MCDONALD v. DOE et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
ALFRED MCDONALD,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:26cv117-MW-HTC
CAPTAIN SPEARS, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Alfred McDonald, 	a prisoner proceeding 	pro se 	and 	in forma
pauperis, has filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the
Defendants violated his constitutional rights by threatening him and monitoring his
bowel movement, and by failing to process his grievances regarding the incident.
Doc. 8. 	The Court screened McDonald’s original complaint, advised him that his
allegations failed to state a constitutional claim under the applicable legal standards,
and gave him an opportunity to amend his complaint. 	Doc. 5. 	Nevertheless, the
undersigned concludes the amended complaint continues to fail to state a claim
under federal law. 	Thus, McDonald’s federal law claims should be DISMISSED
with prejudice, and the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his state law claims.
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I. 	Background
McDonald sues three employees of Blackwater River Correctional Facility
(“BRCF”): (1) Officer John Doe; (2) Captain Spears; and (3) Grievance Coordinator
Bethea. 	His amended complaint contains the following factual allegations, which
are accepted as true for purposes of this Report and Recommendation.
On the morning of January 28, 2025, correctional officers at BRCF conducted
a “mass shakedown.” Captain Spears went to McDonald’s cell in Wing 6 of A Dorm
to escort him to a legal phone call. 	When Spears arrived at the cell, he stated he
smelled marijuana and was going to have the cell searched. 	When McDonald re-
entered Wing 6 after his phone call, the Rapid Response Team officers “were in a
full fledged search” of the wing. 	Officer John Doe called out McDonald’s cell
number, and McDonald and his cellmate reported to Doe. Doe ordered McDonald
to enter the cell “solo”; meanwhile, Officer Bechtel stood guard near the cell door
watching McDonald’s cellmate.
After McDonald entered the cell, “out of nowhere” Doe began “verbally
assaulting” McDonald, calling him “disrespectful names” that included profanity
and racial slurs and accusing him of concealing drugs in his rectum. 	Doe ordered
McDonald to “strip down” and McDonald complied. Doe then told McDonald that
he had two choices: (1) he could defecate in the cell’s toilet while Doe watched; or
(2) Doe, along with other officers, would attack him, choke him out, stick a finger
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in his rectum, and then write him a disciplinary report for assaulting an officer.
Concerned for his well-being, McDonald defecated in the toilet in front of Doe.
When McDonald finished, Doe ordered him to go stand by Officer Bechtel.
When McDonald complained about Doe’s actions, Bechtel informed him “that’s the
new way” officers search inmates “because inmates like to hide drugs in their
behind.” 	After Doe and the other officers finished searching McDonald’s cell, he
re-entered it and discovered his legal and personal documents had been “ripped
apart,” and some of his personal property had been destroyed and confiscated.
On January 30, the lockdown at BRCF ended. McDonald called his brother
and told him about the incident on January 28; his brother then called BRCF and
reported the incident. On January 31, Captain Spears summoned McDonald to the
administration building to discuss the incident. 	McDonald asked to review video
footage and duty logs so he could identify Officer Doe, but Spears refused.
McDonald filled out a witness statement regarding the January 28 incident.
However, reliving the experience caused McDonald to have a nervous breakdown,
which led him to declare a psychological emergency. Spears instructed Lieutenant
Taylor to take McDonald to the mental health department. When they arrived, Dr.
Godfrey spoke with McDonald and helped him get his “emotions in check” and
dissuade him from engaging in self-harm.
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On February 3, McDonald filed an informal grievance regarding the January
28 incident. When he did not receive a response to the informal grievance, he filed
a formal grievance to Warden Dudley on February 17. However, McDonald did not
receive a log number that confirmed the formal grievance was received. 	On
February 21, McDonald filed a grievance against the grievance coordinator, Bethea,
for not processing his grievances. 	McDonald also filed a grievance appeal to the
Secretary’s office on March 2, but he did not receive a log number for that grievance
either.
Based on the foregoing, McDonald alleges: (1) Officer Doe and Captain
Spears violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2)
Bethea violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 As relief, McDonald seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
II. 	Legal Standard
Because McDonald is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking
relief from government employees, the Court must dismiss his complaint, or any
portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
1 McDonald also raises state law claims for negligence, breach of duty, theft, assault, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and respondeat superior. 	Doc. 8 at 10. 	However, as discussed
herein, because the federal claims are subject to dismissal, the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
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immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 	To state a
claim, McDonald must plead factual content which allows the Court to draw the
reasonable inference each Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 	Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The Court must liberally construe pro se
allegations, 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory
allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	McDonald has failed to state a constitutional claim against Officer
Doe.
McDonald alleges that during the “shakedown” on January 28, 2025, Officer
Doe: (1) called him disrespectful names; (2) threatened him; (2) ordered him to
remove his clothes; (3) watched him defecate in a toilet; and (4) destroyed or
confiscated his property. However, as the Court advised McDonald in its January
22 Order, none of these allegations are sufficient to state a constitutional claim.
First, verbal abuse, even if it involves profanity or racial slurs, is not severe
enough to violate the Constitution. 	See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F.
