CAMPBELL v. RODGERS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
REMOI CAMPBELL,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 4:25cv484-AW-HTC
M. CASEY RODGERS,
Respondent.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Remoi 	Campell, 	a 	prisoner 	at 	Florida 	State 	Prison, 	filed 	a 	rambling,
nonsensical pleading on the form for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	Doc. 1. 	It is difficult to tell whether Campbell
seeks to file a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a habeas petition.
Either way, this action should be dismissed. 	To the extent it is a § 1983 action,
Campbell seeks to sue District Judge Rodgers who is immune from liability. To the
extent it is a habeas petition, it is a successive petition.
Whether a habeas petition or a § 1983 action, this Court has an obligation to
promptly review the filing and dismiss it if it fails to state a claim, is frivolous, or
seeks to state a claim against a defendant who is immune from liability. See Habeas
Rule 4 (“[t]he clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court’s
assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief
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Case No. 4:25cv484-AW-HTC
in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify
the petitioner.”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b), 1915A (directing courts to dismiss
complaints at screening for failure to state a claim, if frivolous, or if against a
defendant who is immune). The Court has examined the purported petition, and, for
the following reasons, concludes it plainly shows no entitlement for relief and should
be dismissed.
Petitioner Remoi Campbell is a prisoner at Florida State Prison serving a
fifteen-year sentence on his conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
in 2016 CF 19024 in Lee County, Florida, circuit court. 	Doc. 1 at 1; Florida
Department of Corrections Inmate Population Information Detail, available at
https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/offenderSearch/detail.aspx?Page=Detail&DCN
umber=Y62445&TypeSearch=AI. Since 2023, Campbell has filed thirteen habeas
petitions and sixteen civil actions, all of which were dismissed prior to service. In
fact, he is a three-striker under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), forbidden from filing actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without prepaying the filing fee or showing imminent
physical danger. See Campbell v. Gaudin, 1:24-cv-00167-AW-HTC (N.D. Fla. Nov.
4, 2024).
Also, almost all the orders dismissing his habeas petitions describe them as
rambling, stream-of-consciousness observations about Campbell’s life that do not
allege any grounds for federal habeas relief. 	See, e.g., Campbell v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections, 8:24-cv-02375 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2024) (“Campbell’s
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paper 	contains 	rambling, 	stream-of-consciousness 	observations 	but 	does 	not
challenge the validity of his state court judgment for any reason, much less for a
violation of federal law.”); Campbell v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2:23-
cv-00874 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2023) (“[E]ven when construed liberally, the Petition
does not allege any grounds for federal habeas relief. It mostly consists of stream-
of-consciousness musings about Campbell’s life.”). In fact, in the most recent denial
of habeas relief, the Middle District judge described Campbell’s filing history as
follows:
He 	regularly 	files 	frivolous 	papers 	containing 	immaterial 	and
nonsensical 	statements. 	His 	latest 	habeas 	petition—inexplicably
directed against a United States magistrate judge—is no exception.
Even under the most liberal reading, nothing in Campbell’s petition
could be read as an arguable ground for habeas relief. 	Because
Campbell is clearly not entitled to habeas relief based on any claim in
the petition, the Court will dismiss it.
Campbell v. Fitzpatrick, 2:25-cv-00825-SPC-NPM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19,
2025).
Campbell’s filing in the instant case follows the same pattern and is a
rambling, stream-of-conscious commentary that inexplicably names a District Judge
as Respondent. 	As with all his filings, it is difficult to discern exactly what he is
claiming but it is clear he is not entitled to relief under any conceivable theory.
First, to the extent Campell is seeking habeas relief, the petition is an
unauthorized successive petition. 	In the relief requested portion of the petition,
Campbell states, “I am seeking my immediate release from prison” and at the
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beginning of the petition lists his conviction in 2016 CF 19024 in Lee County,
Florida as the basis for the custody he is challenging. 	Campbell, however, has
already filed a habeas petition challenging that conviction, which was denied on the
merits. 	See Campbell v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2:23-cv-00874
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2023).1 Before filing a second or successive petition, he must
seek authority to do so from the Eleventh Circuit. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A);
Lambrix v. Sec'y, DOC, 872 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (noting
the district court has no jurisdiction to hear a successive petition unless it has been
authorized by the Eleventh Circuit). There is no indication Campbell has done that.
