BELL v. DIXON

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JAMES L. BELL,
Petitioner,
vs. 	Case No.: 4:25cv234/MW/ZCB
RICKY DIXON,
Respondent.
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, James L. Bell, has filed a habeas corpus petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition
as untimely. (Doc. 12). Petitioner opposes dismissal. (Doc. 14). For the
reasons below, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted.1
I. 	Background
On November 6, 1997, a jury in the Taylor County Circuit Court
convicted Petitioner of armed robbery with a firearm. 	(Doc. 12-2 at 10).
The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment as a Violent
Career Criminal (VCC). 	(Id. at 12-16). 	Petitioner appealed, and the
Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed on August 9,
1 This matter can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 1 of 8

2
1999. (Id. at 18). Petitioner challenged the legality of the VCC sentence
enhancement and was subsequently resentenced to life imprisonment,
this time with a different sentence enhancement (a Habitual Felony
Offender enhancement instead of a VCC enhancement). 	(Id. at 31-35).
He again appealed the judgment to the First DCA, which affirmed on
May 24, 2005. (Id. at 39).
On June 22, 2005, Petitioner filed three overlapping motions for
postconviction relief in the trial court under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a) and Rule 3.850. (Id. at 41-48, 58-72, 92-95). The trial
court denied all of those motions. 	(Id. at 50, 81-86, 97-100). 	Petitioner
appealed, and the First DCA affirmed. (Id. at 56, 88, 90, 102, 104). The
latest mandate in those postconviction appeals was issued on December
28, 2010. (Id. at 90).
On February 29, 2012, Petitioner filed another Rule 3.800(a) motion
in the trial court. 	(Id. at 106-10). 	The trial court denied the motion on
March 13, 2012. (Id. at 113-14). Petitioner did not appeal.
Thereafter, 	Petitioner 	filed 	several 	more 	applications 	for
postconviction relief in the state courts. 	(Id. at 126-35, 147-55, 171-81,
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 2 of 8

3
200-09, 249-52, 303-09). None of those applications were successful. (Id.
at 143, 161-62, 167, 187-88, 196, 240-42, 244-45, 256-58, 314-18, 323-24).
Petitioner filed the current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus action
on May 9, 2025. 	(Doc. 1 at 1, 16). 	In the petition, he asserts a double
jeopardy challenge to his resentencing. (Id. at 6). Respondent has moved
to dismiss, arguing the petition was filed after expiration of the one-year
limitations period found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 12 at 6-7).
II. 	Discussion
A one-year limitations period applies to the filing of a § 2254 habeas
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year period runs from the latest
of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) 	the 	date 	on which the 	impediment 	to 	filing an
application 	created 	by 	State 	action 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly 	recognized 	by the 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 3 of 8

4
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute also includes a tolling provision that
provides as follows: 	“The time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any
period of limitation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Respondent 	argues, 	and 	Petitioner 	does 	not 	dispute, 	that 	the
trigger for the one-year period in this case is the date the judgment
became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A). (Doc. 12 at 6). Petitioner’s judgment
became final when the ninety-day window to seek review in the Supreme
Court of the United States closed. 	Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006). 	That ninety-day period began on
May 24, 2005—the date the First DCA affirmed Petitioner's resentencing
judgment. (Doc. 12-2 at 39). Petitioner’s conviction became final ninety
days later, on August 22, 2005. 	See Chavers, 468 F.3d at 1275 (finding
that the one-year period began to run ninety days from the date the state
appellate court issued its judgment and not from the date the mandate
issued).
The clock for the federal limitations period generally would start
running the next day, August 23, 2005. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (stating
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 4 of 8

5
that when computing a time period for the occurrence of an event
specified by the law, the Court should “exclude the day of the event that
triggers the period”). 	But the clock paused one day prior to that date
because Petitioner properly filed a Rule 3.850 motion in the trial court.
(Doc. 12-2 at 58-72); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (tolling the time during the
pendency of a properly filed state court motion for postconviction relief or
other collateral review). 	The federal clock began running again on
December 29, 2010, the day after the date of the First DCA’s mandate
affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 12-2 at
90); see generally Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that when a Florida petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of
post-conviction motion, the motion remains pending until issuance of the
mandate by the appellate court).
The federal clock then ran for one year until it expired on December
29, 2011. Petitioner did not file his § 2254 petition on or before December
29, 2011. 	He also did not file any postconviction applications in state
court within that time and, therefore, he is not entitled to statutory
tolling under § 2244(d)(2). 	See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2000) (“A state-court petition ... that is filed following the
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 5 of 8

6
expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there
is no period remaining to be tolled.”). Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition
on May 9, 2025—over thirteen years after it should have been filed. (Doc
1 at 1, 16). Thus, his petition was untimely.
Petitioner has not argued that any recognized exception excuses his
failure to timely file his § 2254 petition. 	Nor are there any exceptions
readily apparent from the record. 	Because Petitioner filed his § 2254
petition after the one-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) had expired,
his petition was untimely. 	It is, therefore, subject to dismissal with
prejudice. 	See generally Jeffus v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 759 F. App’x
773, 775 (11th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that the dismissal of a § 2254
petition as untimely “constitutes a dismissal with prejudice on the
merits”).
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 was untimely filed and should be dismissed.
IV. 	Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 6 of 8

7
deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to
the applicant,” and if a certificate is issued “the court must state the
specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must
still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. 	28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
“Section 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a
petitioner 	has 	made 	a 	‘substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional right.’” 	Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 	(2003)
(quoting § 2253(c)(2)). 	“At the COA stage, the only question is whether
the applicant has shown that ‘jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court’s resolution of his [or her] constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” 	Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115
(2017) (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327). 	Petitioner cannot make that
showing in this case. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying a
certificate of appealability.
The second sentence of 	Rule 11(a) provides: 	“Before entering the
final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 7 of 8

8
whether a certificate should issue.” Thus, if either party wishes to submit
arguments on the issue of a certificate of appealability that party may do
so in an objection to this Report and Recommendation.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be GRANTED.
2. 	The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be
DISMISSED with prejudice as untimely.
3. 	A certificate of appealability be DENIED.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 8th day of December 2025.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control.
An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all other parties.
A 	party 	who 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the
right 	to 	challenge 	on 	appeal 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
Case 4:25-cv-00234-MW-ZCB Document 15 Filed 12/08/25 Page 8 of 8