App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a
constitutional claim”); Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App’x 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[A]llegations of verbal abuse, no matter how deplorable, do not present actionable
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claims under § 1983”); Sims v. Hickok, 185 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting
allegation that correctional officers subjected inmate to “racial and sexual slurs”
failed to state a claim); see also In re Eric Watkins Litig., 829 F. App’x 428, 431
(11th Cir. 2020) (“[D]irecting demeaning homosexual comments and gestures at
[inmate], 	though 	unacceptable 	and 	unrelated 	to 	any 	legitimate 	governmental
objective, is the type of verbal harassment or taunting that is not actionable under
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments”).
Second, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated threats that are not carried out do
not violate the Constitution. See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862,
866 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]llegations of … threats by the prison officers did not state
a claim because the defendants never carried out these threats”). Furthermore, even
if threats to harm or sexually assault a prisoner can violate the Constitution in some
circumstances, Officer Doe would not have been on notice that his conduct—making
a single set of threats on one day without physical contact—was unconstitutional.
See Watkins v. Azael, 2023 WL 4422527, at *7 (11th Cir. July 10, 2023) (finding
correctional officer was entitled to qualified immunity on claim he verbally
threatened to rape inmate and noting “[n]either the Supreme Court nor [the Eleventh
Circuit] in a published opinion has determined whether a correctional officer’s
verbal threats to physically harm an inmate alone violate the Eighth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment”); DeJesus v. Lewis, 14 F.4th 1182, 1197 n.14 (11th Cir.
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2021) (leaving open question of “whether non-physical contact can constitute
‘sexual assault’ for purposes of establishing an excessive-force claim under the
Eighth Amendment”). Thus, Doe is entitled to qualified immunity on a claim based
on verbal threats.2 See Barcelona v. Burkes, 2022 WL 15137410, at *2 (11th Cir.
2022) (explaining pre-service dismissal based on qualified immunity is appropriate
where qualified immunity is apparent on the face of a complaint).
Third, the visual strip search and the monitored bowel movement did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. “[W]hile persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
524, 527-28 (1984) (“A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.”). 	To
determine whether a search of a prisoner is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
a court “must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it
is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
2 Because Officer Doe was participating in a “shakedown” when the threats were allegedly made,
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority as a correctional officer.
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McDonald’s allegations indicate the visual strip search and the monitored
bowel 	movement: 	(1) 	occurred 	during 	an 	institution-wide 	“shakedown”; 	(2)
occurred 	after 	Captain 	Spears 	indicated 	he 	smelled 	marijuana 	and 	wanted
McDonald’s cell searched; (2) were conducted by Doe because he believed
McDonald was concealing contraband in his rectum; (3) took place in the relative
privacy of McDonald’s cell while he was alone; (4) were conducted by a member of
the same sex as McDonald; and (5) did not involve any physical contact between
Doe and McDonald. 	Officer Bechtel also indicated Doe carried out the search
pursuant to the new protocol prison officials were using to detect contraband. These
factual allegations do not plausibly suggest the visual strip search or the monitored
bowel movement, or the manner in which they were conducted, were unreasonable.
See Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1313 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (visual strip searches
that consist of a male guard viewing the front and back sides of a male inmate’s
naked body are not unconstitutional); Pickett v. Williams, 2023 WL 3044589, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2023) (“While unpleasant, the lack of privacy to use the toilet is a
normal aspect of prison life with which a convicted person must abide.”); Bracey v.
Price, 2012 WL 6015727, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2012) (“Occasional viewing of
inmates while showering or using toilet facilities has been held to be appropriately
within 	the 	parameters 	of 	maintaining 	institutional 	security 	and 	therefore,
constitutional.”).
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Lastly, McDonald cannot state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer
Doe based on the destruction or loss of his property. “[A]n unauthorized intentional
deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at
533. Florida offers such a remedy, as it has waived its sovereign immunity in tort
actions for the negligent or wrongful acts of employees causing injury or loss of
property. 	Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1); see also Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App’x 697, 698
(11th Cir. 2014) (concluding Florida provided adequate postdeprivation remedy
because individuals can sue state officials for the conversion of their personal
property); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law
of Florida, law enforcement officers may be liable for conversion for the seizure or
retention of personal property.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The
availability of an adequate postdeprivation remedy under Florida law prevents
McDonald from pursuing a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Doe for
destroying or confiscating his property.
B. 	McDonald 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	constitutional 	claim 	against
Defendant Bethea.
