual plaintiff. 	Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d
549, 552 (7th Cir. 1991); Herbert ex rel. E., 2007 WL 2827682, at *2.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under Article IV, § 4
of the Constitution.
Plaintiff 	also 	alleges 	Defendant 	violated 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment 	by 	failing 	to 	enforce 	state 	law 	regarding 	the 	required
number of minimum signatures for a County Clerk candidate. 	Plaintiff
fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. 	Not only has Plaintiff
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failed to cite the Florida law he claims was not followed, but he has failed
to show that he had a constitutional right to have the state law regarding
signatures enforced. Plaintiff has not shown that he had any property or
liberty interest in the law being enforced. 	See Harder v. Hunter, 572 F.
App’x 904, 907-908 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding plaintiff to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 when he did not have a
“constitutionally protected property or liberty interest at stake”). 	Nor
has Plaintiff alleged any facts that would support a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. 	Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311,
1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006) (“To establish an equal protection claim, a
[plaintiff] must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other
[individuals] who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state
engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion,
national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.”). 	Thus,
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment
claim.
Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 also fails. 	A claim for
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under § 1985(3) requires factual
allegations showing: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose
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of depriving a person of equal protection under the law; (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) a resultant injury or deprivation of
a constitutional right. 	Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03
(1971). 	The second element of a § 1985(3) claim requires proof that a
conspirator’s 	action 	was 	motivated 	by 	a 	“class-based, 	invidiously
discriminatory animus.” 	Id. at 102. 	Plaintiff has failed to show the
violation 	of 	any 	constitutional 	right 	or 	that 	any 	such 	action 	was
motivated by a “class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” 	Id.
As for Plaintiff’s claim under 52 U.S.C. § 10307, Plaintiff fails to
allege any facts supporting such a claim. 	Section 10307 lists several
prohibited acts when voting. 	Plaintiff’s claims are not about voting, but
rather who was appropriately on the ballot. Moreover, Plaintiff does not
identify what subsection of § 10307 he sues under, and not all subsections
provide a private right of action.
The remaining statutes Plaintiff cites are criminal statutes that do
not provide a private right of action. 	See Stoll v. Martin, No. 3:06cv180
LAC/EMT, 2006 WL 2024387, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2006) (“Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
the criminal statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, because a private citizen
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cannot initiate a federal criminal prosecution and because these statutes
do not provide a private right of action for damages.”); see also Laster v.
Raffensperger, No. 1:24cv5434, 2024 WL 5277390, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9,
2024) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 595).
C. 	The 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	bars 	Plaintiff’s 	suit 	for
monetary damages against Defendant.
In his complaint, Plaintiff says that he is suing Defendant DeSantis
in his official capacity for money damages. (Doc. 1 at 2, 5). The doctrine
of 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	sovereign 	immunity 	bars 	damages 	actions
against state officers sued in their official capacity, unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has properly abrogated it.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). The State of Florida has
not waived its sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims, nor has Congress
abrogated it. 	Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (1986). 	Plaintiff,
therefore, cannot maintain an official capacity damages action under §
1983 against Defendant.5
5 While Plaintiff claims in other parts of his complaint that he is suing
Defendant DeSantis under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, the doctrine
does not apply in Plaintiff’s case. 	(Doc. 1 at 5). 	The “Ex parte Young
doctrine permits federal courts to entertain suits against state officers
seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations of federal
law.” 	Cichowski v. Totten, No. 24-10195, 2024 WL 2182487, at *3 (11th
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D. 	Allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to amend would be
futile.
Given the issues with Plaintiff’s complaint noted above, allowing
Plaintiff another opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile. See
Cavero v. One West Bank FSB, 617 F. App’x 928, 930-31 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
plaintiffs leave to amend when amendment would have been futile
because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) be 	DISMISSED 	for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and
for 	seeking 	monetary 	relief 	against 	a 	defendant 	who 	is
immune under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Cir. May 15, 2024) (cleaned up). 	This exception, however, “applies only
to prospective relief against state officers.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s complaint,
however, 	does 	not 	seek 	any 	prospective 	relief. 	Rather, 	Plaintiff’s
complaint 	seeks 	monetary 	damages 	for 	lost 	salary 	and 	retirement
benefits from the County Clerk position from 2021-2025. 	The Ex Parte
Young doctrine, therefore, does not apply.
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2. 	The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 23rd day of February 2026.
/s/
Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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