Thus, to the extent the Campbell’s filing seeks habeas relief, it should be denied.
Second, to the extent the filing could be construed as seeking monetary or
injunctive relief against Judge Rodgers2, this action should nonetheless be dismissed
for two reasons: (1) judicial immunity; and (2) Campbell is a 3-striker who did not
pay the full filing fee when he filed this action and who has not shown he is under
imminent threat of serious physical injury.
1 Because Campbell is challenging a judgment and conviction from a state court located in the
Middle District of Florida, this Court could transfer this case to that District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
However, such a transfer would not promote judicial efficiency given the frivolous nature of this
filing.
2 Because Campell is challenging his original conviction or sentence, the petition should be one
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and not § 2241, and the proper respondent would be the Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections, not a federal judge. Diaz v. Sec'y, DOC, 2020 WL 708128, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2020).
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“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts
taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’” 	Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)
(citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)). The immunity applies to
§ 1983 actions. Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying
doctrine to § 1983 claims). The immunity applies even if the judge “made a mistake,
acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,
1331 (11th Cir. 2018). And the immunity applies to actions for damages and suits
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. 	Bush v. Washington Mut. Bank, 177 F.
App’x 16, 17 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242).
In determining whether a judge’s act is “judicial” for purposes of immunity,
courts consider (1) whether the act is one normally performed by judges; and (2)
whether the complaining party was dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The Eleventh Circuit has considered the following factors
when determining whether an act by a judge is “judicial”: (1) was the act complained
of a normal judicial function; (2) did the events occur in the judge’s chambers or in
open court; (3) was the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and
(4) did the confrontation arise immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial
capacity.” 	Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). 	Here, those
factors warrant a dismissal of any claims against Judge Rodgers because the only
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allegations against Judge Rodgers are those relating to her handling of a prior habeas
case Campbell filed.
Campell states that “M. Casey Rodgers now is choosing to side against me
too.” Doc. 1 at 7. He admits that he “has a couple of cases in the Northern District
of Florida” and identifies one of those as bearing case number 4:25-cv-395-
MCR/MJR, in which Judge Rodgers was the presiding judge. He complains about
receiving “mere opinion related rulings” in those cases and says, “M. Casey Rodgers
is now looking at my 395 that was dismissed with prejudice on a motion for summary
judgment that seeks to reinstate my civil rights. She must grant the motion.”3 Id. at
8. Clearly, Campbell’s claims against Judge Rodgers, to the extent he seeks to assert
any, are barred by judicial immunity as they relate solely to her handling of his case.
Thus, those claims must be dismissed.
Finally, to the extent this action is construed as one being brought under
§ 1983, Campbell is a 3-striker who is prohibited from proceeding pro se, who has
not shown he is under imminent harm of serious physical injury, and who did not
pay the full filing fee when he commenced this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (3-
striker provision); see also Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002)
3 The Court takes judicial notice that Campbell filed a motion for summary judgment on October
10, 2025, after the petition was transferred to the Middle District of Florida, and thus, the Court
terminated the motion. 	Campbell v. Fitzpatrick, 4:25-cv-395-MCR/MJR (Docs. 3, 5, 7).
Undeterred, Campbell filed a second motion for summary judgment on November 19. Id. at Doc.
9.
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(holding that “the proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint
without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing
fee at the time he initiates the suit”).
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends this action be
dismissed sua sponte. Additionally, for purposes of habeas relief, the undersigned
also finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. In deciding whether to grant
an evidentiary hearing, this Court must consider “whether such a hearing could
enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” 	Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
474 (2007). Here, because Petitioner’s petition is due to be dismissed without any
factual finding, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts provides: “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” If a certificate is
issued, “[T]he court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice
of appeal must still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
After review of the record, the Court finds no substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right. 	§ 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
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(2000) (explaining how to satisfy this showing) (citation omitted). Therefore, it is
also recommended that the district court deny a certificate of appealability in its final
order.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That this action be DISMISSED.
2. 	That a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
3. 	That the clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 4 th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations may be filed within
fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. 	Any different deadline that
may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not
control. A copy of objections shall be served upon the magistrate judge and all other
parties. A party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C.
§ 636.
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