McDonald alleges Defendant Bethea violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to properly process his grievances. However, McDonald’s complaints about
the grievance process at BRCF fail to state a claim because prisoners have no
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constitutional right to a grievance procedure. 	See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s various circuits have held when ruling on an
inmate’s claim that he was denied use of a prison’s grievance procedure, an inmate
has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in access to that procedure.”);
accord Flowers v. Tate, 925 F.2d 1463 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding a prisoner “does not
have a constitutional right to an effective grievance procedure”). 	Thus, even if
Bethea did not provide McDonald with log numbers or timely responses to his
grievances, that does not establish a constitutional violation.3 See Mathews v. Moss,
506 F. App’x 981, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of complaint that alleged
prisoner’s grievances were ignored or wrongly decided, and that prison officials did
not properly follow the prison’s own grievance procedures).
C. 	McDonald has failed to state a constitutional claim against Captain
Spears.
McDonald claims Captain Spears violated his constitutional rights by failing
“to properly train and supervise” his employees, “in violation of policy and
procedure.” Doc. 8 at 9. However, this allegation fails to state a claim for multiple
reasons. 	First, 	as 	explained 	above, 	McDonald 	has 	failed 	to 	establish 	his
3 McDonald may also be claiming the inadequacy of the grievance process at BRCF violated his
right to access the courts since exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court. Doc. 8 at
8. However, prisoners are only required to exhaust the administrative remedies that are “available”
to them. 	See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (“An inmate … must exhaust available
remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”). 	Thus, a flawed grievance process does not
prevent a prisoner from accessing the courts.
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constitutional rights were violated, and “[t]here can be no policy-based liability or
supervisory liability when there is no underlying constitutional violation.” 	Knight
through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
Second, McDonald has not alleged facts showing Spears knew about prior
constitutional violations and failed to take corrective action. 	See Keith v. DeKalb
Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff alleging a
constitutional violation premised on a failure to train must demonstrate that the
supervisor had ‘actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their
training program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights,’ and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain that
training program.”) (citation omitted). As the Court previously told McDonald, an
unsupported assertion that a Defendant failed to train or supervise his employees is
not enough to state a claim under § 1983.
Third, to the extent McDonald claims Spears failed to follow certain policies
or procedures, he has not identified those policies or procedures and, as he was
previously told, “[v]iolations of departmental rules or regulations do not, standing
alone, infringe on an inmate’s federal constitutional rights.” 	Newton v. Wheeler,
2015 WL 6746511, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted, 2015 WL 6756134 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015); see also Sandin v. Conner,
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515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (prison regulations are not intended to confer rights or
benefits on inmates but are merely designed to guide correctional officials in the
administration of prisons); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1052 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“By itself, however, the failure to comply with the regulation does not amount to a
violation of constitutional magnitude.”).
Lastly, McDonald suggests Spears made the investigation into the January 28
incident “disappear.” Doc. 8 at 7. However, prisoners do not have a constitutional
right to an investigation of any kind by government officials. See Vinyard v. Wilson,
311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Vinyard has no substantive right of any kind
to an investigation of her excessive force complaint by the Sheriff’s Office, much
less one created by the Constitution.”); Jacoby v. PREA Coordinator, 2017 WL
2962858, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017
WL 2957825 (N.D. Ala. July 11, 2017) (noting “[t]he failure to investigate the
plaintiff’s claims in a manner satisfactory to the plaintiff is not a constitutional
violation” and “[w]hether an inadequate investigation, or the failure to investigate at
all, no § 1983 liability is created”). 	Thus, McDonald has failed to state a
constitutional claim against Captain Spears.4
4 To the extent McDonald claims Spears violated his rights by not helping him identify Officer
Doe’s name, that claim is meritless because nothing indicates Spears’s actions made McDonald’s
access to the courts ineffective. 	See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“Although access to the concealed evidence might have strengthened their case, the Chappell
children do not allege that they were or would have been prevented from filing a wrongful death
suit within the statute of limitations period, nor that the Defendants’ actions would have made such
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D. 	The Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
McDonald has also raised several claims under Florida law. 	Because the
undersigned concludes McDonald’s federal claims should be dismissed, the Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims at this early stage of the case. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (encouraging “district courts to dismiss any remaining state
claims when … the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial”) (citation
omitted).
IV. 	Conclusion
The Court previously advised McDonald of the legal standards applicable to
his constitutional claims and gave him an opportunity to file an amended complaint
that states a viable claim. McDonald’s amended complaint, however, is substantially
similar to the original complaint and continues to fail to state a claim under federal
law. 	Because McDonald has failed to cure the deficiencies identified in his prior
complaint through amendment, the Court should decline to allow further amendment
and should dismiss his federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
1915A(b)(1). See Brennan v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 626 F. App’x 939, 945-
a suit inadequate, ineffective, or not meaningful.”); Root v. Towers, 2000 WL 1888734, at *1 (6th
Cir. 2000) (“No actual injury occurs without a showing that such a claim has been lost or rejected,
or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented.”) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 354-56 (1996)).
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46 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A pro se litigant must be given at least one opportunity to
amend his complaint before the court dismisses the action with prejudice if it appears
that a more carefully drafted pleading would state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.”).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	McDonald’s federal claims be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) due to his failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
2. 	The 	Court 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over
McDonald’s state law claims and those claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. 	The clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 6 th day of April, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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