CLINE v. BANKS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
BUCCIE CLINE III,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 3:25cv2684/TKW/ZCB
DEPUTY BANKS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this
case by filing a civil rights complaint. 	The Court informed Plaintiff of
deficiencies in his previous two complaints and ordered him to file a
second amended complaint. (Docs. 4, 6). Plaintiff has now filed a second
amended complaint. (Doc. 8).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is
required to review the second amended complaint to determine whether
this action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Having reviewed the second
amended complaint, the Court believes dismissal of Plaintiff’s excessive
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force claim (Claim 2) is warranted for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1
I. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations2
Plaintiff names two Defendants in the second amended complaint:
(1) Deputy Banks, and (2) Deputy Swoboda. (Doc. 8 at 3). Both are from
the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff alleges that on
August 12, 2023, he was “stopped or parked” in a parking lot at Pensacola
Beach. (Id. at 9). Defendant Banks informed Plaintiff that the registered
owner of the vehicle’s license had been suspended. (Id.).
Plaintiff “questioned the basis for the encounter and requested a
supervisor.” 	(Id.). 	Defendant Banks then ordered Plaintiff to get out of
the vehicle. (Id.). Plaintiff responded by “question[ing] the legality of the
order.” (Id.). Defendant Banks then forcibly removed Plaintiff from the
vehicle. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Banks forced
1 The Court previously advised Plaintiff of deficiencies with his excessive
force claim and provided him with an opportunity to amend. 	(Doc. 6 at
6-7). 	Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint, but the excessive
force claim remains deficient. Thus, dismissal of that claim is warranted.
See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “[o]rdinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to
amend before the district court dismisses the complaint”).
2 Because this case is at the pleading stage, the Court assumes the truth
of Plaintiff’s allegations. DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024).
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Plaintiff’s arm behind him and twisted his arm in an excessive manner,
which resulted in pain. (Id.).
Plaintiff was then placed under arrest for driving on a suspended
license and resisting arrest without violence. 	(Id.). 	Next, Defendant
Swoboda 	arrived. 	The 	two 	officers 	allegedly 	proceeded 	to 	search
Plaintiff’s vehicle without his consent or a warrant. (Id. at 10). According
to Plaintiff, the search yielded no contraband. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
the charges against him were later dismissed. (Id.). And he claims that
he sought medical treatment through the VA for shoulder pain resulting
from the arrest. (Id. at 11).
In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff claims he suffered the
following Fourth Amendment violations: (1) “Unlawful Seizure/Arrest”
against 	Defendant 	Banks; 	(2) 	“Excessive 	Force” 	against 	Defendant
Banks; and (3) “Unlawful Vehicle Search” against Defendants Banks and
Swoboda. 	(Id. at 12-13). 	As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
(Id. at 14).
II. 	Statutory Screening Standard
To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The plausibility standard is
met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id.
Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
III. 	Discussion
In Claim 2 of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Banks violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive
force when he pulled Plaintiff out of the car and bent his arm behind him.
(Doc. 8 at 12-13). “Officers are permitted to use some force to effectuate
an arrest.” 	Bolton v. Sheriff of Coweta Cnty., __ F.4th __, 2026 WL
1429373, at *4 (11th Cir. May 21, 2026). 	“The use of de minimis force
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” 	Id. 	“For even minor offenses,
permissible 	force 	includes 	physical 	restraint, 	use 	of 	handcuffs, 	and
pushing into walls.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
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Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant Banks
used de minimis force to effectuate Plaintiff’s arrest when he pulled
Plaintiff from his vehicle and twisted his arm behind his back. 	Indeed,
courts have repeatedly rejected similar excessive force claims. 	See, e.g.,
Bolton, __ F.4th at __ , 2026 WL 1429373, at *4 (holding deputy used de
minimis force when he “removed [plaintiff] from his vehicle, laid him on
the ground, put his knee on his back, and handcuffed his hands behind
his back”); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 740 (11th Cir. 2010)
(finding de minimis force was used when an officer grabbed a suspect’s
arm, twisted it around his back, jerked it up high to the shoulder, and
then handcuffed him); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding the amount of force used by the arresting officer when he
grabbed plaintiff from behind, threw him against a van, kneed him in the
back, 	searched 	his 	groin 	area 	in 	an 	uncomfortable 	manner, 	and
handcuffed him was de minimis and “the application of de minimis force,
without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.”); Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1327-28
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding excessive force was not used by officer who
grabbed the plaintiff by the arm, forced him to the ground, and then
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placed him in handcuffs). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant
Banks.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Banks
(Claim 2) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2. 	This 	matter 	be 	returned 	to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	further
proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s remaining claims (Claims 1
and 3).
At Pensacola, Florida, this 23rd day of June 2026.
/s/
Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
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waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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